fix(mcp): упорядочить записи журнала опроса

app/(main)/traffic/page.tsx

@@ -924,18 +924,21 @@ export default function TrafficPage() {
       })
       return () => { cancelled = true }
     }
-    void Promise.all([
+    const loadFlowCards = async () => {
-      getTrafficFlows(backendUrl, range),
+      // These reads share the collector's constrained admission budget.
-      getFlowExporters(backendUrl, range),
+      const stats = await getTrafficFlows(backendUrl, range)
-      getFlowClients(backendUrl, range),
+      if (cancelled) return
-    ]).then(([stats, exporters, clients]) => {
+      const exporters = await getFlowExporters(backendUrl, range)
+      if (cancelled) return
+      const clients = await getFlowClients(backendUrl, range)
       if (cancelled) return
       setFlowResult({ key: flowKey, receivedAt: Date.now(), stats, exporters: exporters.exporters, clients: clients.clients })
       setSelectedId(prev => {
         const list = flowScope === "users" ? clients.clients : exporters.exporters
         return list.some(x => x.id === prev) ? prev : (list[0]?.id ?? "")
       })
-    }).catch(e => {
+    }
+    void loadFlowCards().catch(e => {
       if (!cancelled) setFlowResult({ key: flowKey, error: e instanceof Error ? e.message : "Не удалось загрузить потоки" })
     })
     return () => { cancelled = true }

app/globals.css

@@ -1,7 +1,16 @@
-@import "tailwindcss";
+@import "tailwindcss" source(none);
 @import "tw-animate-css";
 @import "shadcn/tailwind.css";
 
+/* Scan application sources only; local test archives and generated bundles
+   must not become utility classes in the production stylesheet. */
+@source "./";
+@source "../components";
+@source "../entities";
+@source "../hooks";
+@source "../lib";
+@source "../shared";
+
 /* SVG focus follows the object shape, never the text/foreignObject bounding box. */
 .network-map-focusable {
   outline: none;

backend/drizzle/0045_mcp_operation_replay_tombstones.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+BEGIN;
+CREATE TABLE public.mcp_operation_replay_tombstones (
+ operation_id uuid PRIMARY KEY,
+ plan_id uuid NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+ connection_id uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES public.mcp_connections(id),
+ idempotency_digest text NOT NULL CHECK (idempotency_digest ~ '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'),
+ action_id text NOT NULL CHECK (length(action_id) BETWEEN 1 AND 200),
+ target_server_ids bigint[] NOT NULL CHECK (array_position(target_server_ids, NULL) IS NULL),
+ target_global boolean NOT NULL,
+ UNIQUE (connection_id,idempotency_digest)
+);
+INSERT INTO public.schema_migrations(id) VALUES ('0045_mcp_operation_replay_tombstones') ON CONFLICT(id) DO NOTHING;
+COMMIT;

backend/drizzle/0046_server_poll_operation_retirement.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+-- Inactive poll-history V1-to-V2 retirement. Application owner authenticates
+-- both ciphertext versions; SQL independently fences identity and lifetime.
+BEGIN;
+LOCK TABLE public.server_poll_archives,public.server_poll_storage_admissions IN ACCESS EXCLUSIVE MODE;
+ALTER TABLE public.server_poll_archives DROP CONSTRAINT server_poll_archives_version_check;
+ALTER TABLE public.server_poll_archives ADD CONSTRAINT server_poll_archives_version_check
+ CHECK(version=1 OR (version=2 AND decoded_bytes<=24576 AND compressed_bytes<=24576 AND ciphertext_bytes<=33000));
+
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.server_poll_archive_immutable() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET TimeZone='UTC' SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF TG_OP='DELETE' AND public.server_poll_storage_gc_allowed(OLD.receipt_id) THEN RETURN OLD; END IF;
+ IF TG_OP='UPDATE' AND OLD.version=1 AND NEW.version=2
+   AND current_setting('mm.poll_retire_receipt',true)=OLD.receipt_id::text
+   AND NEW.ciphertext_bytes<=OLD.ciphertext_bytes
+   AND NEW.ciphertext ~ '^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$'
+   AND replace(encode(decode(NEW.ciphertext,'base64'),'base64'),E'\n','')=NEW.ciphertext
+   AND octet_length(decode(NEW.ciphertext,'base64'))=NEW.compressed_bytes+28
+   AND (to_jsonb(OLD)-ARRAY['version','source_digest','source_sha256','decoded_bytes','compressed_bytes','ciphertext','ciphertext_bytes','archive_proof'])=
+       (to_jsonb(NEW)-ARRAY['version','source_digest','source_sha256','decoded_bytes','compressed_bytes','ciphertext','ciphertext_bytes','archive_proof'])
+   AND EXISTS(
+    SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_storage_admissions a JOIN public.mcp_operations o ON o.id=a.execution_id AND o.connection_id=a.connection_id
+    JOIN public.mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id
+    JOIN public.mcp_operation_steps s ON s.operation_id=o.id AND s.step_index=0
+    JOIN public.mcp_operation_replay_tombstones t ON t.operation_id=o.id AND t.plan_id=p.id AND t.connection_id=o.connection_id
+    JOIN public.mcp_connections c ON c.id=o.connection_id AND c.owner_id=a.owner_id
+    WHERE a.receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id AND a.identity_kind='mcp' AND a.storage_state='compacted'
+     AND a.execution_id=OLD.execution_id AND a.connection_id=OLD.connection_id AND a.owner_id=OLD.owner_id
+     AND a.binding_proof=OLD.binding_proof AND a.context_proof=OLD.context_proof AND a.archive_bytes=OLD.ciphertext_bytes
+     AND a.original_activity_at=OLD.original_activity_at AND a.authority_expires_at=OLD.original_expires_at
+     AND o.state='applied' AND o.verification='passed' AND o.error_code IS NULL AND isfinite(o.finished_at)
+     AND o.finished_at<transaction_timestamp()-interval '180 days'
+     AND p.state='completed' AND p.operation_id='servers.poll' AND p.operation_version=1 AND p.approved_by IS NOT NULL
+     AND s.state='verified' AND s.finished_at IS NOT NULL AND t.action_id=p.operation_id
+     AND t.target_global AND cardinality(t.target_server_ids)>0
+   ) THEN RETURN NEW; END IF;
+ RAISE EXCEPTION 'poll archive immutable outside exact retirement or original lifetime GC';
+END $$;
+
+CREATE FUNCTION public.server_poll_retirement_final_guard() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operation_replay_tombstones t
+    WHERE t.operation_id=NEW.execution_id AND t.connection_id=NEW.connection_id AND t.action_id='servers.poll'
+     AND t.target_global AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_plans p WHERE p.id=t.plan_id))
+  OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operations o WHERE o.id=NEW.execution_id)
+  OR NOT public.server_poll_storage_accounting_valid()
+ THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'poll retirement is incomplete'; END IF;
+ RETURN NULL;
+END $$;
+CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER server_poll_retirement_final_guard AFTER UPDATE ON public.server_poll_archives
+ DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED FOR EACH ROW WHEN(OLD.version=1 AND NEW.version=2)
+ EXECUTE FUNCTION public.server_poll_retirement_final_guard();
+
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION server_poll_storage_admission_guard() RETURNS trigger LANGUAGE plpgsql SET TimeZone='UTC' SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+DECLARE retention integer; charged integer; r public.server_poll_archives%ROWTYPE;
+BEGIN
+ PERFORM pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtextextended('server-poll-storage-v1',0));
+ IF TG_OP='DELETE' THEN
+  IF NOT public.server_poll_storage_gc_allowed(OLD.receipt_id) OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_executions WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id)
+   OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_intents WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id) OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_acks WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id)
+   OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_receipts WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id) OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_quarantines WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id)
+   OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_archives WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id) THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'poll lifetime or children prevent admission deletion'; END IF;
+  UPDATE public.server_poll_storage_usage SET admissions=admissions-CASE WHEN OLD.storage_state='full' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END,
+   compacted_admissions=compacted_admissions-CASE WHEN OLD.storage_state='compacted' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END,
+   archive_bytes=archive_bytes-COALESCE(OLD.archive_bytes,0),
+   reserved_rows=reserved_rows-CASE WHEN OLD.storage_state='full' THEN 4019 ELSE 2 END,
+   reserved_bytes=reserved_bytes-CASE WHEN OLD.storage_state='full' THEN 8421376 ELSE 32768+OLD.archive_bytes END
+   WHERE scope IN('global','owner:'||OLD.owner_id);
+  GET DIAGNOSTICS charged=ROW_COUNT; IF charged<>2 THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'poll quota refund mismatch'; END IF; RETURN OLD;
+ END IF;
+ IF TG_OP='UPDATE' THEN
+  IF OLD.storage_state='compacted' AND NEW.storage_state='compacted'
+   AND current_setting('mm.poll_retire_receipt',true)=OLD.receipt_id::text
+   AND (to_jsonb(OLD)-'archive_bytes')=(to_jsonb(NEW)-'archive_bytes') THEN
+   SELECT * INTO r FROM public.server_poll_archives WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id AND version=2;
+   IF NOT FOUND OR r.ciphertext_bytes<>NEW.archive_bytes OR NEW.archive_bytes>OLD.archive_bytes
+    OR r.execution_id<>OLD.execution_id OR r.connection_id<>OLD.connection_id OR r.owner_id<>OLD.owner_id
+   THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'retired poll charge source mismatch'; END IF;
+   UPDATE public.server_poll_storage_usage
+    SET archive_bytes=archive_bytes-OLD.archive_bytes+NEW.archive_bytes,
+        reserved_bytes=reserved_bytes-OLD.archive_bytes+NEW.archive_bytes
+    WHERE scope IN ('global','owner:'||OLD.owner_id) AND compacted_admissions>=1 AND archive_bytes>=OLD.archive_bytes;
+   GET DIAGNOSTICS charged=ROW_COUNT;
+   IF charged<>2 THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'retired poll charge adjustment mismatch'; END IF;
+   RETURN NEW;
+  END IF;
+  -- This durable one-shot marker is written and ACKed in its OWN transaction
+  -- before archive construction. A committed/unknown claim never resets and
+  -- the worker never retries destructive work against an already claimed full
+  -- source. Claim time is maintenance metadata, not renewed execution activity.
+  IF OLD.storage_state='full' AND NEW.storage_state='full' AND OLD.compaction_claim IS NULL AND OLD.compaction_claimed_at IS NULL AND OLD.compaction_claim_xid IS NULL
+   AND NEW.compaction_claim IS NOT NULL AND NEW.compaction_claim_xid IS NULL
+   AND(to_jsonb(OLD)-ARRAY['compaction_claim','compaction_claimed_at','compaction_claim_xid'])=(to_jsonb(NEW)-ARRAY['compaction_claim','compaction_claimed_at','compaction_claim_xid'])
+   AND public.server_poll_storage_compact_allowed(OLD.receipt_id)
+  THEN NEW.compaction_claimed_at:=clock_timestamp(); NEW.compaction_claim_xid:=pg_current_xact_id(); RETURN NEW; END IF;
+  IF(to_jsonb(OLD)-ARRAY['claim_token','claim_attempted_at','used_rows','used_bytes','storage_state','compact_at','archive_bytes','original_activity_at']) IS DISTINCT FROM
+    (to_jsonb(NEW)-ARRAY['claim_token','claim_attempted_at','used_rows','used_bytes','storage_state','compact_at','archive_bytes','original_activity_at']) THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'poll admission identity is immutable'; END IF;
+  IF OLD.storage_state<>'full' THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'compacted poll identity cannot reopen or change'; END IF;
+  IF NEW.storage_state='compacted' THEN
+   SELECT * INTO r FROM public.server_poll_archives WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id AND compaction_xid=pg_current_xact_id();
+   IF NOT FOUND OR NEW.used_rows<>OLD.used_rows OR NEW.used_bytes<>OLD.used_bytes OR NEW.claim_token IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.claim_token
+    OR NEW.claim_attempted_at IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.claim_attempted_at OR NEW.archive_bytes<>r.ciphertext_bytes OR NEW.original_activity_at<>r.original_activity_at
+    OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_executions WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id)
+    OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_intents WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id) OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_acks WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id)
+    OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_receipts WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id) OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_quarantines WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id)
+   THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'poll compaction requires the complete current-transaction archive'; END IF;
+   NEW.compact_at:=r.created_at;
+   UPDATE public.server_poll_storage_usage SET admissions=admissions-1,compacted_admissions=compacted_admissions+1,
+    archive_bytes=archive_bytes+r.ciphertext_bytes,reserved_rows=reserved_rows-4019+2,reserved_bytes=reserved_bytes-8421376+32768+r.ciphertext_bytes
+    WHERE scope IN('global','owner:'||OLD.owner_id) AND admissions>=1;
+   GET DIAGNOSTICS charged=ROW_COUNT; IF charged<>2 THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'poll compaction charge mismatch'; END IF;
+   RETURN NEW;
+  END IF;
+  IF NEW.compact_at IS NOT NULL OR NEW.archive_bytes IS NOT NULL OR NEW.original_activity_at IS NOT NULL THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'full poll cannot carry archive metadata'; END IF;
+  IF OLD.claim_token IS NOT NULL AND NEW.claim_token IS NULL AND OLD.claim_attempted_at IS NULL AND NEW.claim_attempted_at IS NOT NULL
+   AND NEW.used_rows=OLD.used_rows AND NEW.used_bytes=OLD.used_bytes AND OLD.authority_expires_at>clock_timestamp()
+  THEN NEW.claim_attempted_at:=clock_timestamp(); RETURN NEW; END IF;
+  IF OLD.claim_token IS NOT DISTINCT FROM NEW.claim_token AND OLD.claim_attempted_at IS NOT DISTINCT FROM NEW.claim_attempted_at
+   AND NEW.used_rows=OLD.used_rows+1 AND NEW.used_bytes>OLD.used_bytes THEN RETURN NEW; END IF;
+  RAISE EXCEPTION 'poll admission cannot refresh, reopen or refund itself';
+ END IF;
+ IF NEW.storage_state<>'full' OR NEW.compact_at IS NOT NULL OR NEW.archive_bytes IS NOT NULL OR NEW.original_activity_at IS NOT NULL
+  OR NEW.compaction_claim IS NOT NULL OR NEW.compaction_claimed_at IS NOT NULL OR NEW.compaction_claim_xid IS NOT NULL
+  OR NOT public.server_poll_storage_accounting_valid() THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'new poll requires full reservation and exact ledger'; END IF;
+ SELECT requests_retention_days INTO retention FROM public.mcp_settings WHERE id=1;
+ IF retention IS NULL OR retention NOT BETWEEN 1 AND 365 OR NEW.authority_issued_at>clock_timestamp() OR NEW.authority_expires_at<=clock_timestamp()
+  OR NEW.claim_token IS NULL OR NEW.claim_attempted_at IS NOT NULL OR NEW.used_rows<>0 OR NEW.used_bytes<>0 THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'new poll admission needs original live authority'; END IF;
+ IF EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_storage_admissions WHERE receipt_id=NEW.receipt_id OR(identity_kind=NEW.identity_kind AND execution_id=NEW.execution_id)) THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'poll identity already spent'; END IF;
+ NEW.created_at:=clock_timestamp(); NEW.retention_days:=retention; NEW.safety_ms:=60000;
+ NEW.gc_not_before:=NEW.authority_expires_at+make_interval(days=>retention)+interval '60 seconds';
+ INSERT INTO public.server_poll_storage_usage(scope) VALUES('owner:'||NEW.owner_id) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING;
+ IF(SELECT count(*) FROM public.server_poll_storage_usage WHERE scope IN('global','owner:'||NEW.owner_id)
+  AND admissions<CASE WHEN scope='global' THEN 128 ELSE 8 END
+  AND reserved_rows<=CASE WHEN scope='global' THEN 514432 ELSE 32152 END-4019
+  AND reserved_bytes<=CASE WHEN scope='global' THEN 1077936128 ELSE 67371008 END-8421376)<>2 THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'poll admission quota exhausted'; END IF;
+ UPDATE public.server_poll_storage_usage SET admissions=admissions+1,reserved_rows=reserved_rows+4019,reserved_bytes=reserved_bytes+8421376 WHERE scope IN('global','owner:'||NEW.owner_id);
+ GET DIAGNOSTICS charged=ROW_COUNT; IF charged<>2 THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'poll admission quota unavailable'; END IF;
+ RETURN NEW;
+END $$;
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION server_poll_storage_gc_allowed(id uuid) RETURNS boolean LANGUAGE plpgsql SET TimeZone='UTC' SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+DECLARE a public.server_poll_storage_admissions%ROWTYPE; retention integer; activity timestamptz; terminal_at timestamptz;
+BEGIN
+ IF current_setting('mm.poll_storage_gc',true) IS DISTINCT FROM 'on' THEN RETURN false; END IF;
+ PERFORM pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtextextended('server-poll-storage-v1',0));
+ SELECT * INTO a FROM public.server_poll_storage_admissions WHERE receipt_id=id FOR UPDATE;
+ IF NOT FOUND OR a.authority_expires_at>=clock_timestamp() OR a.gc_not_before>=clock_timestamp() THEN RETURN false; END IF;
+ SELECT requests_retention_days INTO retention FROM public.mcp_settings WHERE mcp_settings.id=1 FOR SHARE;
+ IF retention IS NULL OR retention NOT BETWEEN 1 AND 365 THEN RETURN false; END IF;
+ terminal_at:=a.created_at;
+ IF a.identity_kind='mcp' THEN
+  IF NOT pg_try_advisory_xact_lock(hashtextextended('mcp-operation:'||a.execution_id::text,0)) THEN RETURN false; END IF;
+  BEGIN
+   SELECT GREATEST(o.finished_at,p.expires_at) INTO terminal_at FROM public.mcp_operations o
+    JOIN public.mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id JOIN public.mcp_connections c ON c.id=o.connection_id
+    WHERE o.id=a.execution_id AND o.connection_id=a.connection_id AND c.owner_id=a.owner_id AND p.operation_id='servers.poll'
+      AND o.state IN('applied','failed','unknown','rejected','partial','cancelled') AND o.finished_at IS NOT NULL FOR UPDATE OF o,p NOWAIT;
+   IF NOT FOUND THEN
+    IF a.storage_state<>'compacted' OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operations o WHERE o.id=a.execution_id) OR NOT EXISTS (
+      SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operation_replay_tombstones t JOIN public.mcp_connections c ON c.id=t.connection_id
+      WHERE t.operation_id=a.execution_id AND t.connection_id=a.connection_id AND c.owner_id=a.owner_id
+       AND t.action_id='servers.poll' AND t.target_global AND cardinality(t.target_server_ids)>0
+       AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_plans WHERE mcp_plans.id=t.plan_id)
+    ) OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_archives r WHERE r.receipt_id=id AND
+      (r.version<>2 OR r.execution_id<>a.execution_id OR r.connection_id<>a.connection_id OR r.owner_id<>a.owner_id
+       OR r.original_activity_at IS DISTINCT FROM a.original_activity_at OR r.original_expires_at<>a.authority_expires_at
+       OR r.binding_proof<>a.binding_proof OR r.context_proof<>a.context_proof OR r.ciphertext_bytes<>a.archive_bytes))
+    THEN RETURN false; END IF;
+    terminal_at:=a.original_activity_at;
+   END IF;
+   IF terminal_at IS NULL THEN RETURN false; END IF;
+  EXCEPTION WHEN lock_not_available THEN RETURN false; END;
+ END IF;
+ IF a.storage_state='compacted' THEN activity:=GREATEST(a.original_activity_at,a.authority_expires_at,terminal_at);
+ ELSE
+  SELECT GREATEST(a.authority_expires_at,a.created_at,COALESCE(a.claim_attempted_at,a.created_at),terminal_at,
+   COALESCE((SELECT created_at FROM public.server_poll_executions WHERE receipt_id=id),a.created_at),
+   COALESCE((SELECT max(created_at) FROM public.server_poll_intents WHERE receipt_id=id),a.created_at),
+   COALESCE((SELECT max(created_at) FROM public.server_poll_acks WHERE receipt_id=id),a.created_at),
+   COALESCE((SELECT created_at FROM public.server_poll_receipts WHERE receipt_id=id),a.created_at),
+   COALESCE((SELECT created_at FROM public.server_poll_quarantines WHERE receipt_id=id),a.created_at)) INTO activity;
+ END IF;
+ RETURN isfinite(activity) AND activity+make_interval(days=>GREATEST(a.retention_days,retention))+a.safety_ms*interval '1 millisecond'<clock_timestamp();
+END $$;
+INSERT INTO public.schema_migrations(id) VALUES ('0046_server_poll_operation_retirement') ON CONFLICT(id) DO NOTHING;
+COMMIT;

