If no offline leases are available for the current client and assigning online
leases is disabled, and if all IPs of the pool have already been assigned to
clients we look for offline leases that previously were assigned to other
clients.
In case the current client has online leases the previous code would
replace the existing mapping entry and besides resulting in a memory leak
the online leases would be lost forever (even if the client later releases
the addresses). If this happens repeatedly the number of available addresses
would decrease even though the total number of online and offline leases seen
in `ipsec leases` would indicate that there are free addresses available.
Fixes#764.
This adds support for EAP-TLS authentication on Android.
EAP-only authentication is currently not allowed because the AAA identity
is not configurable, so to prevent anyone with a valid certificate from
impersonating the AAA server and thus the gateway, we authenticate the
gateway (like we do with other authentication methods).
Also, it's currently not possible to select a specific CA certificate to
authenticate the AAA server certificate, so it either must be issued by the
same CA as that of the gateway or automatic CA certificate selection must
be used.
Without verification of the identity we can't prevent a malicious user
with a valid certificate from impersonating the AAA server and thus the
VPN gateway. So unless we make the AAA identity configurable we have to
prevent EAP-only authentication.
Since the CC context is now properly reset in the bus listener plugin,
the second connection from host dave re-uses the first CC ID. Adjust
the expect string on gateway sun accordingly.
Adds support to configure address pools as ranges (from-to) in
ipsec.conf and swanctl.conf.
The first and last addresses in subnet based pools are now skipped
properly and the pools' sizes are adjusted accordingly. Which is also
the case if pools are configured with an offset, e.g. 192.168.0.100/24,
which reduces the number of available addresses from 254 to 155, and
assignment now starts at .100 not .101, i.e. .100-.254 are assignable
to clients.
References #744.
Previously one more than the first and last address was ignored.
And if the base address is not the network ID of the subnet we
should not skip it. But we should adjust the size as it does not
represent the actual number of IP addresses assignable.
We currently send the notify in Main Mode only, as it is explicitly not allowed
by RFC 2407 to send (unprotected) notifications in Aggressive Mode. To make
that work, we'd need to handle that notify in Aggressive Mode, which could
allow a MitM to inject such notifies and do some harm.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
Fixes handling of invalid policies in end entity certificates by not rejecting
the full certificate, but just invalidating the affected policy. Additionally
adds a bunch of unit tests for the constraints plugin, and some minor fixes
to the nameConstraints handling.
Currently we still reject CAs that use invalid policy mapping; we should accept
such certificates and just invalid affected policies in a next iteration.
Fixes#453.
While RFC 5280 is not very specific about the matching rules of subjectAltNames,
it has some examples how to match email and FQDN constraints. We try to follow
these examples, and restrict DNS names to subdomain matching and email to
full email, host or domain matching.
Instead of rejecting the certificate completely if a certificate has a policy
OID that is actually not allowed by the issuer CA, we accept it. However, the
certificate policy itself is still considered invalid, and is not returned
in the auth config resulting from trust chain operations.
A user must make sure to rely on the returned auth config certificate policies
instead of the policies contained in the certificate; even if the certificate
is valid, the policy OID itself in the certificate are not to be trusted
anymore.
We explicitly avoided TryAcquireSRWLockExclusive() because of crashes. This
issue was caused by a MinGW-w64 bug (mingw-w64 fix 46f77afc). Using a newer
toolchain works fine.
While try_write_lock() obviously can fail, not supporting it is not really an
option, as some algorithms depend on occasionally successful calls. Certificate
caching in the certificate manager and the cred_set cache rely on successful
try_write_lock()ing.
Otherwise fragmented CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges won't get accepted
because they don't contain an SA payload.
It also prevents a warning when ordering payloads.
Fixes#752.
Previously we got no reference to the cached issuer certificate
before releasing the lock of the cache line, this allowed other
threads, or even the same thread if it replaces a cache line, to
destroy that issuer certificate in cache() (or flush()) before
get_ref() for the issuer certificate is finally called.
Martin Willi