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merged EAP framework from branch into trunk

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includes a lot of other modifications
This commit is contained in:
Martin Willi
2007-02-12 15:56:47 +00:00
parent 6fda18d99d
commit f27f6296e6
64 changed files with 8538 additions and 481 deletions
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configure.in
+24 -5
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@@ -19,9 +19,7 @@ dnl ===========================
AC_INIT(strongSwan,4.0.8)
AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tar-ustar)
AC_C_BIGENDIAN
AC_SUBST(ipsecdir, '${libexecdir}/ipsec')
AC_SUBST(confdir, '${sysconfdir}')
AC_SUBST(piddir, '/var/run')
dnl =================================
dnl check --enable-xxx & --with-xxx
@@ -30,7 +28,7 @@ dnl =================================
AC_ARG_WITH(
[default-pkcs11],
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-default-pkcs11=lib],[set the default PKCS11 library other than /usr/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so]),
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-default-pkcs11=lib],[set the default PKCS11 library other than "/usr/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so"]),
[AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PKCS11_DEFAULT_LIB, "$withval")],
[AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PKCS11_DEFAULT_LIB, "/usr/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so")]
)
@@ -43,18 +41,39 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(
AC_ARG_WITH(
[random-device],
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-random-device=dev],[set the device for real random data other than /dev/random]),
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-random-device=dev],[set the device for real random data other than "/dev/random"]),
[AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DEV_RANDOM, "$withval")],
[AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DEV_RANDOM, "/dev/random")]
)
AC_ARG_WITH(
[urandom-device],
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-urandom-device=dev],[set the device for pseudo random data other than /dev/urandom]),
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-urandom-device=dev],[set the device for pseudo random data other than "/dev/urandom"]),
[AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DEV_URANDOM, "$withval")],
[AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DEV_URANDOM, "/dev/urandom")]
)
AC_ARG_WITH(
[ipsecdir],
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-ipsecdir=dir],[installation path for ipsec tools other than "libexecdir/ipsec"]),
[AC_SUBST(ipsecdir, "$withval")],
[AC_SUBST(ipsecdir, "${libexecdir}/ipsec")]
)
AC_ARG_WITH(
[piddir],
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-piddir=dir],[path for PID and UNIX socket files other than "/var/run"]),
[AC_SUBST(piddir, "$withval")],
[AC_SUBST(piddir, "/var/run")]
)
AC_ARG_WITH(
[eapdir],
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-eapdir=dir],[path for pluggable EAP modules other than "ipsecdir/eap"]),
[AC_SUBST(eapdir, "$withval")],
[AC_SUBST(eapdir, "${ipsecdir}/eap")]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE(
[http],
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-http],[enable OCSP and fetching of Certificates and CRLs over HTTP (default is NO). Requires libcurl.]),
scripts/cfg-leak
+3 -1
View File
@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
#!/bin/bash
CFLAGS="-Wall -Wno-format -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-strict-aliasing -g -O2" ./configure --sysconfdir=/etc --with-random-device=/dev/urandom --enable-ldap --enable-http --enable-leak-detective
CFLAGS="-Wall -Wno-format -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-strict-aliasing -g -O2" ./configure \
--sysconfdir=/etc --with-random-device=/dev/urandom --enable-ldap --enable-http \
--enable-leak-detective
scripts/cfg-nodebug
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
#!/bin/bash
CFLAGS="-Wall -Wno-format -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-strict-aliasing -O2 -DDEBUG_LEVEL=0" ./configure --sysconfdir=/etc --with-random-device=/dev/urandom --enable-ldap --enable-http
CFLAGS="-Wall -Wno-format -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-strict-aliasing -O2 -DDEBUG_LEVEL=0" ./configure \
--sysconfdir=/etc --with-random-device=/dev/urandom --enable-ldap --enable-http
scripts/cfg-norm
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
#!/bin/bash
CFLAGS="-Wall -Wno-format -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-strict-aliasing -g -O2" ./configure --sysconfdir=/etc --with-random-device=/dev/urandom --enable-ldap --enable-http
CFLAGS="-Wall -Wno-format -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-strict-aliasing -g -O2" ./configure \
--sysconfdir=/etc --with-random-device=/dev/urandom --enable-ldap --enable-http
src/charon/Makefile.am
+8 -2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
# SUBDIRS = . testing
eap_LTLIBRARIES =
# build optional EAP modules
ipsec_PROGRAMS = charon
charon_SOURCES = \
@@ -24,6 +28,8 @@ sa/transactions/rekey_ike_sa.h sa/transactions/rekey_ike_sa.c \
sa/authenticators/authenticator.h sa/authenticators/authenticator.c \
sa/authenticators/rsa_authenticator.h sa/authenticators/rsa_authenticator.c \
sa/authenticators/psk_authenticator.h sa/authenticators/psk_authenticator.c \
sa/authenticators/eap_authenticator.h sa/authenticators/eap_authenticator.c \
sa/authenticators/eap/eap_method.h sa/authenticators/eap/eap_method.c \
sa/child_sa.c sa/child_sa.h sa/ike_sa.c sa/ike_sa.h sa/ike_sa_manager.c sa/ike_sa_manager.h \
sa/ike_sa_id.c sa/ike_sa_id.h encoding/payloads/encryption_payload.c \
encoding/payloads/cert_payload.c encoding/payloads/payload.h encoding/payloads/traffic_selector_substructure.c \
@@ -59,5 +65,5 @@ threads/sender.h threads/kernel_interface.h threads/scheduler.h threads/receiver
threads/thread_pool.h threads/receiver.h threads/stroke_interface.h
INCLUDES = -I$(top_srcdir)/src/libstrongswan -I$(top_srcdir)/src/charon -I$(top_srcdir)/src/stroke
AM_CFLAGS = -DIPSEC_CONFDIR=\"${confdir}\" -DIPSEC_PIDDIR=\"${piddir}\"
charon_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/src/libstrongswan/libstrongswan.la -lgmp -lpthread -lm
AM_CFLAGS = -rdynamic -DIPSEC_CONFDIR=\"${confdir}\" -DIPSEC_PIDDIR=\"${piddir}\" -DIPSEC_EAPDIR=\"${eapdir}\"
charon_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/src/libstrongswan/libstrongswan.la -lgmp -lpthread -lm -ldl
src/charon/config/policies/local_policy_store.c
+2 -3
View File
@@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ static bool contains_traffic_selectors(policy_t *policy, bool mine,
static policy_t *get_policy(private_local_policy_store_t *this,
identification_t *my_id, identification_t *other_id,
linked_list_t *my_ts, linked_list_t *other_ts,
host_t *my_host, host_t *other_host,
linked_list_t *requested_ca_keyids)
host_t *my_host, host_t *other_host)
{
typedef enum {
PRIO_UNDEFINED = 0x00,
@@ -254,7 +253,7 @@ local_policy_store_t *local_policy_store_create(void)
this->public.policy_store.add_policy = (void (*) (policy_store_t*,policy_t*))add_policy;
this->public.policy_store.get_policy = (policy_t* (*) (policy_store_t*,identification_t*,identification_t*,
linked_list_t*,linked_list_t*,host_t*,host_t*,linked_list_t*))get_policy;
linked_list_t*,linked_list_t*,host_t*,host_t*))get_policy;
this->public.policy_store.get_policy_by_name = (policy_t* (*) (policy_store_t*,char*))get_policy_by_name;
this->public.policy_store.delete_policy = (status_t (*) (policy_store_t*,char*))delete_policy;
this->public.policy_store.create_iterator = (iterator_t* (*) (policy_store_t*))create_iterator;
src/charon/config/policies/policy.c
+16 -1
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@@ -83,6 +83,11 @@ struct private_policy_t {
*/
auth_method_t auth_method;
/**
* EAP type to use for peer authentication
*/
eap_type_t eap_type;
/**
* we have a cert issued by this CA
*/
@@ -193,6 +198,14 @@ static auth_method_t get_auth_method(private_policy_t *this)
return this->auth_method;
}
/**
* Implementation of connection_t.get_eap_type.
*/
static eap_type_t get_eap_type(private_policy_t *this)
{
return this->eap_type;
}
/**
* Get traffic selectors, with wildcard-address update
*/
@@ -492,7 +505,7 @@ static void destroy(private_policy_t *this)
* Described in header-file
*/
policy_t *policy_create(char *name, identification_t *my_id, identification_t *other_id,
auth_method_t auth_method,
auth_method_t auth_method, eap_type_t eap_type,
u_int32_t hard_lifetime, u_int32_t soft_lifetime,
u_int32_t jitter, char *updown, bool hostaccess,
mode_t mode, dpd_action_t dpd_action)
@@ -506,6 +519,7 @@ policy_t *policy_create(char *name, identification_t *my_id, identification_t *o
this->public.get_my_ca = (identification_t* (*) (policy_t*))get_my_ca;
this->public.get_other_ca = (identification_t* (*) (policy_t*))get_other_ca;
this->public.get_auth_method = (auth_method_t (*) (policy_t*)) get_auth_method;
this->public.get_eap_type = (eap_type_t (*) (policy_t*)) get_eap_type;
this->public.get_my_traffic_selectors = (linked_list_t* (*) (policy_t*,host_t*))get_my_traffic_selectors;
this->public.get_other_traffic_selectors = (linked_list_t* (*) (policy_t*,host_t*))get_other_traffic_selectors;
this->public.select_my_traffic_selectors = (linked_list_t* (*) (policy_t*,linked_list_t*,host_t*))select_my_traffic_selectors;
@@ -530,6 +544,7 @@ policy_t *policy_create(char *name, identification_t *my_id, identification_t *o
this->my_id = my_id;
this->other_id = other_id;
this->auth_method = auth_method;
this->eap_type = eap_type;
this->hard_lifetime = hard_lifetime;
this->soft_lifetime = soft_lifetime;
this->jitter = jitter;
src/charon/config/policies/policy.h
+11 -1
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@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ typedef struct policy_t policy_t;
#include <config/traffic_selector.h>
#include <config/proposal.h>
#include <sa/authenticators/authenticator.h>
#include <sa/authenticators/eap/eap_method.h>
/**
@@ -148,6 +149,14 @@ struct policy_t {
* @return authentication method
*/
auth_method_t (*get_auth_method) (policy_t *this);
/**
* @brief Get the EAP type to use for peer authentication.
*
* @param this calling object
* @return authentication method
*/
eap_type_t (*get_eap_type) (policy_t *this);
/**
* @brief Get configured traffic selectors for our site.
@@ -358,6 +367,7 @@ struct policy_t {
* @param my_id identification_t for ourselves
* @param other_id identification_t for the remote guy
* @param auth_method Authentication method to use for our(!) auth data
* @param eap_type EAP type to use for peer authentication
* @param hard_lifetime lifetime before deleting an SA
* @param soft_lifetime lifetime before rekeying an SA
* @param jitter range of randomization time
@@ -371,7 +381,7 @@ struct policy_t {
*/
policy_t *policy_create(char *name,
identification_t *my_id, identification_t *other_id,
auth_method_t auth_method,
auth_method_t auth_method, eap_type_t eap_type,
u_int32_t hard_lifetime, u_int32_t soft_lifetime,
u_int32_t jitter, char *updown, bool hostaccess,
mode_t mode, dpd_action_t dpd_action);
src/charon/config/policies/policy_store.h
+8 -10
View File
@@ -49,14 +49,13 @@ struct policy_store_t {
* other_id must be fully qualified. my_id may be %any, as the
* other peer may not include an IDr Request.
*
* @param this calling object
* @param my_id own ID of the policy
* @param other_id others ID of the policy
* @param my_ts traffic selectors requested for local host
* @param other_ts traffic selectors requested for remote host
* @param my_host host to use for wilcards in TS compare
* @param other_host host to use for wildcards in TS compare
* @param requested_ca_keyids list of requested CA keyids
* @param this calling object
* @param my_id own ID of the policy
* @param other_id others ID of the policy
* @param my_ts traffic selectors requested for local host
* @param other_ts traffic selectors requested for remote host
* @param my_host host to use for wilcards in TS compare
* @param other_host host to use for wildcards in TS compare
* @return
* - matching policy_t, if found
* - NULL otherwise
@@ -64,8 +63,7 @@ struct policy_store_t {
policy_t *(*get_policy) (policy_store_t *this,
identification_t *my_id, identification_t *other_id,
linked_list_t *my_ts, linked_list_t *other_ts,
host_t *my_host, host_t* other_host,
linked_list_t *requested_ca_keyids);
host_t *my_host, host_t* other_host);
/**
* @brief Returns a policy identified by a connection name.
src/charon/daemon.c
+10
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@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#include <config/credentials/local_credential_store.h>
#include <config/connections/local_connection_store.h>
#include <config/policies/local_policy_store.h>
#include <sa/authenticators/eap/eap_method.h>
typedef struct private_daemon_t private_daemon_t;
@@ -393,6 +394,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
bool strict_crl_policy = FALSE;
bool use_syslog = FALSE;
char *eapdir = IPSEC_EAPDIR;
private_daemon_t *private_charon;
FILE *pid_file;
@@ -416,6 +418,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{ "version", no_argument, NULL, 'v' },
{ "use-syslog", no_argument, NULL, 'l' },
{ "strictcrlpolicy", no_argument, NULL, 'r' },
{ "eapdir", required_argument, NULL, 'e' },
/* TODO: handle "debug-all" */
{ "debug-dmn", required_argument, &signal, DBG_DMN },
{ "debug-mgr", required_argument, &signal, DBG_MGR },
@@ -447,6 +450,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
case 'r':
strict_crl_policy = TRUE;
continue;
case 'e':
eapdir = optarg;
continue;
case 0:
/* option is in signal */
levels[signal] = atoi(optarg);
@@ -463,6 +469,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
/* initialize daemon */
initialize(private_charon, strict_crl_policy, use_syslog, levels);
/* load pluggable EAP modules */
eap_method_load(eapdir);
/* check/setup PID file */
if (stat(PID_FILE, &stb) == 0)
@@ -477,6 +485,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
fprintf(pid_file, "%d\n", getpid());
fclose(pid_file);
}
/* log socket info */
list = charon->socket->create_local_address_list(charon->socket);
DBG1(DBG_NET, "listening on %d addresses:", list->get_count(list));
@@ -490,6 +499,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
/* run daemon */
run(private_charon);
eap_method_unload();
/* normal termination, cleanup and exit */
destroy(private_charon);
unlink(PID_FILE);
src/charon/daemon.h
+8
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@@ -179,6 +179,14 @@ typedef struct daemon_t daemon_t;
* @ingroup sa
*/
/**
* @defgroup eap eap
*
* EAP authentication module interface and it's implementations.
*
* @ingroup authenticators
*/
/**
* @defgroup threads threads
*
src/charon/doc/standards/rfc3748.txt
+3755
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
src/charon/doc/standards/rfc4739.txt
+619
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@@ -0,0 +1,619 @@
Network Working Group P. Eronen
Request for Comments: 4739 Nokia
Category: Experimental J. Korhonen
TeliaSonera
November 2006
Multiple Authentication Exchanges
in the Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol
Status of This Memo
This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2006).
Abstract
The Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) protocol supports several
mechanisms for authenticating the parties, including signatures with
public-key certificates, shared secrets, and Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) methods. Currently, each endpoint uses
only one of these mechanisms to authenticate itself. This document
specifies an extension to IKEv2 that allows the use of multiple
authentication exchanges, using either different mechanisms or the
same mechanism. This extension allows, for instance, performing
certificate-based authentication of the client host followed by an
EAP authentication of the user. When backend authentication servers
are used, they can belong to different administrative domains, such
as the network access provider and the service provider.
Eronen & Korhonen Experimental [Page 1]
RFC 4739 Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Usage Scenarios ............................................4
1.2. Terminology ................................................5
2. Solution ........................................................5
2.1. Solution Overview ..........................................5
2.2. Example 1: Multiple EAP Authentications ....................6
2.3. Example 2: Mixed EAP and Certificate Authentications .......7
2.4. Example 3: Multiple Initiator Certificates .................8
2.5. Example 4: Multiple Responder Certificates .................8
3. Payload Formats .................................................9
3.1. MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED Notify Payload .....................9
3.2. ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS Notify Payload ........................9
4. IANA Considerations .............................................9
5. Security Considerations .........................................9
6. Acknowledgments ................................................10
7. References .....................................................10
7.1. Normative References ......................................10
7.2. Informative References ....................................10
Eronen & Korhonen Experimental [Page 2]
RFC 4739 Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006
1. Introduction
IKEv2 [IKEv2] supports several mechanisms for parties involved in the
IKE_SA (IKE security association). These include signatures with
public-key certificates, shared secrets, and Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) methods.
Currently, each endpoint uses only one of these mechanisms to
authenticate itself. However, there are scenarios where making the
authorization decision in IKEv2 (whether to allow access or not)
requires using several of these methods.
For instance, it may be necessary to authenticate both the host
(machine) requesting access, and the user currently using the host.
These two authentications would use two separate sets of credentials
(such as certificates and associated private keys) and might even use
different authentication mechanisms.
To take another example, when an operator is hosting a Virtual
Private Network (VPN) gateway service for a third party, it may be
necessary to authenticate the client to both the operator (for
billing purposes) and the third party's Authentication,
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server (for authorizing access to
the third party's internal network).
This document specifies an extension to IKEv2 that allows the use of
multiple authentication exchanges, using either different mechanisms
or the same mechanism. This extension allows, for instance,
performing certificate-based authentication of the client host
followed by an EAP authentication of the user.
Each authentication exchange requiring communication with backend AAA
servers may be directed to different backend AAA servers, located
even in different administrative domains. However, details of the
communication between the IKEv2 gateway and the backend
authentication servers are beyond the scope of this document. In
particular, this document does not specify any changes to existing
AAA protocols, and it does not require the use of any particular AAA
protocol.
In case of several EAP authentications, it is important to notice
that they are not a "sequence" (as described in Section 2.1 of
[EAP]), but separate independent EAP conversations, which are usually
also terminated in different EAP servers. Multiple authentication
methods within a single EAP conversation are still prohibited as
described in Section 2.1 of [EAP]. Using multiple independent EAP
conversations is similar to the separate Network Access Provider
(NAP) and Internet Service Provider (ISP) authentication exchanges
Eronen & Korhonen Experimental [Page 3]
RFC 4739 Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006
planned for [PANA]. The discovery of the appropriate EAP server for
each EAP authentication conversation is based on AAA routing.
1.1. Usage Scenarios
Figure 1 shows an example architecture of an operator-hosted VPN
scenario that could benefit from a two-phase authentication within
the IKEv2 exchange. First, the client authenticates towards the
Network Access Provider (NAP) and gets access to the NAP-hosted VPN
gateway. The first-phase authentication involves the backend AAA
server of the NAP. After the first authentication, the client
initiates the second authentication round that also involves the
Third Party's backend AAA server. If both authentications succeed,
the required IPsec tunnels are set up and the client can access
protected networks behind the Third Party.
Client *Network Access Provider*
+---------+ +---------+ +-----+
| | | NAP's | | NAP |
|Protected| IPsec SAs | Tunnel | AAA Protocol | AAA |
|Endpoint |<------------------>|Endpoint |<------------>|Serv/|
| | | | |Proxy|
+---------+ +---------+ +-----+
^ ^
IPsec or / AAA |
Leased Line / Protocol |
/ |
v |
+---------+ *Third Party* v
|3rd Party| +-----+
Protected | Tunnel | | 3rd |
Subnet <----|Endpoint | |Party|
| | | AAA |
+---------+ +-----+
Figure 1: Two-phase authentication used to gain access to
the Third Party network via Network Access Provider. AAA
traffic goes through NAP's AAA server.
The NAP's AAA server can be used to proxy the AAA traffic to the
Third Party's backend AAA server. Alternatively, the AAA traffic
from the NAP's tunnel endpoint could go directly to the Third Party's
backend AAA servers. However, this is more or less an AAA routing
issue.
Eronen & Korhonen Experimental [Page 4]
RFC 4739 Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].