backend/drizzle/0047_server_poll_retirement_claims.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+BEGIN;
+CREATE TABLE public.server_poll_retirement_claims (
+ receipt_id uuid PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES public.server_poll_storage_admissions(receipt_id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+ old_archive_proof text NOT NULL CHECK(old_archive_proof ~ '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'),
+ claim_token uuid NOT NULL,
+ claim_xid xid8 NOT NULL DEFAULT pg_current_xact_id()
+);
+CREATE FUNCTION public.server_poll_retirement_claim_immutable() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF TG_OP='INSERT' AND NEW.claim_xid=pg_current_xact_id() AND EXISTS(
+  SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_archives r WHERE r.receipt_id=NEW.receipt_id
+   AND r.version=1 AND r.archive_proof=NEW.old_archive_proof
+ ) THEN RETURN NEW; END IF;
+ IF TG_OP='DELETE' AND pg_trigger_depth()>1 AND NOT EXISTS(
+  SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_storage_admissions a WHERE a.receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id
+ ) THEN RETURN OLD; END IF;
+ RAISE EXCEPTION 'poll retirement claim cannot be replaced or reopened';
+END $$;
+CREATE TRIGGER server_poll_retirement_claim_immutable
+ BEFORE INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE ON public.server_poll_retirement_claims
+ FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION public.server_poll_retirement_claim_immutable();
+CREATE TRIGGER server_poll_retirement_claim_no_truncate
+ BEFORE TRUNCATE ON public.server_poll_retirement_claims
+ FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION public.server_poll_retirement_claim_immutable();
+CREATE FUNCTION public.server_poll_retirement_requires_claim() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_retirement_claims c
+  WHERE c.receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id AND c.old_archive_proof=OLD.archive_proof
+  AND c.claim_token::text=current_setting('mm.poll_retire_claim',true)
+  AND c.claim_xid<>pg_current_xact_id())
+ THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'poll retirement requires prior exact claim'; END IF;
+ RETURN NEW;
+END $$;
+CREATE TRIGGER server_poll_retirement_requires_claim BEFORE UPDATE ON public.server_poll_archives
+ FOR EACH ROW WHEN(OLD.version=1 AND NEW.version=2)
+ EXECUTE FUNCTION public.server_poll_retirement_requires_claim();
+INSERT INTO public.schema_migrations(id) VALUES ('0047_server_poll_retirement_claims') ON CONFLICT(id) DO NOTHING;
+COMMIT;

backend/drizzle/0048_mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+BEGIN;
+CREATE TABLE public.mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims (
+ operation_id uuid PRIMARY KEY,
+ plan_id uuid NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+ connection_id uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES public.mcp_connections(id),
+ source_proof text NOT NULL CHECK(source_proof ~ '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'),
+ claim_token uuid NOT NULL,
+ claim_xid xid8 NOT NULL DEFAULT pg_current_xact_id()
+);
+CREATE FUNCTION public.mcp_ordinary_retirement_claim_immutable() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET TimeZone='UTC' SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF TG_OP='INSERT' AND NEW.claim_xid=pg_current_xact_id() AND EXISTS(
+  SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operations o JOIN public.mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id
+  WHERE o.id=NEW.operation_id AND o.plan_id=NEW.plan_id AND o.connection_id=NEW.connection_id
+   AND o.state='applied' AND o.verification='passed' AND o.error_code IS NULL
+   AND isfinite(o.finished_at) AND o.finished_at<transaction_timestamp()-interval '180 days'
+   AND p.operation_id='logs.settings.update' AND p.operation_version=1 AND p.state='completed'
+ ) THEN RETURN NEW; END IF;
+ RAISE EXCEPTION 'ordinary operation retirement claim cannot be replaced or reopened';
+END $$;
+CREATE TRIGGER mcp_ordinary_retirement_claim_immutable BEFORE INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE
+ ON public.mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION public.mcp_ordinary_retirement_claim_immutable();
+CREATE TRIGGER mcp_ordinary_retirement_claim_no_truncate BEFORE TRUNCATE
+ ON public.mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION public.mcp_ordinary_retirement_claim_immutable();
+INSERT INTO public.schema_migrations(id) VALUES ('0048_mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims') ON CONFLICT(id) DO NOTHING;
+COMMIT;

backend/drizzle/0049_mcp_ordinary_telemetry_retirement.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+BEGIN;
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.mcp_ordinary_retirement_claim_immutable() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET TimeZone='UTC' SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF TG_OP='INSERT' AND NEW.claim_xid=pg_current_xact_id() AND EXISTS(
+  SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operations o JOIN public.mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id
+  WHERE o.id=NEW.operation_id AND o.plan_id=NEW.plan_id AND o.connection_id=NEW.connection_id
+   AND o.state='applied' AND o.verification='passed' AND o.error_code IS NULL
+   AND isfinite(o.finished_at) AND o.finished_at<transaction_timestamp()-interval '180 days'
+   AND (p.operation_id,p.operation_version) IN (
+    ('logs.settings.update',1),('traffic.settings.update',2),('uptime.settings.update',2),
+    ('servers.api-ping.settings.update',2),('internet-path.settings.update',1)
+   ) AND p.state='completed'
+ ) THEN RETURN NEW; END IF;
+ RAISE EXCEPTION 'ordinary operation retirement claim cannot be replaced or reopened';
+END $$;
+INSERT INTO public.schema_migrations(id) VALUES ('0049_mcp_ordinary_telemetry_retirement') ON CONFLICT(id) DO NOTHING;
+COMMIT;

backend/drizzle/0050_server_probe_retired_sources.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+BEGIN;
+CREATE TABLE public.server_probe_retired_sources (
+ receipt_id uuid PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES public.server_probe_storage_admissions(receipt_id),
+ operation_id uuid NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES public.mcp_operation_replay_tombstones(operation_id),
+ source jsonb NOT NULL CHECK(jsonb_typeof(source)='object' AND octet_length(source::text) BETWEEN 1 AND 8192),
+ proof text NOT NULL CHECK(proof ~ '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'),
+ CHECK((source->>'version') IS NOT DISTINCT FROM '1'
+   AND (source->>'receiptId') IS NOT DISTINCT FROM receipt_id::text
+   AND (source->>'executionId') IS NOT DISTINCT FROM operation_id::text)
+);
+CREATE FUNCTION public.server_probe_retired_source_immutable() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+BEGIN
+ RAISE EXCEPTION 'retired diagnostic source is immutable';
+END $$;
+CREATE TRIGGER server_probe_retired_source_immutable
+ BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON public.server_probe_retired_sources
+ FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION public.server_probe_retired_source_immutable();
+CREATE TRIGGER server_probe_retired_source_no_truncate BEFORE TRUNCATE ON public.server_probe_retired_sources
+ FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION public.server_probe_retired_source_immutable();
+INSERT INTO public.schema_migrations(id) VALUES ('0050_server_probe_retired_sources') ON CONFLICT(id) DO NOTHING;
+COMMIT;

