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Merge branch 'ocsp-constraints'

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Limits cached OCSP verification to responses signed by the CA, a directly
delegated signer or a pre-installed OCSP responder certificate. Disables
auth config merge for revocation trust-chain strength checkin, as it breaks
CA constraints in some scenarios.
This commit is contained in:
Martin Willi
2014-03-31 14:44:50 +02:00
parent efce234de4 91d71abb16
commit 11614d783b
3 changed files with 86 additions and 46 deletions
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src/libstrongswan/plugins/revocation/revocation_validator.c
+84 -43
View File
@@ -93,40 +93,92 @@ static certificate_t *fetch_ocsp(char *url, certificate_t *subject,
/**
* check the signature of an OCSP response
*/
static bool verify_ocsp(ocsp_response_t *response, auth_cfg_t *auth)
static bool verify_ocsp(ocsp_response_t *response, certificate_t *ca)
{
certificate_t *issuer, *subject;
identification_t *responder;
ocsp_response_wrapper_t *wrapper;
enumerator_t *enumerator;
auth_cfg_t *current;
bool verified = FALSE;
x509_t *x509;
bool verified = FALSE, found = FALSE;
wrapper = ocsp_response_wrapper_create((ocsp_response_t*)response);
lib->credmgr->add_local_set(lib->credmgr, &wrapper->set, FALSE);
subject = &response->certificate;
responder = subject->get_issuer(subject);
enumerator = lib->credmgr->create_trusted_enumerator(lib->credmgr,
/* check OCSP response using CA or directly delegated OCSP signer */
enumerator = lib->credmgr->create_cert_enumerator(lib->credmgr, CERT_X509,
KEY_ANY, responder, FALSE);
while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &issuer, &current))
while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &issuer))
{
x509 = (x509_t*)issuer;
if (!issuer->get_validity(issuer, NULL, NULL, NULL))
{ /* OCSP signer currently invalid */
continue;
}
found = TRUE;
if (!ca->equals(ca, issuer))
{ /* delegated OCSP signer? */
if (!lib->credmgr->issued_by(lib->credmgr, issuer, ca, NULL))
{ /* OCSP response not signed by CA, nor delegated OCSP signer */
continue;
}
if (!(x509->get_flags(x509) & X509_OCSP_SIGNER))
{ /* delegated OCSP signer does not have OCSP signer flag */
continue;
}
}
if (lib->credmgr->issued_by(lib->credmgr, subject, issuer, NULL))
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, " ocsp response correctly signed by \"%Y\"",
issuer->get_subject(issuer));
if (auth)
{
auth->merge(auth, current, FALSE);
}
issuer->get_subject(issuer));
verified = TRUE;
break;
}
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "ocsp response verification failed, "
"invalid signature");
}
enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
if (!verified)
{
/* as fallback, use any locally installed OCSP signer certificate */
enumerator = lib->credmgr->create_cert_enumerator(lib->credmgr,
CERT_X509, KEY_ANY, responder, TRUE);
while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &issuer))
{
x509 = (x509_t*)issuer;
/* while issued_by() accepts both OCSP signer or CA basic
* constraint flags to verify OCSP responses, unrelated but trusted
* OCSP signers must explicitly have the OCSP signer flag set. */
if ((x509->get_flags(x509) & X509_OCSP_SIGNER) &&
issuer->get_validity(issuer, NULL, NULL, NULL))
{
found = TRUE;
if (lib->credmgr->issued_by(lib->credmgr, subject, issuer, NULL))
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, " ocsp response correctly signed by \"%Y\"",
issuer->get_subject(issuer));
verified = TRUE;
break;
}
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "ocsp response verification failed, "
"invalid signature");
}
}
enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
}
lib->credmgr->remove_local_set(lib->credmgr, &wrapper->set);
wrapper->destroy(wrapper);
if (!found)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "ocsp response verification failed, "
"no signer certificate '%Y' found", responder);
}
return verified;
}
@@ -134,8 +186,8 @@ static bool verify_ocsp(ocsp_response_t *response, auth_cfg_t *auth)
* Get the better of two OCSP responses, and check for usable OCSP info
*/
static certificate_t *get_better_ocsp(certificate_t *cand, certificate_t *best,
