This is the recommended location and import config as it allows running the
tests against installed versions of the package. And while the test file
itself is automatically included in the source distribution this way, the
__init__.py file is not, so we still have to update MANIFEST.in.
While the TPM expects and returns the data in big-endian, the SAPI
implementation converts it to native-endianness. As stated in the
SAPI specification (section 3.2):
8. All SAPI data SHALL be in native-endian format. This means that
the SAPI implementation will do any endian conversion required for
both inputs and outputs.
So to use the exponent in a chunk we have to convert it to big-endian again.
Fixes: 7533cedb9a ("libtpmtss: Read RSA public key exponent instead of assuming its value")
RFC 7296, section 2.21.3:
If a peer parsing a request notices that it is badly formatted (after
it has passed the message authentication code checks and window
checks) and it returns an INVALID_SYNTAX notification, then this
error notification is considered fatal in both peers, meaning that
the IKE SA is deleted without needing an explicit Delete payload.
RFC 7296, section 2.21.3:
If a peer parsing a request notices that it is badly formatted (after
it has passed the message authentication code checks and window
checks) and it returns an INVALID_SYNTAX notification, then this
error notification is considered fatal in both peers, meaning that
the IKE SA is deleted without needing an explicit Delete payload.
This happened when installing a duplicate bypass policy for a locally
connected subnet. The destructor and the kernel-net part already
handle this correctly.
Without this we only would learn that the algorithm isn't actually
available (e.g. due to FIPS mode) when set_key() is called later, so there
isn't any automatic fallback to other implementations.
Fixes#3284.
Enforcing CA based constraints previously required the CA certificate file
to be locally installed. This is problematic from a maintencance perspective
when having many intermediate CAs, and is actually redundant if the client
sends its intermediate cert in the request.
The alternative was to use Distinguished Name matching in the subject
identity to indirectly check for the issuing CA by some RDN field, such as OU.
However, this requires trust in the intermediate CA to issue only certificates
with legitime subject identities.
This new approach checks for an intermediate CA by comparing the issuing
identity. This does not require trust in the intermediate, as long as
a path len constraint prevents that intermediate to issue further
intermediate certificates.
This avoids having to register certificates with authority/ca backends
beforehand, which is tricky for intermediate CA certificates loaded
themselves via authority/ca sections. On the other hand, the form of
these URLs can't be determined by config backends anymore (not an issue
for the two current implementations, no idea if custom implementations
ever made use of that possibility). If that became necessary, we could
perhaps pass the certificate to the CDP enumerator or add a new method
to the credential_set_t interface.
Tobias Brunner