wolfSSL 5.9.1 starts to enforce a minimum (and maximum) length for the
hash when signing. Since we'll always require SHA-1, use 20 bytes as
input in the tests to succeed with SIGN_ECDSA_WITH_NULL.
The `cipher_suites` field has a 16-bit length field, so up to 32k 2-byte
cipher suites could technically be proposed. With `tls_cipher_suite_t`
typically being 4 bytes wide, the necessary allocation for the temporary
array can be up to 128 KiB. Even though this should be fine on typical
systems, we avoid potentially overflowing the stack by using malloc()
instead of alloca().
These certificate requests also contain SHA-1 hashes, which is assumed
in `ike_cert_pre.c::process_certreq()` when enumerating key IDs.
Because the parser allocates a separate chunk for the data and the
enumerator doesn't read beyond that chunk's length after the first
iteration, only lengths between 1 and 19 are problematic (0 doesn't
cause an enumeration because chunk_empty is assigned).
Whether the OOB read then can cause a segmentation fault depends on the
allocator, its alignment rules, and its minimum overhead. For instance,
with glibc on a typical 64-bit system (8 bytes for pointers and size_t),
the alignment is 16 bytes and the minimum allocated size is 32 bytes,
with typically 24 that are technically available for data, even if only
0 bytes are allocated (as returned by `malloc_usable_size()`). So with
an allocation between 1 and 19, we can always safely read 20 bytes.
Assuming that other allocators behave similar for small allocations, it
seems unlikely that this causes a crash.
Fixes: 15612b3a42 ("Add support for IKEv2 OCSP extensions (RFC 4806)")
`xmlNodeGetContent()` returns `NULL` if `child` is `NULL`, which causes
a segmentation fault in `chunk_from_str()`.
Fixes: ec1eab0319 ("fixed XML parsing of TNCCS 1.1 ReasonString message")
The RFC only allows that the number of fragments increases (if the
sender reduces the MTU).
Not enforcing this before could cause early reassembly as the trigger was
that the number of received fragments matches the total count of the
current packet (which was a bit weird anyway). Only an active MITM could
trigger this as individual fragments are encrypted and authenticated.
This mainly intended as defense-in-depth measure to avoid parsing
massively nested structures that could cause a call stack overflow due
to the massive recursion. In particular PKCS#7 signed data is prone to
this as these can be nested basically infinitely. When used in IKEv1 via
ENC_PKCS7_WRAPPED_X509 CERT payloads, our default of 10000 bytes for IKE
messages guards against this, but that's configurable and there might be
a chance for some bug that triggers problematic recursive parsing for
smaller input.
The upper limit is chosen arbitrarily, but there are currently no known
cases that require a depth of more than 10 levels.
If nothing was read from the message, the previous code could result in
a crash depending on where `ext.ptr` pointed to, as determined by the
current stack contents. Since TLS 1.3 is still disabled by default and
this is usually used for TLS-based EAP methods after validating the
IKEv2 server's certificate, the real world impact seems relatively low.
Fixes: 9ef46cfaf9 ("tls-peer: Mutual authentication support for TLS 1.3")
These attributes contain a 16-bit length field for the actual length of
the data in bits or bytes, as compared to the length in 4-byte blocks in
the attribute header. The previous code didn't correctly account for the
length of the fixed header (4 bytes) when it compared the parsed length
to the length in the header. This could cause an out-of-bounds read of
up to four bytes beyond the end of the attribute/message.
Fixes: f8330d0395 ("Added a libsimaka library with shared message handling code for EAP-SIM/AKA")
The length field in the AVP header includes the 8 bytes of the header
itself. Not checking for that and later subtracting it causes an
integer underflow that usually triggers a crash when accessing a
NULL pointer that resulted from the failing chunk_alloc() call because
of the high value.
The attempted allocations for invalid lengths (0-7) are 0xfffffff8,
0xfffffffc, or 0x100000000 (0 on 32-bit hosts), so this doesn't result
in a buffer overflow even if the allocation succeeds.
Fixes: 79f2102cb4 ("implemented server side support for EAP-TTLS")
Fixes: CVE-2026-25075
VICI_END (7) shouldn't be encoded in a message. However, if we encounter
it, we should at least set `out` accordingly so callers can abort the
enumeration. By not doing so previously and returning TRUE, callers
might access the possibly uninitialized name/value arguments passed to
the enumerator.
This ensures that we don't load a key with e=1, which basically renders
RSA into a no-op. Since keys are universally generated with e=65537 and
no reputable CA will sign keys with e=1, allowing this before didn't have
any real world impact.
GCC 15 tightened its built-in declarations for strchr() and strstr() so
that they now propagate const from their first argument, triggering
-Werror=discarded-qualifiers on three assignments in string.c:
translate():
char *match = strchr(from, *pos)
`from` is const char *, so the result of strchr() is const char *.
`match` is only used for pointer arithmetic (match - from), so
declaring it const char * is correct and safe.
strreplace():
found = strstr(str, search) [line ~73]
found = strstr(pos, search) [line ~89, while condition]
`str`/`pos` are derived from a const char * parameter, so strstr()
returns const char *. `found` is used as a mutable char * later
(pos = found + slen), consistent with the existing (char*) casts
already used throughout this function for the same reason.
Add explicit (char*) casts to match the established pattern.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#3015
Calling stream_t::destroy from the stream_t::on_read callback will
block the thread in watcher_t::remove because the FD is currently "in
callback". A similar issue was fixed in the lookip plugin with
961409b668 ("lookip: Disconnect asynchronously to avoid dead-locking
watcher unregistration").
