Add a return value to simaka_crypto_t.derive_keys_*()
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@@ -290,10 +290,13 @@ static status_t process_challenge(private_eap_aka_peer_t *this,
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}
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data = chunk_cata("cc", chunk_create(ik, AKA_IK_LEN),
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chunk_create(ck, AKA_CK_LEN));
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free(this->msk.ptr);
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this->msk = this->crypto->derive_keys_full(this->crypto, id, data, &mk);
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chunk_clear(&this->msk);
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if (!this->crypto->derive_keys_full(this->crypto, id, data, &mk, &this->msk))
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{
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return FAILED;
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}
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memcpy(this->mk, mk.ptr, mk.len);
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free(mk.ptr);
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chunk_clear(&mk);
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/* Verify AT_MAC attribute and parse() again after key derivation,
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* reading encrypted attributes */
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@@ -373,8 +376,11 @@ static status_t process_reauthentication(private_eap_aka_peer_t *this,
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return NEED_MORE;
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}
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this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth(this->crypto,
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chunk_create(this->mk, HASH_SIZE_SHA1));
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if (!this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth(this->crypto,
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chunk_create(this->mk, HASH_SIZE_SHA1)))
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{
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return FAILED;
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}
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/* verify MAC and parse again with decryption key */
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if (!in->verify(in, chunk_empty) || !in->parse(in))
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@@ -434,10 +440,14 @@ static status_t process_reauthentication(private_eap_aka_peer_t *this,
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}
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else
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{
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free(this->msk.ptr);
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this->msk = this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth_msk(this->crypto,
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this->reauth, counter, nonce,
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chunk_create(this->mk, HASH_SIZE_SHA1));
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chunk_clear(&this->msk);
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if (!this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth_msk(this->crypto,
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this->reauth, counter, nonce,
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chunk_create(this->mk, HASH_SIZE_SHA1), &this->msk))
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{
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message->destroy(message);
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return FAILED;
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}
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if (id.len)
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{
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identification_t *reauth;
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@@ -199,8 +199,11 @@ static status_t challenge(private_eap_aka_server_t *this, eap_payload_t **out)
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}
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data = chunk_cata("cc", chunk_create(ik, AKA_IK_LEN),
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chunk_create(ck, AKA_CK_LEN));
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free(this->msk.ptr);
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this->msk = this->crypto->derive_keys_full(this->crypto, id, data, &mk);
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chunk_clear(&this->msk);
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if (!this->crypto->derive_keys_full(this->crypto, id, data, &mk, &this->msk))
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{
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return FAILED;
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}
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this->rand = chunk_clone(chunk_create(rand, AKA_RAND_LEN));
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this->xres = chunk_clone(chunk_create(xres, xres_len));
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@@ -252,9 +255,12 @@ static status_t reauthenticate(private_eap_aka_server_t *this,
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counter = htons(counter);
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this->counter = chunk_clone(chunk_create((char*)&counter, sizeof(counter)));
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this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth(this->crypto, mkc);
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this->msk = this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth_msk(this->crypto,
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this->reauth, this->counter, this->nonce, mkc);
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if (!this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth(this->crypto, mkc) ||
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!this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth_msk(this->crypto,
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this->reauth, this->counter, this->nonce, mkc, &this->msk))
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{
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return FAILED;
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}
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message = simaka_message_create(TRUE, this->identifier++, EAP_AKA,
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AKA_REAUTHENTICATION, this->crypto);
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@@ -344,10 +344,13 @@ static status_t process_challenge(private_eap_sim_peer_t *this,
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id = this->pseudonym;
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}
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data = chunk_cata("cccc", kcs, this->nonce, this->version_list, version);
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free(this->msk.ptr);
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this->msk = this->crypto->derive_keys_full(this->crypto, id, data, &mk);