The terms and abbreviations "authenticator", "backend authentication
server", "EAP server", and "peer" in this document are to be
interpreted as described in [EAP].
When messages containing IKEv2 payloads are described, optional
payloads are shown in brackets (for instance, "[FOO]"), and a plus
sign indicates that a payload can be repeated one or more times (for
instance, "FOO+").
2. Solution
2.1. Solution Overview
The peers announce support for this IKEv2 extension by including a
MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED notification in the IKE_SA_INIT response
(responder) and the first IKE_AUTH request (initiator).
If both peers support this extension, either of them can announce
that it wishes to have a second authentication by including an
ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS notification in any IKE_AUTH message that
contains an AUTH payload. This indicates that the peer sending the
ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS wishes to authenticate another set of
credentials to the other peer. The next IKE_AUTH message sent by
this peer will contain a second identity payload (IDi or IDr) and
starts another authentication exchange. The IKE_AUTH phase is
considered successful only if all the individual authentication
exchanges complete successfully.
It is assumed that both peers know what credentials they want to
present; there is no negotiation about, for instance, what type of
authentication is to be done. As in IKEv2, EAP-based authentication
is always requested by the initiator (by omitting the AUTH payload).
The AUTH payloads are calculated as specified in [IKEv2] Sections
2.15 and 2.16, where IDi' refers to the latest IDi payload sent by
the initiator, and IDr' refers to the latest IDr payload sent by the
responder. If EAP methods that do not generate shared keys are used,
it is possible that several AUTH payloads with identical contents are
sent. When such EAP methods are used, the purpose of the AUTH
payload is simply to delimit the authentication exchanges, and ensure
that the IKE_SA_INIT request/response messages were not modified.
Eronen & Korhonen Experimental [Page 5]
RFC 4739 Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006
2.2. Example 1: Multiple EAP Authentications
This example shows certificate-based authentication of the responder
followed by an EAP authentication exchange (messages 1-10). When the
first EAP exchange is ending (the initiator is sending its AUTH
payload), the initiator announces that it wishes to have a second
authentication exchange by including an ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS
notification (message 9).
After this, a second authentication exchange begins. The initiator
sends a new IDi payload but no AUTH payload (message 11), indicating
that EAP will be used. After that, another EAP authentication
exchange follows (messages 12-18).
Initiator Responder
----------- -----------
1. HDR, SA, KE, Ni -->
<-- 2. HDR, SA, KE, Nr, [CERTREQ],
N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED)
3. HDR, SK { IDi, [CERTREQ+], [IDr],
SA, TSi, TSr, N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED) } -->
<-- 4. HDR, SK { IDr, [CERT+], AUTH,
EAP(Request) }
5. HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } -->
<-- 6. HDR, SK { EAP(Request) }
7. HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } -->
<-- 8. HDR, SK { EAP(Success) }
9. HDR, SK { AUTH,
N(ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS) } -->
<-- 10. HDR, SK { AUTH }
11. HDR, SK { IDi } -->
<-- 12. HDR, SK { EAP(Request) }
13. HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } -->
<-- 14. HDR, SK { EAP(Request) }
15. HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } -->
<-- 16. HDR, SK { EAP(Success) }
17. HDR, SK { AUTH } -->
<-- 18. HDR, SK { AUTH, SA, TSi, TSr }
Example 1: Certificate-based authentication of the
responder, followed by two EAP authentication exchanges.
Eronen & Korhonen Experimental [Page 6]
RFC 4739 Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006
2.3. Example 2: Mixed EAP and Certificate Authentications
Another example is shown below: here both the initiator and the
responder are first authenticated using certificates (or shared
secrets); this is followed by an EAP authentication exchange.
Initiator Responder
----------- -----------
1. HDR, SA, KE, Ni -->
<-- 2. HDR, SA, KE, Nr, [CERTREQ],
N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED)
3. HDR, SK { IDi, [CERT+], [CERTREQ+], [IDr], AUTH,
SA, TSi, TSr, N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED),
N(ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS) } -->
<-- 4. HDR, SK { IDr, [CERT+], AUTH }
5. HDR, SK { IDi } -->
<-- 6. HDR, SK { EAP(Request) }
7. HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } -->
<-- 8. HDR, SK { EAP(Request) }
9. HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } -->
<-- 10. HDR, SK { EAP(Success) }
11. HDR, SK { AUTH } -->
<-- 12. HDR, SK { AUTH, SA, TSi, TSr }
Example 2: Certificate-based (or shared-secret-based)
authentication of the initiator and the responder,
followed by an EAP authentication exchange.
Eronen & Korhonen Experimental [Page 7]
RFC 4739 Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006
2.4. Example 3: Multiple Initiator Certificates
This example shows yet another possibility: the initiator has two
different certificates (and associated private keys), and
authenticates both of them to the responder.
Initiator Responder
----------- -----------
1. HDR, SA, KE, Ni -->
<-- 2. HDR, SA, KE, Nr, [CERTREQ],
N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED)
3. HDR, SK { IDi, [CERT+], [CERTREQ+], [IDr], AUTH,
SA, TSi, TSr, N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED),
N(ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS) } -->
<-- 4. HDR, SK { IDr, [CERT+], AUTH }
5. HDR, SK { IDi, [CERT+], AUTH } -->
<-- 6. HDR, SK { SA, TSi, TSr }
Example 3: Two certificate-based authentications of the
initiator, and one certificate-based authentication
of the responder.
2.5. Example 4: Multiple Responder Certificates
This example shows yet another possibility: the responder has two
different certificates (and associated private keys), and
authenticates both of them to the initiator.
Initiator Responder
----------- -----------
1. HDR, SA, KE, Ni -->
<-- 2. HDR, SA, KE, Nr, [CERTREQ],
N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED)
3. HDR, SK { IDi, [CERT+], [CERTREQ+], [IDr], AUTH,
SA, TSi, TSr, N(MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED) } -->
<-- 4. HDR, SK { IDr, [CERT+], AUTH,
N(ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS) }
5. HDR, SK { } -->
<-- 6. HDR, SK { IDr, [CERT+], AUTH,
SA, TSi, TSr }
Example 4: Two certificate-based authentications of the
responder, and one certificate-based authentication
of the initiator.
Eronen & Korhonen Experimental [Page 8]
RFC 4739 Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006
3. Payload Formats
3.1. MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED Notify Payload
The MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED notification is included in the
IKE_SA_INIT response or the first IKE_AUTH request to indicate that
the peer supports this specification. The Notify Message Type is
MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED (16404). The Protocol ID and SPI Size fields
MUST be set to zero, and there is no data associated with this Notify
type.
3.2. ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS Notify Payload
The ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS notification payload is included in an
IKE_AUTH message containing an AUTH payload to indicate that the peer
wants to continue with another authentication exchange. The Notify
Message Type is ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS (16405). The Protocol ID and
SPI Size fields MUST be set to zero, and there is no data associated
with this Notify type.
4. IANA Considerations
This document defines two new IKEv2 notifications,
MULTIPLE_AUTH_SUPPORTED and ANOTHER_AUTH_FOLLOWS, whose values are
allocated from the "IKEv2 Notify Message Types" namespace defined in
[IKEv2].
This document does not define any new namespaces to be managed by
IANA.
5. Security Considerations
Security considerations for IKEv2 are discussed in [IKEv2]. The
reader is encouraged to pay special attention to considerations
relating to the use of EAP methods that do not generate shared keys.
However, the use of multiple authentication exchanges results in at
least one new security consideration.
In normal IKEv2, the responder authenticates the initiator before
revealing its identity (except when EAP is used). When multiple
authentication exchanges are used to authenticate the initiator, the
responder has to reveal its identity before all of the initiator
authentication exchanges have been completed.
Eronen & Korhonen Experimental [Page 9]
RFC 4739 Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006
6. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Bernard Aboba, Jari Arkko, Spencer
Dawkins, Lakshminath Dondeti, Henry Haverinen, Russ Housley, Mika
Joutsenvirta, Charlie Kaufman, Tero Kivinen, Yoav Nir, Magnus
Nystrom, Mohan Parthasarathy, and Juha Savolainen for their valuable
comments.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[IKEv2] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005.
[KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
7.2. Informative References
[EAP] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004.
[PANA] Yegin, A., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C.
Wang, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
Access (PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May 2005.
Authors' Addresses
Pasi Eronen
Nokia Research Center
P.O. Box 407
FIN-00045 Nokia Group
Finland
EMail: pasi.eronen@nokia.com
Jouni Korhonen
TeliaSonera
P.O. Box 970
FIN-00051 Sonera
Finland
EMail: jouni.korhonen@teliasonera.com
Eronen & Korhonen Experimental [Page 10]
RFC 4739 Multiple Auth. Exchanges in IKEv2 November 2006
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2006).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST,
AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES,
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT
THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Eronen & Korhonen Experimental [Page 11]
src/charon/encoding/generator.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ static void generate_payload (private_generator_t *this,payload_t *payload)
case SPIS:
case CONFIGURATION_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
case VID_DATA:
case EAP_MESSAGE:
case EAP_DATA:
{
u_int32_t payload_length_position_offset;
u_int16_t length_of_payload;
@@ -777,7 +777,7 @@ static void generate_payload (private_generator_t *this,payload_t *payload)
case CONFIGURATION_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
header_length = CONFIGURATION_ATTRIBUTE_HEADER_LENGTH;
break;
case EAP_MESSAGE:
case EAP_DATA:
header_length = EAP_PAYLOAD_HEADER_LENGTH;
break;
default:
src/charon/encoding/message.c
+8 -6
View File
@@ -142,11 +142,12 @@ static payload_rule_t ike_sa_init_r_payload_rules[] = {
*/
static payload_rule_t ike_auth_i_payload_rules[] = {
{NOTIFY,0,MAX_NOTIFY_PAYLOADS,TRUE,FALSE},
{EXTENSIBLE_AUTHENTICATION,0,1,TRUE,TRUE},
{AUTHENTICATION,0,1,TRUE,TRUE},
{ID_INITIATOR,1,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{CERTIFICATE,0,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,0,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{ID_RESPONDER,0,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{AUTHENTICATION,1,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{SECURITY_ASSOCIATION,1,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{TRAFFIC_SELECTOR_INITIATOR,1,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{TRAFFIC_SELECTOR_RESPONDER,1,1,TRUE,FALSE},
@@ -158,12 +159,13 @@ static payload_rule_t ike_auth_i_payload_rules[] = {
*/
static payload_rule_t ike_auth_r_payload_rules[] = {
{NOTIFY,0,MAX_NOTIFY_PAYLOADS,TRUE,TRUE},
{EXTENSIBLE_AUTHENTICATION,0,1,TRUE,TRUE},
{CERTIFICATE,0,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{ID_RESPONDER,1,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{AUTHENTICATION,1,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{SECURITY_ASSOCIATION,1,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{TRAFFIC_SELECTOR_INITIATOR,1,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{TRAFFIC_SELECTOR_RESPONDER,1,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{ID_RESPONDER,0,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{AUTHENTICATION,0,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{SECURITY_ASSOCIATION,0,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{TRAFFIC_SELECTOR_INITIATOR,0,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{TRAFFIC_SELECTOR_RESPONDER,0,1,TRUE,FALSE},
{CONFIGURATION,0,1,TRUE,FALSE},
};
src/charon/encoding/parser.c
+26 -26
View File
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case U_INT_32:
{
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case U_INT_64:
{
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case IKE_SPI:
{
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case RESERVED_BIT:
{
@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case RESERVED_BYTE:
{
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case PAYLOAD_LENGTH:
{
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
payload_length = *(u_int16_t*)(output + rule->offset);
break;
break;
}
case HEADER_LENGTH:
{
@@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case SPI_SIZE:
{
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
spi_size = *(u_int8_t*)(output + rule->offset);
break;
break;
}
case SPI:
{
@@ -718,7 +718,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case PROPOSALS:
{
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case TRANSFORMS:
{
@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case TRANSFORM_ATTRIBUTES:
{
@@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case CONFIGURATION_ATTRIBUTES:
{
@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case ATTRIBUTE_FORMAT:
{
@@ -789,7 +789,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
}
attribute_length = *(u_int16_t*)(output + rule->offset);
break;
}
}
case ATTRIBUTE_LENGTH_OR_VALUE:
{
if (this->parse_uint16(this, rule_number, output + rule->offset) != SUCCESS)
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case ID_DATA:
{
@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
break;
}
case AUTH_DATA:
{
@@ -839,8 +839,8 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
{
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
}
break;
}
case CERT_DATA:
{
@@ -849,8 +849,8 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
{
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
}
break;
}
case CERTREQ_DATA:
{
@@ -859,18 +859,18 @@ static status_t parse_payload(private_parser_t *this, payload_type_t payload_typ
{
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
}
break;
}
case EAP_MESSAGE:
case EAP_DATA:
{
size_t data_length = payload_length - EAP_PAYLOAD_HEADER_LENGTH;
if (this->parse_chunk(this, rule_number, output + rule->offset, data_length) != SUCCESS)
{
pld->destroy(pld);
return PARSE_ERROR;
}
break;
}
break;
}
case SPIS:
{
src/charon/encoding/payloads/eap_payload.c
+144 -41
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "eap_payload.h"
#include <daemon.h>
typedef struct private_eap_payload_t private_eap_payload_t;
@@ -54,9 +55,9 @@ struct private_eap_payload_t {
u_int16_t payload_length;
/**
* The contained message.
* EAP message data, if available
*/
chunk_t message;
chunk_t data;
};
/**
@@ -80,21 +81,21 @@ encoding_rule_t eap_payload_encodings[] = {
{ RESERVED_BIT, 0 },
{ RESERVED_BIT, 0 },
/* Length of the whole payload*/
{ PAYLOAD_LENGTH, offsetof(private_eap_payload_t, payload_length)},
/* some eap data bytes, length is defined in PAYLOAD_LENGTH */
{ EAP_MESSAGE, offsetof(private_eap_payload_t, message) }
{ PAYLOAD_LENGTH, offsetof(private_eap_payload_t, payload_length) },
/* chunt to data, starting at "code" */
{ EAP_DATA, offsetof(private_eap_payload_t, data) },
};
/*
1 2 3
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Next Payload !C! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! !
~ EAP Message ~
! !
! Code ! Identifier ! Length !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Type ! Type_Data...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
*/
/**
@@ -102,6 +103,47 @@ encoding_rule_t eap_payload_encodings[] = {
*/
static status_t verify(private_eap_payload_t *this)
{
u_int16_t length;
u_int8_t code;
if (this->data.len < 4)
{
DBG1(DBG_ENC, "EAP payloads EAP message too short (%d)", this->data.len);
return FAILED;
}
code = *this->data.ptr;
length = htons(*(u_int16_t*)(this->data.ptr + 2));
if (this->data.len != length)
{
DBG1(DBG_ENC, "EAP payload length (%d) does not match contained message length (%d)",
this->data.len, length);
return FAILED;
}
switch (code)
{
case EAP_REQUEST:
case EAP_RESPONSE:
{
if (this->data.len < 4)
{
DBG1(DBG_ENC, "EAP Request/Response does not have any data");
return FAILED;
}
break;
}
case EAP_SUCCESS:
case EAP_FAILURE:
{
if (this->data.len != 4)
{
DBG1(DBG_ENC, "EAP Success/Failure has data");
return FAILED;
}
break;
}
default:
return FAILED;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
@@ -147,40 +189,59 @@ static size_t get_length(private_eap_payload_t *this)
}
/**
* Implementation of eap_payload_t.set_message.
* Implementation of eap_payload_t.get_data.
*/
static void set_message (private_eap_payload_t *this, chunk_t message)
static chunk_t get_data(private_eap_payload_t *this)
{
if (this->message.ptr != NULL)
{
chunk_free(&(this->message));
}
this->message.ptr = clalloc(message.ptr,message.len);
this->message.len = message.len;
this->payload_length = EAP_PAYLOAD_HEADER_LENGTH + this->message.len;
return this->data;
}
/**
* Implementation of eap_payload_t.get_message.
* Implementation of eap_payload_t.set_data.
*/
static chunk_t get_message (private_eap_payload_t *this)
static void set_data(private_eap_payload_t *this, chunk_t data)
{
return (this->message);
chunk_free(&this->data);
this->data = chunk_clone(data);
this->payload_length = this->data.len + 4;
}
/**
* Implementation of eap_payload_t.get_data_clone.
* Implementation of eap_payload_t.get_code.
*/
static chunk_t get_message_clone (private_eap_payload_t *this)
static eap_code_t get_code(private_eap_payload_t *this)
{
chunk_t cloned_message;
if (this->message.ptr == NULL)
if (this->data.len > 0)
{
return (this->message);
return *this->data.ptr;
}
cloned_message.ptr = clalloc(this->message.ptr,this->message.len);
cloned_message.len = this->message.len;
return cloned_message;
/* should not happen, as it is verified */
return 0;
}
/**
* Implementation of eap_payload_t.get_identifier.
*/
static u_int8_t get_identifier(private_eap_payload_t *this)
{
if (this->data.len > 1)
{
return *(this->data.ptr + 1);
}
/* should not happen, as it is verified */
return 0;
}
/**
* Implementation of eap_payload_t.get_type.
*/
static eap_type_t get_type(private_eap_payload_t *this)
{
if (this->data.len > 4)
{
return *(this->data.ptr + 4);
}
return 0;
}
/**
@@ -188,12 +249,8 @@ static chunk_t get_message_clone (private_eap_payload_t *this)
*/
static void destroy(private_eap_payload_t *this)
{
if (this->message.ptr != NULL)
{
chunk_free(&(this->message));
}
free(this);
chunk_free(&this->data);
free(this);
}
/*
@@ -202,7 +259,7 @@ static void destroy(private_eap_payload_t *this)
eap_payload_t *eap_payload_create()
{
private_eap_payload_t *this = malloc_thing(private_eap_payload_t);
/* interface functions */
this->public.payload_interface.verify = (status_t (*) (payload_t *))verify;
this->public.payload_interface.get_encoding_rules = (void (*) (payload_t *, encoding_rule_t **, size_t *) ) get_encoding_rules;
@@ -214,15 +271,61 @@ eap_payload_t *eap_payload_create()
/* public functions */
this->public.destroy = (void (*) (eap_payload_t *)) destroy;
this->public.set_message = (void (*) (eap_payload_t *,chunk_t)) set_message;
this->public.get_message_clone = (chunk_t (*) (eap_payload_t *)) get_message_clone;
this->public.get_message = (chunk_t (*) (eap_payload_t *)) get_message;
this->public.get_data = (chunk_t (*) (eap_payload_t*))get_data;
this->public.set_data = (void (*) (eap_payload_t *,chunk_t))set_data;
this->public.get_code = (eap_code_t (*) (eap_payload_t*))get_code;
this->public.get_identifier = (u_int8_t (*) (eap_payload_t*))get_identifier;
this->public.get_type = (eap_type_t (*) (eap_payload_t*))get_type;
/* private variables */
this->critical = FALSE;
this->next_payload = NO_PAYLOAD;
this->payload_length = EAP_PAYLOAD_HEADER_LENGTH;
this->message = chunk_empty;
this->data = chunk_empty;
return &(this->public);
}
return (&(this->public));
/*
* Described in header
*/
eap_payload_t *eap_payload_create_data(chunk_t data)
{
eap_payload_t *this = eap_payload_create();
this->set_data(this, data);
return this;
}
/*
* Described in header
*/
eap_payload_t *eap_payload_create_code(eap_code_t code)
{
eap_payload_t *this = eap_payload_create();
chunk_t data = chunk_alloca(4);
*(data.ptr + 0) = code;
*(data.ptr + 1) = 0;
*(u_int16_t*)(data.ptr + 2) = htons(data.len);
this->set_data(this, data);
return this;
}
/*
* Described in header
*/
eap_payload_t *eap_payload_create_nak()
{
eap_payload_t *this = eap_payload_create();
chunk_t data = chunk_alloca(5);
*(data.ptr + 0) = EAP_RESPONSE;
*(data.ptr + 1) = 0;
*(u_int16_t*)(data.ptr + 2) = htons(data.len);
*(data.ptr + 4) = EAP_NAK;
this->set_data(this, data);
return this;
}
src/charon/encoding/payloads/eap_payload.h
+67 -23
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ typedef struct eap_payload_t eap_payload_t;
#include <library.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/payload.h>
#include <sa/authenticators/eap/eap_method.h>
/**
* Length of a EAP payload without the EAP Message in bytes.
