The logrotate function causes the apt history to be split into
several parts at arbitrary points in time. If history.log only
is parsed then some package installation changes stored in
zipped backup history files might get lost.
Thus sw-collector now searches all backup history files until
a date older than the current event stored in the collector.db
database is found, so that no entries get overlooked.
Using the trusted RSA or ECC Endorsement Key of the TPM 2.0 a
secure session is established via RSA public key encryption or
an ephemeral ECDH key exchange, respectively.
The session allows HMAC-based authenticated communication with
the TPM 2.0 and the exchanged parameters can be encrypted where
necessary to guarantee confidentiality.
We still require these algorithms for e.g. EAP-MSCHAPv2, so the option is
enabled, by default. To use other providers (e.g. fips or even custom
ones), the option can be disabled and the providers to load/activate can
be configured in openssl.cnf. For instance, the following has the same
effect as enabling the option:
openssl_conf = openssl_init
[openssl_init]
providers = providers
[providers]
default = activate
legacy = activate
[activate]
activate = yes
Determined by whether the library provides curves for it or not.
For instance, in the OpenSSL 3 FIPS provider the Brainpool curves are
not included. And in the Fedora package several weak curves are
explicitly patched out and the Brainpool curves are omitted even in
non-FIPS mode.
In particular as server, the previous code might cause it to hang in
recv() if this case wasn't triggered by a close notify (followed by a
shutdown of the socket) but it e.g. failed processing a ServerHello and
responded with a fatal alert.
Fixes: 09fbaad6bd ("tls-socket: Don't fail reading if sending data failed")
This is useful for kernel implementations where the ordering of SAs
is unpredictable and the new SA might otherwise not be used until the
DELETE response has been received, which is not ideal as the responder
might not keep the old SA around that long. On Linux, it makes no
difference as we switch to the new outbound SA immediately because the
updated outbound policy references its SPI.
This way we can run many unit tests without having to run the TKM in the
background and as regular user. To run the other tests, TESTS_TKM can
optionally be defined when running `make check`.
The default MTU of 1500 is too high if kernel-libipsec is used (considering
the overhead of UDP-encapsulated ESP), but might also have an effect if
a TUN device is only used to install a virtual IP (the route points to it,
so the system might use its MTU and 1500 would still be too high).
This also works around an issue on macOS 12 where no RTM_IFINFO event
is sent for the newly created TUN device (neither for the creation,
setting it "up", nor adding the address). Changing the MTU, however,
triggers such an event and we can detect the virtual IP.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#707
Currently the length of vendor ID Cisco VPN Concentrator is 16
bytes but the string has only 13+1 bytes. The actual vendor
ID has 16 bytes with a prefix length of 14 bytes and two version
bytes.
Fixes: 6c49ddfbca ("ike: Add additional Vendor IDs for third-party implementations")
Before commit 6c49ddfbca ("ike: Add additional Vendor IDs for
third-party implementations") the prefix length of vendor ID
Cisco Unity was hardcoded to 14. Since we need to know the actual
length of this VID to send it, the length can't be overloaded
with a prefix length. Revert part of commit 6c49ddfbca to
fix this problem.
Fixes: 6c49ddfbca ("ike: Add additional Vendor IDs for third-party implementations")
Before commit 6c49ddfbca ("ike: Add additional Vendor IDs for
third-party implementations") the prefix length of vendor ID
MS NT5 ISAKMPOAKLEY was hardcoded to 16. Change the prefix length
accordingly.
Fixes: 6c49ddfbca ("ike: Add additional Vendor IDs for third-party implementations")
NULL parameters (for classic PKCS#1 signature schemes) are explicitly
allowed (for any schemes for now), but we only expect parameters for
RSASSA-PSS. Before enforcing this, it was possible to modify the
parameters in the signatureAlgorithm field of the outer X.509 Certificate
structure to something different than the signature field of the signed,
inner tbsCertificate structure, allowing generating infinite versions
of valid certificates with different binary encodings. Now we accept at
most two (NULL and absent parameters).
Previously, only parameters of type OID, SEQUENCE and OCTET STRING were
returned (so e.g. random integers could be put in parameters and we
wouldn't know about it).
Log output is basically the same as with asn1_parser_t before, except
that parameters are always dumped (if any), that wasn't the case before
because ASN1_RAW (instead of ASN1_OBJ) was used.
random() allocates values in the range [0, RAND_MAX], with RAND_MAX usually
equaling INT_MAX = 2^31-1. Previously, values between 0 and 31 were added
directly to that offset before applying`% CACHE_SIZE` to get an index into
the cache array. If the random value was very high, this resulted in an
integer overflow and a negative index value and, therefore, an out-of-bounds
access of the array and in turn dereferencing invalid pointers when trying
to acquire the read lock. This most likely results in a segmentation fault.
Fixes: 764e8b2211 ("reimplemented certificate cache")
Fixes: CVE-2021-41991
The `salt_len` field is signed because negative values are used to indicate
automatic salt lengths when generating signatures. This must never be the
case when validating them.
Not checking this could lead to an integer overflow below. The value is
assigned to the `len` field of a chunk (`size_t`), which is further used
in calculations to check the padding structure and (if that is passed by
a matching crafted signature value) eventually a memcpy() that will result
in a segmentation fault.
Fixes: 7d6b81648b ("gmp: Add support for RSASSA-PSS signature verification")
Fixes: CVE-2021-41990
The `salt_len` member in the struct is of type `ssize_t` because we use
negative values for special automatic salt lengths when generating
signatures. This change ensures that `salt_len` will not overflow the
`len` fields of chunks (`size_t`), which could lead to integer overflows
when validating signatures (see the next commit).
Fixes: a22316520b ("signature-params: Add functions to parse/build ASN.1 RSASSA-PSS params")
If the randomly allocated serial starts with 0x80, the fix added with
e49197f15e ("pki: Don't generate negative random serial numbers in
X.509 certificates") causes the value to become zero. So the encoded
ASN.1 integer will start with a zero byte, which is only correct if the
integer would otherwise be interpreted as negative, i.e. the next byte
starts with the most significant bit set. If that isn't the case, the
encoding is technically invalid and might get rejected by strict parsers.
Note that e49197f15e did not actually fix a violation of RFC 5280 as
asn1_integer() assumes all passed numbers are positive and automatically
adds a zero prefix if the MSB is set. What it did instead (or at least
attempted to) is ensure that the generated serial is a positive 64-bit
number in two's complement. The difference can be seen in the output of
`openssl x509 -text`. While 8-byte serials with the MSB set are printed
as hex dump:
Serial Number:
af:e2:e1:47:0f:66:b5:a4
(The encoding is 02:09:00:af:e2:e1:47:0f:66:b5:a4)
those without MSB set are actually printed as number:
Serial Number: 289805014144645117 (0x405981ffa37f7fd)
(The encoding is 02:08:04:05:98:1F:FA:37:F7:FD)
The reason is that OpenSSL only does the latter if the number fits into a
signed `long` variable, which isn't the case if a positive 64-bit number
has the MSB set (i.e. has a zero prefix) as it would be interpreted as
negative number in two's complement. OpenSSL does print negative serial
numbers (even if it's a violation of the RFC), but only if they were
encoded as such, i.e. if there was no zero prefix:
Serial Number: -5492225205882687294 (-0x4c384db9c7158f3e)
(The encoding is 02:08:b3:c7:b2:46:38:ea:70:c2)
Fixes: e49197f15e ("pki: Don't generate negative random serial numbers in X.509 certificates")
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#631
Tobias Brunner