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chunk_clear(&this->msk);
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if (!this->crypto->derive_keys_full(this->crypto, id, data, &mk, &this->msk))
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{
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return FAILED;
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}
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memcpy(this->mk, mk.ptr, mk.len);
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free(mk.ptr);
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chunk_clear(&mk);
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/* Verify AT_MAC attribute, signature is over "EAP packet | NONCE_MT", and
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* parse() again after key derivation, reading encrypted attributes */
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@@ -427,8 +430,11 @@ static status_t process_reauthentication(private_eap_sim_peer_t *this,
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return NEED_MORE;
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}
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this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth(this->crypto,
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chunk_create(this->mk, HASH_SIZE_SHA1));
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if (!this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth(this->crypto,
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chunk_create(this->mk, HASH_SIZE_SHA1)))
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{
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return FAILED;
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}
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/* verify MAC and parse again with decryption key */
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if (!in->verify(in, chunk_empty) || !in->parse(in))
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@@ -488,10 +494,14 @@ static status_t process_reauthentication(private_eap_sim_peer_t *this,
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}
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else
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{
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free(this->msk.ptr);
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this->msk = this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth_msk(this->crypto,
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this->reauth, counter, nonce,
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chunk_create(this->mk, HASH_SIZE_SHA1));
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chunk_clear(&this->msk);
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if (!this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth_msk(this->crypto,
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this->reauth, counter, nonce,
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chunk_create(this->mk, HASH_SIZE_SHA1), &this->msk))
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{
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message->destroy(message);
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return FAILED;
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}
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if (id.len)
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{
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identification_t *reauth;
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@@ -180,9 +180,12 @@ static status_t reauthenticate(private_eap_sim_server_t *this,
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counter = htons(counter);
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this->counter = chunk_clone(chunk_create((char*)&counter, sizeof(counter)));
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this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth(this->crypto, mkc);
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this->msk = this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth_msk(this->crypto,
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this->reauth, this->counter, this->nonce, mkc);
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if (!this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth(this->crypto, mkc) ||
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!this->crypto->derive_keys_reauth_msk(this->crypto,
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this->reauth, this->counter, this->nonce, mkc, &this->msk))
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{
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return FAILED;
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}
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message = simaka_message_create(TRUE, this->identifier++, EAP_SIM,
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SIM_REAUTHENTICATION, this->crypto);
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@@ -406,7 +409,10 @@ static status_t process_start(private_eap_sim_server_t *this,
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{
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id = this->pseudonym;
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}
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this->msk = this->crypto->derive_keys_full(this->crypto, id, data, &mk);
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if (!this->crypto->derive_keys_full(this->crypto, id, data, &mk, &this->msk))
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{
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return FAILED;
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}
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/* build response with AT_MAC, built over "EAP packet | NONCE_MT" */
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message = simaka_message_create(TRUE, this->identifier++, EAP_SIM,
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@@ -115,11 +115,11 @@ static void call_hook(private_simaka_crypto_t *this, chunk_t encr, chunk_t auth)
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mgr->key_hook(mgr, encr, auth);
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}
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METHOD(simaka_crypto_t, derive_keys_full, chunk_t,
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METHOD(simaka_crypto_t, derive_keys_full, bool,
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private_simaka_crypto_t *this, identification_t *id,
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chunk_t data, chunk_t *mk)
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chunk_t data, chunk_t *mk, chunk_t *msk)
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{
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chunk_t str, msk, k_encr, k_auth;
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chunk_t str, k_encr, k_auth;
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int i;
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/* For SIM: MK = SHA1(Identity|n*Kc|NONCE_MT|Version List|Selected Version)
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@@ -138,19 +138,20 @@ METHOD(simaka_crypto_t, derive_keys_full, chunk_t,
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k_encr = chunk_create(str.ptr, KENCR_LEN);