@@ -44,62 +45,105 @@ typedef struct eap_payload_t eap_payload_t;
* @b Constructors:
* - eap_payload_create()
*
* @todo Implement functionality for this payload
*
* @ingroup payloads
*/
struct eap_payload_t {
/**
* The payload_t interface.
*/
payload_t payload_interface;
/**
* @brief Set the EAP Message.
*
* Data are getting cloned.
* @brief Set the contained EAP data.
*
* @param this calling eap_payload_t object
* @param message EAP message as chunk_t
* This contains the FULL EAP message starting with "code".
* Chunk gets cloned.
*
* @param this calling eap_payload_t object
* @param message EAP data
*/
void (*set_message) (eap_payload_t *this, chunk_t message);
void (*set_data) (eap_payload_t *this, chunk_t data);
/**
* @brief Get the EAP message.
*
* Returned data are a copy of the internal one.
* @brief Get the contained EAP data.
*
* @param this calling eap_payload_t object
* @return EAP message as chunk_t
* This contains the FULL EAP message starting with "code".
*
* @param this calling eap_payload_t object
* @return EAP data (pointer to internal data)
*/
chunk_t (*get_message_clone) (eap_payload_t *this);
chunk_t (*get_data) (eap_payload_t *this);
/**
* @brief Get the EAP message.
*
* Returned data are NOT copied.
* @brief Get the EAP code.
*
* @param this calling eap_payload_t object
* @return EAP message as chunk_t
* @param this calling eap_payload_t object
* @return EAP message as chunk_t
*/
chunk_t (*get_message) (eap_payload_t *this);
eap_code_t (*get_code) (eap_payload_t *this);
/**
* @brief Get the EAP identifier.
*
* @param this calling eap_payload_t object
* @return unique identifier
*/
u_int8_t (*get_identifier) (eap_payload_t *this);
/**
* @brief Get the EAP method type.
*
* @param this calling eap_payload_t object
* @return EAP method type
*/
eap_type_t (*get_type) (eap_payload_t *this);
/**
* @brief Destroys an eap_payload_t object.
*
* @param this eap_payload_t object to destroy
* @param this eap_payload_t object to destroy
*/
void (*destroy) (eap_payload_t *this);
};
/**
* @brief Creates an empty eap_payload_t object.
*
*
* @return eap_payload_t object
*
*
* @ingroup payloads
*/
eap_payload_t *eap_payload_create(void);
/**
* @brief Creates an eap_payload_t object with data.
*
* @return eap_payload_t object
*
* @ingroup payloads
*/
eap_payload_t *eap_payload_create_data(chunk_t data);
/**
* @brief Creates an eap_payload_t object with a code.
*
* Could should be either EAP_SUCCESS/EAP_FAILURE, use
* constructor above otherwise.
*
* @return eap_payload_t object
*
* @ingroup payloads
*/
eap_payload_t *eap_payload_create_code(eap_code_t code);
/**
* @brief Creates an eap_payload_t EAP_RESPONSE containing an EAP_NAK.
*
* @return eap_payload_t object
*
* @ingroup payloads
*/
eap_payload_t *eap_payload_create_nak();
#endif /* EAP_PAYLOAD_H_ */
src/charon/encoding/payloads/encodings.h
+1 -1
View File
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ enum encoding_type_t {
*
* When parsing (Payload Length - 4) bytes are read and written into the chunk pointing to.
*/
EAP_MESSAGE,
EAP_DATA,
/**
* Representating the SPIS field in a DELETE payload.
src/charon/encoding/payloads/notify_payload.c
+3 -1
View File
@@ -75,7 +75,9 @@ ENUM_NEXT(notify_type_names, INITIAL_CONTACT, AUTH_LIFETIME, INVALID_SELECTORS,
"COOKIE2",
"NO_NATS_ALLOWED",
"AUTH_LIFETIME");
ENUM_END(notify_type_names, AUTH_LIFETIME);
ENUM_NEXT(notify_type_names, EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION, EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION, AUTH_LIFETIME,
"EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION");
ENUM_END(notify_type_names, EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION);
typedef struct private_notify_payload_t private_notify_payload_t;
src/charon/encoding/payloads/notify_payload.h
+3 -1
View File
@@ -88,8 +88,10 @@ enum notify_type_t {
NO_NATS_ALLOWED = 16402,
/* repeated authentication extension, RFC4478 */
AUTH_LIFETIME = 16403,
/* draft-eronen-ipsec-ikev2-eap-auth, not assigned by IANA yet */
EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION = 40960,
/* BEET mode, not even a draft yet. private use */
USE_BEET_MODE = 40960,
USE_BEET_MODE = 40961,
};
/**
src/charon/sa/authenticators/authenticator.c
+3
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <sa/authenticators/rsa_authenticator.h>
#include <sa/authenticators/psk_authenticator.h>
#include <sa/authenticators/eap_authenticator.h>
ENUM_BEGIN(auth_method_names, AUTH_RSA, AUTH_DSS,
@@ -47,6 +48,8 @@ authenticator_t *authenticator_create(ike_sa_t *ike_sa, auth_method_t auth_metho
return (authenticator_t*)rsa_authenticator_create(ike_sa);
case AUTH_PSK:
return (authenticator_t*)psk_authenticator_create(ike_sa);
case AUTH_EAP:
return (authenticator_t*)eap_authenticator_create(ike_sa);
default:
return NULL;
}
src/charon/sa/authenticators/eap/eap_aka.c
+1399
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
src/charon/sa/authenticators/eap/eap_aka.h
+133
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
/**
* @file eap_aka.h
*
* @brief Interface of eap_aka_t.
*
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2006 Martin Willi
* Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
* option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* for more details.
*/
#ifndef EAP_AKA_H_
#define EAP_AKA_H_
typedef struct eap_aka_t eap_aka_t;
typedef enum aka_subtype_t aka_subtype_t;
typedef enum aka_attribute_t aka_attribute_t;
#include <sa/authenticators/eap/eap_method.h>
/**
* Subtypes of AKA messages
*/
enum aka_subtype_t {
AKA_CHALLENGE = 1,
AKA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT = 2,
AKA_SYNCHRONIZATION_FAILURE = 4,
AKA_IDENTITY = 5,
AKA_NOTIFICATION = 12,
AKA_REAUTHENTICATION = 13,
AKA_CLIENT_ERROR = 14,
};
/**
* enum names for aka_subtype_t
*/
extern enum_name_t *aka_subtype_names;
/**
* Attribute types in AKA messages
*/
enum aka_attribute_t {
/** defines the end of attribute list */
AT_END = -1,
AT_RAND = 1,
AT_AUTN = 2,
AT_RES = 3,
AT_AUTS = 4,
AT_PADDING = 6,
AT_NONCE_MT = 7,
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ = 10,
AT_MAC = 11,
AT_NOTIFICATION = 12,
AT_ANY_ID_REQ = 13,
AT_IDENTITY = 14,
AT_VERSION_LIST = 15,
AT_SELECTED_VERSION = 16,
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ = 17,
AT_COUNTER = 19,
AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL = 20,
AT_NONCE_S = 21,
AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE = 22,
AT_IV = 129,
AT_ENCR_DATA = 130,
AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM = 132,
AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID = 133,
AT_CHECKCODE = 134,
AT_RESULT_IND = 135,
};
/**
* enum names for aka_attribute_t
*/
extern enum_name_t *aka_attribute_names;
/**
* @brief Implementation of the eap_method_t interface using EAP-AKA.
*
* EAP-AKA uses 3rd generation mobile phone standard authentication
* mechanism for authentication. It is a mutual authentication
* mechanism which establishs a shared key and therefore supports EAP_ONLY
* authentication. This implementation follows the standard of the
* 3GPP2 (S.S0055) and not the one of 3GGP.
* The shared key used for authentication is from ipsec.secrets. The
* peers ID is used to query it.
* The AKA mechanism uses sequence numbers to detect replay attacks. The
* peer stores the sequence number normally in a USIM and accepts
* incremental sequence numbers (incremental for lifetime of the USIM). To
* prevent a complex sequence number management, this implementation uses
* a sequence number derived from time. It is initialized to the startup
* time of the daemon. As long as the (UTC) time of the system is not
* turned back while the daemon is not running, this method is secure.
*
* @b Constructors:
* - eap_aka_create()
* - eap_client_create() using eap_method EAP_AKA
*
* @ingroup eap
*/
struct eap_aka_t {
/**
* Implemented eap_method_t interface.
*/
eap_method_t eap_method_interface;
};
/**
* @brief Creates the EAP method EAP-AKA.
*
* @param server ID of the EAP server
* @param peer ID of the EAP client
* @return eap_aka_t object
*
* @ingroup eap
*/
eap_aka_t *eap_create(eap_role_t role,
identification_t *server, identification_t *peer);
#endif /* EAP_AKA_H_ */
src/charon/sa/authenticators/eap/eap_method.c
+243
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
/**
* @file eap_method.c
*
* @brief Generic constructor for eap_methods.
*
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2006 Martin Willi
* Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
* option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* for more details.
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <error.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include "eap_method.h"
#include <daemon.h>
#include <library.h>
#include <utils/linked_list.h>
#include <utils/identification.h>
ENUM_BEGIN(eap_type_names, EAP_IDENTITY, EAP_TOKEN_CARD,
"EAP_IDENTITY",
"EAP_NOTIFICATION",
"EAP_NAK",
"EAP_MD5",
"EAP_ONE_TIME_PASSWORD",
"EAP_TOKEN_CARD");
ENUM_NEXT(eap_type_names, EAP_AKA, EAP_AKA, EAP_TOKEN_CARD,
"EAP_AKA");
ENUM_END(eap_type_names, EAP_AKA);
ENUM(eap_code_names, EAP_REQUEST, EAP_FAILURE,
"EAP_REQUEST",
"EAP_RESPONSE",
"EAP_SUCCESS",
"EAP_FAILURE",
);
ENUM(eap_role_names, EAP_SERVER, EAP_PEER,
"EAP_SERVER",
"EAP_PEER",
);
typedef struct module_entry_t module_entry_t;
/**
* Representation of a loaded module: EAP type, library handle, constructor
*/
struct module_entry_t {
eap_type_t type;
void *handle;
eap_constructor_t constructor;
};
/** List of module_entry_t's */
static linked_list_t *modules = NULL;
/**
* unload modules at daemon shutdown
*/
void eap_method_unload()
{
if (modules)
{
module_entry_t *entry;
while (modules->remove_last(modules, (void**)&entry) == SUCCESS)
{
DBG2(DBG_CFG, "unloaded module for %s", eap_type_names, entry->type);
dlclose(entry->handle);
free(entry);
}
modules->destroy(modules);
modules = NULL;
}
}
/**
* Load EAP modules at daemon startup
*/
void eap_method_load(char *directory)
{
struct dirent* entry;
struct stat stb;
DIR* dir;
eap_method_unload();
modules = linked_list_create();
if (stat(directory, &stb) == -1 || !(stb.st_mode & S_IFDIR))
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "error opening EAP modules directory %s", directory);
return;
}
if (stb.st_uid != 0)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "EAP modules directory %s not owned by root, skipped", directory);
return;
}
if (stb.st_mode & S_IWOTH || stb.st_mode & S_IWGRP)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "EAP modules directory %s writable by others, skipped", directory);
return;
}
dir = opendir(directory);
if (dir == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "error opening EAP modules directory %s", directory);
return;
}
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "loading EAP modules from '%s'", directory);
while ((entry = readdir(dir)) != NULL)
{
char file[256];
module_entry_t module, *loaded_module;
eap_method_t *method;
identification_t *id;
char *ending;
snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/%s", directory, entry->d_name);
if (stat(file, &stb) == -1 || !(stb.st_mode & S_IFREG))
{
DBG2(DBG_CFG, " skipping %s, doesn't look like a file",
entry->d_name);
continue;
}
ending = entry->d_name + strlen(entry->d_name) - 3;
if (ending <= entry->d_name || !streq(ending, ".so"))
{
/* skip anything which does not look like a library */
DBG2(DBG_CFG, " skipping %s, doesn't look like a library",
entry->d_name);
continue;
}
if (stb.st_uid != 0)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, " skipping %s, file is not owned by root", entry->d_name);
return;
}
if (stb.st_mode & S_IWOTH || stb.st_mode & S_IWGRP)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, " skipping %s, file is writeable by others", entry->d_name);
continue;
}
/* try to load the library */
module.handle = dlopen(file, RTLD_LAZY);
if (module.handle == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, " opening EAP module %s failed: %s", entry->d_name,
dlerror());
continue;
}
module.constructor = dlsym(module.handle, "eap_create");
if (module.constructor == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, " EAP module %s has no eap_create() function, skipped",
entry->d_name);
dlclose(module.handle);
continue;
}
/* get the type implemented in the method, create an instance for it */
id = identification_create_from_string("john@doe.xyz");
method = module.constructor(EAP_SERVER, id, id);
if (method == NULL)
{
method = module.constructor(EAP_PEER, id, id);
}
id->destroy(id);
if (method == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, " unable to create instance of EAP method %s, skipped",
entry->d_name);
dlclose(module.handle);
continue;
}
module.type = method->get_type(method);
method->destroy(method);
DBG1(DBG_CFG, " loaded EAP method %N successfully from %s",
eap_type_names, module.type, entry->d_name);
loaded_module = malloc_thing(module_entry_t);
memcpy(loaded_module, &module, sizeof(module));
modules->insert_last(modules, loaded_module);
}
closedir(dir);
}
/*
* Described in header.
*/
eap_method_t *eap_method_create(eap_type_t type, eap_role_t role,
identification_t *server,
identification_t *peer)
{
eap_method_t *method = NULL;
iterator_t *iterator;
module_entry_t *entry;
iterator = modules->create_iterator(modules, TRUE);
while (iterator->iterate(iterator, (void**)&entry))
{
if (entry->type == type)
{
method = entry->constructor(role, server, peer);
if (method)
{
break;
}
}
}
iterator->destroy(iterator);
if (method == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "no EAP module found for %N %N",
eap_type_names, type, eap_role_names, role);
}
return method;
}
src/charon/sa/authenticators/eap/eap_method.h
+241
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
/**
* @file eap_method.h
*
* @brief Interface eap_method_t.
*
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2006 Martin Willi
* Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
* option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* for more details.
*/
#ifndef EAP_METHOD_H_
#define EAP_METHOD_H_
typedef struct eap_method_t eap_method_t;
typedef enum eap_role_t eap_role_t;
typedef enum eap_type_t eap_type_t;
typedef enum eap_code_t eap_code_t;
#include <library.h>
#include <utils/identification.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/eap_payload.h>
/**
* Role of an eap_method, SERVER or PEER (client)
*
* @ingroup eap
*/
enum eap_role_t {
EAP_SERVER,
EAP_PEER,
};
/**
* enum names for eap_role_t.
*
* @ingroup eap
*/
extern enum_name_t *eap_role_names;
/**
* EAP types, defines the EAP method implementation
*
* @ingroup eap
*/
enum eap_type_t {
EAP_IDENTITY = 1,
EAP_NOTIFICATION = 2,
EAP_NAK = 3,
EAP_MD5 = 4,
EAP_ONE_TIME_PASSWORD = 5,
EAP_TOKEN_CARD = 6,
EAP_AKA = 23,
};
/**
* enum names for eap_type_t.
*
* @ingroup eap
*/
extern enum_name_t *eap_type_names;
/**
* EAP code, type of an EAP message
*
* @ingroup eap
*/
enum eap_code_t {
EAP_REQUEST = 1,
EAP_RESPONSE = 2,
EAP_SUCCESS = 3,
EAP_FAILURE = 4,
};
/**
* enum names for eap_code_t.
*
* @ingroup eap
*/
extern enum_name_t *eap_code_names;
/**
* @brief Interface of an EAP method for server and client side.
*
* An EAP method initiates an EAP exchange and processes requests and
* responses. An EAP method may need multiple exchanges before succeeding, and
* the eap_authentication may use multiple EAP methods to authenticate a peer.
* To accomplish these requirements, all EAP methods have their own
* implementation while the eap_authenticatior uses one or more of these
* EAP methods. Sending of EAP(SUCCESS/FAILURE) message is not the job
* of the method, the eap_authenticator does this.
* An EAP method may establish a MSK, this is used the complete the
* authentication. Even if a mutual EAP method is used, the traditional
* AUTH payloads are required. Only these include the nonces and messages from
* ike_sa_init and therefore prevent man in the middle attacks.
*
* @b Constructors:
* - eap_method_create()
*
* @ingroup eap
*/
struct eap_method_t {
/**
* @brief Initiate the EAP exchange.
*
* initiate() is only useable for server implementations, as clients only
* reply to server requests.
* A eap_payload is created in "out" if result is NEED_MORE.
*
* @param this calling object
* @param out eap_payload to send to the client
* @return
* - NEED_MORE, if an other exchange is required
* - FAILED, if unable to create eap request payload
*/
status_t (*initiate) (eap_method_t *this, eap_payload_t **out);
/**
* @brief Process a received EAP message.
*
* A eap_payload is created in "out" if result is NEED_MORE.
*
* @param this calling object
* @param in eap_payload response received
* @param out created eap_payload to send
* @return
* - NEED_MORE, if an other exchange is required
* - FAILED, if EAP method failed
* - SUCCESS, if EAP method succeeded
*/
status_t (*process) (eap_method_t *this, eap_payload_t *in,
eap_payload_t **out);
/**
* @brief Get the EAP type implemented in this method.
*
* @param this calling object
* @return type of the EAP method
*/
eap_type_t (*get_type) (eap_method_t *this);
/**
* @brief Check if this EAP method authenticates the server.
*
* Some EAP methods provide mutual authentication and
* allow authentication using only EAP, if the peer supports it.
*
* @param this calling object
* @return TRUE if methods provides mutual authentication
*/
bool (*is_mutual) (eap_method_t *this);
/**
* @brief Get the MSK established by this EAP method.
*
* Not all EAP methods establish a shared secret.
*
* @param this calling object
* @param msk chunk receiving internal stored MSK
* @return
* - SUCCESS, or
* - FAILED, if MSK not established (yet)
*/
status_t (*get_msk) (eap_method_t *this, chunk_t *msk);
/**
* @brief Destroys a eap_method_t object.
*
* @param this calling object
*/
void (*destroy) (eap_method_t *this);
};
/**
* @brief Creates an EAP method for a specific type and role.
*
* @param eap_type EAP type to use
* @param role role of the eap_method, server or peer
* @param server ID of acting server
* @param peer ID of involved peer (client)
* @return eap_method_t object
*
* @ingroup eap
*/
eap_method_t *eap_method_create(eap_type_t eap_type, eap_role_t role,
identification_t *server, identification_t *peer);
/**
* @brief (Re-)Load all EAP modules in the EAP modules directory.
*
* For security reasons, the directory and all it's modules must be owned
* by root and must not be writeable by someone else.
*
* @param dir directory of the EAP modules
*
* @ingroup eap
*/
void eap_method_load(char *directory);
/**
* @brief Unload all loaded EAP modules
*
* @ingroup eap
*/
void eap_method_unload();
/**
* @brief Constructor definition for a pluggable EAP module.
*
* Each EAP module must define a constructor function which will return
* an initialized object with the methods defined in eap_method_t. The
* constructor must be named eap_create() and it's signature must be equal
* to that of eap_constructor_t.
* A module may implement only a single role. If it does not support the role
* requested, NULL should be returned. Multiple modules are allowed of the
* same EAP type to support seperate implementations of peer/server.