Fixes: 85ebf6abd4 ("whitelist: Add error handling to socket reads and fix a memory leak")
This doesn't really seem useful (perhaps it was before we started to
configure the outbound interface on our routes). And it can actually
cause the route installation to fail e.g. for routes over point-to-point
interfaces where we'd get "Error: Nexthop has invalid gateway" errors.
Note that we can't return NULL if we find an interface as e.g. the updown
plugin uses this method to determine the outbound interface (it ignores
the nexthop), which it passes to the script. If we returned NULL, it
would pass "unknown" instead, which would cause the firewall rules to
mismatch. While it seems that 0.0.0.0/:: is ignored as nexthop by the
kernel on the installed route, I still explicitly ignore such addresses
to avoid any unintended side-effects.
The automatic route installation in the ikev2/shunt-manual-prio scenario
had to be disabled on the clients. The reason is that the route in table
220 won't have a nexthop set (the peers are directly connected), so when
trying to reach alice or venus via SSH, which matches the port-specific
bypass policies for which we don't install throw routes, the hosts will
do ARP requests for the target IPs instead of routing the packets via
moon.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2548
While 3c12905103 ("ipsec: Add function to compare two ipsec_sa_cfg_t
instances") added a comparison function to avoid issues with non-zeroed
padding, hashes were still calculated using chunk_hash().
If a CHILD_SA is rekeyed using a CREATE_CHILD_SA request, a subsequent
DELETE for the old CHILD_SA may time out. Before sending this DELETE,
a CHILD_REKEYED state CHILD_SA set from child_rekey::process_i() is
immediately set to CHILD_DELETING from child_delete::build_i(). If the
IKE_SA dies due to a retransmission timeout of this DELETE, a redundant
child-down event is issued for the rekeyed CHILD_SA that has already seen a
child-rekey event.
A reproducer shows the following log and events:
[CFG] vici rekey CHILD_SA #533
[IKE] establishing CHILD_SA XXX{534} reqid 20
[ENC] generating CREATE_CHILD_SA request 0 [ N(REKEY_SA) SA No KE TSi TSr ]
[ENC] parsed CREATE_CHILD_SA response 0 [ SA No TSi TSr ]
[IKE] rekeyed CHILD_SA XXX{533} with SPIs ca997de6_i cd27d4fe_o with XXX{534} with SPIs ced1cd01_i c460a7c9_o
Event: child-rekey
[OLD SA] state: REKEYING, spi-in: ca997de6
[NEW SA] state: INSTALLED, spi-in: ced1cd01
[IKE] closing CHILD_SA XXX{533} with SPIs ca997de6_i (352 bytes) cd27d4fe_o (264 bytes) and TS 0.0.0.0/0 === 10.11.9.40/29
[IKE] sending DELETE for ESP CHILD_SA with SPI ca997de6
[ENC] generating INFORMATIONAL request 1 [ D ]
[IKE] retransmit 1 of request with message ID 1
[IKE] retransmit 2 of request with message ID 1
[IKE] retransmit 3 of request with message ID 1
[IKE] retransmit 4 of request with message ID 1
[IKE] giving up after 4 retransmits
Event: child-updown
[SA] state: DELETING, spi-in: ca997de6
Event: child-updown
[SA] state: INSTALLED, spi-in: ced1cd01
To prevent the redundant child-down event for the successfully rekeyed CHILD_SA,
check if a DELETING CHILD_SA has already removed its outbound state due to
having been rekeyed before issuing the child-down event.
Add a new exchange test exercising that a delete timeout after rekeying does
not cause a duplicate child-down event.
Similarly to the previous commit for pki, this allows setting these
options before the command, and by pre-parsing them we can see log
messages during the initialization.
This allows setting the log level before initializing the library and
loading the plugins, as well as having the top-level command itself in
an options file.
Distributions like Debian/Ubuntu ship the plugins in multiple packages
that are not all installed by default. When running tools like pki or
swanctl, which don't use modular loading with config snippets by default,
there are errors in the output if these packages and plugins are
currently not available. In order to not alarm users, this change adds
a configure option that package maintainers can use. It causes the log
level of the message to increase and also adds a note that mentions that
plugins are potentially available in other packages (which should be the
case unless the user tried to load a plugin, e.g. via load statement,
that is not actually built and shipped by the package maintainers).
Loading all libstrongswan plugins isn't necessary as the tool only uses
the plugins to parse/decrypt credentials. So it's similar to pki, but
it doesn't do (online) certificate validation, access tokens, or need
access to databases.
While it's usually not an issue to load unnecessary plugins, one thing
that came up recently are the new capabilities required by the agent
plugin. Since Debian's AppArmor policy for swanctl doesn't grant them,
this produces an error message that might confuse users.
This is useful during make-before-break reauthentication, where the
new SA is created before the old one is terminated and the virtual IP
gets released.
This also changes the hash() and equals() functions to avoid potential
collisions.
References strongswan/strongswan#2967
The referenced commit ignored that INVALID_ARG was returned by this
authenticator if an unsupported signature scheme is encountered. This
caused a crash in find_alternative_eap_cfg() as no EAP identity is
stored in the current auth config.
Since we don't distinguish the situation outside of the authenticator,
we can just return FAILED.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2979
Fixes: 2f2e4abe3c ("ikev2: Add support to switch peer configs based on EAP-Identities")
Tobias Brunner