Only the tests with client authentication failed, the client accepted
the trusted self-signed certificate even when it was expired. On the
server the lookup (based on the pre-configured SAN) first found the ECDSA
cert, which it dismissed for the RSA authentication the client used, and
since only the first "pretrusted" cert is considered the following RSA
cert was verified more thoroughly.
The lookup on the client always uses the full DN of the server certificate
not the pre-configured identity so it found the correct certificate on
the first try.
If a the original responder narrows the selectors of its peer in addrblock,
the peer gets a subset of that selectors. However, once the original responder
initiates rekeying of that CHILD_SA, it sends the full selectors to the peer,
and then narrows the received selectors locally for the installation, only.
This is insufficient, as the peer ends up with wider selectors, sending traffic
that the original responder will reject to the stricter IPsec policy. So
additionally narrow the selectors when rekeying CHILD_SAs before sending the
TS list to the peer.
This is different if `ike` and `child` are provided and uninstall()
fails as we call that without knowing whether a matching shunt exists.
But if `ike` is not provided we explicitly search for a matching shunt
and if found don't need to look for a trap policy.
Most functions in libunwind.h are actually mapped via macros to obscure
function names, so checking for these would require some elaborate test
via AC_LINK_IFELSE(). However, unw_backtrace() seems to be one of the few
actual functions so lets use this for now, even though we don't call it
ourselves later.
Fixes: 016228c158 ("configure: Check for actual functions in libraries
with AC_CHECK_LIB")
The tpm plugin can be used to derive true random numbers from a
TPM 2.0 device. The get_random method must be explicitly enabled
in strongswan.conf with the plugin.tpm.use_rng = yes option.
This provides a solution for configs where there is e.g. a catch-all %any
PSK, while more specific PSKs would be found by the identities of configs
that e.g. use FQDNs as local/remote addresses.
Fixes#2223.
Memory is allocated with calloc, hence set to zero, thus assigning the
numerical value 0 is not required.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
The aikpub2 tool has been replaced by pki --pub|--req --keyid hex ..
where keyid indicates the TPM 2.0 private key object handle. Thus
either the public key in PKCS#1 format can be extracted or a PKCS#10
certificate request signed by the TPM private key can be generated.
It now does replace the IPs too. This way it's easier to play around
with a config (otherwise a do-tests run was required to build the
config files in the build dir).
RFC 4303 reserves the SPIs between 1 and 255 for future use. This also
avoids an overflow and a division by zero if spi_min is 0 and spi_max is
0xffffffff.
We actually want to wait until the IKE_SA is destroyed, not any of the
CHILD_SAs (even though there might not be that much of a difference
depending on the number of CHILD_SAs).
Fixes#2261.
Previously, the client had to propose no wider selectors than the certificate
permits, otherwise the complete CHILD_SA was rejected. However, with IKEv2
we can dynamically narrow the selectors to what the certificate allows. This
makes client and gateway configurations very simple by just proposing 0.0.0.0/0,
narrowed to selectors the client is permitted to route into the network.
This allows a gateway to enforce the addrblock policy on certificates that
actually have the extension only. For (legacy) certificates not having the
extension, traffic selectors are validated/narrowed by other means, most
likely by the configuration.
Tobias Brunner