*
* @param role role the module will play, peer or server
* @param server ID of the server to use for credential lookup
* @param peer ID of the peer to use for credential lookup
* @return implementation of the eap_method_t interface
*
* @ingroup eap
*/
typedef eap_method_t *(*eap_constructor_t)(eap_role_t role,
identification_t *server,
identification_t *peer);
#endif /* EAP_METHOD_H_ */
src/charon/sa/authenticators/eap_authenticator.c
+348
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
/**
* @file eap_authenticator.c
*
* @brief Implementation of eap_authenticator_t.
*
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2006 Martin Willi
* Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
* option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* for more details.
*/
#include <string.h>
#include "eap_authenticator.h"
#include <daemon.h>
#include <config/policies/policy.h>
#include <sa/authenticators/eap/eap_method.h>
typedef struct private_eap_authenticator_t private_eap_authenticator_t;
/**
* Private data of an eap_authenticator_t object.
*/
struct private_eap_authenticator_t {
/**
* Public authenticator_t interface.
*/
eap_authenticator_t public;
/**
* Assigned IKE_SA
*/
ike_sa_t *ike_sa;
/**
* Role of this authenticator, PEER or SERVER
*/
eap_role_t role;
/**
* Current EAP method processing
*/
eap_method_t *method;
/**
* MSK used to build and verify auth payload
*/
chunk_t msk;
};
extern chunk_t build_shared_key_signature(chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce,
chunk_t secret, identification_t *id,
prf_t *prf);
/**
* Implementation of authenticator_t.verify.
*/
static status_t verify(private_eap_authenticator_t *this, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
chunk_t my_nonce, auth_payload_t *auth_payload)
{
chunk_t auth_data, recv_auth_data;
identification_t *other_id = this->ike_sa->get_other_id(this->ike_sa);
prf_t *prf = this->ike_sa->get_auth_verify(this->ike_sa);
auth_data = build_shared_key_signature(ike_sa_init, my_nonce, this->msk,
other_id, prf);
recv_auth_data = auth_payload->get_data(auth_payload);
if (!chunk_equals(auth_data, recv_auth_data))
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "verification of AUTH payload created from EAP MSK failed");
chunk_free(&auth_data);
return FAILED;
}
chunk_free(&auth_data);
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "authentication of '%D' with %N successful",
other_id, auth_method_names, AUTH_EAP);
return SUCCESS;
}
/**
* Implementation of authenticator_t.build.
*/
static status_t build(private_eap_authenticator_t *this, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
chunk_t other_nonce, auth_payload_t **auth_payload)
{
chunk_t auth_data;
identification_t *my_id = this->ike_sa->get_my_id(this->ike_sa);
prf_t *prf = this->ike_sa->get_auth_build(this->ike_sa);
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "authentication of '%D' (myself) with %N",
my_id, auth_method_names, AUTH_EAP);
auth_data = build_shared_key_signature(ike_sa_init, other_nonce,
this->msk, my_id, prf);
*auth_payload = auth_payload_create();
(*auth_payload)->set_auth_method(*auth_payload, AUTH_PSK);
(*auth_payload)->set_data(*auth_payload, auth_data);
chunk_free(&auth_data);
return SUCCESS;
}
/**
* Implementation of eap_authenticator_t.initiate
*/
static status_t initiate(private_eap_authenticator_t *this, eap_type_t type,
eap_payload_t **out)
{
/* if initiate() is called, role is always server */
this->role = EAP_SERVER;
if (type == 0)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE,
"client requested EAP authentication, but configuration forbids it");
*out = eap_payload_create_code(EAP_FAILURE);
return FAILED;
}
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "requesting %N authentication", eap_type_names, type);
this->method = eap_method_create(type, this->role,
this->ike_sa->get_my_id(this->ike_sa),
this->ike_sa->get_other_id(this->ike_sa));
if (this->method == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "configured EAP server method %N not supported, sending %N",
eap_type_names, type, eap_code_names, EAP_FAILURE);
*out = eap_payload_create_code(EAP_FAILURE);
return FAILED;
}
if (this->method->initiate(this->method, out) != NEED_MORE)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "failed to initiate %N, sending %N",
eap_type_names, type, eap_code_names, EAP_FAILURE);
*out = eap_payload_create_code(EAP_FAILURE);
return FAILED;
}
return NEED_MORE;
}
/**
* Processing method for a peer
*/
static status_t process_peer(private_eap_authenticator_t *this,
eap_payload_t *in, eap_payload_t **out)
{
eap_type_t type = in->get_type(in);
/* create an eap_method for the first call */
if (this->method == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP server requested %N authentication",
eap_type_names, type);
this->method = eap_method_create(type, EAP_PEER,
this->ike_sa->get_other_id(this->ike_sa),
this->ike_sa->get_my_id(this->ike_sa));
if (this->method == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP server requested unsupported "
"EAP method %N, sending EAP_NAK", eap_type_names, type);
*out = eap_payload_create_nak();
return NEED_MORE;
}
}
switch (this->method->process(this->method, in, out))
{
case NEED_MORE:
return NEED_MORE;
case SUCCESS:
if (this->method->get_msk(this->method, &this->msk) == SUCCESS)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP method %N succeded, MSK established",
eap_type_names, this->method->get_type(this->method));
this->msk = chunk_clone(this->msk);
return SUCCESS;
}
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP method %N succeded, but no MSK established",
eap_type_names, this->method->get_type(this->method));
return FAILED;
case FAILED:
default:
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP method %N failed",
eap_type_names, this->method->get_type(this->method));
return FAILED;
}
}
/**
* Processing method for a server
*/
static status_t process_server(private_eap_authenticator_t *this,
eap_payload_t *in, eap_payload_t **out)
{
switch (this->method->process(this->method, in, out))
{
case NEED_MORE:
return NEED_MORE;
case SUCCESS:
if (this->method->get_msk(this->method, &this->msk) == SUCCESS)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP method %N succeded, MSK established",
eap_type_names, this->method->get_type(this->method));
this->msk = chunk_clone(this->msk);
*out = eap_payload_create_code(EAP_SUCCESS);
return SUCCESS;
}
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP method %N succeded, but no MSK established",
eap_type_names, this->method->get_type(this->method));
*out = eap_payload_create_code(EAP_FAILURE);
return FAILED;
case FAILED:
default:
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP method %N failed for peer %D",
eap_type_names, this->method->get_type(this->method),
this->ike_sa->get_other_id(this->ike_sa));
*out = eap_payload_create_code(EAP_FAILURE);
return FAILED;
}
}
/**
* Implementation of eap_authenticator_t.process
*/
static status_t process(private_eap_authenticator_t *this, eap_payload_t *in,
eap_payload_t **out)
{
eap_code_t code = in->get_code(in);
switch (this->role)
{
case EAP_SERVER:
{
switch (code)
{
case EAP_RESPONSE:
{
return process_server(this, in, out);
}
default:
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received %N, sending %N",
eap_code_names, code, eap_code_names, EAP_FAILURE);
*out = eap_payload_create_code(EAP_FAILURE);
return FAILED;
}
}
}
case EAP_PEER:
{
switch (code)
{
case EAP_REQUEST:
{
return process_peer(this, in, out);
}
case EAP_SUCCESS:
{
if (this->method->get_msk(this->method, &this->msk) == SUCCESS)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP method %N succeded, MSK established",
eap_type_names, this->method->get_type(this->method));
this->msk = chunk_clone(this->msk);
return SUCCESS;
}
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "EAP method %N succeded, but no MSK established",
eap_type_names, this->method->get_type(this->method));
return FAILED;
}
case EAP_FAILURE:
default:
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received %N, EAP authentication failed",
eap_code_names, code);
return FAILED;
}
}
}
default:
{
return FAILED;
}
}
}
/**
* Implementation of authenticator_t.is_mutual.
*/
static bool is_mutual(private_eap_authenticator_t *this)
{
if (this->method)
{
return this->method->is_mutual(this->method);
}
return FALSE;
}
/**
* Implementation of authenticator_t.destroy.
*/
static void destroy(private_eap_authenticator_t *this)
{
DESTROY_IF(this->method);
chunk_free(&this->msk);
free(this);
}
/*
* Described in header.
*/
eap_authenticator_t *eap_authenticator_create(ike_sa_t *ike_sa)
{
private_eap_authenticator_t *this = malloc_thing(private_eap_authenticator_t);
/* public functions */
this->public.authenticator_interface.verify = (status_t(*)(authenticator_t*,chunk_t,chunk_t,auth_payload_t*))verify;
this->public.authenticator_interface.build = (status_t(*)(authenticator_t*,chunk_t,chunk_t,auth_payload_t**))build;
this->public.authenticator_interface.destroy = (void(*)(authenticator_t*))destroy;
this->public.is_mutual = (bool(*)(eap_authenticator_t*))is_mutual;
this->public.initiate = (status_t(*)(eap_authenticator_t*,eap_type_t,eap_payload_t**))initiate;
this->public.process = (status_t(*)(eap_authenticator_t*,eap_payload_t*,eap_payload_t**))process;
/* private data */
this->ike_sa = ike_sa;
this->role = EAP_PEER;
this->method = NULL;
this->msk = chunk_empty;
return &this->public;
}
src/charon/sa/authenticators/eap_authenticator.h
+156
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
/**
* @file eap_authenticator.h
*
* @brief Interface of eap_authenticator_t.
*
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2006 Martin Willi
* Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
* option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* for more details.
*/
#ifndef EAP_AUTHENTICATOR_H_
#define EAP_AUTHENTICATOR_H_
typedef struct eap_authenticator_t eap_authenticator_t;
#include <sa/authenticators/authenticator.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/eap_payload.h>
/**
* @brief Implementation of the authenticator_t interface using AUTH_EAP.
*
* Authentication using EAP involves the most complex authenticator. It stays
* alive over multiple ike_auth transactions and handles multiple EAP
* messages.
* EAP authentication must be clearly distinguished between using
* mutual EAP methods and using methods not providing server authentication.
* If no mutual authentication is used, the server must prove it's identity
* by traditional AUTH methods (RSA, psk). Only when the EAP method is mutual,
* the client should accept an EAP-only authentication.
* RFC4306 does always use traditional authentiction, EAP only authentication
* is described in the internet draft draft-eronen-ipsec-ikev2-eap-auth-05.txt.
*
* @verbatim
ike_sa_init
------------------------->
<-------------------------
followed by multiple ike_auth:
+--------+ +--------+
| EAP | ID, SA, TS, N(EAP_ONLY) | EAP |
| client | ---------------------------> | server |
| | ID, [AUTH,] EAP | | AUTH payload is
| | <--------------------------- | | only included if
| | EAP | | authentication
| | ---------------------------> | | is not mutual.
| | EAP | |
| | <--------------------------- | |
| | EAP | |
| | ---------------------------> | |
| | EAP(SUCCESS) | |
| | <--------------------------- | |
| | AUTH | | If EAP establishes
| | ---------------------------> | | a session key, AUTH
| | AUTH, SA, TS | | payloads use this
| | <--------------------------- | | key, not SK_pi/pr
+--------+ +--------+
@endverbatim
* @b Constructors:
* - eap_authenticator_create()
* - authenticator_create() using auth_method AUTH_EAP
*
* @ingroup authenticators
*/
struct eap_authenticator_t {
/**
* Implemented authenticator_t interface.
*/
authenticator_t authenticator_interface;
/**
* @brief Check if the EAP method was/is mutual and secure.
*
* RFC4306 proposes to authenticate the EAP responder (server) by standard
* IKEv2 methods (RSA, psk). Not all, but some EAP methods
* provide mutual authentication, which would result in a redundant
* authentication. If the client supports EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION, and
* the the server provides mutual authentication, authentication using
* RSA/PSK may be omitted. If the server did not include a traditional
* AUTH payload, the client must verify that the server initiated mutual
* EAP authentication before it can trust the server.
*
* @param this calling object
* @return TRUE, if no AUTH payload required, FALSE otherwise
*/
bool (*is_mutual) (eap_authenticator_t* this);
/**
* @brief Initiate the EAP exchange.
*
* The server initiates EAP exchanges, so the client never calls
* this method. If initiate() returns NEED_MORE, the EAP authentication
* process started. In any case, a payload is created in "out".
*
* @param this calling object
* @param type EAP method to use to authenticate client
* @param out created initiaal EAP message to send
* @return
* - FAILED, if initiation failed
* - NEED_MORE, if more EAP exchanges reqired
*/
status_t (*initiate) (eap_authenticator_t* this, eap_type_t type,
eap_payload_t **out);
/**
* @brief Process an EAP message.
*
* After receiving an EAP message "in", the peer/server processes
* the payload and creates a reply/subsequent request.
* The server side always returns NEED_MORE if another EAP message
* is excepted from the client, SUCCESS if EAP exchange completed and
* "out" is EAP_SUCCES, or FAILED if the EAP exchange failed with
* a EAP_FAILURE payload in "out". Anyway, a payload in "out" is always
* created.
* The peer (client) side only creates a "out" payload if result is
* NEED_MORE, a SUCCESS/FAILED is returned whenever a
* EAP_SUCCESS/EAP_FAILURE message is received in "in".
* If a SUCCESS is returned (on any side), the EAP authentication was
* successful and the AUTH payload can be exchanged.
*
* @param this calling object
* @param in received EAP message
* @param out created EAP message to send
* @return
* - FAILED, if authentication/EAP exchange failed
* - SUCCESS, if authentication completed
* - NEED_MORE, if more EAP exchanges reqired
*/
status_t (*process) (eap_authenticator_t* this,
eap_payload_t *in, eap_payload_t **out);
};
/**
* @brief Creates an authenticator for AUTH_EAP.
*
* @param ike_sa associated ike_sa
* @return eap_authenticator_t object
*
* @ingroup authenticators
*/
eap_authenticator_t *eap_authenticator_create(ike_sa_t *ike_sa);
#endif /* EAP_AUTHENTICATOR_H_ */
src/charon/sa/authenticators/psk_authenticator.c
+26 -15
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/**
* @file authenticator.c
* @file psk_authenticator.c
*
* @brief Implementation of authenticator_t.
* @brief Implementation of psk_authenticator_t.
*
*/
@@ -54,24 +54,35 @@ struct private_psk_authenticator_t {
};
/**
* Function implemented in rsa_authenticator.c
* Builds the octets to be signed as described in section 2.15 of RFC 4306
*/
extern chunk_t build_tbs_octets(private_psk_authenticator_t *this, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
chunk_t nonce, identification_t *id, prf_t *prf);
chunk_t build_tbs_octets(chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce,
identification_t *id, prf_t *prf)
{
u_int8_t id_header_buf[] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
chunk_t id_header = chunk_from_buf(id_header_buf);
chunk_t id_with_header, id_prfd, id_encoding;
id_header_buf[0] = id->get_type(id);
id_encoding = id->get_encoding(id);
id_with_header = chunk_cat("cc", id_header, id_encoding);
prf->allocate_bytes(prf, id_with_header, &id_prfd);
chunk_free(&id_with_header);
return chunk_cat("ccm", ike_sa_init, nonce, id_prfd);
}
/**
* Creates the AUTH data using auth method SHARED_KEY_MESSAGE_INTEGRITY_CODE.
*/
static chunk_t build_shared_key_signature(private_psk_authenticator_t *this,
chunk_t ike_sa_init,
chunk_t nonce,
chunk_t secret,
identification_t *id,
prf_t *prf)
chunk_t build_shared_key_signature(chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce,
chunk_t secret, identification_t *id,
prf_t *prf)
{
chunk_t key_pad, key, auth_data, octets;
octets = build_tbs_octets(this, ike_sa_init, nonce, id, prf);
octets = build_tbs_octets(ike_sa_init, nonce, id, prf);
/* AUTH = prf(prf(Shared Secret,"Key Pad for IKEv2"), <msg octets>) */
key_pad.ptr = IKEV2_KEY_PAD;
key_pad.len = IKEV2_KEY_PAD_LENGTH;
@@ -94,7 +105,7 @@ static chunk_t build_shared_key_signature(private_psk_authenticator_t *this,
* Implementation of authenticator_t.verify.
*/
static status_t verify(private_psk_authenticator_t *this, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
chunk_t my_nonce, auth_payload_t *auth_payload)
chunk_t my_nonce, auth_payload_t *auth_payload)
{
status_t status;
chunk_t auth_data, recv_auth_data, shared_key;
@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ static status_t verify(private_psk_authenticator_t *this, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
return status;
}
auth_data = build_shared_key_signature(this, ike_sa_init, my_nonce,
auth_data = build_shared_key_signature(ike_sa_init, my_nonce,
shared_key, other_id,
this->ike_sa->get_auth_verify(this->ike_sa));
chunk_free(&shared_key);
@@ -153,7 +164,7 @@ static status_t build(private_psk_authenticator_t *this, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
return status;
}
auth_data = build_shared_key_signature(this, ike_sa_init,
auth_data = build_shared_key_signature(ike_sa_init,
other_nonce, shared_key, my_id,
this->ike_sa->get_auth_build(this->ike_sa));
DBG2(DBG_IKE, "successfully created shared key MAC");
src/charon/sa/authenticators/rsa_authenticator.c
+7 -21
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/**
* @file authenticator.c
* @file rsa_authenticator.c
*
* @brief Implementation of authenticator_t.
* @brief Implementation of rsa_authenticator_t.
*
*/
@@ -48,24 +48,10 @@ struct private_rsa_authenticator_t {
};
/**
* Builds the octets to be signed as described in section 2.15 of RFC 4306
* Function implemented in psk_authenticator.c
*/
chunk_t build_tbs_octets(private_rsa_authenticator_t *this, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
chunk_t nonce, identification_t *id, prf_t *prf)
{
u_int8_t id_header_buf[] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
chunk_t id_header = chunk_from_buf(id_header_buf);
chunk_t id_with_header, id_prfd, id_encoding;
id_header_buf[0] = id->get_type(id);
id_encoding = id->get_encoding(id);
id_with_header = chunk_cat("cc", id_header, id_encoding);
prf->allocate_bytes(prf, id_with_header, &id_prfd);
chunk_free(&id_with_header);
return chunk_cat("ccm", ike_sa_init, nonce, id_prfd);
}
extern chunk_t build_tbs_octets(chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce,
identification_t *id, prf_t *prf);
/**
* Implementation of authenticator_t.verify.