backend/drizzle/0051_server_probe_retirement_claims.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+BEGIN;
+CREATE TABLE public.server_probe_retirement_claims (
+ receipt_id uuid PRIMARY KEY,
+ operation_id uuid NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+ plan_id uuid NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+ connection_id uuid NOT NULL,
+ source_proof text NOT NULL CHECK(source_proof ~ '^[a-f0-9]{64}$'),
+ claim_token uuid NOT NULL,
+ claim_xid xid8 NOT NULL DEFAULT pg_current_xact_id()
+);
+CREATE FUNCTION public.server_probe_retirement_claim_guard() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET search_path=pg_catalog,public SET TimeZone='UTC' AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF TG_OP='INSERT' AND NEW.claim_xid=pg_current_xact_id() AND EXISTS(
+  SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_storage_admissions a
+  JOIN public.mcp_operations o ON o.id=a.execution_id
+  JOIN public.mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id
+  JOIN public.mcp_connections c ON c.id=o.connection_id AND c.owner_id=a.owner_id
+  WHERE a.receipt_id=NEW.receipt_id AND a.identity_kind='mcp' AND a.claim_token IS NULL
+   AND a.claim_attempted_at IS NOT NULL AND a.cancelled_at IS NULL AND a.purged_at IS NULL
+   AND o.id=NEW.operation_id AND p.id=NEW.plan_id AND c.id=NEW.connection_id
+   AND o.state='applied' AND o.verification='inconclusive' AND o.error_code IS NULL
+   AND isfinite(o.finished_at) AND o.finished_at<transaction_timestamp()-interval '180 days'
+   AND p.operation_id='servers.probes.run' AND p.operation_version=1 AND p.state='completed'
+ ) THEN RETURN NEW; END IF;
+ RAISE EXCEPTION 'diagnostic retirement claim cannot be replaced or reopened';
+END $$;
+CREATE TRIGGER server_probe_retirement_claim_guard BEFORE INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE
+ ON public.server_probe_retirement_claims FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION public.server_probe_retirement_claim_guard();
+CREATE TRIGGER server_probe_retirement_claim_no_truncate BEFORE TRUNCATE
+ ON public.server_probe_retirement_claims FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION public.server_probe_retirement_claim_guard();
+CREATE FUNCTION public.server_probe_retired_source_insert_guard() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF EXISTS(
+  SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_retirement_claims r
+  JOIN public.mcp_operation_replay_tombstones t ON t.operation_id=r.operation_id AND t.plan_id=r.plan_id
+   AND t.connection_id=r.connection_id AND t.action_id='servers.probes.run' AND NOT t.target_global
+  JOIN public.mcp_operations o ON o.id=r.operation_id AND o.plan_id=r.plan_id AND o.connection_id=r.connection_id
+  JOIN public.server_probe_storage_admissions a ON a.receipt_id=r.receipt_id AND a.execution_id=r.operation_id
+  WHERE r.receipt_id=NEW.receipt_id AND r.operation_id=NEW.operation_id AND r.source_proof=NEW.proof
+   AND r.claim_xid<>pg_current_xact_id() AND r.claim_token::text=current_setting('mm.probe_retirement_claim',true)
+   AND NEW.source->>'planId'=r.plan_id::text AND NEW.source->>'connectionId'=r.connection_id::text
+   AND NEW.source->>'ownerId'=a.owner_id AND NEW.source->>'bindingProof'=a.binding_proof
+   AND NEW.source->'serverIds'=to_jsonb(t.target_server_ids)
+ ) THEN RETURN NEW; END IF;
+ RAISE EXCEPTION 'diagnostic archive requires an exact committed retirement claim';
+END $$;
+CREATE TRIGGER server_probe_retired_source_insert_guard BEFORE INSERT ON public.server_probe_retired_sources
+ FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION public.server_probe_retired_source_insert_guard();
+INSERT INTO public.schema_migrations(id) VALUES ('0051_server_probe_retirement_claims') ON CONFLICT(id) DO NOTHING;
+COMMIT;

backend/drizzle/0052_server_probe_retired_gc.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+BEGIN;
+ALTER TABLE public.server_probe_retired_sources
+ DROP CONSTRAINT server_probe_retired_sources_receipt_id_fkey,
+ ADD CONSTRAINT server_probe_retired_sources_receipt_id_fkey
+  FOREIGN KEY(receipt_id) REFERENCES public.server_probe_storage_admissions(receipt_id) ON DELETE CASCADE;
+
+CREATE FUNCTION public.server_probe_retired_gc_allowed(target_receipt uuid,current_retention integer) RETURNS boolean
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET TimeZone='UTC' SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+DECLARE activity timestamptz; retained_days integer; safety integer;
+BEGIN
+ IF current_setting('mm.probe_storage_gc',true) IS DISTINCT FROM 'on'
+  OR current_setting('mm.probe_retired_gc_receipt',true) IS DISTINCT FROM target_receipt::text THEN RETURN false; END IF;
+ SELECT (r.source->>'activityAt')::timestamptz,a.retention_days,a.safety_ms
+ INTO activity,retained_days,safety
+ FROM public.server_probe_retired_sources r
+ JOIN public.server_probe_storage_admissions a ON a.receipt_id=r.receipt_id AND a.execution_id=r.operation_id
+ JOIN public.mcp_operation_replay_tombstones t ON t.operation_id=r.operation_id
+ JOIN public.mcp_connections c ON c.id=t.connection_id AND c.owner_id=a.owner_id
+ WHERE r.receipt_id=target_receipt AND r.proof=current_setting('mm.probe_retired_gc_proof',true)
+  AND a.identity_kind='mcp' AND a.cancelled_at IS NULL AND a.claim_token IS NULL AND isfinite(a.claim_attempted_at)
+  AND t.action_id='servers.probes.run' AND NOT t.target_global
+  AND r.source->>'planId'=t.plan_id::text AND r.source->>'connectionId'=c.id::text
+  AND r.source->'serverIds'=to_jsonb(t.target_server_ids) AND r.source->>'ownerId'=a.owner_id
+  AND r.source->>'bindingProof'=a.binding_proof
+  AND (r.source->>'authorityExpiresAt')::timestamptz=a.authority_expires_at
+  AND (r.source->>'gcNotBefore')::timestamptz=a.gc_not_before
+  AND (r.source->>'retentionDays')::int=a.retention_days AND (r.source->>'safetyMs')::int=a.safety_ms
+  AND isfinite(a.authority_expires_at) AND isfinite(a.gc_not_before)
+  AND a.authority_expires_at<clock_timestamp() AND a.gc_not_before<clock_timestamp()
+  AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operations WHERE id=t.operation_id)
+  AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_plans WHERE id=t.plan_id)
+  AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operation_steps WHERE operation_id=t.operation_id)
+  AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operation_checkpoints WHERE operation_id=t.operation_id)
+  AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_diagnostic_cancellations WHERE operation_id=t.operation_id)
+  AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_execution_quarantines q
+   WHERE q.receipt_id=r.receipt_id OR(q.identity_kind='mcp' AND q.execution_id=r.operation_id));
+ IF NOT FOUND OR activity IS NULL OR NOT isfinite(activity)
+  OR current_retention IS NULL OR current_retention NOT BETWEEN 1 AND 365 THEN RETURN false; END IF;
+ IF EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_executions j WHERE j.receipt_id=target_receipt
+   AND (j.finished_at IS NULL OR j.finished_at>activity))
+  OR EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_execution_stages s WHERE s.receipt_id=target_receipt
+   AND GREATEST(s.created_at,COALESCE(s.received_at,s.created_at))>activity)
+ THEN RETURN false; END IF;
+ RETURN activity+make_interval(days=>GREATEST(retained_days,current_retention))
+   +GREATEST(safety,60000)*interval '1 millisecond'<clock_timestamp();
+END $$;
+
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.server_probe_retired_source_immutable() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF TG_OP='DELETE' THEN
+  IF current_setting('mm.probe_storage_gc',true)='on'
+  AND current_setting('mm.probe_retired_gc_receipt',true)=OLD.receipt_id::text
+  AND current_setting('mm.probe_retired_gc_proof',true)=OLD.proof
+  AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_storage_admissions WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id)
+  AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_executions WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id)
+  AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_execution_payloads WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id)
+  AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_execution_stages WHERE receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id)
+  THEN RETURN OLD; END IF;
+ END IF;
+ RAISE EXCEPTION 'retired diagnostic source is immutable';
+END $$;
+
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.server_probe_storage_gc_allowed(id uuid) RETURNS boolean
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET TimeZone='UTC' AS $$
+DECLARE a server_probe_storage_admissions%ROWTYPE; activity timestamptz; current_retention integer; terminal_at timestamptz;
+BEGIN
+ IF current_setting('mm.probe_storage_gc',true) IS DISTINCT FROM 'on' THEN RETURN false; END IF;
+ PERFORM pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtextextended('server-probe-storage-v2',0));
+ SELECT * INTO a FROM server_probe_storage_admissions WHERE receipt_id=id FOR UPDATE;
+ IF NOT FOUND OR a.gc_not_before>=clock_timestamp() OR a.authority_expires_at>=clock_timestamp() THEN RETURN false; END IF;
+ SELECT settings.requests_retention_days INTO current_retention FROM mcp_settings settings WHERE settings.id=1;
+ IF current_retention IS NULL OR current_retention NOT BETWEEN 1 AND 365 THEN RETURN false; END IF;
+ IF EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_retired_sources WHERE receipt_id=id) THEN
+  RETURN public.server_probe_retired_gc_allowed(id,current_retention);
+ END IF;
+ terminal_at:=a.created_at;
+ IF a.identity_kind='mcp' THEN
+  SELECT GREATEST(o.finished_at,p.expires_at,COALESCE(cancellation.created_at,o.finished_at)) INTO terminal_at
+   FROM mcp_operations o JOIN mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id
+   JOIN mcp_connections owner_connection ON owner_connection.id=o.connection_id
+   LEFT JOIN mcp_diagnostic_cancellations cancellation ON cancellation.operation_id=o.id
+   WHERE o.id=a.execution_id AND owner_connection.owner_id=a.owner_id AND p.operation_id='servers.probes.run'
+    AND o.state IN ('applied','failed','unknown','rejected','partial','cancelled') AND o.finished_at IS NOT NULL
+    AND (cancellation.operation_id IS NULL OR(cancellation.connection_id=o.connection_id AND cancellation.actor_id=a.owner_id))
+   FOR UPDATE OF o,p,owner_connection;
+  IF NOT FOUND OR terminal_at IS NULL THEN RETURN false; END IF;
+ END IF;
+ SELECT GREATEST(a.created_at,a.authority_expires_at,terminal_at,COALESCE(a.cancelled_at,a.created_at),
+   COALESCE((SELECT finished_at FROM server_probe_executions WHERE receipt_id=id),a.created_at),
+   COALESCE((SELECT created_at FROM server_probe_execution_quarantines WHERE receipt_id=id),a.created_at),
+   COALESCE((SELECT max(GREATEST(created_at,COALESCE(received_at,created_at))) FROM server_probe_execution_stages WHERE receipt_id=id),a.created_at)) INTO activity;
+ RETURN activity+make_interval(days=>GREATEST(a.retention_days,current_retention))+a.safety_ms*interval '1 millisecond'<clock_timestamp();
+END $$;
+INSERT INTO public.schema_migrations(id) VALUES ('0052_server_probe_retired_gc') ON CONFLICT(id) DO NOTHING;
+COMMIT;

backend/drizzle/0053_server_probe_terminal_proofs.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+BEGIN;
+CREATE TABLE public.server_probe_terminal_proofs (
+ operation_id uuid PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES public.mcp_operations(id),
+ receipt_id uuid NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+ source jsonb NOT NULL CHECK(jsonb_typeof(source)='object' AND octet_length(source::text) BETWEEN 1 AND 8192),
+ source_proof text NOT NULL CHECK(source_proof ~ '^[a-f0-9]{64}$'),
+ idempotency_digest text NOT NULL CHECK(idempotency_digest ~ '^[a-f0-9]{64}$'),
+ capture_proof text NOT NULL CHECK(capture_proof ~ '^[a-f0-9]{64}$'),
+ CHECK((source->>'version') IS NOT DISTINCT FROM '1'
+   AND (source->>'executionId') IS NOT DISTINCT FROM operation_id::text
+   AND (source->>'receiptId') IS NOT DISTINCT FROM receipt_id::text)
+);
+CREATE FUNCTION public.server_probe_terminal_proof_guard() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF TG_OP='INSERT' THEN
+  IF EXISTS(
+   SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operations o
+   JOIN public.mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id
+   JOIN public.mcp_connections c ON c.id=o.connection_id
+   JOIN public.server_probe_storage_admissions a ON a.execution_id=o.id AND a.identity_kind='mcp' AND a.owner_id=c.owner_id
+   JOIN public.server_probe_executions j ON j.receipt_id=a.receipt_id
+   JOIN public.server_probe_execution_payloads b ON b.receipt_id=a.receipt_id AND b.receipt_proof=j.receipt_proof
+   WHERE o.id=NEW.operation_id AND a.receipt_id=NEW.receipt_id AND a.purged_at IS NULL AND a.cancelled_at IS NULL
+    AND a.claim_token IS NULL AND a.claim_attempted_at IS NOT NULL
+    AND o.state='applied' AND o.verification='inconclusive' AND o.error_code IS NULL
+    AND p.state='completed' AND p.operation_id='servers.probes.run' AND p.operation_version=1
+    AND j.state='completed' AND j.execution_id=o.id AND j.mcp_connection_id=c.id AND j.actor_id=c.owner_id
+    AND NEW.source->>'connectionId'=c.id::text AND NEW.source->>'planId'=p.id::text
+    AND NEW.source->>'ownerId'=a.owner_id AND NEW.source->>'bindingProof'=a.binding_proof
+    AND NEW.source->>'receiptProof'=b.receipt_proof
+    AND NEW.source->>'ciphertextSha256'=encode(sha256(convert_to(b.receipt_ciphertext,'UTF8')),'hex')
+  ) THEN RETURN NEW; END IF;
+ ELSIF TG_OP='DELETE' THEN
+  IF EXISTS(
+   SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_retirement_claims r
+   JOIN public.mcp_operation_replay_tombstones t ON t.operation_id=r.operation_id AND t.plan_id=r.plan_id AND t.connection_id=r.connection_id
+   WHERE r.operation_id=OLD.operation_id AND r.receipt_id=OLD.receipt_id AND r.source_proof=OLD.source_proof
+    AND r.claim_xid<>pg_current_xact_id() AND r.claim_token::text=current_setting('mm.probe_retirement_claim',true)
+    AND t.action_id='servers.probes.run' AND NOT t.target_global AND t.idempotency_digest=OLD.idempotency_digest
+    AND OLD.source->'serverIds'=to_jsonb(t.target_server_ids)
+  ) THEN RETURN OLD; END IF;
+ END IF;
+ RAISE EXCEPTION 'diagnostic terminal proof must match its original source or exact retirement claim';
+END $$;
+CREATE TRIGGER server_probe_terminal_proof_guard BEFORE INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE
+ ON public.server_probe_terminal_proofs FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION public.server_probe_terminal_proof_guard();
+CREATE TRIGGER server_probe_terminal_proof_no_truncate BEFORE TRUNCATE
+ ON public.server_probe_terminal_proofs FOR EACH STATEMENT EXECUTE FUNCTION public.server_probe_terminal_proof_guard();
+
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.server_probe_retirement_claim_guard() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET search_path=pg_catalog,public SET TimeZone='UTC' AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF TG_OP='INSERT' AND NEW.claim_xid=pg_current_xact_id() AND EXISTS(
+  SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operations o
+  JOIN public.mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id
+  JOIN public.mcp_connections c ON c.id=o.connection_id
+  WHERE o.id=NEW.operation_id AND p.id=NEW.plan_id AND c.id=NEW.connection_id
+   AND o.state='applied' AND o.verification='inconclusive' AND o.error_code IS NULL
+   AND isfinite(o.finished_at) AND o.finished_at<transaction_timestamp()-interval '180 days'
+   AND p.operation_id='servers.probes.run' AND p.operation_version=1 AND p.state='completed'
+   AND (EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_storage_admissions a
+     WHERE a.receipt_id=NEW.receipt_id AND a.execution_id=o.id AND a.identity_kind='mcp' AND a.owner_id=c.owner_id
+      AND a.claim_token IS NULL AND a.claim_attempted_at IS NOT NULL AND a.cancelled_at IS NULL AND a.purged_at IS NULL)
+    OR(EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_terminal_proofs f
+       WHERE f.operation_id=o.id AND f.receipt_id=NEW.receipt_id AND f.source_proof=NEW.source_proof
+        AND f.source->>'ownerId'=c.owner_id AND f.source->>'connectionId'=c.id::text AND f.source->>'planId'=p.id::text)
+       AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_storage_admissions a
+         WHERE a.receipt_id=NEW.receipt_id OR(a.identity_kind='mcp' AND a.execution_id=o.id))))
+ ) THEN RETURN NEW; END IF;
+ RAISE EXCEPTION 'diagnostic retirement claim cannot be replaced or reopened';
+END $$;
+INSERT INTO public.schema_migrations(id) VALUES ('0053_server_probe_terminal_proofs') ON CONFLICT(id) DO NOTHING;
+COMMIT;

