Note that manually adding an IPv6 address without disabling duplicate
address detection (DAD, e.g. via `nodad` when using iproute2) will cause
a roam event due to a flag change after about 1-2 seconds (TENTATIVE is
removed). If this is a problem, we might have to ignore addresses with
TENTATIVE flag when we receive a RTM_NEWADDR message until that flag is
eventually removed.
Fixes#3511.
We create the child_sa_t object when initiating the CREATE_CHILD_SA
request, however, the IP addresses/ports might have changed once we
eventually receive the response (potentially to a retransmit sent to
a different address). So update them before installing the SA and
policies.
If the local address changed too and depending on the kernel
implementation, the temporary SA created to allocate the inbound SPI
might remain as it can't be updated. This could cause issues if e.g.
the address switches back before that SA expired (the updated inbound
SA conflicts with the temporary one), or if that happens close together
and the expire (having to wait for the address update) causes the
updated SA to get deleted.
Fixes#3164.
The previous code required explicit support for a particular key type,
of which Ed25519 and Ed448 were missing. While a fallback to `any` would
have been possible (this is already the case for unencrypted keys in the
`private` and `pkcs8` directories, which are not parsed by swanctl), it's
not necessary (as long as swanctl and the daemon are from the same release)
and does not require the daemon to detect the key type again.
Fixes#3586.
Commit 27756b081c (revocation: Check that nonce in OCSP response matches)
introduced strict nonce validation to prevent replay attacks with OCSP
responses having a longer lifetime. However, many commercial CAs (such as
Digicert) do not support nonces in responses, as they reuse once-issued OCSP
responses for the OCSP lifetime. This can be problematic for replay attack
scenarios, but is nothing we can fix at our end.
With the mentioned commit, such OCSP responses get completely unusable,
requiring the fallback to CRL based revocation. CRLs don't provide any
replay protection either, so there is nothing gained security-wise, but may
require a download of several megabytes CRL data.
To make use of replay protection where available, but fix OCSP verification
where it is not, do nonce verification only if the response actually contains
a nonce. To be safe against replay attacks, one has to fix the OCSP responder
or use a different CA, but this is not something we can enforce.
Fixes#3557.
The x509 plugin accepted CRL signers since forever, to be precise, since
dffb176f2b ("CRLSign keyUsage or CA basicConstraint are sufficient
for CRL validation")).
References #3529.
A new global option enables sending this vendor ID to prevent Cisco
devices from narrowing the initiator's local traffic selector to the
requested virtual IP, so e.g. 0.0.0.0/0 can be used instead.
This has been tested with a "tunnel mode ipsec ipv4" Cisco template but
should also work for GRE encapsulation.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#180.
While `pos` was moved to the end, `len` was not adjusted (i.e. set to 0)
so later calls could write beyond the buffer. However, the last port
written might have been incomplete, so instead we just reset the string.
If it takes a while to start one of the threads, another thread might already
have passed the usleep() call previously used and re-enabled cancelability
so that the loop that checked for it would never terminate.
This way we only have one reference for each CA certificate, whether it
is loaded in an authority section, a connection or via load-certs() command.
It also avoids enumerating CA certificates multiple times if they are
loaded in different ways.
With the previous approach, CA certificates that were not re-loaded via
load-cert() (e.g. from tokens or via absolute paths) would not be available
anymore after the clear-creds() command was used. This avoids this
issue, but can cause duplicate CA certificates to get stored and enumerated,
so there might be a scaling factor.
Tobias Brunner