@@ -92,7 +78,7 @@ static status_t verify(private_rsa_authenticator_t *this, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no RSA public key found for '%D'", other_id);
return NOT_FOUND;
}
octets = build_tbs_octets(this, ike_sa_init, my_nonce, other_id,
octets = build_tbs_octets(ike_sa_init, my_nonce, other_id,
this->ike_sa->get_auth_verify(this->ike_sa));
status = public_key->verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature(public_key, octets, auth_data);
chunk_free(&octets);
@@ -145,7 +131,7 @@ static status_t build(private_rsa_authenticator_t *this, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
}
DBG2(DBG_IKE, "matching RSA private key found");
octets = build_tbs_octets(this, ike_sa_init, other_nonce, my_id,
octets = build_tbs_octets(ike_sa_init, other_nonce, my_id,
this->ike_sa->get_auth_build(this->ike_sa));
status = my_key->build_emsa_pkcs1_signature(my_key, HASH_SHA1, octets, &auth_data);
chunk_free(&octets);
src/charon/sa/ike_sa.c
+3 -5
View File
@@ -454,8 +454,7 @@ static void dpd_detected(private_ike_sa_t *this)
policy = charon->policies->get_policy(charon->policies,
this->my_id, this->other_id,
my_ts, other_ts,
this->my_host, this->other_host,
NULL);
this->my_host, this->other_host);
if (policy == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no policy for CHILD to handle DPD");
@@ -1021,8 +1020,7 @@ static status_t acquire(private_ike_sa_t *this, u_int32_t reqid)
policy = charon->policies->get_policy(charon->policies,
this->my_id, this->other_id,
my_ts, other_ts,
this->my_host, this->other_host,
NULL);
this->my_host, this->other_host);
if (policy == NULL)
{
SIG(CHILD_UP_START, "acquiring CHILD_SA with reqid %d", reqid);
@@ -1878,7 +1876,7 @@ static status_t reauth(private_ike_sa_t *this)
other_ts = child_sa->get_other_traffic_selectors(child_sa);
policy = charon->policies->get_policy(charon->policies,
this->my_id, this->other_id, my_ts, other_ts,
this->my_host, this->other_host, NULL);
this->my_host, this->other_host);
if (policy == NULL)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "policy not found to recreate CHILD_SA, skipped");
src/charon/sa/transactions/create_child_sa.c
+2 -4
View File
@@ -291,8 +291,7 @@ static status_t get_request(private_create_child_sa_t *this, message_t **result)
this->policy = charon->policies->get_policy(charon->policies,
my_id, other_id,
my_ts, other_ts,
me, other,
NULL);
me, other);
this->reqid = this->rekeyed_sa->get_reqid(this->rekeyed_sa);
@@ -694,8 +693,7 @@ static status_t get_response(private_create_child_sa_t *this, message_t *request
this->policy = charon->policies->get_policy(charon->policies,
my_id, other_id,
my_ts, other_ts,
me, other,
NULL);
me, other);
if (this->policy)
{
this->tsr = this->policy->select_my_traffic_selectors(this->policy, my_ts, me);
src/charon/sa/transactions/ike_auth.c
+463 -171
View File
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <encoding/payloads/auth_payload.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/ts_payload.h>
#include <sa/authenticators/authenticator.h>
#include <sa/authenticators/eap_authenticator.h>
#include <sa/child_sa.h>
@@ -129,6 +130,31 @@ struct private_ike_auth_t {
*/
u_int32_t reqid;
/**
* List of CA certificates the other peer trusts
*/
linked_list_t *cacerts;
/**
* EAP uses this authentication, which is passed along multiple ike_auths
*/
eap_authenticator_t *eap_auth;
/**
* if the client receives a EAP request, it is stored here for later use
*/
eap_payload_t *eap_next;
/**
* set to TRUE if authentication should be done with EAP only
*/
bool eap_only;
/**
* has the other peer been authenticated yet?
*/
bool peer_authenticated;
/**
* mode the CHILD_SA uses: tranport, tunnel, BEET
*/
@@ -245,6 +271,57 @@ static status_t get_request(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t **result)
/* store for retransmission */
this->message = request;
this->message_id = this->ike_sa->get_next_message_id(this->ike_sa);
request->set_message_id(request, this->message_id);
if (this->eap_auth)
{
/* we already sent ID, SA, TS in an earlier ike_auth, we now
* continiue EAP processing */
if (this->eap_next)
{
/* if we have another outstanding EAP response, send it */
request->add_payload(request, (payload_t*)this->eap_next);
this->eap_next = NULL;
return SUCCESS;
}
else
{
/* if not, we have received an EAP_SUCCESS, send AUTH payload.
* we only send our data if:
* a) The peer has been authenticated using RSA/PSK, or
* b) The EAP method is mutual and gives us enough security
*/
if (this->eap_auth->is_mutual(this->eap_auth) ||
this->peer_authenticated)
{
auth_payload_t *auth_payload;
authenticator_t *authenticator = (authenticator_t*)this->eap_auth;
if (authenticator->build(authenticator, this->init_request,
this->nonce_r, &auth_payload) != SUCCESS)
{
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED,
"EAP authentication data generation failed, deleting IKE_SA");
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED,
"initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
return DESTROY_ME;
}
request->add_payload(request, (payload_t*)auth_payload);
return SUCCESS;
}
else
{
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED,
"peer didn't send authentication data, deleting IKE_SA");
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED,
"initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
return DESTROY_ME;
}
}
}
/* otherwise we do a normal ike_auth request... */
{ /* build ID payload */
my_id_payload = id_payload_create_from_identification(TRUE, my_id);
request->add_payload(request, (payload_t*)my_id_payload);
@@ -274,8 +351,8 @@ static status_t get_request(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t **result)
}
/* build certificate payload. TODO: Handle certreq from init_ike_sa. */
if (this->policy->get_auth_method(this->policy) == AUTH_RSA
&& this->connection->get_cert_policy(this->connection) != CERT_NEVER_SEND)
if (this->policy->get_auth_method(this->policy) == AUTH_RSA &&
this->connection->get_cert_policy(this->connection) != CERT_NEVER_SEND)
{
cert_payload_t *cert_payload;
@@ -301,6 +378,7 @@ static status_t get_request(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t **result)
}
}
if (this->policy->get_auth_method(this->policy) != AUTH_EAP)
{ /* build auth payload */
authenticator_t *authenticator;
auth_payload_t *auth_payload;
@@ -327,6 +405,12 @@ static status_t get_request(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t **result)
}
request->add_payload(request, (payload_t*)auth_payload);
}
else
{
this->eap_auth = eap_authenticator_create(this->ike_sa);
/* include notify that we support EAP only authentication */
build_notify(EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION, request, FALSE);
}
{ /* build SA payload for CHILD_SA */
linked_list_t *proposal_list;
@@ -399,8 +483,6 @@ static status_t get_request(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t **result)
request->add_payload(request, (payload_t*)ts_payload);
}
this->message_id = this->ike_sa->get_next_message_id(this->ike_sa);
request->set_message_id(request, this->message_id);
return SUCCESS;
}
@@ -434,6 +516,12 @@ static status_t process_notifies(private_ike_auth_t *this, notify_payload_t *not
this->build_child = FALSE;
return SUCCESS;
}
case EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION:
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "peer requested EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION");
this->eap_only = TRUE;
return SUCCESS;
}
case USE_TRANSPORT_MODE:
{
this->mode = MODE_TRANSPORT;
@@ -465,38 +553,37 @@ static status_t process_notifies(private_ike_auth_t *this, notify_payload_t *not
/**
* Import certificate requests from a certreq payload
*/
static void add_certificate_request(certreq_payload_t *certreq_payload,
linked_list_t *requested_ca_keyids)
static void process_certificate_request(private_ike_auth_t *this,
certreq_payload_t *certreq_payload)
{
chunk_t keyids;
cert_encoding_t encoding = certreq_payload->get_cert_encoding(certreq_payload);
if (encoding != CERT_X509_SIGNATURE)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "certreq payload %N not supported, ignored",
cert_encoding_names, encoding);
return;
}
keyids = certreq_payload->get_data(certreq_payload);
while (keyids.len >= HASH_SIZE_SHA1)
{
chunk_t keyid = { keyids.ptr, HASH_SIZE_SHA1};
x509_t *cacert = charon->credentials->get_ca_certificate_by_keyid(charon->credentials, keyid);
x509_t *cacert = charon->credentials->get_ca_certificate_by_keyid(
charon->credentials, keyid);
if (cacert)
{
DBG2(DBG_IKE, "request for certificate issued by ca '%D'", cacert->get_subject(cacert));
requested_ca_keyids->insert_last(requested_ca_keyids, (void *)&keyid);
DBG2(DBG_IKE, "request for certificate issued by ca '%D'",
cacert->get_subject(cacert));
this->cacerts->insert_last(this->cacerts, cacert);
}
else
{
DBG2(DBG_IKE, "request for certificate issued by unknown ca");
}
DBG2(DBG_IKE, " with keyid %#B", &keyid);
keyids.ptr += HASH_SIZE_SHA1;
keyids.len -= HASH_SIZE_SHA1;
}
@@ -614,6 +701,113 @@ static status_t install_child_sa(private_ike_auth_t *this, bool initiator)
return SUCCESS;
}
/**
* create a CHILD SA, install it, and build response message
*/
static void setup_child_sa(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *response)
{
bool use_natt;
u_int32_t soft_lifetime, hard_lifetime;
host_t *me, *other;
identification_t *my_id, *other_id;
me = this->ike_sa->get_my_host(this->ike_sa);
other = this->ike_sa->get_other_host(this->ike_sa);
my_id = this->ike_sa->get_my_id(this->ike_sa);
other_id = this->ike_sa->get_other_id(this->ike_sa);
soft_lifetime = this->policy->get_soft_lifetime(this->policy);
hard_lifetime = this->policy->get_hard_lifetime(this->policy);
use_natt = this->ike_sa->is_natt_enabled(this->ike_sa);
this->child_sa = child_sa_create(this->reqid, me, other, my_id, other_id,
soft_lifetime, hard_lifetime,
this->policy->get_updown(this->policy),
this->policy->get_hostaccess(this->policy),
use_natt);
this->child_sa->set_name(this->child_sa, this->policy->get_name(this->policy));
/* check mode, and include notify into reply */
switch (this->mode)
{
case MODE_TUNNEL:
/* is the default */
break;
case MODE_TRANSPORT:
if (!ts_list_is_host(this->tsi, other) ||
!ts_list_is_host(this->tsr, me))
{
this->mode = MODE_TUNNEL;
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "not using tranport mode, not host-to-host");
}
else if (this->ike_sa->is_natt_enabled(this->ike_sa))
{
this->mode = MODE_TUNNEL;
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "not using tranport mode, as connection NATed");
}
else
{
build_notify(USE_TRANSPORT_MODE, response, FALSE);
}
break;
case MODE_BEET:
if (!ts_list_is_host(this->tsi, NULL) ||
!ts_list_is_host(this->tsr, NULL))
{
this->mode = MODE_TUNNEL;
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "not using BEET mode, not host-to-host");
}
else
{
build_notify(USE_BEET_MODE, response, FALSE);
}
break;
}
if (install_child_sa(this, FALSE) != SUCCESS)
{
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "installing CHILD_SA %s failed, no CHILD_SA created",
this->policy->get_name(this->policy));
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "adding NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notify to response");
build_notify(NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN, response, FALSE);
}
else
{
/* build SA and TS payloads */
SIG(CHILD_UP_SUCCESS, "CHILD_SA created");
ts_payload_t *ts_response;
sa_payload_t *sa_response = sa_payload_create();
sa_response->add_proposal(sa_response, this->proposal);
response->add_payload(response, (payload_t*)sa_response);
ts_response = ts_payload_create_from_traffic_selectors(TRUE, this->tsi);
response->add_payload(response, (payload_t*)ts_response);
ts_response = ts_payload_create_from_traffic_selectors(FALSE, this->tsr);
response->add_payload(response, (payload_t*)ts_response);
}
}
/**
* clone the transaction to requeue it for EAP handling
*/
static private_ike_auth_t *clone_for_eap(private_ike_auth_t *this)
{
private_ike_auth_t *clone;
clone = (private_ike_auth_t*)ike_auth_create(this->ike_sa);
clone->tsi = this->tsi; this->tsi = NULL;
clone->tsr = this->tsr; this->tsr = NULL;
clone->eap_auth = this->eap_auth; this->eap_auth = NULL;
clone->eap_next = this->eap_next; this->eap_next = NULL;
clone->build_child = this->build_child;
clone->nonce_i = this->nonce_i; this->nonce_i = chunk_empty;
clone->nonce_r = this->nonce_r; this->nonce_r = chunk_empty;
clone->child_sa = this->child_sa; this->child_sa = NULL;
clone->proposal = this->proposal; this->proposal = NULL;
clone->peer_authenticated = this->peer_authenticated;
clone->connection = this->connection; this->connection = NULL;
clone->policy = this->policy; this->policy = NULL;
return clone;
}
/**
* Implementation of transaction_t.get_response.
*/
@@ -622,7 +816,6 @@ static status_t get_response(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *request,
{
host_t *me, *other;
identification_t *my_id, *other_id;
linked_list_t *requested_ca_keyids;
message_t *response;
status_t status;
iterator_t *payloads;
@@ -635,6 +828,7 @@ static status_t get_response(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *request,
sa_payload_t *sa_request = NULL;
ts_payload_t *tsi_request = NULL;
ts_payload_t *tsr_request = NULL;
eap_payload_t *eap_request = NULL;
id_payload_t *idr_response;
/* check if we already have built a response (retransmission) */
@@ -648,6 +842,8 @@ static status_t get_response(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *request,
me = this->ike_sa->get_my_host(this->ike_sa);
other = this->ike_sa->get_other_host(this->ike_sa);
my_id = this->ike_sa->get_my_id(this->ike_sa);
other_id = this->ike_sa->get_other_id(this->ike_sa);
this->message_id = request->get_message_id(request);
/* set up response */
@@ -668,9 +864,6 @@ static status_t get_response(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *request,
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
return DESTROY_ME;
}
/* initialize list of requested ca keyids */
requested_ca_keyids = linked_list_create();
/* Iterate over all payloads. */
payloads = request->get_payload_iterator(request);
@@ -689,7 +882,7 @@ static status_t get_response(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *request,
break;
case CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
certreq_request = (certreq_payload_t*)payload;
add_certificate_request(certreq_request, requested_ca_keyids);
process_certificate_request(this, certreq_request);
break;
case CERTIFICATE:
cert_request = (cert_payload_t*)payload;
@@ -703,20 +896,21 @@ static status_t get_response(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *request,
case TRAFFIC_SELECTOR_RESPONDER:
tsr_request = (ts_payload_t*)payload;
break;
case EXTENSIBLE_AUTHENTICATION:
eap_request = (eap_payload_t*)payload;
break;
case NOTIFY:
{
status = process_notifies(this, (notify_payload_t*)payload);
if (status == FAILED)
{
payloads->destroy(payloads);
requested_ca_keyids->destroy(requested_ca_keyids);
/* we return SUCCESS, returned FAILED means do next transaction */
return SUCCESS;
}
if (status == DESTROY_ME)
{
payloads->destroy(payloads);
requested_ca_keyids->destroy(requested_ca_keyids);
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
return DESTROY_ME;
}
@@ -732,13 +926,67 @@ static status_t get_response(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *request,
}
payloads->destroy(payloads);
/* check if we have all payloads */
if (!(idi_request && auth_request && sa_request && tsi_request && tsr_request))
/* if message contains an EAP payload, we process it */
if (eap_request && this->eap_auth)
{
eap_payload_t *eap_response;
private_ike_auth_t *next_auth;
status = this->eap_auth->process(this->eap_auth, eap_request, &eap_response);
response->add_payload(response, (payload_t*)eap_response);
if (status == FAILED)
{
/* shut down if EAP message is EAP_FAILURE */
return DESTROY_ME;
}
next_auth = clone_for_eap(this);
next_auth->message_id = this->message_id + 1;
*next = (transaction_t*)next_auth;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* if we do EAP authentication and a AUTH payload comes in, verify it */
if (auth_request && this->eap_auth)
{
auth_payload_t *auth_response;
authenticator_t *authenticator = (authenticator_t*)this->eap_auth;
if (authenticator->verify(authenticator, this->init_request,
this->nonce_r, auth_request) != SUCCESS)
{
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED, "authentication with EAP failed, deleting IKE_SA");
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
build_notify(AUTHENTICATION_FAILED, response, TRUE);
return DESTROY_ME;
}
if (authenticator->build(authenticator, this->init_response,
this->nonce_i, &auth_response) != SUCCESS)
{
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED, "EAP authentication data generation failed, deleting IKE_SA");
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
build_notify(AUTHENTICATION_FAILED, response, TRUE);
return DESTROY_ME;
}
response->add_payload(response, (payload_t*)auth_response);
SIG(IKE_UP_SUCCESS, "IKE_SA '%s' established between %H[%D]...%H[%D]",
this->ike_sa->get_name(this->ike_sa), me, my_id, other, other_id);
this->ike_sa->set_state(this->ike_sa, IKE_ESTABLISHED);
setup_child_sa(this, response);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* check if we have all payloads (AUTH is not checked, not required with EAP) */
if (!(idi_request && sa_request && tsi_request && tsr_request))
{
build_notify(INVALID_SYNTAX, response, TRUE);
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED, "request message incomplete, deleting IKE_SA");
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
requested_ca_keyids->destroy(requested_ca_keyids);
return DESTROY_ME;
}
@@ -754,7 +1002,6 @@ static status_t get_response(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *request,
}
}
{ /* get a policy and process traffic selectors */
linked_list_t *my_ts, *other_ts;
@@ -764,9 +1011,7 @@ static status_t get_response(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *request,
this->policy = charon->policies->get_policy(charon->policies,
my_id, other_id,
my_ts, other_ts,
me, other,
requested_ca_keyids);
requested_ca_keyids->destroy(requested_ca_keyids);
me, other);
if (this->policy)
{
@@ -799,8 +1044,8 @@ static status_t get_response(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *request,
response->add_payload(response, (payload_t*)idr_response);
}
if (this->policy->get_auth_method(this->policy) == AUTH_RSA
&& this->connection->get_cert_policy(this->connection) != CERT_NEVER_SEND)
if (this->policy->get_auth_method(this->policy) == AUTH_RSA &&
this->connection->get_cert_policy(this->connection) != CERT_NEVER_SEND)
{ /* build certificate payload */
x509_t *cert;
cert_payload_t *cert_payload;
@@ -822,9 +1067,76 @@ static status_t get_response(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *request,
import_certificate(cert_request);
}
{ /* process auth payload */
authenticator_t *authenticator;
{ /* process SA payload */
linked_list_t *proposal_list;
/* get proposals from request, and select one with ours */
proposal_list = sa_request->get_proposals(sa_request);
DBG2(DBG_IKE, "selecting proposals:");
this->proposal = this->policy->select_proposal(this->policy, proposal_list);
proposal_list->destroy_offset(proposal_list, offsetof(proposal_t, destroy));
/* do we have a proposal? */
if (this->proposal == NULL)
{
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "CHILD_SA proposals unacceptable, no CHILD_SA created");
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "adding NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notify to response");
build_notify(NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN, response, FALSE);
this->build_child = FALSE;
}
/* do we have traffic selectors? */
else if (this->tsi->get_count(this->tsi) == 0 || this->tsr->get_count(this->tsr) == 0)
{
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "CHILD_SA traffic selectors unacceptable, no CHILD_SA created");
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "adding TS_UNACCEPTABLE notify to response");
build_notify(TS_UNACCEPTABLE, response, FALSE);
this->build_child = FALSE;
}
}
if (!this->eap_only || this->policy->get_auth_method(this->policy) != AUTH_EAP)
{ /* build response AUTH payload when not using a mutual EAP authentication */
auth_payload_t *auth_response;
authenticator_t *authenticator;
auth_method_t auth_method;
status_t status;
auth_method = this->policy->get_auth_method(this->policy);
if (auth_method == AUTH_EAP)
{
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED,
"peer does not support EAP only authentication, deleting IKE_SA");
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED,
"initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
build_notify(AUTHENTICATION_FAILED, response, TRUE);
return DESTROY_ME;
}
authenticator = authenticator_create(this->ike_sa, auth_method);
if (authenticator == NULL)
{
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED, "auth method %N not supported, deleting IKE_SA",
auth_method_names, auth_method);
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
build_notify(AUTHENTICATION_FAILED, response, TRUE);
return DESTROY_ME;
}
status = authenticator->build(authenticator, this->init_response,
this->nonce_i, &auth_response);
authenticator->destroy(authenticator);
if (status != SUCCESS)
{
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED, "authentication data generation failed, deleting IKE_SA");
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
build_notify(AUTHENTICATION_FAILED, response, TRUE);
return DESTROY_ME;
}
response->add_payload(response, (payload_t*)auth_response);
}
if (auth_request)
{ /* process auth payload, if not using EAP */
authenticator_t *authenticator;
auth_method_t auth_method;
status_t status;
@@ -848,145 +1160,51 @@ static status_t get_response(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *request,
return DESTROY_ME;
}
auth_method = this->policy->get_auth_method(this->policy);
authenticator = authenticator_create(this->ike_sa, auth_method);
if (authenticator == NULL)
SIG(IKE_UP_SUCCESS, "IKE_SA '%s' established between %H[%D]...%H[%D]",
this->ike_sa->get_name(this->ike_sa), me, my_id, other, other_id);
this->ike_sa->set_state(this->ike_sa, IKE_ESTABLISHED);
/* set up CHILD_SA if negotiation succeded */
if (this->build_child)
{
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED, "auth method %N not supported, deleting IKE_SA",
auth_method_names, auth_method);
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
setup_child_sa(this, response);
}
this->peer_authenticated = TRUE;
}
else
{
/* if no AUTH payload was included, we start with an EAP exchange.