backend/drizzle/0054_mcp_geoip_retirement.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+BEGIN;
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.mcp_ordinary_retirement_claim_immutable() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET TimeZone='UTC' SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF TG_OP='INSERT' AND NEW.claim_xid=pg_current_xact_id() AND EXISTS(
+  SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operations o JOIN public.mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id
+  WHERE o.id=NEW.operation_id AND o.plan_id=NEW.plan_id AND o.connection_id=NEW.connection_id
+   AND o.state='applied' AND o.verification='passed' AND o.error_code IS NULL
+   AND isfinite(o.finished_at) AND o.finished_at<transaction_timestamp()-interval '180 days'
+   AND (p.operation_id,p.operation_version) IN (
+    ('logs.settings.update',1),('traffic.settings.update',2),('uptime.settings.update',2),
+    ('servers.api-ping.settings.update',2),('internet-path.settings.update',1),('geoip.settings.update',1)
+   ) AND p.state='completed'
+ ) THEN RETURN NEW; END IF;
+ RAISE EXCEPTION 'ordinary operation retirement claim cannot be replaced or reopened';
+END $$;
+INSERT INTO public.schema_migrations(id) VALUES ('0054_mcp_geoip_retirement') ON CONFLICT(id) DO NOTHING;
+COMMIT;

backend/drizzle/0055_mcp_backup_schedule_retirement.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+BEGIN;
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.mcp_ordinary_retirement_claim_immutable() RETURNS trigger
+LANGUAGE plpgsql SET TimeZone='UTC' SET search_path=pg_catalog,public AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF TG_OP='INSERT' AND NEW.claim_xid=pg_current_xact_id() AND EXISTS(
+  SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operations o JOIN public.mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id
+  WHERE o.id=NEW.operation_id AND o.plan_id=NEW.plan_id AND o.connection_id=NEW.connection_id
+   AND o.state='applied' AND o.verification='passed' AND o.error_code IS NULL
+   AND isfinite(o.finished_at) AND o.finished_at<transaction_timestamp()-interval '180 days'
+   AND (p.operation_id,p.operation_version) IN (
+    ('logs.settings.update',1),('traffic.settings.update',2),('uptime.settings.update',2),
+    ('servers.api-ping.settings.update',2),('internet-path.settings.update',1),('geoip.settings.update',1),('backups.schedule.update',1)
+   ) AND p.state='completed'
+ ) THEN RETURN NEW; END IF;
+ RAISE EXCEPTION 'ordinary operation retirement claim cannot be replaced or reopened';
+END $$;
+INSERT INTO public.schema_migrations(id) VALUES ('0055_mcp_backup_schedule_retirement') ON CONFLICT(id) DO NOTHING;
+COMMIT;

backend/drizzle/0056_mcp_manual_inverse_recovery_v8.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+-- Keep the live charge and intent fences in sync with recovery action v8.
+-- Existing authenticated v6/v7 history remains unchanged.
+BEGIN;
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.mcp_routing_manual_inverse_charge_source() RETURNS trigger LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF NOT EXISTS(
+   SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operations o
+   JOIN public.mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id
+   JOIN public.mcp_routing_profiles r ON r.id=NEW.profile_id AND r.connection_id=o.connection_id
+   JOIN public.mcp_operations source ON source.id=NEW.source_operation_id AND source.connection_id=o.connection_id
+   JOIN public.mcp_plans sp ON sp.id=source.plan_id AND sp.connection_id=source.connection_id
+   JOIN public.mcp_connections c ON c.id=o.connection_id
+   WHERE o.id=NEW.recovery_operation_id AND p.id=NEW.recovery_plan_id
+     AND o.connection_id=NEW.connection_id AND c.owner_id=NEW.owner_id
+     AND r.version=NEW.profile_version AND o.state='pending' AND p.state='executing'
+     AND p.operation_id='operations.recover' AND p.operation_version=8
+     AND sp.id=NEW.source_plan_id AND sp.operation_id='routing.community.switch' AND sp.operation_version=7
+     AND source.state IN('applied','partial')
+ ) THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'manual inverse charge differs from pending admission'; END IF;
+ RETURN NEW;
+END $$;
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.mcp_scoped_recovery_manual_version() RETURNS trigger LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $$
+BEGIN
+ IF NEW.mode='manual' AND NOT pg_try_advisory_xact_lock(hashtextextended('mcp-runner-admission',0))
+ THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'manual intent admission snapshot busy'; END IF;
+ IF NEW.mode='manual' AND NOT EXISTS(
+   SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operations o
+   JOIN public.mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id
+   JOIN public.mcp_operation_steps s ON s.operation_id=o.id AND s.step_index=0
+   JOIN public.mcp_operations source ON source.id=NEW.source_operation_id AND source.connection_id=o.connection_id
+   WHERE o.id=NEW.recovery_operation_id AND o.state='running'
+     AND p.state='executing' AND p.operation_id='operations.recover' AND p.operation_version=8
+     AND NEW.source_step_index=0 AND s.state='intent'
+     AND s.intended_state->>'kind'='service'
+     AND s.intended_state->>'service'='routing.community.scoped.recover'
+     AND s.intended_state->'input'->>'mode'='manual'
+     AND s.intended_state->'input'->>'sourceOperationId'=NEW.source_operation_id::text
+     AND s.intended_state->'input'->>'receiptId'=NEW.recovery_receipt_id::text
+ ) THEN RAISE EXCEPTION 'manual inverse requires current exact running recovery'; END IF;
+ RETURN NEW;
+END $$;
+INSERT INTO public.schema_migrations(id) VALUES('0056_mcp_manual_inverse_recovery_v8') ON CONFLICT(id) DO NOTHING;
+COMMIT;

backend/mcp-coverage.json

@@ -597,6 +597,13 @@
       "operations": [],
       "reason": "Управление самим MCP, транспорт или машинная авторизация: отдельного AI-инструмента нет."
     },
+    {
+      "method": "GET",
+      "path": "/api/mcp/devices/:serverId/bridge-vlan/configuration",
+      "status": "mediated",
+      "operations": ["network.bridge-vlan.read"],
+      "reason": "Чтение связанной конфигурации bridge/VLAN через общую типизированную модель и проверку доступа MCP."
+    },
     {
       "method": "GET",
       "path": "/api/mcp/drift",
@@ -1611,6 +1618,13 @@
       "operations": [],
       "reason": "Управление самим MCP, транспорт или машинная авторизация: отдельного AI-инструмента нет."
     },
+    {
+      "method": "POST",
+      "path": "/api/mcp/devices/:serverId/bridge-vlan/configuration/plan",
+      "status": "mediated",
+      "operations": ["network.bridge-vlan.configure"],
+      "reason": "Подготовка связанного плана bridge/VLAN через тот же MCP-инструмент; выполнение требует человеческого подтверждения."
+    },
     {
       "method": "POST",
       "path": "/api/mcp/management-channels",

backend/package.json

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
     "test:exec": "tsx src/services/mikrotik-logs.test.ts && tsx src/services/terminal-diagnostics.test.ts && tsx src/routes/exec.test.ts && tsx src/plugins/auth.exec.test.ts",
     "test:auth": "tsx --test src/modules/mcp/routing-manual-inverse-history.test.ts && tsx src/db/application-writer-profile-registry-structure.test.ts && tsx src/db/application-writer-profile-registry-read.test.ts && tsx src/db/application-writer-profile-registry-read-parity.test.ts && tsx src/db/application-writer-profile-format.test.ts && tsx src/plugins/auth-path.test.ts && tsx src/lib/permissions.test.ts && tsx src/plugins/auth-provenance.test.ts && tsx src/services/bandwidth-rest-speed-original.test.ts && tsx src/plugins/auth.smoke.test.ts && tsx src/plugins/auth.ospf-optimizer.test.ts && npm run test:mcp",
     "test:mcp": "tsx --test src/services/server-poll-error-provenance.test.ts && tsx --test src/modules/mcp/plan-expiry.test.ts src/modules/mcp/result-budget.test.ts src/modules/mcp/result-delivery.test.ts src/modules/mcp/wire-admission.test.ts src/modules/mcp/flow-envelope-allowance.test.ts src/modules/mcp/sdk-terminal-budget.test.ts src/modules/mcp/inflight-owner.test.ts && npm run test:database-source-binding && tsx --test src/modules/mcp/integration-fixture-expiry.test.ts && npm run test:mcp:operation-origin && npm run test:mcp:service-context && npm run test:mcp:operation-locks && tsx --test src/modules/mcp/routing-community-public.test.ts src/modules/mcp/management-transport.test.ts src/modules/mcp/routing-community-context-model.test.ts src/modules/mcp/routing-community-context-native.test.ts ../packages/contracts/src/mcp-routing.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/human-artifact-receipts.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/chr-overlay-readiness.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/chr-recovery-source.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/chr-native-failure.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/ospf-owner-graph.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/routing-measurement-address.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/routing-observation-source.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-talkers-model.test.ts && tsx src/services/bgp-prefix-model.test.ts && tsx src/services/vrf-members.test.ts && tsx src/services/routing-gateway-reference.test.ts && tsx src/services/bgp-export-model.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-history-model.test.ts && tsx src/services/internet-path-snapshot.test.ts && tsx src/services/internet-path-observation.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/coverage.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/policy.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/events-batch-model.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/operation-revisions.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/native-create-identity.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/ros-step-verification.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/ros-prefix.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/native-conservation-http.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/security.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/state-file-publish.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/routing-model.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/routing-observations-model.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/ospf-health.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/ecmp-preflight.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/recursive-recovery.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/control-path-model.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/routing-community-scoped-model.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/routing-community-scoped-native.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/path-verification.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/database-maintenance.test.ts && tsx src/routes/mcp.test.ts && tsx ../lib/auth-mcp.test.ts && tsx --test src/modules/mcp/routing-controller-fence.test.ts && tsx src/test/chr-vrf-companion-proof.test.ts && tsx src/test/chr-vrf-companion-telemetry.test.ts && tsx src/test/chr-vrf-companion-address-space.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/flow-facts-rebuild-actions.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/ipsec-peer-create-dependencies.test.ts && tsx src/services/ipsec-certificate-update-model.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/ipsec-native-dispatch.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/ipsec-user-update-actions.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/ipsec-server-delete-actions.test.ts && tsx src/services/ipsec-proof-telemetry.test.ts && tsx src/services/vrf-production-admission.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/flow-host-keys-actions.test.ts && tsx src/services/vrf-production-read.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/ipsec-user-create-actions.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/flow-settings-actions.test.ts && tsx src/services/vrf-production-ticket-store.test.ts && npm run test:mcp:routing-baseline",
-    "test:wireguard": "tsx src/services/mikrotik-response-bounds.test.ts && tsx src/services/wireguard-interface-update.test.ts && tsx src/services/wireguard-peer-update.test.ts && npx tsx src/services/wireguard-config.test.ts && npx tsx src/services/wireguard-ipv6.test.ts && npx tsx --test src/services/wireguard-import.test.ts src/services/wireguard-import-apply.test.ts src/services/wireguard-import-revision.test.ts src/services/wireguard-delete.test.ts && npx tsx src/routes/wireguard-import.test.ts && tsx src/services/wireguard-interface-create.test.ts && tsx src/services/wireguard-peer-create.test.ts && tsx src/services/wireguard-import-plan.test.ts && tsx src/services/wireguard-import-execution.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/wireguard-import-actions.test.ts && tsx --test src/services/wireguard-export.test.ts",
+    "test:wireguard": "tsx src/services/mikrotik-response-bounds.test.ts && tsx --test src/services/wireguard-dependency-read.test.ts && tsx src/services/wireguard-interface-update.test.ts && tsx src/services/wireguard-peer-update.test.ts && npx tsx src/services/wireguard-config.test.ts && npx tsx src/services/wireguard-ipv6.test.ts && npx tsx --test src/services/wireguard-import.test.ts src/services/wireguard-import-apply.test.ts src/services/wireguard-import-revision.test.ts src/services/wireguard-delete.test.ts && npx tsx src/routes/wireguard-import.test.ts && tsx src/services/wireguard-interface-create.test.ts && tsx src/services/wireguard-peer-create.test.ts && tsx src/services/wireguard-import-plan.test.ts && tsx src/services/wireguard-import-execution.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/wireguard-import-actions.test.ts && tsx --test src/services/wireguard-export.test.ts",
     "test:traffic-rate": "tsx src/services/traffic-rate.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-observation.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-freshness.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-live.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-observation-sql.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-history-sql.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-live-sql.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-volume-sql.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-binding-status.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-status-sql.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-gap.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-identity.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-membership.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-aggregate-peak.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-users-cache.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-collection-lock.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-concurrency-sql.test.ts",
     "test:traffic-flow": "tsx --test src/services/traffic-flow-heartbeat.test.ts src/services/traffic-flow-heartbeat-wiring.test.ts src/services/traffic-flow-heartbeat-receiver.test.ts src/services/traffic-flow-ingest-quality.test.ts src/services/traffic-flow-quality-contract.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-catalog-read.test.ts && tsx src/routes/traffic-flow-query.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-month.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-parse.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-ipv6-pipeline.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-map-exporter.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-ifaces.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-ifindex.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-dedup.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-planes.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-ip.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-dest.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-classify.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-ripe.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-brands.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-ingest.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-analytics.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-map-hops.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-purge.test.ts && tsx src/services/geoip-download.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-geoip.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-fact-accumulator.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-facts.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-facts-filter.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-facts-rebuild.test.ts && tsx src/services/statistics-aggregate.test.ts && tsx src/services/geoip-manual-update.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-overlay-model.test.ts && npm run test:traffic-flow:ownership && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-worker-platform.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-template-cache.test.ts && tsx --test src/services/traffic-flow-template-lifetime.test.ts && tsx src/services/traffic-flow-protocol-scope.test.ts && npm run test:traffic-flow:read-budget && npm run test:traffic-flow:resource-profile",
     "test:users": "tsx ../packages/contracts/src/users.test.ts && tsx src/modules/users/iface-type.test.ts && tsx src/modules/users/bindings.test.ts && tsx src/modules/users/interface-inventory.test.ts && tsx src/routes/users-catalog.test.ts",
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
     "test:mcp:ipsec-export-journal:pg": "node scripts/test-mcp-postgres.mjs --ipsec-export-journal --restore",
     "test:mcp:ipsec-export:http:pg": "node scripts/test-mcp-postgres.mjs --ipsec-export-http --restore",
     "test:mcp:diagnostic-cancel-host:pg": "node scripts/test-mcp-postgres.mjs --diagnostic-cancel-host --restore",
-    "test:server-probe-management": "tsx src/services/server-probe-authority.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-public-result.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-execution.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-rest-contract.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-rest-execution.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-journal.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-journal-history.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/server-probe-actions.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/diagnostic-cancellation.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/service-diagnostic-progress.test.ts && tsx src/services/mikrotik-get-admission.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-storage-journal-adapter.test.ts && tsx --test src/services/server-probe-storage-history.test.ts && npm run test:server-probe-storage-models",
+    "test:server-probe-management": "tsx src/services/server-probe-authority.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-public-result.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-execution.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-rest-contract.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-rest-execution.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-journal.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-journal-history.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/server-probe-actions.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/diagnostic-cancellation.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/service-diagnostic-progress.test.ts && tsx src/services/mikrotik-get-admission.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-storage-journal-adapter.test.ts && npm run test:server-probe-history && npm run test:server-probe-storage-models",
     "test:server-poll-http:pg": "node scripts/test-server-poll-http-owned.mjs",
     "test:server-poll-approval:pg": "node scripts/test-server-poll-approval-owned.mjs",
     "test:server-poll-atomic:pg": "node scripts/test-server-poll-atomic-owned.mjs",
@@ -155,8 +155,9 @@
     "test:server-poll-durable:pg": "node scripts/test-mcp-postgres.mjs --server-poll-durable --restore",
     "test:server-probe-legacy:pg": "node scripts/test-mcp-postgres.mjs --probe-legacy-orphans",
     "test:server-probe-storage:pg": "node scripts/test-mcp-postgres.mjs --probe-storage-journal",
-    "test:server-probe-history": "tsx --test src/services/server-probe-storage-history.test.ts",
+    "test:server-probe-history": "tsx --test src/services/server-probe-storage-history.test.ts src/services/server-probe-retired-source.test.ts",
     "test:server-probe-history:pg": "node scripts/test-mcp-postgres.mjs --probe-storage-history",
+    "test:server-probe-retirement:pg": "node scripts/test-mcp-postgres.mjs --probe-operation-retirement",
     "test:server-probe-storage-models": "tsx src/services/server-probe-journal-maintenance.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/diagnostic-cancellation-source.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-storage-source.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-storage-connection.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/server-probe-storage-host.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-storage-rest.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-storage-metadata.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-legacy-verifier.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-legacy-snapshot.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-legacy-inspection.test.ts && tsx src/db/database-source-observation.test.ts && tsx src/services/server-probe-retention.test.ts && tsx src/modules/mcp/server-probe-registration.test.ts",
     "test:mcp:migration-data:pg": "node scripts/test-mcp-postgres.mjs --migration-data-inventory --restore",
     "test:mcp:poll-memory:pg": "npm run build -w @mmapp/contracts && node scripts/acceptance/build-poll-memory.mjs && node scripts/test-mcp-postgres.mjs --poll-memory",