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k_auth = chunk_create(str.ptr + KENCR_LEN, KAUTH_LEN);
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msk = chunk_create(str.ptr + KENCR_LEN + KAUTH_LEN, MSK_LEN);
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DBG3(DBG_LIB, "K_encr %B\nK_auth %B\nMSK %B", &k_encr, &k_auth, &msk);
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this->signer->set_key(this->signer, k_auth);
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this->crypter->set_key(this->crypter, k_encr);
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*msk = chunk_create(str.ptr + KENCR_LEN + KAUTH_LEN, MSK_LEN);
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call_hook(this, k_encr, k_auth);
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this->derived = TRUE;
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return chunk_clone(msk);
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return TRUE;
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}
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METHOD(simaka_crypto_t, derive_keys_reauth, void,
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METHOD(simaka_crypto_t, derive_keys_reauth, bool,
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private_simaka_crypto_t *this, chunk_t mk)
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{
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chunk_t str, k_encr, k_auth;
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@@ -173,14 +174,15 @@ METHOD(simaka_crypto_t, derive_keys_reauth, void,
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call_hook(this, k_encr, k_auth);
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this->derived = TRUE;
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return TRUE;
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}
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METHOD(simaka_crypto_t, derive_keys_reauth_msk, chunk_t,
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METHOD(simaka_crypto_t, derive_keys_reauth_msk, bool,
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private_simaka_crypto_t *this, identification_t *id, chunk_t counter,
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chunk_t nonce_s, chunk_t mk)
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chunk_t nonce_s, chunk_t mk, chunk_t *msk)
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{
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char xkey[HASH_SIZE_SHA1];
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chunk_t str, msk;
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chunk_t str;
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int i;
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this->hasher->get_hash(this->hasher, id->get_encoding(id), NULL);
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@@ -195,10 +197,10 @@ METHOD(simaka_crypto_t, derive_keys_reauth_msk, chunk_t,
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{
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this->prf->get_bytes(this->prf, chunk_empty, str.ptr + str.len / 2 * i);
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}
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msk = chunk_create(str.ptr, MSK_LEN);
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DBG3(DBG_LIB, "MSK %B", &msk);
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*msk = chunk_create(str.ptr, MSK_LEN);
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DBG3(DBG_LIB, "MSK %B", msk);
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return chunk_clone(msk);
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return TRUE;
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}
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METHOD(simaka_crypto_t, clear_keys, void,
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@@ -62,10 +62,11 @@ struct simaka_crypto_t {
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* @param id peer identity
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* @param data method specific data
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* @param mk chunk receiving allocated master key MK
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* @return allocated MSK value
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* @param msk chunk receiving allocated MSK
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* @return TRUE if keys allocated and derived successfully
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*/
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chunk_t (*derive_keys_full)(simaka_crypto_t *this, identification_t *id,
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chunk_t data, chunk_t *mk);
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bool (*derive_keys_full)(simaka_crypto_t *this, identification_t *id,
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chunk_t data, chunk_t *mk, chunk_t *msk);
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/**
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* Derive k_encr/k_auth keys from MK using fast reauthentication.
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@@ -74,8 +75,9 @@ struct simaka_crypto_t {
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* internal crypter/signer instances.
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*
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* @param mk master key
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* @return TRUE if keys derived successfully
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*/
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void (*derive_keys_reauth)(simaka_crypto_t *this, chunk_t mk);
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bool (*derive_keys_reauth)(simaka_crypto_t *this, chunk_t mk);
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/**
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* Derive MSK using fast reauthentication.
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@@ -84,10 +86,12 @@ struct simaka_crypto_t {
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* @param counter fast reauthentication counter value, network order
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* @param nonce_s server generated NONCE_S value
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* @param mk master key of last full authentication
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* @param msk chunk receiving allocated MSK
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* @return TRUE if MSK allocated and derived successfully
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*/
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chunk_t (*derive_keys_reauth_msk)(simaka_crypto_t *this,
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identification_t *id, chunk_t counter,
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chunk_t nonce_s, chunk_t mk);
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bool (*derive_keys_reauth_msk)(simaka_crypto_t *this,
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identification_t *id, chunk_t counter,
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chunk_t nonce_s, chunk_t mk, chunk_t *msk);
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/**
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* Clear keys (partially) derived.
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