* eap_response is a request in the EAP meaning, but is
* contained in a IKEv2 response */
eap_payload_t *eap_response;
private_ike_auth_t *next_auth;
eap_type_t eap_type;
eap_type = this->policy->get_eap_type(this->policy);
this->eap_auth = eap_authenticator_create(this->ike_sa);
status = this->eap_auth->initiate(this->eap_auth, eap_type, &eap_response);
response->add_payload(response, (payload_t*)eap_response);
if (status == FAILED)
{
/* EAP initiaton failed, we send the EAP_FAILURE message and quit */
return DESTROY_ME;
}
status = authenticator->build(authenticator, this->init_response,
this->nonce_i, &auth_response);
authenticator->destroy(authenticator);
if (status != SUCCESS)
{
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED, "authentication data generation failed, deleting IKE_SA");
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
build_notify(AUTHENTICATION_FAILED, response, TRUE);
return DESTROY_ME;
}
response->add_payload(response, (payload_t*)auth_response);
/* we send an EAP request. to handle the reply, we reschedule
* this transaction, as it knows how to handle the reply */
next_auth = clone_for_eap(this);
next_auth->message_id = this->message_id + 1;
*next = (transaction_t*)next_auth;
}
SIG(IKE_UP_SUCCESS, "IKE_SA '%s' established between %H[%D]...%H[%D]",
this->ike_sa->get_name(this->ike_sa), me, my_id, other, other_id);
{ /* process SA payload */
linked_list_t *proposal_list;
sa_payload_t *sa_response;
ts_payload_t *ts_response;
bool use_natt;
u_int32_t soft_lifetime, hard_lifetime;
/* prepare reply */
sa_response = sa_payload_create();
/* get proposals from request, and select one with ours */
proposal_list = sa_request->get_proposals(sa_request);
DBG2(DBG_IKE, "selecting proposals:");
this->proposal = this->policy->select_proposal(this->policy, proposal_list);
proposal_list->destroy_offset(proposal_list, offsetof(proposal_t, destroy));
/* do we have a proposal? */
if (this->proposal == NULL)
{
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "CHILD_SA proposals unacceptable, no CHILD_SA created");
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "adding NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notify to response");
build_notify(NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN, response, FALSE);
}
/* do we have traffic selectors? */
else if (this->tsi->get_count(this->tsi) == 0 || this->tsr->get_count(this->tsr) == 0)
{
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "CHILD_SA traffic selectors unacceptable, no CHILD_SA created");
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "adding TS_UNACCEPTABLE notify to response");
build_notify(TS_UNACCEPTABLE, response, FALSE);
}
else
{
/* create child sa */
soft_lifetime = this->policy->get_soft_lifetime(this->policy);
hard_lifetime = this->policy->get_hard_lifetime(this->policy);
use_natt = this->ike_sa->is_natt_enabled(this->ike_sa);
this->child_sa = child_sa_create(this->reqid, me, other, my_id, other_id,
soft_lifetime, hard_lifetime,
this->policy->get_updown(this->policy),
this->policy->get_hostaccess(this->policy),
use_natt);
this->child_sa->set_name(this->child_sa, this->policy->get_name(this->policy));
/* check mode, and include notify into reply */
switch (this->mode)
{
case MODE_TUNNEL:
/* is the default */
break;
case MODE_TRANSPORT:
if (!ts_list_is_host(this->tsi, other) ||
!ts_list_is_host(this->tsr, me))
{
this->mode = MODE_TUNNEL;
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "not using tranport mode, not host-to-host");
}
else if (this->ike_sa->is_natt_enabled(this->ike_sa))
{
this->mode = MODE_TUNNEL;
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "not using tranport mode, as connection NATed");
}
else
{
build_notify(USE_TRANSPORT_MODE, response, FALSE);
}
break;
case MODE_BEET:
if (!ts_list_is_host(this->tsi, NULL) ||
!ts_list_is_host(this->tsr, NULL))
{
this->mode = MODE_TUNNEL;
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "not using BEET mode, not host-to-host");
}
else
{
build_notify(USE_BEET_MODE, response, FALSE);
}
break;
}
if (install_child_sa(this, FALSE) != SUCCESS)
{
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "installing CHILD_SA '%s' failed, no CHILD_SA created",
this->policy->get_name(this->policy));
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "adding NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notify to response");
build_notify(NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN, response, FALSE);
}
else
{
/* add proposal to sa payload */
sa_response->add_proposal(sa_response, this->proposal);
SIG(CHILD_UP_SUCCESS, "CHILD_SA '%s' created",
this->policy->get_name(this->policy));
}
}
response->add_payload(response, (payload_t*)sa_response);
/* add ts payload after sa payload */
ts_response = ts_payload_create_from_traffic_selectors(TRUE, this->tsi);
response->add_payload(response, (payload_t*)ts_response);
ts_response = ts_payload_create_from_traffic_selectors(FALSE, this->tsr);
response->add_payload(response, (payload_t*)ts_response);
}
/* set established state */
this->ike_sa->set_state(this->ike_sa, IKE_ESTABLISHED);
return SUCCESS;
}
/**
* Implementation of transaction_t.conclude
*/
static status_t conclude(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *response,
transaction_t **transaction)
transaction_t **next)
{
iterator_t *payloads;
payload_t *payload;
@@ -998,6 +1216,7 @@ static status_t conclude(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *response,
cert_payload_t *cert_payload = NULL;
auth_payload_t *auth_payload = NULL;
sa_payload_t *sa_payload = NULL;
eap_payload_t *eap_payload = NULL;
status_t status;
/* check message type */
@@ -1010,6 +1229,8 @@ static status_t conclude(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *response,
me = this->ike_sa->get_my_host(this->ike_sa);
other = this->ike_sa->get_other_host(this->ike_sa);
my_id = this->ike_sa->get_my_id(this->ike_sa);
other_id = this->ike_sa->get_other_id(this->ike_sa);
/* Iterate over all payloads to collect them */
payloads = response->get_payload_iterator(response);
@@ -1035,6 +1256,9 @@ static status_t conclude(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *response,
case TRAFFIC_SELECTOR_RESPONDER:
tsr_payload = (ts_payload_t*)payload;
break;
case EXTENSIBLE_AUTHENTICATION:
eap_payload = (eap_payload_t*)payload;
break;
case NOTIFY:
{
status = process_notifies(this, (notify_payload_t*)payload);
@@ -1062,13 +1286,7 @@ static status_t conclude(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *response,
}
payloads->destroy(payloads);
if (!(idr_payload && auth_payload && sa_payload && tsi_payload && tsr_payload))
{
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED, "response message incomplete, deleting IKE_SA");
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
return DESTROY_ME;
}
if (idr_payload)
{ /* process idr payload */
identification_t *configured_other_id;
int wildcards;
@@ -1080,7 +1298,7 @@ static status_t conclude(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *response,
{
other_id->destroy(other_id);
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED, "other peer uses unacceptable ID (%D, excepted "
"%D), deleting IKE_SA", other_id, configured_other_id);
"%D), deleting IKE_SA", other_id, configured_other_id);
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
return DESTROY_ME;
}
@@ -1093,6 +1311,7 @@ static status_t conclude(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *response,
import_certificate(cert_payload);
}
if (auth_payload && idr_payload)
{ /* authenticate peer */
authenticator_t *authenticator;
auth_method_t auth_method;
@@ -1118,10 +1337,72 @@ static status_t conclude(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *response,
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
return DESTROY_ME;
}
this->peer_authenticated = TRUE;
}
if (eap_payload && this->eap_auth)
{
switch (this->eap_auth->process(this->eap_auth, eap_payload, &this->eap_next))
{
case SUCCESS:
{
/* EAP message was EAP_SUCCESS, send AUTH in next transaction */
DBG2(DBG_IKE, "EAP authentication exchanges completed successful");
this->eap_next = NULL;
/* fall through */
}
case NEED_MORE:
{
/* EAP message was a EAP_REQUEST, handle it in next transaction */
private_ike_auth_t *next_auth = clone_for_eap(this);
next_auth->message_id = this->message_id + 1;
*next = (transaction_t*)next_auth;
return SUCCESS;
}
case FAILED:
default:
{
/* EAP message was EAP_FAILURE */
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED, "EAP authentication failed, deleting IKE_SA");
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
return DESTROY_ME;
}
}
}
if (!(auth_payload && sa_payload && tsi_payload && tsr_payload))
{
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED, "response message incomplete, deleting IKE_SA");
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
return DESTROY_ME;
}
/* if we do EAP authentication and a AUTH payload comes in, verify it */
if (this->eap_auth &&
(this->eap_auth->is_mutual(this->eap_auth) || this->peer_authenticated))
{
authenticator_t *authenticator = (authenticator_t*)this->eap_auth;
if (authenticator->verify(authenticator, this->init_response,
this->nonce_i, auth_payload) != SUCCESS)
{
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED, "authentication with EAP failed, deleting IKE_SA");
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
return DESTROY_ME;
}
this->peer_authenticated = TRUE;
}
if (!this->peer_authenticated)
{
SIG(IKE_UP_FAILED, "server didn't send authentication data, deleting IKE_SA");
SIG(CHILD_UP_FAILED, "initiating CHILD_SA failed, unable to create IKE_SA");
return DESTROY_ME;
}
SIG(IKE_UP_SUCCESS, "IKE_SA '%s' established between %H[%D]...%H[%D]",
this->ike_sa->get_name(this->ike_sa), me, my_id, other, other_id);
this->ike_sa->set_state(this->ike_sa, IKE_ESTABLISHED);
{ /* process traffic selectors for us */
linked_list_t *ts_received = tsi_payload->get_traffic_selectors(tsi_payload);
@@ -1198,8 +1479,6 @@ static status_t conclude(private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *response,
}
}
}
/* set new state */
this->ike_sa->set_state(this->ike_sa, IKE_ESTABLISHED);
return SUCCESS;
}
@@ -1213,6 +1492,12 @@ static void destroy(private_ike_auth_t *this)
DESTROY_IF(this->child_sa);
DESTROY_IF(this->policy);
DESTROY_IF(this->connection);
DESTROY_IF(this->cacerts);
if (this->eap_auth)
{
this->eap_auth->authenticator_interface.destroy(&this->eap_auth->authenticator_interface);
}
DESTROY_IF(this->eap_next);
if (this->tsi)
{
this->tsi->destroy_offset(this->tsi, offsetof(traffic_selector_t, destroy));
@@ -1260,10 +1545,17 @@ ike_auth_t *ike_auth_create(ike_sa_t *ike_sa)
this->init_response = chunk_empty;
this->child_sa = NULL;
this->proposal = NULL;
this->policy = NULL;
this->connection = NULL;
this->tsi = NULL;
this->tsr = NULL;
this->build_child = TRUE;
this->eap_auth = NULL;
this->eap_next = NULL;
this->eap_only = FALSE;
this->peer_authenticated = FALSE;
this->reqid = 0;
this->cacerts = linked_list_create();
this->mode = MODE_TUNNEL;
return &this->public;
src/charon/threads/stroke_interface.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void stroke_add_conn(stroke_msg_t *msg, FILE *out)
}
policy = policy_create(msg->add_conn.name, my_id, other_id,
msg->add_conn.auth_method,
msg->add_conn.auth_method, msg->add_conn.eap_type,
msg->add_conn.rekey.ipsec_lifetime,
msg->add_conn.rekey.ipsec_lifetime - msg->add_conn.rekey.margin,
msg->add_conn.rekey.margin * msg->add_conn.rekey.fuzz / 100,
src/libstrongswan/Makefile.am
+1
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ asn1/pem.c asn1/pem.h \
asn1/ttodata.c asn1/ttodata.h \
crypto/rsa/rsa_private_key.c crypto/rsa/rsa_private_key.h \
crypto/rsa/rsa_public_key.h crypto/rsa/rsa_public_key.c \
crypto/prfs/fips_prf.c crypto/prfs/fips_prf.h \
crypto/prfs/hmac_prf.c crypto/prfs/hmac_prf.h \
crypto/prfs/prf.c crypto/prfs/prf.h \
crypto/signers/hmac_signer.c crypto/signers/hmac_signer.h \
src/libstrongswan/chunk.c
+148 -36
View File
@@ -35,13 +35,22 @@ chunk_t chunk_empty = { NULL, 0 };
/**
* Described in header.
*/
chunk_t chunk_clone(chunk_t chunk)
chunk_t chunk_create(u_char *ptr, size_t len)
{
chunk_t chunk = {ptr, len};
return chunk;
}
/**
* Described in header.
*/
chunk_t chunk_create_clone(u_char *ptr, chunk_t chunk)
{
chunk_t clone = chunk_empty;
if (chunk.ptr && chunk.len > 0)
{
clone.ptr = malloc(chunk.len);
clone.ptr = ptr;
clone.len = chunk.len;
memcpy(clone.ptr, chunk.ptr, chunk.len);
}
@@ -52,51 +61,151 @@ chunk_t chunk_clone(chunk_t chunk)
/**
* Decribed in header.
*/
chunk_t chunk_cat(const char* mode, ...)
size_t chunk_length(const char* mode, ...)
{
chunk_t construct;
va_list chunks;
u_char *pos;
int i;
int count = strlen(mode);
/* sum up lengths of individual chunks */
size_t length = 0;
va_start(chunks, mode);
construct.len = 0;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
while (TRUE)
{
chunk_t ch = va_arg(chunks, chunk_t);
construct.len += ch.len;
}
va_end(chunks);
/* allocate needed memory for construct */
construct.ptr = malloc(construct.len);
pos = construct.ptr;
/* copy or move the chunks */
va_start(chunks, mode);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
chunk_t ch = va_arg(chunks, chunk_t);
switch (*mode++)
{
case 'm':
memcpy(pos, ch.ptr, ch.len);
pos += ch.len;
free(ch.ptr);
break;
case 'c':
{
chunk_t ch = va_arg(chunks, chunk_t);
length += ch.len;
continue;
}
default:
memcpy(pos, ch.ptr, ch.len);
pos += ch.len;
break;
}
break;
}
va_end(chunks);
return length;
}
/**
* Decribed in header.
*/
chunk_t chunk_create_cat(u_char *ptr, const char* mode, ...)
{
va_list chunks;
chunk_t construct = chunk_create(ptr, 0);
va_start(chunks, mode);
while (TRUE)
{
bool free_chunk = FALSE;
switch (*mode++)
{
case 'm':
{
free_chunk = TRUE;
}
case 'c':
{
chunk_t ch = va_arg(chunks, chunk_t);
memcpy(ptr, ch.ptr, ch.len);
ptr += ch.len;
construct.len += ch.len;
if (free_chunk)
{
free(ch.ptr);
}
continue;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
va_end(chunks);
return construct;
}
/**
* Decribed in header.
*/
void chunk_split(chunk_t chunk, const char *mode, ...)
{
va_list chunks;
size_t len;
chunk_t *ch;
va_start(chunks, mode);
while (TRUE)
{
if (*mode == '\0')
{
break;
}
len = va_arg(chunks, size_t);
ch = va_arg(chunks, chunk_t*);
/* a null chunk means skip len bytes */
if (ch == NULL)
{
chunk = chunk_skip(chunk, len);
continue;
}
switch (*mode++)
{
case 'm':
{
ch->len = min(chunk.len, len);
if (ch->len)
{
ch->ptr = chunk.ptr;
}
else
{
ch->ptr = NULL;
}
chunk = chunk_skip(chunk, ch->len);
continue;
}
case 'a':
{
ch->len = min(chunk.len, len);
if (ch->len)
{
ch->ptr = malloc(ch->len);
memcpy(ch->ptr, chunk.ptr, ch->len);
}
else
{
ch->ptr = NULL;
}
chunk = chunk_skip(chunk, ch->len);
continue;
}
case 'c':
{
ch->len = min(ch->len, chunk.len);
ch->len = min(ch->len, len);
if (ch->len)
{
memcpy(ch->ptr, chunk.ptr, ch->len);
}
else
{
ch->ptr = NULL;
}
chunk = chunk_skip(chunk, ch->len);
continue;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
va_end(chunks);
}
/**
* Described in header.
*/
@@ -110,12 +219,15 @@ void chunk_free(chunk_t *chunk)
/**
* Described in header.
*/
chunk_t chunk_alloc(size_t bytes)
chunk_t chunk_skip(chunk_t chunk, size_t bytes)
{
chunk_t new_chunk;
new_chunk.ptr = malloc(bytes);
new_chunk.len = bytes;
return new_chunk;
if (chunk.len > bytes)
{
chunk.ptr += bytes;
chunk.len -= bytes;
return chunk;
}
return chunk_empty;
}
/**
src/libstrongswan/chunk.h
+60 -10
View File
@@ -47,21 +47,36 @@ struct chunk_t {
extern chunk_t chunk_empty;
/**
* Initialize a chunk to point to a static(!) buffer
* Create a new chunk pointing to "ptr" with length "len"
*/
#define chunk_from_buf(str) { str, sizeof(str) }
chunk_t chunk_create(u_char *ptr, size_t len);
/**
* Clone chunk contents in a newly allocated chunk
* Create a clone of a chunk pointing to "ptr"
*/
chunk_t chunk_clone(chunk_t chunk);
chunk_t chunk_create_clone(u_char *ptr, chunk_t chunk);
/**
* Allocate a chunk from concatenation of other chunks.
* mode is a string 'm' and 'c, 'm' means move chunk,
* 'c' means copy chunk.
* Calculate length of multiple chunks
*/
chunk_t chunk_cat(const char* mode, ...);
size_t chunk_length(const char *mode, ...);
/**
* Concatenate chunks into a chunk pointing to "ptr",
* "mode" is a string of "c" (copy) and "m" (move), which says
* how to handle to chunks in "..."
*/
chunk_t chunk_create_cat(u_char *ptr, const char* mode, ...);
/**
* Split up a chunk into parts, "mode" is a string of "a" (alloc),
* "c" (copy) and "m" (move). Each letter say for the corresponding chunk if
* it should get allocated on heap, copied into existing chunk, or the chunk
* should point into "chunk". The length of each part is an argument before
* each target chunk. E.g.:
* chunk_split(chunk, "mcac", 3, &a, 7, &b, 5, &c, d.len, &d);
*/
void chunk_split(chunk_t chunk, const char *mode, ...);
/**
* Free contents of a chunk
@@ -69,9 +84,44 @@ chunk_t chunk_cat(const char* mode, ...);
void chunk_free(chunk_t *chunk);
/**
* Allocate a chunk
* Initialize a chunk to point to buffer inspectable by sizeof()
*/
chunk_t chunk_alloc(size_t bytes);
#define chunk_from_buf(str) { str, sizeof(str) }
/**
* Allocate a chunk on the heap
*/
#define chunk_alloc(bytes) chunk_create(malloc(bytes), bytes)
/**
* Allocate a chunk on the stack
*/
#define chunk_alloca(bytes) chunk_create(alloca(bytes), bytes)
/**
* Clone a chunk on heap
*/
#define chunk_clone(chunk) chunk_create_clone(malloc(chunk.len), chunk)
/**
* Clone a chunk on stack
*/
#define chunk_clonea(chunk) chunk_create_clone(alloca(chunk.len), chunk)
/**
* Concatenate chunks into a chunk on heap
*/
#define chunk_cat(mode, ...) chunk_create_cat(malloc(chunk_length(mode, __VA_ARGS__)), mode, __VA_ARGS__)
/**
* Concatenate chunks into a chunk on stack
*/
#define chunk_cata(mode, ...) chunk_create_cat(alloca(chunk_length(mode, __VA_ARGS__)), mode, __VA_ARGS__)
/**
* Skip n bytes in chunk (forward pointer, shorten length)
*/
chunk_t chunk_skip(chunk_t chunk, size_t bytes);
/**
* Compare two chunks for equality,
src/libstrongswan/crypto/hashers/hasher.h
+15 -1
View File
@@ -122,10 +122,24 @@ struct hasher_t {
*/
void (*reset) (hasher_t *this);
/**
* @brief Get the state of the hasher.