backend/scripts/acceptance/chr-netflow-drain-witness-pg.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
+import { lstat, mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'
+import { createServer } from 'node:net'
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
+import { isAbsolute, join, resolve } from 'node:path'
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
+import EmbeddedPostgres from 'embedded-postgres'
+import pg from 'pg'
+import { applySqlMigrations } from '../../src/db/migrate.ts'
+import { MIGRATION_MANIFEST } from '../../src/db/migration-manifest.ts'
+
+assert.deepEqual(process.argv.slice(2), ['--owned-embedded'])
+const bin = process.env.MMAPP_PG_CLIENT_BIN
+assert(bin && isAbsolute(bin) && resolve(bin) === bin, 'Set MMAPP_PG_CLIENT_BIN to the exact local PostgreSQL client directory')
+const psql = join(bin, process.platform === 'win32' ? 'psql.exe' : 'psql')
+const executable = await lstat(psql)
+assert(executable.isFile() && !executable.isSymbolicLink(), 'PostgreSQL client must be a regular file')
+const clientEnv = Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(process.env).filter(([name]) => !/^PG/i.test(name)))
+const run = (command, args, options = {}) => execFileSync(command, args, {
+  timeout: 10000, maxBuffer: 16384, encoding: 'utf8', windowsHide: true, ...options,
+})
+assert.match(run(psql, ['--version'], { env: clientEnv }), /^psql \(PostgreSQL\) (?:1[6-9]|[2-9][0-9])\./)
+const witness = fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../tmp/mcp-netflow-linux-topology-20261104/collector-drain-witness.py', import.meta.url))
+const { IDENTITY_SQL, SQL } = JSON.parse(run('python', ['-I', '-B', '-c',
+  'import json,runpy,sys; m=runpy.run_path(sys.argv[1]); print(json.dumps({k:m[k] for k in ("IDENTITY_SQL","SQL")}))', witness]))
+assert(typeof SQL === 'string' && typeof IDENTITY_SQL === 'string')
+
+const directory = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'mm-netflow-drain-pg-'))
+const password = randomBytes(24).toString('hex')
+const host = '127.0.0.1', database = 'postgres', user = 'mcp_test'
+const listener = createServer()
+let embedded, pool, started = false
+try {
+  await new Promise((done, reject) => { listener.once('error', reject); listener.listen(0, host, done) })
+  const { port } = listener.address()
+  await new Promise((done, reject) => listener.close(error => error ? reject(error) : done()))
+  embedded = new EmbeddedPostgres({
+    databaseDir: join(directory, 'pg'), port, user, password, persistent: true, createPostgresUser: false,
+    initdbFlags: ['--encoding=UTF8'], postgresFlags: ['-h', host, '-c', 'unix_socket_directories='],
+    onLog: () => {}, onError: () => {},
+  })
+  await embedded.initialise()
+  await embedded.start()
+  started = true
+  pool = new pg.Pool({ host, port, database, user, password, max: 1, connectionTimeoutMillis: 5000 })
+  await applySqlMigrations(pool)
+  const { rows: [version] } = await pool.query("SELECT current_setting('server_version_num')::int AS number, (SELECT count(*)::int FROM schema_migrations) AS migrations")
+  assert(version.number >= 180000 && version.number <= 189999)
+  assert.equal(version.migrations, MIGRATION_MANIFEST.length)
+
+  const runId = 'a012bcde', owner = 'netflow-operator-' + runId, collectorPort = 51000
+  const read = (sql, probePort = collectorPort) => JSON.parse(run(psql, ['-X', '-w', '-qAt',
+    '-h', host, '-p', String(port), '-U', user, '-d', database, '-v', 'ON_ERROR_STOP=1',
+    '-v', 'database=' + database, '-v', 'socket_dir=/tmp/mcp-netflow-' + runId + '/pg-socket',
+    '-v', 'run_id=' + runId, '-v', 'port=' + probePort],
+  { env: { ...clientEnv, PGCONNECT_TIMEOUT: '2', PGPASSWORD: password }, input: sql }).trim())
+  const identity = read(IDENTITY_SQL)
+  assert.deepEqual(Object.keys(identity).sort(), ['oid', 'source'])
+  assert.match(identity.oid, /^[1-9][0-9]{0,9}$/)
+  // The production source predicate deliberately rejects this TCP fixture.
+  assert.equal(identity.source, false)
+  const expect = (planCount, enabled, verified, ordered = true, sqlPort = collectorPort) =>
+    assert.deepEqual(read(SQL, sqlPort), { ...identity, connectionCount: 1, planCount, enabled, verified, ordered })
+
+  const uuid = index => 'a012bcde-0000-4000-8000-' + String(index).padStart(12, '0')
+  const connection = uuid(1)
+  await pool.query(`INSERT INTO mcp_connections(id,name,owner_id,owner_permissions,policy,generation)
+    VALUES($1,$2,$3,'[]','{}','inert-witness')`, [connection, 'Owned NetFlow ' + runId, owner])
+  await pool.query("UPDATE traffic_flow_settings SET collector_ip='198.18.242.3', flow_listen_port=$1, enabled=false WHERE id=1", [collectorPort])
+  expect(0, false, [])
+
+  async function seed(index, enabled) {
+    const plan = uuid(index), operation = uuid(index + 1), receipt = uuid(index + 2)
+    const base = Date.UTC(2026, 0, 1) + index * 1000
+    const at = offset => new Date(base + offset)
+    const result = { receiptId: receipt, configurationConfirmed: true, receiptConfirmed: true,
+      listener: 'request-acknowledged', automaticReplay: false }
+    await pool.query(`INSERT INTO mcp_plans(id,connection_id,operation_id,operation_version,policy_version,generation,payload,evidence,state,expires_at,approved_by,approved_at,created_at)
+      VALUES($1,$2,'netflow.settings.update',3,1,'inert-witness','{}','{}','completed',$3,$4,$5,$6)`,
+    [plan, connection, at(9000), owner, at(100), at(0)])
+    await pool.query(`INSERT INTO mcp_operations(id,plan_id,connection_id,idempotency_key,state,verification,created_at,finished_at)
+      VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4,'applied','passed',$5,$6)`, [operation, plan, connection, 'inert-' + index, at(200), at(400)])
+    await pool.query(`INSERT INTO mcp_operation_steps(operation_id,step_index,state,intended_state,result,created_at,finished_at)
+      VALUES($1,0,'verified',$2,$3,$4,$5)`,
+    [operation, { service: 'netflow.settings.update', input: { receiptId: receipt, enabled } }, result, at(300), at(400)])
+    await pool.query(`INSERT INTO mcp_audit(actor_id,action,connection_id,payload,created_at)
+      VALUES($1,'plan.approve',$2,$3,$4)`, [owner, connection, { planId: plan }, at(100)])
+    await pool.query(`INSERT INTO flow_settings_intents(receipt_id,phase,request_proof,state,result,created_at)
+      VALUES($1,'configuration','inert-proof','completed',$2,$3),($1,'listener','inert-proof','completed',$2,$3)`, [receipt, result, at(300)])
+    await pool.query('UPDATE traffic_flow_settings SET enabled=$1 WHERE id=1', [enabled])
+    return [plan, operation, receipt]
+  }
+  const enabled = await seed(10, true)
+  expect(1, true, [enabled])
+  const disabled = await seed(20, false)
+  expect(2, false, [enabled, disabled])
+  expect(2, null, [enabled, disabled], true, collectorPort + 1)
+
+  await pool.query("UPDATE flow_settings_intents SET request_proof='foreign' WHERE receipt_id=$1 AND phase='listener'", [disabled[2]])
+  expect(2, false, [enabled])
+  await pool.query("UPDATE flow_settings_intents SET request_proof='inert-proof' WHERE receipt_id=$1 AND phase='listener'", [disabled[2]])
+  const { rows: [duplicate] } = await pool.query(`INSERT INTO mcp_audit(actor_id,action,connection_id,payload)
+    VALUES($1,'plan.approve',$2,$3) RETURNING id`, [owner, connection, { planId: disabled[0] }])
+  expect(2, false, [enabled])
+  await pool.query('DELETE FROM mcp_audit WHERE id=$1', [duplicate.id])
+  const { rows: [original] } = await pool.query(`UPDATE mcp_operations SET finished_at=(SELECT created_at + interval '1 second' FROM mcp_plans WHERE id=$2)
+    WHERE id=$1 RETURNING created_at`, [enabled[1], disabled[0]])
+  expect(2, false, [enabled, disabled], false)
+  await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operations SET finished_at=$2::timestamptz + interval '200 milliseconds' WHERE id=$1", [enabled[1], original.created_at])
+  expect(2, false, [enabled, disabled])
+  console.log(JSON.stringify({ migrations: version.migrations, exactPsqlQueries: true, inertEnableDisableAndRejections: true,
+    linuxSocketSourceAccepted: false, realMcpExecutionClaimed: false }))
+} finally {
+  try {
+    await pool?.end()
+  } finally {
+    if (started) await embedded.stop()
+    if (listener.listening) await new Promise(done => listener.close(done))
+    await rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true, maxRetries: 5, retryDelay: 200 })
+  }
+}