x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer, cert_validation_t *valid,
auth_cfg_t *auth, bool cache)
x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer,
cert_validation_t *valid, bool cache)
{
ocsp_response_t *response;
time_t revocation, this_update, next_update, valid_until;
@@ -145,9 +197,8 @@ static certificate_t *get_better_ocsp(certificate_t *cand, certificate_t *best,
response = (ocsp_response_t*)cand;
/* check ocsp signature */
if (!verify_ocsp(response, auth))
if (!verify_ocsp(response, &issuer->interface))
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "ocsp response verification failed");
cand->destroy(cand);
return best;
}
@@ -226,8 +277,7 @@ static cert_validation_t check_ocsp(x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer,
while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &current))
{
current->get_ref(current);
best = get_better_ocsp(current, best, subject, issuer,
&valid, auth, FALSE);
best = get_better_ocsp(current, best, subject, issuer, &valid, FALSE);
if (best && valid != VALIDATION_STALE)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, " using cached ocsp response");
@@ -254,7 +304,7 @@ static cert_validation_t check_ocsp(x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer,
if (current)
{
best = get_better_ocsp(current, best, subject, issuer,
&valid, auth, TRUE);
&valid, TRUE);
if (best && valid != VALIDATION_STALE)
{
break;
@@ -276,7 +326,7 @@ static cert_validation_t check_ocsp(x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer,
if (current)
{
best = get_better_ocsp(current, best, subject, issuer,
&valid, auth, TRUE);
&valid, TRUE);
if (best && valid != VALIDATION_STALE)
{
break;
@@ -330,25 +380,20 @@ static certificate_t* fetch_crl(char *url)
/**
* check the signature of an CRL
*/
static bool verify_crl(certificate_t *crl, auth_cfg_t *auth)
static bool verify_crl(certificate_t *crl)
{
certificate_t *issuer;
enumerator_t *enumerator;
bool verified = FALSE;
auth_cfg_t *current;
enumerator = lib->credmgr->create_trusted_enumerator(lib->credmgr,
KEY_ANY, crl->get_issuer(crl), FALSE);
while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &issuer, &current))
while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &issuer, NULL))
{
if (lib->credmgr->issued_by(lib->credmgr, crl, issuer, NULL))
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, " crl correctly signed by \"%Y\"",
issuer->get_subject(issuer));
if (auth)
{
auth->merge(auth, current, FALSE);
}
verified = TRUE;
break;
}
@@ -362,7 +407,7 @@ static bool verify_crl(certificate_t *crl, auth_cfg_t *auth)
* Get the better of two CRLs, and check for usable CRL info
*/
static certificate_t *get_better_crl(certificate_t *cand, certificate_t *best,
x509_t *subject, cert_validation_t *valid, auth_cfg_t *auth,
x509_t *subject, cert_validation_t *valid,
bool cache, crl_t *base)
{
enumerator_t *enumerator;
@@ -390,7 +435,7 @@ static certificate_t *get_better_crl(certificate_t *cand, certificate_t *best,
}
/* check CRL signature */
if (!verify_crl(cand, auth))
if (!verify_crl(cand))
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "crl response verification failed");
cand->destroy(cand);
@@ -452,8 +497,8 @@ static certificate_t *get_better_crl(certificate_t *cand, certificate_t *best,
* Find or fetch a certificate for a given crlIssuer
*/
static cert_validation_t find_crl(x509_t *subject, identification_t *issuer,
auth_cfg_t *auth, crl_t *base,
certificate_t **best, bool *uri_found)
crl_t *base, certificate_t **best,
bool *uri_found)
{
cert_validation_t valid = VALIDATION_SKIPPED;
enumerator_t *enumerator;
@@ -466,8 +511,7 @@ static cert_validation_t find_crl(x509_t *subject, identification_t *issuer,
while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &current))
{
current->get_ref(current);
*best = get_better_crl(current, *best, subject, &valid,
auth, FALSE, base);
*best = get_better_crl(current, *best, subject, &valid, FALSE, base);
if (*best && valid != VALIDATION_STALE)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, " using cached crl");
@@ -495,7 +539,7 @@ static cert_validation_t find_crl(x509_t *subject, identification_t *issuer,
continue;
}
*best = get_better_crl(current, *best, subject,
&valid, auth, TRUE, base);