*
* A hasher stores internal state information. This state may be
* manipulated to include a "seed" into the hashing operation. It used by
* some exotic protocols (such as AKA).
* The data pointed by chunk may be manipulated, but not replaced nor freed.
* This is more a hack than a feature. The hasher's state may be byte
* order dependant; use with care.
*
* @param this calling object
*/
chunk_t (*get_state) (hasher_t *this);
/**
* @brief Destroys a hasher object.
*
* @param this calling object
* @param this calling object
*/
void (*destroy) (hasher_t *this);
};
src/libstrongswan/crypto/hashers/md5_hasher.c
+14
View File
@@ -363,6 +363,19 @@ static void reset(private_md5_hasher_t *this)
this->count[1] = 0;
}
/**
* Implementation of hasher_t.get_state
*/
static chunk_t get_state(private_md5_hasher_t *this)
{
chunk_t chunk;
chunk.ptr = (u_char*)&this->state[0];
chunk.len = sizeof(this->state);
return chunk;
}
/**
* Implementation of hasher_t.destroy.
*/
@@ -382,6 +395,7 @@ md5_hasher_t *md5_hasher_create(void)
this->public.hasher_interface.allocate_hash = (void (*) (hasher_t*, chunk_t, chunk_t*))allocate_hash;
this->public.hasher_interface.get_hash_size = (size_t (*) (hasher_t*))get_hash_size;
this->public.hasher_interface.reset = (void (*) (hasher_t*))reset;
this->public.hasher_interface.get_state = (chunk_t (*) (hasher_t*))get_state;
this->public.hasher_interface.destroy = (void (*) (hasher_t*))destroy;
/* initialize */
src/libstrongswan/crypto/hashers/sha1_hasher.c
+16 -1
View File
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static size_t get_hash_size(private_sha1_hasher_t *this)
{
return HASH_SIZE_SHA1;
}
/**
* Implementation of hasher_t.reset.
*/
@@ -237,6 +237,20 @@ static void reset(private_sha1_hasher_t *this)
this->count[0] = 0;
this->count[1] = 0;
}
/**
* Implementation of hasher_t.get_state
*/
static chunk_t get_state(private_sha1_hasher_t *this)
{
chunk_t chunk;
chunk.ptr = (u_char*)&this->state[0];
chunk.len = sizeof(this->state);
return chunk;
}
/**
* Implementation of hasher_t.destroy.
*/
@@ -256,6 +270,7 @@ sha1_hasher_t *sha1_hasher_create(void)
this->public.hasher_interface.allocate_hash = (void (*) (hasher_t*, chunk_t, chunk_t*))allocate_hash;
this->public.hasher_interface.get_hash_size = (size_t (*) (hasher_t*))get_hash_size;
this->public.hasher_interface.reset = (void (*) (hasher_t*))reset;
this->public.hasher_interface.get_state = (chunk_t (*) (hasher_t*))get_state;
this->public.hasher_interface.destroy = (void (*) (hasher_t*))destroy;
/* initialize */
src/libstrongswan/crypto/hashers/sha2_hasher.c
+35
View File
@@ -586,6 +586,38 @@ static void reset512(private_sha512_hasher_t *ctx)
ctx->sha_bufCnt = 0;
}
/**
* Implementation of hasher_t.get_state for SHA256
*/
static chunk_t get_state256(private_sha256_hasher_t *ctx)
{
chunk_t chunk;
chunk.ptr = (u_char*)&ctx->sha_H[0];
chunk.len = HASH_SIZE_SHA256;
return chunk;
}
/**
* Implementation of hasher_t.get_state for SHA384
*/
static chunk_t get_state384(private_sha512_hasher_t *ctx)
{
chunk_t chunk;
chunk.ptr = (u_char*)&ctx->sha_H[0];
chunk.len = HASH_SIZE_SHA384;
return chunk;
}
/**
* Implementation of hasher_t.get_state for SHA512
*/
static chunk_t get_state512(private_sha512_hasher_t *ctx)
{
chunk_t chunk;
chunk.ptr = (u_char*)&ctx->sha_H[0];
chunk.len = HASH_SIZE_SHA512;
return chunk;
}
/**
* Implementation of hasher_t.destroy.
*/
@@ -606,6 +638,7 @@ sha2_hasher_t *sha2_hasher_create(hash_algorithm_t algorithm)
case HASH_SHA256:
this = (sha2_hasher_t*)malloc_thing(private_sha256_hasher_t);
this->hasher_interface.reset = (void(*)(hasher_t*))reset256;
this->hasher_interface.get_state = (chunk_t(*)(hasher_t*))get_state256;
this->hasher_interface.get_hash_size = (size_t(*)(hasher_t*))get_hash_size256;
this->hasher_interface.get_hash = (void(*)(hasher_t*,chunk_t,u_int8_t*))get_hash256;
this->hasher_interface.allocate_hash = (void(*)(hasher_t*,chunk_t,chunk_t*))allocate_hash256;
@@ -614,6 +647,7 @@ sha2_hasher_t *sha2_hasher_create(hash_algorithm_t algorithm)
/* uses SHA512 data structure */
this = (sha2_hasher_t*)malloc_thing(private_sha512_hasher_t);
this->hasher_interface.reset = (void(*)(hasher_t*))reset384;
this->hasher_interface.get_state = (chunk_t(*)(hasher_t*))get_state384;
this->hasher_interface.get_hash_size = (size_t(*)(hasher_t*))get_hash_size384;
this->hasher_interface.get_hash = (void(*)(hasher_t*,chunk_t,u_int8_t*))get_hash384;
this->hasher_interface.allocate_hash = (void(*)(hasher_t*,chunk_t,chunk_t*))allocate_hash384;
@@ -621,6 +655,7 @@ sha2_hasher_t *sha2_hasher_create(hash_algorithm_t algorithm)
case HASH_SHA512:
this = (sha2_hasher_t*)malloc_thing(private_sha512_hasher_t);
this->hasher_interface.reset = (void(*)(hasher_t*))reset512;
this->hasher_interface.get_state = (chunk_t(*)(hasher_t*))get_state512;
this->hasher_interface.get_hash_size = (size_t(*)(hasher_t*))get_hash_size512;
this->hasher_interface.get_hash = (void(*)(hasher_t*,chunk_t,u_int8_t*))get_hash512;
this->hasher_interface.allocate_hash = (void(*)(hasher_t*,chunk_t,chunk_t*))allocate_hash512;
src/libstrongswan/crypto/prfs/fips_prf.c
+258
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
/**
* @file fips_prf.c
*
* @brief Implementation for fips_prf_t.
*
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2006 Martin Willi
* Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
* option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* for more details.
*/
#include "fips_prf.h"
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <debug.h>
typedef struct private_fips_prf_t private_fips_prf_t;
/**
* Private data of a fips_prf_t object.
*/
struct private_fips_prf_t {
/**
* Public fips_prf_t interface.
*/
fips_prf_t public;
/**
* key of prf function, "b" long
*/
u_int8_t *key;
/**
* size of "b" in bytes
*/
size_t b;
/**
* G function, either SHA1 or DES
*/
void (*g)(u_int8_t t[], chunk_t c, u_int8_t res[]);
};
/**
* t used in G(), equals to initial SHA1 value
*/
static u_int8_t t[] = {
0x67,0x45,0x23,0x01,0xEF,0xCD,0xAB,0x89,0x98,0xBA,
0xDC,0xFE,0x10,0x32,0x54,0x76,0xC3,0xD2,0xE1,0xF0,
};
/**
* sum = (a + b) mod 2 ^ (length * 8)
*/
static void add_mod(size_t length, u_int8_t a[], u_int8_t b[], u_int8_t sum[])
{
int i;
for(i = length - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
u_int32_t tmp;
int c = 0;
tmp = a[i] + b[i] + c;
sum[i] = 0xff & tmp;
c = tmp >> 8;
}
}
/**
* calculate "chunk mod 2^(length*8)" and save it into buffer
*/
static void chunk_mod(size_t length, chunk_t chunk, u_int8_t buffer[])
{
if (chunk.len < length)
{
/* apply seed as least significant bits, others are zero */
memset(buffer, 0, length - chunk.len);
memcpy(buffer + length - chunk.len, chunk.ptr, chunk.len);
}
else
{
/* use least significant bytes from seed, as we use mod 2^b */
memcpy(buffer, chunk.ptr + chunk.len - length, length);
}
}
/**
* Implementation of prf_t.get_bytes.
*
* Test vector:
*
* key:
* 0xbd, 0x02, 0x9b, 0xbe, 0x7f, 0x51, 0x96, 0x0b,
* 0xcf, 0x9e, 0xdb, 0x2b, 0x61, 0xf0, 0x6f, 0x0f,
* 0xeb, 0x5a, 0x38, 0xb6
*
* seed:
* 0x00
*
* result:
* 0x20, 0x70, 0xb3, 0x22, 0x3d, 0xba, 0x37, 0x2f,
* 0xde, 0x1c, 0x0f, 0xfc, 0x7b, 0x2e, 0x3b, 0x49,
* 0x8b, 0x26, 0x06, 0x14, 0x3c, 0x6c, 0x18, 0xba,
* 0xcb, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x55, 0xba, 0xbb, 0x13, 0x78,
* 0x8e, 0x20, 0xd7, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x27, 0x51, 0x16
*/
static void get_bytes(private_fips_prf_t *this, chunk_t seed, u_int8_t w[])
{
int i;
u_int8_t xval[this->b];
u_int8_t xseed[this->b];
u_int8_t *xkey = this->key;
u_int8_t one[this->b];
chunk_t xval_chunk = chunk_from_buf(xval);
memset(one, 0, this->b);
one[this->b - 1] = 0x01;
/* 3.1 */
chunk_mod(this->b, seed, xseed);
/* 3.2 */
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) /* twice */
{
/* a. XVAL = (XKEY + XSEED j) mod 2^b */
add_mod(this->b, xkey, xseed, xval);
DBG3("XVAL %b", xval, this->b);
/* b. wi = G(t, XVAL ) */
this->g(t, xval_chunk, &w[i * this->b]);
DBG3("w[%d] %b", i, &w[i * this->b], this->b);
/* c. XKEY = (1 + XKEY + wi) mod 2b */
add_mod(this->b, xkey, one, xkey);
add_mod(this->b, xkey, &w[i * this->b], xkey);
DBG3("XKEY %b", xkey, this->b);
}
/* 3.3 done already, mod q not used */
}
/**
* Implementation of prf_t.get_block_size.
*/
static size_t get_block_size(private_fips_prf_t *this)
{
return 2 * this->b;
}
/**
* Implementation of prf_t.allocate_bytes.
*/
static void allocate_bytes(private_fips_prf_t *this, chunk_t seed, chunk_t *chunk)
{
*chunk = chunk_alloc(get_block_size(this));
get_bytes(this, seed, chunk->ptr);
}
/**
* Implementation of prf_t.get_key_size.
*/
static size_t get_key_size(private_fips_prf_t *this)
{
return this->b;
}
/**
* Implementation of prf_t.set_key.
*/
static void set_key(private_fips_prf_t *this, chunk_t key)
{
/* save key as "key mod 2^b" */
chunk_mod(this->b, key, this->key);
}
/**
* Implementation of the G() function based on SHA1
*/
void g_sha1(u_int8_t t[], chunk_t c, u_int8_t res[])
{
hasher_t *hasher;
u_int8_t buf[64];
chunk_t state_chunk;
u_int32_t *state, *iv, *hash;
if (c.len < sizeof(buf))
{
/* pad c with zeros */
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
memcpy(buf, c.ptr, c.len);
c.ptr = buf;
c.len = sizeof(buf);
}
else
{
/* not more than 512 bits can be G()-ed */
c.len = sizeof(buf);
}
/* our SHA1 hasher's state is 32-Bit integers in host order. We must
* convert them */
hasher = hasher_create(HASH_SHA1);
state_chunk = hasher->get_state(hasher);
state = (u_int32_t*)state_chunk.ptr;
iv = (u_int32_t*)t;
hash = (u_int32_t*)res;
state[0] = htonl(iv[0]);
state[1] = htonl(iv[1]);
state[2] = htonl(iv[2]);
state[3] = htonl(iv[3]);
hasher->get_hash(hasher, c, NULL);
hash[0] = htonl(state[0]);
hash[1] = htonl(state[1]);
hash[2] = htonl(state[2]);
hash[3] = htonl(state[3]);
hash[4] = htonl(state[4]);
hasher->destroy(hasher);
}
/**
* Implementation of prf_t.destroy.
*/
static void destroy(private_fips_prf_t *this)
{
free(this->key);
free(this);
}
/*
* Described in header.
*/
fips_prf_t *fips_prf_create(size_t b, void(*g)(u_int8_t[],chunk_t,u_int8_t[]))
{
private_fips_prf_t *this = malloc_thing(private_fips_prf_t);
this->public.prf_interface.get_bytes = (void (*) (prf_t *,chunk_t,u_int8_t*))get_bytes;
this->public.prf_interface.allocate_bytes = (void (*) (prf_t*,chunk_t,chunk_t*))allocate_bytes;
this->public.prf_interface.get_block_size = (size_t (*) (prf_t*))get_block_size;
this->public.prf_interface.get_key_size = (size_t (*) (prf_t*))get_key_size;
this->public.prf_interface.set_key = (void (*) (prf_t *,chunk_t))set_key;
this->public.prf_interface.destroy = (void (*) (prf_t *))destroy;
this->g = g;
this->b = b;
this->key = malloc(b);
return &(this->public);
}
src/libstrongswan/crypto/prfs/fips_prf.h
+80
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
/**
* @file fips_prf.h
*
* @brief Interface of fips_prf_t.
*
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2006 Martin Willi
* Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
* option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* for more details.
*/
#ifndef FIPS_PRF_H_
#define FIPS_PRF_H_
typedef struct fips_prf_t fips_prf_t;
#include <library.h>
#include <crypto/prfs/prf.h>
#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
/**
* @brief Implementation of prf_t using the FIPS 186-2-change1 standard.
*
* FIPS defines a "General Purpose Random Number Generator" (Revised
* Algorithm for Computing m values of x (Appendix 3.1 of FIPS 186-2)). This
* implementation is not intended for private key generation and therefore does
* not include the "mod q" operation (see FIPS 186-2-change1 p74).
* The FIPS PRF is stateful; the key changes every time when bytes are acquired.
*
* @b Constructors:
* - fips_prf_create()
* - prf_create() using one of the FIPS algorithms
*
* @ingroup prfs
*/
struct fips_prf_t {
/**
* Generic prf_t interface for this fips_prf_t class.
*/
prf_t prf_interface;
};
/**
* @brief Creates a new fips_prf_t object.
*
* FIPS 186-2 defines G() functions used in the PRF function. It can
* be implemented either based on SHA1 or DES.
*
* @param b size of b (in bytes, not bits)
* @param g G() function to use (e.g. g_sha1)
* @return
* - fips_prf_t object
* - NULL if b invalid not supported
*
* @ingroup prfs
*/
fips_prf_t *fips_prf_create(size_t b, void(*g)(u_int8_t[],chunk_t,u_int8_t[]));
/**
* @brief Implementation of the G() function based on SHA1.
*
* @param t initialization vector for SHA1 hasher, 20 bytes long
* @param c value to hash, not longer than 512 bit
* @param res result of G(), requries 20 bytes
*/
void g_sha1(u_int8_t t[], chunk_t c, u_int8_t res[]);
#endif /* FIPS_PRF_H_ */
src/libstrongswan/crypto/prfs/prf.c
+9 -7
View File
@@ -26,10 +26,13 @@
#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
#include <crypto/prfs/hmac_prf.h>
#include <crypto/prfs/fips_prf.h>
ENUM_BEGIN(pseudo_random_function_names, PRF_UNDEFINED, PRF_UNDEFINED,
"PRF_UNDEFINED");
ENUM_NEXT(pseudo_random_function_names, PRF_HMAC_MD5, PRF_AES128_CBC, PRF_UNDEFINED,
ENUM_BEGIN(pseudo_random_function_names, PRF_UNDEFINED, PRF_FIPS_DES,
"PRF_UNDEFINED",
"PRF_FIPS_SHA1_160",
"PRF_FIPS_DES");
ENUM_NEXT(pseudo_random_function_names, PRF_HMAC_MD5, PRF_AES128_CBC, PRF_FIPS_DES,
"PRF_HMAC_MD5",
"PRF_HMAC_SHA1",
"PRF_HMAC_TIGER",
@@ -44,13 +47,12 @@ prf_t *prf_create(pseudo_random_function_t pseudo_random_function)
switch (pseudo_random_function)
{
case PRF_HMAC_SHA1:
{
return (prf_t*)hmac_prf_create(HASH_SHA1);
}
case PRF_HMAC_MD5:
{
return (prf_t*)hmac_prf_create(HASH_MD5);
}
case PRF_FIPS_SHA1_160:
return (prf_t*)fips_prf_create(20, g_sha1);
case PRF_FIPS_DES:
case PRF_HMAC_TIGER:
case PRF_AES128_CBC:
default:
src/libstrongswan/crypto/prfs/prf.h
+11 -5
View File
@@ -31,11 +31,10 @@ typedef struct prf_t prf_t;
/**
* @brief Pseudo random function, as in IKEv2 RFC 3.3.2.
*
* Currently only the following algorithms are implemented:
* - PRF_HMAC_MD5
* - PRF_HMAC_SHA1
*
*
* PRF algorithms not defined in IKEv2 are allocated in "private use"
* space.
*
* @ingroup prfs
*/
enum pseudo_random_function_t {
@@ -46,6 +45,10 @@ enum pseudo_random_function_t {
PRF_HMAC_SHA1 = 2,
PRF_HMAC_TIGER = 3,
PRF_AES128_CBC = 4,
/** Implemented via fips_prf_t, other output sizes would be possible */
PRF_FIPS_SHA1_160 = 1025,
/** Could be implemented via fips_prf_t, uses fixed output size of 160bit */
PRF_FIPS_DES = 1026,
};
/**
@@ -93,6 +96,9 @@ struct prf_t {
/**
* @brief Get the key size of this prf_t object.
*
* This is a suggestion only, all implemented PRFs accept variable key
* length.
*
* @param this calling object
* @return key size in bytes
src/libstrongswan/crypto/signers/hmac_signer.c
+27 -23
View File
@@ -27,11 +27,6 @@
#include <crypto/prfs/hmac_prf.h>
/**
* This class represents a hmac signer with 12 byte (96 bit) output.
*/
#define BLOCK_SIZE 12
typedef struct private_hmac_signer_t private_hmac_signer_t;
/**
@@ -43,10 +38,15 @@ struct private_hmac_signer_t {
*/
hmac_signer_t public;
/*
/**
* Assigned hmac function.
*/
prf_t *hmac_prf;
/**
* Block size (truncation of HMAC Hash)
*/
size_t block_size;
};
/**
@@ -56,10 +56,10 @@ static void get_signature (private_hmac_signer_t *this, chunk_t data, u_int8_t *
{
u_int8_t full_mac[this->hmac_prf->get_block_size(this->hmac_prf)];
this->hmac_prf->get_bytes(this->hmac_prf,data,full_mac);
this->hmac_prf->get_bytes(this->hmac_prf, data, full_mac);
/* copy mac aka signature :-) */
memcpy(buffer,full_mac,BLOCK_SIZE);
/* copy MAC depending on truncation */
memcpy(buffer, full_mac, this->block_size);
}
/**
@@ -72,11 +72,11 @@ static void allocate_signature (private_hmac_signer_t *this, chunk_t data, chunk
this->hmac_prf->get_bytes(this->hmac_prf,data,full_mac);
signature.ptr = malloc(BLOCK_SIZE);
signature.len = BLOCK_SIZE;
signature.ptr = malloc(this->block_size);
signature.len = this->block_size;
/* copy signature */
memcpy(signature.ptr,full_mac,BLOCK_SIZE);
memcpy(signature.ptr, full_mac, this->block_size);
*chunk = signature;
}
@@ -84,19 +84,19 @@ static void allocate_signature (private_hmac_signer_t *this, chunk_t data, chunk
/**
* Implementation of signer_t.verify_signature.