backend/scripts/mcp-external-process/bridge-vlan-client.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/** External SDK consumer. No application/store/runtime/database imports. */
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
+import { Client, StreamableHTTPClientTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/client'
+
+const endpoint = new URL(process.env.OWN_MCP_ENDPOINT)
+assert.equal(process.env.OWN_EXTERNAL_CLIENT, 'true')
+assert.equal(endpoint.hostname, '127.0.0.1')
+assert.notEqual(process.pid, Number(process.env.OWN_SERVER_PID))
+const client = new Client({ name: 'owned-linked-bridge-vlan-sdk', version: '1.0.0' })
+const boundedFetch = async (input, init) => {
+  const url = new URL(typeof input === 'string' || input instanceof URL ? input : input.url)
+  assert.equal(url.origin, endpoint.origin)
+  return fetch(input, { ...init, redirect: 'manual', signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000) })
+}
+const payload = result => {
+  const text = result.content.find(item => item.type === 'text')?.text
+  assert(text && Buffer.byteLength(text) < 131072)
+  return JSON.parse(text)
+}
+const call = async (name, args) => {
+  const result = await client.callTool({ name, arguments: args }, undefined, { timeout: 10000 })
+  assert(!result.isError, JSON.stringify(payload(result)))
+  return payload(result)
+}
+try {
+  await client.connect(new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(endpoint, {
+    requestInit: { headers: { authorization: 'Bearer ' + process.env.OWN_MCP_TOKEN } }, fetch: boundedFetch,
+  }), { timeout: 10000 })
+  const tools = (await client.listTools({}, { timeout: 10000 })).tools
+  const read = tools.find(tool => tool.name === 'mm_bridge_vlan_configuration_get')
+  const configure = tools.find(tool => tool.name === 'mm_bridge_vlan_configuration_plan')
+  assert(read && configure)
+  assert.match(read.description, /Полная конфигурация bridge VLAN/)
+  assert.match(read.description, /Возвращает данные только из разрешённой области/)
+  assert.match(configure.description, /Связанный план VLAN membership, PVID и bridge filtering/)
+  assert.match(configure.description, /Подготавливает неизменяемый план/)
+  assert.equal(read.annotations.readOnlyHint, true)
+  assert.equal(configure.annotations.readOnlyHint, false)
+  assert.deepEqual(read.inputSchema.required, ['serverId'])
+  assert.deepEqual(configure.inputSchema.required, ['serverId', 'bridgeId', 'desired'])
+  const desiredSchema = configure.inputSchema.properties.desired
+  for (const name of ['ports', 'vlans', 'removePortIds', 'removeVlanIds']) assert(desiredSchema.properties[name])
+  const serverId = Number(process.env.OWN_ALLOWED_SERVER)
+  const state = (await call(read.name, { serverId })).state
+  assert.equal(state.bridges[0]['.id'], '*1')
+  assert(state.interfaces.some(item => item.resource === 'ethernet' && item.id === '*3' && item.name === 'ether3'))
+  assert.equal(state.vlans[0]['vlan-ids'], '10')
+  const cpu = { resource: 'bridge', id: '*1' }, access = { resource: 'ethernet', id: '*2' }, trunk = { resource: 'ethernet', id: '*3' }
+  const plan = await call(configure.name, { serverId, bridgeId: '*1', desired: {
+    filtering: true, pvid: 1,
+    ports: [{ id: '*10', interface: access, pvid: 10, ingressFiltering: true, frameTypes: 'admit-all', disabled: false },
+      { interface: trunk, pvid: 1, ingressFiltering: true, frameTypes: 'admit-only-vlan-tagged', disabled: false }],
+    vlans: [{ id: '*11', vlanIds: '10', tagged: [cpu], untagged: [access], disabled: false },
+      { vlanIds: '20', tagged: [cpu, trunk], untagged: [], disabled: false }], removePortIds: [], removeVlanIds: [],
+  } })
+  assert.equal(plan.state, 'awaiting-approval')
+  assert.equal(typeof plan.planId, 'string')
+  assert.equal(plan.changes.requiresHuman, true)
+  assert.deepEqual(plan.changes.steps.map(item => [item.step.resource, item.step.action]),
+    [['bridge_vlan', 'create'], ['bridge_port', 'create'], ['bridge', 'update']])
+  const denied = await client.callTool({ name: 'mm_change_apply', arguments: { planId: plan.planId, idempotencyKey: randomUUID() } }, undefined, { timeout: 10000 })
+  assert.equal(denied.isError, true)
+  const deniedPayload = payload(denied)
+  assert(JSON.stringify(deniedPayload).includes('APPROVAL_REQUIRED'))
+  const readback = (await call(read.name, { serverId })).state
+  assert.deepEqual(readback, state)
+  process.send({ kind: 'result', result: { externalSdkProcess: true, transport: 'streamable-http', clientPid: process.pid,
+    listedTools: [read, configure], state, plan, applyDenial: deniedPayload, unchangedReadback: true } })
+} finally {
+  await client.close()
+  process.disconnect?.()
+}

backend/scripts/mcp-external-process/bridge-vlan-fixture.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'
+import { createServer } from 'node:http'
+import { writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
+import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'
+import { isAbsolute, resolve } from 'node:path'
+
+assert.equal(process.env.OWN_EXTERNAL_PROCESS_PG, 'true')
+assert.equal(process.env.NODE_ENV, 'test')
+assert(isAbsolute(process.env.OWN_EXTERNAL_SOURCE_ROOT!))
+assert(isAbsolute(process.env.OWN_EXTERNAL_RESULT_FILE!))
+const database = new URL(process.env.DATABASE_URL!)
+assert.equal(database.hostname, '127.0.0.1'); assert.equal(database.username, 'mcp_test')
+assert.equal(database.pathname, '/postgres'); assert.notEqual(database.port, '5432')
+const source = (path: string) => pathToFileURL(resolve(process.env.OWN_EXTERNAL_SOURCE_ROOT!, 'backend/src', path)).href
+const rows: Record<string, Record<string, string>[]> = {
+  '/interface/ethernet': [{ '.id': '*2', name: 'ether2', disabled: 'false' }, { '.id': '*3', name: 'ether3', disabled: 'false' }, { '.id': '*4', name: 'ether-mgmt', disabled: 'false' }],
+  '/interface/bridge': [{ '.id': '*1', name: 'br-users', pvid: '1', 'vlan-filtering': 'false', 'frame-types': 'admit-all', 'ingress-filtering': 'true', mvrp: 'false', disabled: 'false' }],
+  '/interface/bridge/port': [{ '.id': '*10', bridge: 'br-users', interface: 'ether2', pvid: '10', 'ingress-filtering': 'true', 'frame-types': 'admit-all', disabled: 'false' }],
+  '/interface/bridge/vlan': [{ '.id': '*11', bridge: 'br-users', 'vlan-ids': '10', tagged: 'br-users', untagged: 'ether2', disabled: 'false', dynamic: 'false' }],
+  '/interface/vlan': [], '/interface/gre': [], '/interface/wireguard': [], '/interface/vxlan': [],
+  '/ip/address': [{ '.id': '*20', interface: 'ether-mgmt', address: '127.0.0.1/8', disabled: 'false', dynamic: 'false' }], '/ipv6/address': [],
+}
+const requests: string[] = []
+let writeAttempts = 0
+const router = createServer((req, res) => {
+  res.setHeader('content-type', 'application/json')
+  const path = decodeURIComponent(new URL(req.url!, 'http://127.0.0.1').pathname.replace(/^\/rest/, ''))
+  requests.push(req.method + ' ' + path)
+  if (req.method !== 'GET') { writeAttempts++; res.writeHead(405); res.end('{}'); return }
+  if (req.headers.authorization !== 'Basic ' + Buffer.from('fixture:fixture-only').toString('base64')) { res.writeHead(401); res.end('{}'); return }
+  if (!Object.hasOwn(rows, path)) { res.writeHead(404); res.end('{}'); return }
+  res.end(JSON.stringify(rows[path]))
+})
+await new Promise<void>(done => router.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', done))
+const { pool, closePool } = await import(source('db/index.js'))
+const { applySqlMigrations } = await import(source('db/migrate.js'))
+const { mcpConnectionCreateSchema } = await import('@mmapp/contracts/mcp')
+const { createMcpConnection, updateMcpSettings } = await import(source('modules/mcp/store.js'))
+const { buildApp } = await import(source('index.js'))
+const actor = { id: 'owned-bridge-vlan-sdk-owner', email: 'bridge-sdk@example.invalid', name: 'Owned bridge VLAN SDK owner', apps: ['mm'], permissions: ['mm:settings:admin', 'mm:mcp:admin', 'mm:network:admin', 'mm:servers:admin'], expiresAt: Date.now() + 3600000, issuedAt: Date.now() - 1000 }
+let app: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof buildApp>> | undefined
+let child: ReturnType<typeof spawn> | undefined
+let childExit: Promise<number> | undefined
+try {
+  await applySqlMigrations(pool)
+  const serverId = (await pool.query("INSERT INTO servers(name,host,port,use_ssl,enabled,username,password) VALUES('owned bridge VLAN SDK','127.0.0.1',$1,false,true,'fixture','fixture-only') RETURNING id", [(router.address() as { port: number }).port])).rows[0].id
+  await updateMcpSettings({ enabled: true }, actor)
+  app = await buildApp({ startScheduler: false, logger: false })
+  await app.listen({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: 0 })
+  const endpoint = `http://127.0.0.1:${(app.server.address() as { port: number }).port}/mcp`
+  const issued = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ name: 'Owned bridge VLAN external SDK', mode: 'autonomous',
+    expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 1200000).toISOString(), permissions: ['mm:network:write'],
+    scope: { serverIds: [serverId], operationIds: ['network.bridge-vlan.read', 'network.bridge-vlan.configure', 'changes.apply'], allowGlobal: false },
+    limits: { callsPerMinute: 120, mutationsPerHour: 100 } }), actor)
+  let result: unknown, stdout = '', stderr = ''
+  child = spawn(process.execPath, [fileURLToPath(new URL('./bridge-vlan-client.mjs', import.meta.url))], { cwd: process.cwd(), windowsHide: true,
+    stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe', 'ipc'], env: { ...Object.fromEntries(['SystemRoot', 'WINDIR', 'TEMP', 'TMP', 'PATH', 'Path'].filter(k => process.env[k]).map(k => [k, process.env[k]!])),
+      OWN_EXTERNAL_CLIENT: 'true', OWN_MCP_ENDPOINT: endpoint, OWN_MCP_TOKEN: issued.token, OWN_SERVER_PID: String(process.pid), OWN_ALLOWED_SERVER: String(serverId) } })
+  child.on('message', (message: { kind: string; result?: unknown }) => { if (message.kind === 'result') result = message.result })
+  child.stdout?.on('data', chunk => { stdout += String(chunk); if (stdout.length > 1048576) child?.kill() })
+  child.stderr?.on('data', chunk => { stderr += String(chunk); if (stderr.length > 1048576) child?.kill() })
+  childExit = new Promise<number>((done, reject) => { child!.once('exit', code => done(code ?? 1)); child!.once('error', reject) })
+  const timeout = setTimeout(() => child?.kill(), 60000)
+  const code = await childExit; clearTimeout(timeout)
+  assert.equal(code, 0, stderr.slice(0, 3000)); assert(result)
+  assert.equal(writeAttempts, 0)
+  assert.equal((await pool.query('SELECT count(*)::int AS count FROM mcp_operations')).rows[0].count, 0)
+  const plans = (await pool.query('SELECT operation_id,state,approved_by FROM mcp_plans')).rows
+  assert.equal(plans.length, 1); assert.equal(plans[0].operation_id, 'network.bridge-vlan.configure')
+  assert.equal(plans[0].state, 'awaiting-approval'); assert.equal(plans[0].approved_by, null)
+  const audit = (await pool.query('SELECT tool,status,error_code FROM mcp_requests ORDER BY created_at')).rows
+  assert(audit.some(row => row.error_code === 'APPROVAL_REQUIRED'))
+  const serialized = JSON.stringify({ result, stdout, stderr, audit })
+  assert(!serialized.includes(issued.token)); assert(!serialized.includes('fixture-only'))
+  const final = { ...(result as object), actualOwnPg: true, actualProductionHttpServer: true, serverFixturePid: process.pid,
+    connectionMode: 'autonomous', plans, audit, nativeReadRequests: requests, nativeWriteAttempts: writeAttempts,
+    appliedOperations: 0, syntheticRouterOnly: true, productionDatabaseTouched: false, portalContacted: false }
+  await writeFile(process.env.OWN_EXTERNAL_RESULT_FILE!, JSON.stringify(final, null, 2))
+  console.log('Owned bridge VLAN SDK passed:', JSON.stringify({ listedTools: 2, planState: plans[0].state, nativeReadRequests: requests.length, nativeWriteAttempts: writeAttempts }))
+} finally {
+  if (child && child.exitCode === null && child.signalCode === null) { child.kill(); await childExit }
+  try { await app?.close() } finally { try { await closePool() } finally { router.closeIdleConnections(); await new Promise<void>((done, reject) => router.close(error => error ? reject(error) : done())) } }
+}

backend/scripts/mcp-external-process/run-owned.mjs

@@ -6,10 +6,14 @@ import { randomBytes, createHash } from 'node:crypto'
 import { createServer } from 'node:net'
 import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'
 const sourceRoot = resolve(process.argv[2] ?? fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../', import.meta.url)))
-const output = resolve(sourceRoot, 'tmp/mcp-external-process-acceptance'); await mkdir(output, { recursive: true })
+const scenario = process.argv[3] ?? 'acceptance'
+if (!['acceptance', 'bridge-vlan'].includes(scenario)) throw Error('Unsupported owned external scenario')
+const output = resolve(sourceRoot, scenario === 'bridge-vlan' ? 'tmp/mcp-bridge-vlan-sdk-20261105' : 'tmp/mcp-external-process-acceptance'); await mkdir(output, { recursive: true })
 const paths = ['backend/src/scripts/mcp-stdio.ts', 'backend/src/routes/mcp-transport.ts', 'backend/src/routes/mcp-oauth.ts', 'backend/src/modules/mcp/store.ts',
   'backend/src/modules/mcp/runtime.ts', 'backend/src/modules/mcp/actions.ts', 'backend/src/modules/mcp/security.ts', 'backend/src/modules/mcp/protocol-limits.ts',
   'backend/src/modules/mcp/portal-revocation.ts', 'backend/src/plugins/auth.ts', 'backend/src/index.ts', 'node_modules/@modelcontextprotocol/client/package.json', 'node_modules/@modelcontextprotocol/server/package.json']
+if (scenario === 'bridge-vlan') paths.push('backend/scripts/mcp-external-process/bridge-vlan-client.mjs', 'backend/scripts/mcp-external-process/bridge-vlan-fixture.ts',
+  'backend/src/modules/mcp/bridge-vlan-actions.ts', 'backend/src/services/bridge-vlan-configuration.ts', 'packages/contracts/src/bridge-vlan.ts')
 async function pins() { const result = []; for (const path of paths) result.push({ path, sha256: createHash('sha256').update(await readFile(resolve(sourceRoot, path))).digest('hex') }); return result }
 const before = await pins(), directory = await mkdtemp(join(resolve(sourceRoot, 'tmp'), 'mm-mcp-external-')), state = join(directory, 'state'); await mkdir(state)
 const listener = createServer(); await new Promise(resolve => listener.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve)); const port = listener.address().port; await new Promise(resolve => listener.close(resolve))
@@ -19,7 +23,7 @@ const postgres = new EmbeddedPostgres({ databaseDir: join(directory, 'pg'), port
 try {
   await postgres.initialise(); await postgres.start()
   process.exitCode = await new Promise((done, reject) => {
-    const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['--import', import.meta.resolve('tsx'), fileURLToPath(new URL('./server-fixture.ts', import.meta.url))], { cwd: directory,
+    const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['--import', import.meta.resolve('tsx'), fileURLToPath(new URL(scenario === 'bridge-vlan' ? './bridge-vlan-fixture.ts' : './server-fixture.ts', import.meta.url))], { cwd: directory,
       windowsHide: true, stdio: 'inherit', env: { ...Object.fromEntries(['SystemRoot', 'WINDIR', 'TEMP', 'TMP', 'PATH', 'Path'].filter(k => process.env[k]).map(k => [k, process.env[k]])),
         OWN_EXTERNAL_CLEANUP_FAULT: process.env.OWN_EXTERNAL_CLEANUP_FAULT, OWN_EXTERNAL_SOURCE_ROOT: sourceRoot, OWN_EXTERNAL_RESULT_FILE: join(output, 'result.json'), NODE_ENV: 'test', OWN_EXTERNAL_PROCESS_PG: 'true', DATABASE_URL: `postgresql://mcp_test:${password}@127.0.0.1:${port}/postgres`, DATABASE_PATH: join(directory, 'no-legacy.sqlite'),
         MCP_STATE_DIR: state, AUTH_REQUIRED: 'true', AUTH_JWT_SECRET: 'owned-external-synthetic-issuer-test-only', AUTH_ISSUER: 'https://synthetic-portal.invalid', AUTH_PORTAL_URL: 'https://synthetic-portal.invalid' } })