&valid, TRUE, base);
if (*best && valid != VALIDATION_STALE)
{
break;
@@ -511,7 +555,7 @@ static cert_validation_t find_crl(x509_t *subject, identification_t *issuer,
* Look for a delta CRL for a given base CRL
*/
static cert_validation_t check_delta_crl(x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer,
crl_t *base, cert_validation_t base_valid, auth_cfg_t *auth)
crl_t *base, cert_validation_t base_valid)
{
cert_validation_t valid = VALIDATION_SKIPPED;
certificate_t *best = NULL, *current;
@@ -526,7 +570,7 @@ static cert_validation_t check_delta_crl(x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer,
if (chunk.len)
{
id = identification_create_from_encoding(ID_KEY_ID, chunk);
valid = find_crl(subject, id, auth, base, &best, &uri);
valid = find_crl(subject, id, base, &best, &uri);
id->destroy(id);
}
@@ -537,7 +581,7 @@ static cert_validation_t check_delta_crl(x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer,
{
if (cdp->issuer)
{
valid = find_crl(subject, cdp->issuer, auth, base, &best, &uri);
valid = find_crl(subject, cdp->issuer, base, &best, &uri);
}
}
enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
@@ -558,8 +602,7 @@ static cert_validation_t check_delta_crl(x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer,
current->destroy(current);
continue;
}
best = get_better_crl(current, best, subject, &valid,
auth, TRUE, base);
best = get_better_crl(current, best, subject, &valid, TRUE, base);
if (best && valid != VALIDATION_STALE)
{
break;
@@ -576,7 +619,6 @@ static cert_validation_t check_delta_crl(x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer,
return base_valid;
}
/**
* validate a x509 certificate using CRL
*/
@@ -597,7 +639,7 @@ static cert_validation_t check_crl(x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer,
if (chunk.len)
{
id = identification_create_from_encoding(ID_KEY_ID, chunk);
valid = find_crl(subject, id, auth, NULL, &best, &uri_found);
valid = find_crl(subject, id, NULL, &best, &uri_found);
id->destroy(id);
}
@@ -608,8 +650,7 @@ static cert_validation_t check_crl(x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer,
{
if (cdp->issuer)
{
valid = find_crl(subject, cdp->issuer, auth, NULL,
&best, &uri_found);
valid = find_crl(subject, cdp->issuer, NULL, &best, &uri_found);
}
}
enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
@@ -633,7 +674,7 @@ static cert_validation_t check_crl(x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer,
continue;
}
best = get_better_crl(current, best, subject, &valid,
auth, TRUE, NULL);
TRUE, NULL);
if (best && valid != VALIDATION_STALE)
{
break;
@@ -646,7 +687,7 @@ static cert_validation_t check_crl(x509_t *subject, x509_t *issuer,
/* look for delta CRLs */
if (best && (valid == VALIDATION_GOOD || valid == VALIDATION_STALE))
{
valid = check_delta_crl(subject, issuer, (crl_t*)best, valid, auth);
valid = check_delta_crl(subject, issuer, (crl_t*)best, valid);
}
/* an uri was found, but no result. switch validation state to failed */
testing/tests/ikev2/ocsp-no-signer-cert/evaltest.dat
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
moon:: cat /var/log/daemon.log::requesting ocsp status from::YES
moon:: cat /var/log/daemon.log::ocsp response verification failed::YES
moon:: cat /var/log/daemon.log::ocsp response verification failed, no signer::YES
moon:: cat /var/log/daemon.log::certificate status is not available::YES
moon:: cat /var/log/daemon.log::constraint check failed: RULE_CRL_VALIDATION is FAILED, but requires at least GOOD::YES
moon:: ipsec status 2> /dev/null::rw.*ESTABLISHED::NO
testing/tests/ikev2/ocsp-untrusted-cert/evaltest.dat
+1 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
moon:: cat /var/log/daemon.log::requesting ocsp status from::YES
moon:: cat /var/log/daemon.log::self-signed certificate.*is not trusted::YES
moon:: cat /var/log/daemon.log::ocsp response verification failed::YES
moon:: cat /var/log/daemon.log::ocsp response verification failed, no signer::YES
moon:: cat /var/log/daemon.log::certificate status is not available::YES
moon:: cat /var/log/daemon.log::constraint check failed: RULE_CRL_VALIDATION is FAILED, but requires at least GOOD::YES
moon:: ipsec status 2> /dev/null::rw.*ESTABLISHED::NO