*/
static bool verify_signature (private_hmac_signer_t *this, chunk_t data, chunk_t signature)
static bool verify_signature(private_hmac_signer_t *this, chunk_t data, chunk_t signature)
{
u_int8_t full_mac[this->hmac_prf->get_block_size(this->hmac_prf)];
this->hmac_prf->get_bytes(this->hmac_prf,data,full_mac);
this->hmac_prf->get_bytes(this->hmac_prf, data, full_mac);
if (signature.len != BLOCK_SIZE)
if (signature.len != this->block_size)
{
return FALSE;
}
/* compare mac aka signature :-) */
if (memcmp(signature.ptr,full_mac,BLOCK_SIZE) == 0)
if (memcmp(signature.ptr, full_mac, this->block_size) == 0)
{
return TRUE;
}
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static bool verify_signature (private_hmac_signer_t *this, chunk_t data, chunk_t
/**
* Implementation of signer_t.get_key_size.
*/
static size_t get_key_size (private_hmac_signer_t *this)
static size_t get_key_size(private_hmac_signer_t *this)
{
/* for HMAC signer, IKEv2 uses block size as key size */
return this->hmac_prf->get_block_size(this->hmac_prf);
@@ -118,17 +118,17 @@ static size_t get_key_size (private_hmac_signer_t *this)
/**
* Implementation of signer_t.get_block_size.
*/
static size_t get_block_size (private_hmac_signer_t *this)
static size_t get_block_size(private_hmac_signer_t *this)
{
return BLOCK_SIZE;
return this->block_size;
}
/**
* Implementation of signer_t.set_key.
*/
static void set_key (private_hmac_signer_t *this, chunk_t key)
static void set_key(private_hmac_signer_t *this, chunk_t key)
{
this->hmac_prf->set_key(this->hmac_prf,key);
this->hmac_prf->set_key(this->hmac_prf, key);
}
/**
@@ -144,12 +144,12 @@ static status_t destroy(private_hmac_signer_t *this)
/*
* Described in header
*/
hmac_signer_t *hmac_signer_create(hash_algorithm_t hash_algoritm)
hmac_signer_t *hmac_signer_create(hash_algorithm_t hash_algoritm, size_t block_size)
{
size_t hmac_block_size;
private_hmac_signer_t *this = malloc_thing(private_hmac_signer_t);
this->hmac_prf = (prf_t *) hmac_prf_create(hash_algoritm);
if (this->hmac_prf == NULL)
{
/* algorithm not supported */
@@ -157,6 +157,10 @@ hmac_signer_t *hmac_signer_create(hash_algorithm_t hash_algoritm)
return NULL;
}
/* prevent invalid truncation */
hmac_block_size = this->hmac_prf->get_block_size(this->hmac_prf);
this->block_size = min(block_size, hmac_block_size);
/* interface functions */
this->public.signer_interface.get_signature = (void (*) (signer_t*, chunk_t, u_int8_t*))get_signature;
this->public.signer_interface.allocate_signature = (void (*) (signer_t*, chunk_t, chunk_t*))allocate_signature;
src/libstrongswan/crypto/signers/hmac_signer.h
+14 -5
View File
@@ -30,9 +30,11 @@ typedef struct hmac_signer_t hmac_signer_t;
#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
/**
* @brief Implementation of signer_t interface using the
* HMAC algorithm in combination with either MD5 or SHA1.
*
* @brief Implementation of signer_t interface using HMAC.
*
* HMAC uses a standard hash function implemented in a hasher_t to build
* a MAC.
*
* @ingroup signers
*/
struct hmac_signer_t {
@@ -45,15 +47,22 @@ struct hmac_signer_t {
/**
* @brief Creates a new hmac_signer_t.
*
*
* HMAC signatures are often truncated to shorten them to a more usable, but
* still secure enough length.
* Block size must be equal or smaller then the hash algorithms
* hash.
*
* @param hash_algoritm Hash algorithm to use with signer
* @param block_size Size of resulting signature (truncated to block_size)
* @return
* - hmac_signer_t
* - NULL if hash algorithm not supported
*
* @ingroup signers
*/
hmac_signer_t *hmac_signer_create(hash_algorithm_t hash_algoritm);
hmac_signer_t *hmac_signer_create(hash_algorithm_t hash_algoritm,
size_t block_size);
#endif /*HMAC_SIGNER_H_*/
src/libstrongswan/crypto/signers/signer.c
+8 -9
View File
@@ -25,9 +25,10 @@
#include <crypto/signers/hmac_signer.h>
ENUM_BEGIN(integrity_algorithm_names, AUTH_UNDEFINED, AUTH_UNDEFINED,
"UNDEFINED");
ENUM_NEXT(integrity_algorithm_names, AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96, AUTH_AES_XCBC_96, AUTH_UNDEFINED,
ENUM_BEGIN(integrity_algorithm_names, AUTH_UNDEFINED, AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_128,
"UNDEFINED",
"AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_128");
ENUM_NEXT(integrity_algorithm_names, AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96, AUTH_AES_XCBC_96, AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_128,
"HMAC_MD5_96",
"HMAC_SHA1_96",
"DES_MAC",
@@ -43,13 +44,11 @@ signer_t *signer_create(integrity_algorithm_t integrity_algorithm)
switch(integrity_algorithm)
{
case AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96:
{
return ((signer_t *) hmac_signer_create(HASH_SHA1));
}
return (signer_t *)hmac_signer_create(HASH_SHA1, 12);
case AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_128:
return (signer_t *)hmac_signer_create(HASH_SHA1, 16);
case AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96:
{
return ((signer_t *) hmac_signer_create(HASH_MD5));
}
return (signer_t *)hmac_signer_create(HASH_MD5, 12);
default:
return NULL;
}
src/libstrongswan/crypto/signers/signer.h
+6 -6
View File
@@ -31,11 +31,9 @@ typedef struct signer_t signer_t;
/**
* @brief Integrity algorithm, as in IKEv2 RFC 3.3.2.
*
* Currently only the following algorithms are implemented and therefore supported:
* - AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96
* - AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96
*
*
* Algorithms not specified in IKEv2 are allocated in private use space.
*
* @ingroup signers
*/
enum integrity_algorithm_t {
@@ -46,7 +44,9 @@ enum integrity_algorithm_t {
AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 = 2,
AUTH_DES_MAC = 3,
AUTH_KPDK_MD5 = 4,
AUTH_AES_XCBC_96 = 5
AUTH_AES_XCBC_96 = 5,
/** Implemented via hmac_signer_t */
AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_128 = 1025,
};
/**
src/libstrongswan/library.c
+13
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ ENUM(status_names, SUCCESS, DESTROY_ME,
"VERIFY_ERROR",
"INVALID_STATE",
"DESTROY_ME",
"NEED_MORE",
);
/**
@@ -58,6 +59,18 @@ void *clalloc(void * pointer, size_t size)
return (data);
}
/**
* Described in header.
*/
void memxor(u_int8_t dest[], u_int8_t src[], size_t n)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
{
dest[i] ^= src[i];
}
}
/**
* We use a single mutex for all refcount variables. This
* is not optimal for performance, but the critical section
src/libstrongswan/library.h
+10
View File
@@ -226,6 +226,11 @@ enum status_t {
* Destroy object which called method belongs to.
*/
DESTROY_ME,
/**
* Another call to the method is required.
*/
NEED_MORE,
};
/**
@@ -259,6 +264,11 @@ typedef struct sockaddr sockaddr_t;
*/
void *clalloc(void *pointer, size_t size);
/**
* Same as memcpy, but XORs src into dst instead of copy
*/
void memxor(u_int8_t dest[], u_int8_t src[], size_t n);
/**
* Special type to count references
*/
src/libstrongswan/utils/leak_detective.c
+1
View File
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ whitelist_t whitelist[] = {
{getservbyport, 311},
{register_printf_function, 159},
{syslog, 45},
{dlopen, 109},
};
/**
src/starter/Makefile.am
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ keywords.c files.h keywords.h cmp.c starter.c cmp.h exec.c invokecharon.c \
exec.h invokecharon.h lex.yy.c
INCLUDES = -I$(top_srcdir)/src/libfreeswan -I$(top_srcdir)/src/pluto -I$(top_srcdir)/src/whack -I$(top_srcdir)/src/stroke
AM_CFLAGS = -DIPSEC_DIR=\"${ipsecdir}\" -DIPSEC_CONFDIR=\"${confdir}\" -DIPSEC_PIDDIR=\"${piddir}\" -DDEBUG
AM_CFLAGS = -DIPSEC_DIR=\"${ipsecdir}\" -DIPSEC_CONFDIR=\"${confdir}\" -DIPSEC_PIDDIR=\"${piddir}\" -DIPSEC_EAPDIR=\"${eapdir}\" -DDEBUG
starter_LDADD = loglite.o defs.o $(top_srcdir)/src/libfreeswan/libfreeswan.a
EXTRA_DIST = parser.l parser.y keywords.txt ipsec.conf
dist_man_MANS = ipsec.conf.5
src/starter/args.c
+2
View File
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ static const token_info_t token_info[] =
{ ARG_ENUM, offsetof(starter_config_t, setup.nat_traversal), LST_bool },
{ ARG_TIME, offsetof(starter_config_t, setup.keep_alive), NULL },
{ ARG_STR, offsetof(starter_config_t, setup.virtual_private), NULL },
{ ARG_STR, offsetof(starter_config_t, setup.eapdir), NULL },
{ ARG_STR, offsetof(starter_config_t, setup.pkcs11module), NULL },
{ ARG_ENUM, offsetof(starter_config_t, setup.pkcs11keepstate), LST_bool },
{ ARG_ENUM, offsetof(starter_config_t, setup.pkcs11proxy), LST_bool },
@@ -184,6 +185,7 @@ static const token_info_t token_info[] =
{ ARG_MISC, 0, NULL /* KW_COMPRESS */ },
{ ARG_MISC, 0, NULL /* KW_AUTH */ },
{ ARG_MISC, 0, NULL /* KW_AUTHBY */ },
{ ARG_MISC, 0, NULL /* KW_EAP */ },
{ ARG_TIME, offsetof(starter_conn_t, sa_ike_life_seconds), NULL },
{ ARG_TIME, offsetof(starter_conn_t, sa_ipsec_life_seconds), NULL },
{ ARG_TIME, offsetof(starter_conn_t, sa_rekey_margin), NULL },
src/starter/confread.c
+16 -1
View File
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static void default_values(starter_config_t *cfg)
cfg->setup.interfaces = new_list("%defaultroute");
cfg->setup.charonstart = TRUE;
cfg->setup.plutostart = TRUE;
cfg->setup.eapdir = IPSEC_EAPDIR;
cfg->conn_default.seen = LEMPTY;
cfg->conn_default.startup = STARTUP_NO;
@@ -414,7 +415,7 @@ load_conn(starter_conn_t *conn, kw_list_t *kw, starter_config_t *cfg)
case KW_AUTHBY:
conn->policy &= ~(POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK | POLICY_ENCRYPT);
if (strcmp(kw->value, "never") != 0)
if (!(streq(kw->value, "never") || streq(kw->value, "eap")))
{
char *value = kw->value;
char *second = strchr(kw->value, '|');
@@ -446,6 +447,20 @@ load_conn(starter_conn_t *conn, kw_list_t *kw, starter_config_t *cfg)
}
}
break;
case KW_EAP:
/* TODO: a gperf function for all EAP types */
if (streq(kw->value, "aka"))
conn->eap = 23;
else
{
conn->eap = atoi(kw->value);
if (conn->eap == 0)
{
plog("# unknown EAP type: %s=%s", kw->entry->name, kw->value);
cfg->err++;
}
}
break;
case KW_REKEY:
KW_POLICY_FLAG("no", "yes", POLICY_DONT_REKEY)
break;
src/starter/confread.h
+2
View File
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct starter_conn {
starter_state_t state;
keyexchange_t keyexchange;
int eap;
lset_t policy;
time_t sa_ike_life_seconds;
time_t sa_ipsec_life_seconds;
@@ -167,6 +168,7 @@ struct starter_config {
bool nat_traversal;
u_int keep_alive;
char *virtual_private;
char *eapdir;
char *pkcs11module;
bool pkcs11keepstate;
bool pkcs11proxy;
src/starter/invokecharon.c
+2
View File
@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ starter_start_charon (starter_config_t *cfg, bool debug)
{
arg[argc++] = "--strictcrlpolicy";
}
arg[argc++] = "--eapdir";
arg[argc++] = cfg->setup.eapdir;
{ /* parse debug string */
char *pos, *level, *buf_pos, type[4], buffer[512];
src/starter/keywords.h
+2
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ typedef enum {
KW_NAT_TRAVERSAL,
KW_KEEP_ALIVE,
KW_VIRTUAL_PRIVATE,
KW_EAPDIR,
KW_PKCS11MODULE,
KW_PKCS11KEEPSTATE,
KW_PKCS11PROXY,
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ typedef enum {
KW_COMPRESS,
KW_AUTH,
KW_AUTHBY,
KW_EAP,
KW_IKELIFETIME,
KW_KEYLIFE,
KW_REKEYMARGIN,
src/starter/keywords.txt
+2
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ nocrsend, KW_NOCRSEND
nat_traversal, KW_NAT_TRAVERSAL
keep_alive, KW_KEEP_ALIVE
virtual_private, KW_VIRTUAL_PRIVATE
eap, KW_EAP
eapdir, KW_EAPDIR
pkcs11module, KW_PKCS11MODULE
pkcs11keepstate, KW_PKCS11KEEPSTATE
pkcs11proxy, KW_PKCS11PROXY
src/starter/starterstroke.c
+21 -23
View File
@@ -37,29 +37,13 @@
#include "files.h"
/**
* AUTH Method to use.
*
* @ingroup config
* Authentication mehtods, must be the same values as in charon
*/
enum auth_method_t {
/**
* Computed as specified in section 2.15 of RFC using
* an RSA private key over a PKCS#1 padded hash.
*/
RSA_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE = 1,
/**
* Computed as specified in section 2.15 of RFC using the
* shared key associated with the identity in the ID payload
* and the negotiated prf function
*/
SHARED_KEY_MESSAGE_INTEGRITY_CODE = 2,
/**
* Computed as specified in section 2.15 of RFC using a
* DSS private key over a SHA-1 hash.
*/
DSS_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE = 3,
AUTH_RSA = 1,
AUTH_PSK = 2,
AUTH_DSS = 3,
AUTH_EAP = 201,
};
static char* push_string(stroke_msg_t *msg, char *string)
@@ -192,8 +176,22 @@ int starter_stroke_add_conn(starter_conn_t *conn)
msg.length = offsetof(stroke_msg_t, buffer);
msg.add_conn.ikev2 = conn->keyexchange == KEY_EXCHANGE_IKEV2;
msg.add_conn.name = push_string(&msg, connection_name(conn));
msg.add_conn.auth_method = (conn->policy & POLICY_PSK)?
SHARED_KEY_MESSAGE_INTEGRITY_CODE : RSA_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
/* RSA is preferred before PSK and EAP */
if (conn->policy & POLICY_RSASIG)
{
msg.add_conn.auth_method = AUTH_RSA;
}
else if (conn->policy & POLICY_PSK)
{
msg.add_conn.auth_method = AUTH_PSK;
}
else
{
msg.add_conn.auth_method = AUTH_EAP;
}
msg.add_conn.eap_type = conn->eap;
if (conn->policy & POLICY_TUNNEL)
{
msg.add_conn.mode = 1; /* XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT */
src/stroke/stroke.c
+2
View File
@@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ static int add_connection(char *name,
msg.add_conn.name = push_string(&msg, name);
msg.add_conn.ikev2 = 1;
msg.add_conn.auth_method = 2;
msg.add_conn.eap_type = 0;
msg.add_conn.mode = 1;
msg.add_conn.rekey.reauth = 0;
src/stroke/stroke.h
+1
View File
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ struct stroke_msg_t {
char *name;
int ikev2;
int auth_method;
int eap_type;
int mode;
struct {
char *ike;
testing/start-testing
+4
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ case $UMLSTARTMODE in
cecho "Start the uml instances (scripts/kstart-umls)"
$DIR/scripts/kstart-umls $HOSTS
;;
gnome-terminal)
cecho "Start the uml instances (scripts/gstart-umls)"
$DIR/scripts/gstart-umls $HOSTS
;;
xterm)
cecho "Start the uml instances (scripts/xstart-umls)"
$DIR/scripts/xstart-umls $HOSTS
testing/testing.conf
+10 -10
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
# RCSID $Id: testing.conf,v 1.52 2006/04/24 16:58:03 as Exp $
# Root directory of testing
UMLTESTDIR=~/strongswan-testing
UMLTESTDIR=/home/strongswan-testing
# Bzipped kernel sources
# (file extension .tar.bz2 required)
@@ -49,13 +49,13 @@ ROOTFSSIZE=544
# Amount of Memory to use per UML [MB].
# If "auto" is stated 1/12 of total host ram will be used.
# Examples: MEM=64, MEM="128", MEM="auto"
MEM=64
MEM=96
# Directory where the UML kernels and file system will be built
BUILDDIR=$UMLTESTDIR/umlbuild
# Filename of the built UML Kernel
UMLKERNEL=$BUILDDIR/linux-uml-$KERNELVERSION
UMLKERNEL=$UMLTESTDIR/linux
# Directory where test results will be stored
TESTRESULTSDIR=$UMLTESTDIR/testresults
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ TESTRESULTSDIR=$UMLTESTDIR/testresults
# Path to a full strongswan tree on the host system, which is
# mounted into /root/strongswan-shared. This gives us an easy
# way to apply and test changes instantly.
#SHAREDTREE=/home/mwilli/strongswan/trunk
SHAREDTREE=/home/martin/strongswan/trunk
# Timezone for the UMLs, look in /usr/share/zoneinfo!
TZUML="Europe/Zurich"
@@ -72,22 +72,22 @@ TZUML="Europe/Zurich"
# Enable particular steps in the make-testing and
# start-testing scripts
#
ENABLE_BUILD_UMLKERNEL="yes"
ENABLE_BUILD_UMLKERNEL="no"
ENABLE_BUILD_SSHKEYS="yes"
ENABLE_BUILD_HOSTCONFIG="yes"
ENABLE_BUILD_UMLROOTFS="yes"
ENABLE_BUILD_UMLHOSTFS="yes"
ENABLE_START_TESTING="yes"
ENABLE_DO_TESTS="yes"
ENABLE_START_TESTING="no"
ENABLE_DO_TESTS="no"
ENABLE_STOP_TESTING="no"
##############################################################
# How to start the UMLs?
#
# Start the UML instance in KDE konsole (requires KDE)
UMLSTARTMODE="konsole"
#UMLSTARTMODE="gnome-terminal"
# Start the UML instance in an xterm (requires X11R6)
# UMLSTARTMODE="xterm"
UMLSTARTMODE="xterm"
# Start the UML instance without a terminal window
# but screen -r <host> can open a window anytime
# UMLSTARTMODE="screen"
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ SELECTEDTESTSONLY="no"
# Tests to do if $SELECTEDTESTSONLY is set "yes".
#
SELECTEDTESTS="net2net-cert"
SELECTEDTESTS="ikev2-net2net ikev2-rw"
##############################################################
# hostname and corresponding IPv4 and IPv6 addresses