backend/scripts/mcp-external-process/server-fixture.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import assert from "node:assert/strict"
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto"
 import { spawn } from "node:child_process"
 import { createServer } from "node:net"
 import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from "node:url"
@@ -49,6 +50,61 @@ try {
   await updateMcpSettings({ enabled: true }, actor)
   app = await buildApp({ startScheduler: false, logger: false }); await app.listen({ port, host: "127.0.0.1" })
   const jwt = await new SignJWT({ sub: actor.id, apps: actor.apps, permissions: actor.permissions }).setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" }).setIssuer(env.authIssuer).setIssuedAt().setExpirationTime("1h").sign(new TextEncoder().encode(env.jwtSecret))
+  const portalHeaders = { authorization: `Bearer ${jwt}`, "content-type": "application/json" }
+  assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS count FROM mcp_connections WHERE owner_id=$1", [actor.id])).rows[0].count, 0)
+  const callback = "http://localhost:45678/callback?registered=1"
+  const registration = await fetch(origin + "/api/mcp/oauth/clients", { method: "POST", headers: portalHeaders,
+    body: JSON.stringify({ name: "Owned denial fixture", redirectUris: [callback] }) })
+  assert.equal(registration.status, 200)
+  const { clientId } = await registration.json() as { clientId: string }
+  const consent = (payload: Record<string, unknown>, headers = portalHeaders) => fetch(origin + "/api/mcp/oauth/consent", { method: "POST", headers, body: JSON.stringify(payload) })
+  const authorize = async (state: string) => {
+    const parameters = new URLSearchParams({ client_id: clientId, redirect_uri: callback, response_type: "code", resource: endpoint,
+      code_challenge_method: "S256", code_challenge: createHash("sha256").update("v".repeat(64)).digest("base64url"), state })
+    const response = await fetch(`${origin}/oauth/authorize?${parameters}`, { redirect: "manual" })
+    assert.equal(response.status, 302)
+    const requestId = new URL(response.headers.get("location")!).searchParams.get("oauthRequest")
+    assert.ok(requestId)
+    return requestId
+  }
+  const requestId = await authorize("deny-without-connection")
+  assert.equal((await consent({ requestId, approve: false }, { ...portalHeaders, authorization: "" })).status, 401)
+  assert.equal((await consent({ requestId, approve: true })).status, 400)
+  const refusals = await Promise.all([consent({ requestId, approve: false }), consent({ requestId, approve: false })])
+  assert.deepEqual(refusals.map(response => response.status).sort(), [200, 404])
+  const { redirectUrl } = await refusals.find(response => response.status === 200)!.json() as { redirectUrl: string }
+  const redirect = new URL(redirectUrl)
+  const expected = new URL(callback)
+  expected.searchParams.set("state", "deny-without-connection")
+  expected.searchParams.set("iss", origin)
+  expected.searchParams.set("error", "access_denied")
+  assert.equal(redirect.href, expected.href)
+  const otherOwner = { ...actor, id: "owned-external-process-other-owner" }
+  const unrelated = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ name: "Unrelated paused connection", mode: "observer",
+    expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 600000).toISOString(), permissions: ["mm:servers:read"],
+    scope: { serverIds: [Number(allowed)], operationIds: ["servers.list"], allowGlobal: false } }), otherOwner)
+  await setConnectionStatus(unrelated.connection.id, "paused", otherOwner)
+  const legacyRequestId = await authorize("legacy-denial")
+  const legacy = await consent({ requestId: legacyRequestId, connectionId: unrelated.connection.id, approve: false })
+  assert.equal(legacy.status, 200)
+  assert.equal((await consent({ requestId: legacyRequestId, connectionId: unrelated.connection.id, approve: false })).status, 404)
+  const expired = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ name: "Expired connection", mode: "observer",
+    expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 600000).toISOString(), permissions: ["mm:servers:read"],
+    scope: { serverIds: [Number(allowed)], operationIds: ["servers.list"], allowGlobal: false } }), actor)
+  await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_connections SET policy=jsonb_set(policy,'{expiresAt}',to_jsonb($2::text)) WHERE id=$1", [expired.connection.id, "2000-01-01T00:00:00Z"])
+  const expiredRequestId = await authorize("expired-approval")
+  assert.equal((await consent({ requestId: expiredRequestId, connectionId: expired.connection.id, approve: true })).status, 403)
+  const expiredRequest = (await pool.query("SELECT consumed_at,code_digest,connection_id FROM mcp_oauth_requests WHERE id=$1", [expiredRequestId])).rows[0]
+  assert.deepEqual(expiredRequest, { consumed_at: null, code_digest: null, connection_id: null })
+  assert.equal((await consent({ requestId: expiredRequestId, approve: false })).status, 200)
+  const deniedRows = (await pool.query("SELECT consumed_at,code_digest,connection_id FROM mcp_oauth_requests WHERE client_id=$1", [clientId])).rows
+  assert.equal(deniedRows.length, 3)
+  assert(deniedRows.every(row => row.consumed_at instanceof Date && row.code_digest === null && row.connection_id === null))
+  assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS count FROM mcp_credentials WHERE client_id=$1", [clientId])).rows[0].count, 0)
+  const denialAudit = (await pool.query("SELECT actor_id,connection_id,payload FROM mcp_audit WHERE action='oauth.consent' AND payload->>'clientId'=$1", [clientId])).rows
+  assert.equal(denialAudit.length, 3)
+  assert(denialAudit.every(row => row.actor_id === actor.id && row.connection_id === null && row.payload.approved === false))
+  console.log("OAuth consent: expired approval refused before code issuance, denial uses exact redirect and one-use request without credentials")
   const transcript: unknown[] = []; let failure: unknown, result: unknown
   child = spawn(process.execPath, [fileURLToPath(new URL("./client.mjs", import.meta.url))], { cwd: process.cwd(), windowsHide: true, stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe", "ipc"],
     env: { ...Object.fromEntries(["SystemRoot", "WINDIR", "TEMP", "TMP", "PATH", "Path"].filter(k => process.env[k]).map(k => [k, process.env[k]!])),
@@ -90,7 +146,8 @@ try {
   const logs = JSON.stringify((await pool.query("SELECT tool,input,result,error_code FROM mcp_requests ORDER BY created_at")).rows)
   for (const token of [...credentials, jwt, secret]) { assert(!logs.includes(token)); assert(!stdout.includes(token)); assert(!stderr.includes(token)) }
   const final = { ...(result as object), actualOwnPg: true, actualProductionHttpServer: true, serverFixturePid: process.pid,
-    controlTransitions: transcript, auditCredentialLeakAbsent: true, nativeRouterCalls: 0, productionDatabaseTouched: false }
+    controlTransitions: transcript, auditCredentialLeakAbsent: true, denialWithoutConnection: true,
+    legacyDenialIgnoresPausedForeignConnection: true, nativeRouterCalls: 0, productionDatabaseTouched: false }
   await writeFile(process.env.OWN_EXTERNAL_RESULT_FILE!, JSON.stringify(final, null, 2))
   console.log("Owned external process SDK result:", JSON.stringify(final))
 } finally {

backend/scripts/test-mcp-postgres.mjs

@@ -94,8 +94,11 @@ const operatorPeerMetadata = process.argv.includes('--operator-peer-metadata')
 if (operatorPeerMetadata && process.argv.slice(2).some(arg => arg !== '--operator-peer-metadata')) throw new Error('Operator peer metadata requires a separate disposable cluster without restore')
 const externalPeerMetadata = process.argv.includes('--external-peer-metadata')
 if (externalPeerMetadata && process.argv.slice(2).some(arg => arg !== '--external-peer-metadata')) throw new Error('Guarded external peer metadata requires a separate disposable cluster without restore')
-const mcpOperationOrigin = process.argv.includes('--mcp-operation-origin')
+const pollOperationRetirement = process.argv.includes('--poll-operation-retirement')
-if (mcpOperationOrigin && process.argv.slice(2).some(arg => arg !== '--mcp-operation-origin')) throw new Error('MCP operation root requires a separate disposable cluster without restore')
+const ordinaryOperationRetirement = process.argv.includes('--ordinary-operation-retirement')
+const probeOperationRetirement = process.argv.includes('--probe-operation-retirement')
+const mcpOperationOrigin = process.argv.includes('--mcp-operation-origin') || pollOperationRetirement || ordinaryOperationRetirement || probeOperationRetirement
+if (mcpOperationOrigin && process.argv.slice(2).some(arg => arg !== (probeOperationRetirement ? '--probe-operation-retirement' : ordinaryOperationRetirement ? '--ordinary-operation-retirement' : pollOperationRetirement ? '--poll-operation-retirement' : '--mcp-operation-origin'))) throw new Error('MCP operation root requires a separate disposable cluster without restore')
 const mcpSpeedOriginal = process.argv.includes('--mcp-speed-original')
 if (mcpSpeedOriginal && process.argv.slice(2).some(arg => arg !== '--mcp-speed-original')) throw new Error('MCP speed component requires a separate disposable cluster without restore')
 const routerConfigurationGuard = process.argv.includes('--router-configuration-guard')
@@ -243,13 +246,13 @@ try {
   if (regressionOnly) console.log('Selected regression only: primary integration and terminal restore are not run')
   if (profilesOnly) console.log('Profiles-only regression matrix: primary integration NOT RUN; terminal restore NOT RUN; full acceptance is not claimed')
   const result = regressionOnly || profilesOnly ? 0 : await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-    const child = spawn(process.execPath, pollMemory ? ['--max-old-space-size=192', '--max-semi-space-size=16', fileURLToPath(new URL('../dist-mcp-memory/services/server-poll-memory.owned.test.js', import.meta.url))] : ['--import', 'tsx', principalSecuritySource ? 'src/modules/mcp/principal-security-source.owned.test.ts' : pollJournalSnapshot ? 'src/services/server-poll-journal-snapshot.owned.test.ts' : pollTerminalArchive ? 'src/services/server-poll-terminal-archive.owned.test.ts' : pollArchiveSchema ? 'src/db/server-poll-terminal-archives.sql.test.ts' : telemetrySettingsConfiguration ? 'src/modules/mcp/telemetry-settings-configuration.owned.test.ts' : routingReservationSchema ? 'src/db/routing-reservation-schema.owned.test.ts' : routingForwardRounds ? 'src/modules/mcp/routing-network-forward-rounds.owned.test.ts' : flowActiveServices ? 'src/services/traffic-flow-active-services.owned.test.ts' : flowActiveRebuild ? 'src/services/traffic-flow-active-rebuild.owned.test.ts' : flowQuality ? 'src/services/traffic-flow-quality.owned.test.ts' : flowWorkerIpc ? 'src/services/traffic-flow-worker-ipc.owned.test.ts' : manualUptime ? 'src/modules/mcp/manual-uptime-http.test.ts' : manualPingGroup ? 'src/modules/mcp/manual-ping-group-http.test.ts' : manualTraffic ? 'src/modules/mcp/manual-traffic-http.test.ts' : manualApiPing ? 'src/modules/mcp/manual-api-ping-http.test.ts' : simpleSpeedChr ? 'src/modules/mcp/simple-speed-chr.test.ts' : simpleSpeed ? 'src/modules/mcp/simple-speed-http.test.ts' : externalPeerMetadata ? 'src/services/bandwidth-external-peer-metadata.sql.test.ts' : operatorPeerMetadata ? 'src/services/bandwidth-operator-metadata.sql.test.ts' : publicRegistryMetadata ? 'src/services/bandwidth-public-registry.sql.test.ts' : operatorDockerSql ? 'src/services/bandwidth-operator-docker-stop.sql.test.ts' : mcpOperationOrigin ? 'src/modules/mcp/operation-execution-origin.sql.test.ts' : mcpSpeedOriginal ? 'src/modules/mcp/speed-bandwidth-original.sql.test.ts' : routerConfigurationGuard ? 'src/services/router-configuration-guard.sql.test.ts' : scheduledSpeedOriginal ? 'src/services/bandwidth-scheduled-speed-original.sql.test.ts' : bandwidthSpeedWorkflow ? 'src/services/bandwidth-speed-workflow.sql.test.ts' : restSpeedOriginal ? 'src/services/bandwidth-rest-speed-original.sql.test.ts' : operationLocks ? 'src/services/operation-config-lock-lease.sql.test.ts' : serviceExecutionOrigin ? 'src/modules/mcp/service-execution-origin.sql.test.ts' : bandwidthNodeSource ? 'src/services/bandwidth-node-source.sql.test.ts' : bandwidthExternalRegistry ? 'src/services/bandwidth-external-node-registry.sql.test.ts' : bandwidthNodeRegistry ? 'src/services/bandwidth-node-registry.sql.test.ts' : bandwidthControlSource ? 'src/services/bandwidth-control-source.sql.test.ts' : bandwidthAdmission ? 'src/services/bandwidth-admission.sql.test.ts' : serverPollStorageFresh ? 'src/services/server-poll-storage-fresh.sql.test.ts' : serverPollStorage ? 'src/services/server-poll-storage.sql.test.ts' : probeStorageFresh ? 'src/services/server-probe-storage-fresh.sql.test.ts' : probeLegacyOrphans ? 'src/services/server-probe-legacy-orphans.sql.test.ts' : diagnosticCancelHost ? 'src/modules/mcp/diagnostic-cancellation-storage.sql.test.ts' : ipsecExportHttp ? 'src/modules/mcp/ipsec-existing-certificate-export-http.sql.test.ts' : ipsecExportJournal ? 'src/services/ipsec-existing-certificate-export-rest-journal.sql.test.ts' : migrationDataInventory ? 'src/db/migration-data-inventory.sql.test.ts' : probeStorageHistory ? 'src/services/server-probe-storage-history.sql.test.ts' : probeStorageJournal ? 'src/services/server-probe-storage-journal.sql.test.ts' : controlledSchemaReference ? 'src/db/controlled-schema-reference.sql.test.ts' : controlledMigrations ? 'src/db/controlled-migrations.sql.test.ts' : databaseSchemaControl ? 'src/db/database-schema-control.sql.test.ts' : migrationSchemaInventory ? 'src/db/migration-schema-inventory.sql.test.ts' : routingNetworkNative ? 'src/modules/mcp/routing-network-native.sql.test.ts' : routingReservationRuntime ? 'src/modules/mcp/routing-reservation-runtime.sql.test.ts' : routingReservations ? 'src/modules/mcp/routing-reservation.sql.test.ts' : collectorPartitionWriters ? 'src/services/collector-partition-writes.sql.test.ts' : serverPollDurable ? 'src/services/server-poll-durable-session.sql.test.ts' : routingRecoveryAuthority ? 'src/modules/mcp/routing-recovery-authority.sql.test.ts' : legacyFlowRebuild ? 'src/test/legacy-flow-rebuild-sql.ts' : probeJournal ? 'src/services/server-probe-journal.sql.test.ts' : flowHostKeys ? 'src/modules/mcp/flow-host-keys-http.test.ts' : flowRebuildMcp ? 'src/modules/mcp/flow-facts-rebuild-http.test.ts' : flowRebuild ? 'src/test/flow-facts-rebuild-sql.ts' : flowWrites ? 'src/services/traffic-flow-write-transaction.pg.test.ts' : nativeConservation ? 'src/modules/mcp/native-conservation-sql.test.ts' : nativeCreateId ? 'src/modules/mcp/native-create-id-http.test.ts' : ipsecAdapters ? "src/mLine truncated
+    const child = spawn(process.execPath, pollMemory ? ['--max-old-space-size=192', '--max-semi-space-size=16', fileURLToPath(new URL('../dist-mcp-memory/services/server-poll-memory.owned.test.js', import.meta.url))] : ['--import', 'tsx', principalSecuritySource ? 'src/modules/mcp/principal-security-source.owned.test.ts' : pollJournalSnapshot ? 'src/services/server-poll-journal-snapshot.owned.test.ts' : pollTerminalArchive ? 'src/services/server-poll-terminal-archive.owned.test.ts' : pollArchiveSchema ? 'src/db/server-poll-terminal-archives.sql.test.ts' : telemetrySettingsConfiguration ? 'src/modules/mcp/telemetry-settings-configuration.owned.test.ts' : routingReservationSchema ? 'src/db/routing-reservation-schema.owned.test.ts' : routingForwardRounds ? 'src/modules/mcp/routing-network-forward-rounds.owned.test.ts' : flowActiveServices ? 'src/services/traffic-flow-active-services.owned.test.ts' : flowActiveRebuild ? 'src/services/traffic-flow-active-rebuild.owned.test.ts' : flowQuality ? 'src/services/traffic-flow-quality.owned.test.ts' : flowWorkerIpc ? 'src/services/traffic-flow-worker-ipc.owned.test.ts' : manualUptime ? 'src/modules/mcp/manual-uptime-http.test.ts' : manualPingGroup ? 'src/modules/mcp/manual-ping-group-http.test.ts' : manualTraffic ? 'src/modules/mcp/manual-traffic-http.test.ts' : manualApiPing ? 'src/modules/mcp/manual-api-ping-http.test.ts' : simpleSpeedChr ? 'src/modules/mcp/simple-speed-chr.test.ts' : simpleSpeed ? 'src/modules/mcp/simple-speed-http.test.ts' : externalPeerMetadata ? 'src/services/bandwidth-external-peer-metadata.sql.test.ts' : operatorPeerMetadata ? 'src/services/bandwidth-operator-metadata.sql.test.ts' : publicRegistryMetadata ? 'src/services/bandwidth-public-registry.sql.test.ts' : operatorDockerSql ? 'src/services/bandwidth-operator-docker-stop.sql.test.ts' : probeOperationRetirement ? 'src/services/server-probe-operation-retirement.owned.test.ts' : ordinaryOperationRetirement ? 'src/modules/mcp/ordinary-operation-retirement.owned.test.ts' : pollOperationRetirement ? 'src/services/server-poll-operation-retirement.owned.test.ts' : mcpOperationOrigin ? 'src/modules/mcp/operation-execution-origin.sql.test.ts' : mcpSpeedOriginal ? 'src/modules/mcp/speed-bandwidth-original.sql.test.ts' : routerConfigurationGuard ? 'src/services/router-configuration-guard.sql.test.ts' : scheduledSpeedOriginal ? 'src/services/bandwidth-scheduled-speed-original.sql.test.ts' : bandwidthSpeedWorkflow ? 'src/services/bandwidth-speed-workflow.sql.test.ts' : restSpeedOriginal ? 'src/services/bandwidth-rest-speed-original.sql.test.ts' : operationLocks ? 'src/services/operation-config-lock-lease.sql.test.ts' : serviceExecutionOrigin ? 'src/modules/mcp/service-execution-origin.sql.test.ts' : bandwidthNodeSource ? 'src/services/bandwidth-node-source.sql.test.ts' : bandwidthExternalRegistry ? 'src/services/bandwidth-external-node-registry.sql.test.ts' : bandwidthNodeRegistry ? 'src/services/bandwidth-node-registry.sql.test.ts' : bandwidthControlSource ? 'src/services/bandwidth-control-source.sql.test.ts' : bandwidthAdmission ? 'src/services/bandwidth-admission.sql.test.ts' : serverPollStorageFresh ? 'src/services/server-poll-storage-fresh.sql.test.ts' : serverPollStorage ? 'src/services/server-poll-storage.sql.test.ts' : probeStorageFresh ? 'src/services/server-probe-storage-fresh.sql.test.ts' : probeLegacyOrphans ? 'src/services/server-probe-legacy-orphans.sql.test.ts' : diagnosticCancelHost ? 'src/modules/mcp/diagnostic-cancellation-storage.sql.test.ts' : ipsecExportHttp ? 'src/modules/mcp/ipsec-existing-certificate-export-http.sql.test.ts' : ipsecExportJournal ? 'src/services/ipsec-existing-certificate-export-rest-journal.sql.test.ts' : migrationDataInventory ? 'src/db/migration-data-inventory.sql.test.ts' : probeStorageHistory ? 'src/services/server-probe-storage-history.sql.test.ts' : probeStorageJournal ? 'src/services/server-probe-storage-journal.sql.test.ts' : controlledSchemaReference ? 'src/db/controlled-schema-reference.sql.test.ts' : controlledMigrations ? 'src/db/controlled-migrations.sql.test.ts' : databaseSchemaControl ? 'src/db/database-schema-control.sql.test.ts' : migrationSchemaInventory ? 'src/db/migration-schema-inventory.sql.test.ts' : routingNetworkNative ? 'src/modules/mcp/routing-network-native.sql.test.ts' : routingReservationRuntime ? 'src/modules/mcp/routing-reservation-runtime.sql.test.ts' : routingReservations ? 'src/modules/mcp/routing-reservation.sql.test.ts' : collectorPartitionWriters ? 'src/services/collector-partition-writes.sql.test.ts' : serverPollDurable ? 'src/services/server-poll-durable-session.sql.test.ts' : routingRecoveryAuthority ? 'src/modules/mcp/routing-recovery-authority.sql.test.ts' : legacyFlowRebuild ? 'src/test/legacy-flow-rebuild-sql.ts' : probeJournal ? 'src/services/server-probe-journal.sql.test.ts' : flowHostKeys ? 'src/modules/mcp/flow-host-keys-http.test.ts' : flowRebuildMcp ? 'src/modules/mcp/flow-facts-rebuild-http.test.ts' : flowRebuildLine truncated
       cwd: pollMemory ? directory : new URL('../', import.meta.url), stdio: 'inherit', env: { ...(pollMemory ? pollMemoryEnvironment : process.env),
         ...(routingOriginalEffects ? { MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_ORIGINAL_EFFECTS: 'true' } : {}),
         DATABASE_URL: `postgresql://mcp_test:${password}@127.0.0.1:${port}/postgres`,
         DATABASE_PATH: join(directory, 'no-legacy-database.sqlite'), SQLITE_IMPORT_FULL_HISTORY: 'false',
         MCP_STATE_DIR: join(directory, 'state'), AUTH_REQUIRED: 'true', AUTH_JWT_SECRET: 'mcp-integration-test-only', MMAPP_TEST_WG_EXPORT_ONLY: String(wireguardExport),
-        MCP_PUBLIC_URL: 'http://localhost:8000/mcp', NODE_ENV: 'test', PATH: testPath, NODE_OPTIONS: pollMemory ? '' : process.env.NODE_OPTIONS, MMAPP_OWN_PRINCIPAL_SECURITY_SOURCE: String(principalSecuritySource), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_JOURNAL_SNAPSHOT: String(pollJournalSnapshot), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_MEMORY: String(pollMemory), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_BOOTSTRAP: String(pollMemoryBootstrap), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_COST_DIAGNOSTICS: String(pollMemoryCost), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_ARCHIVE_CLAIM_LOSS: String(pollArchiveClaimLoss), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_ARCHIVE_HISTORY: String(pollArchiveHistory), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_ARCHIVE_COLD: String(pollArchiveCold), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_ARCHIVE_LOST_ACK: String(pollArchiveLostAck), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_TERMINAL_ARCHIVE: String(pollTerminalArchive), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_ARCHIVE_SCHEMA: String(pollArchiveSchema), MMAPP_OWN_TELEMETRY_SETTINGS_CONFIGURATION: String(telemetrySettingsConfiguration), MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_RESERVATION_SCHEMA: String(routingReservationSchema), MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_FORWARD_ROUNDS: String(routingForwardRounds), MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_ACTIVE_SERVICES: String(flowActiveServices), MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_ACTIVE_REBUILD: String(flowActiveRebuild), MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_QUALITY: String(flowQuality), MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_WORKER_IPC: String(flowWorkerIpc), MMAPP_OWN_MANUAL_UPTIME: String(manualUptime), MMAPP_OWN_MANUAL_PING_GROUP: String(manualPingGroup), MMAPP_OWN_MANUAL_TRAFFIC: String(manualTraffic), MMAPP_OWN_MANUAL_API_PING: String(manualApiPing), MMAPP_OWN_SIMPLE_SPEED: String(simpleSpeed), MMAPP_OWN_SIMPLE_SPEED_CHR: String(simpleSpeedChr), MMAPP_OWN_DIAGNOSTIC_CANCEL_HOST: String(diagnosticCancelHost), MMAPP_OWN_OPERATOR_DOCKER_SQL: String(operatorDockerSql), MMAPP_OWN_PUBLIC_REGISTRY_METADATA: String(publicRegistryMetadata), MMAPP_OWN_OPERATOR_PEER_METADATA: String(operatorPeerMetadata), MMAPP_OWN_EXTERNAL_PEER_METADATA: String(externalPeerMetadata), MMAPP_OWN_BANDWIDTH_EXTERNAL_REGISTRY: String(externalPeerMetadata || operatorPeerMetadata || publicRegistryMetadata || operatorDockerSql || mcpSpeedOriginal || bandwidthSpeedWorkflow || bandwidthExternalRegistry), MMAPP_OWN_BANDWIDTH_SPEED_WORKFLOW: String(bandwidthSpeedWorkflow), MMAPP_OWN_REST_SPEED_ORIGINAL: String(restSpeedOriginal), MMAPP_OWN_MCP_OPERATION_ORIGIN: String(mcpOperationOrigin), MMAPP_OWN_MCP_SPEED_ORIGINAL: String(mcpSpeedOriginal), MMAPP_OWN_SCHEDULED_SPEED_ORIGINAL: String(scheduledSpeedOriginal), MMAPP_TEST_ROUTER_GUARD_OWNED: String(routerConfigurationGuard), MMAPP_TEST_ROUTER_GUARD_CLUSTER_DISPOSABLE: String(routerConfigurationGuard), MMAPP_TEST_ROUTER_GUARD_ADMIN_URL: routerConfigurationGuard ? `postgresql://mcp_test:${password}@127.0.0.1:${port}/postgres` : '', MMAPP_OWN_BANDWIDTH_ADMISSION: String(externalPeerMetadata || operatorPeerMetadata || publicRegistryMetadata || operatorDockerSql || mcpOperationOrigin || mcpSpeedOriginal || scheduledSpeedOriginal || bandwidthSpeedWorkflow || restSpeedOriginal || bandwidthExternalRegistry || operationLocks || serviceExecutionOrigin || bandwidthAdmission || bandwidthControlSource || bandwidthNodeRegistry || bandwidthNodeSource), MMAPP_OWN_BANDWIDTH_RESTORE: String((bandwidthAdmission || bandwidthControlSource || bandwidthNodeRegistry || bandwidthNodeSource) && process.argv.includes('--restore')), MMAPP_OWN_IPSEC_EXPORT_HTTP: String(ipsecExportHttp), MMAPP_OWN_IPSEC_EXPORT_JOURNAL: String(ipsecExportJournal), MMAPP_OWN_SQL_DB: 'postgres', MMAPP_OWN_PROBE_LEGACY_ORPHANS: String(probeLegacyOrphans), MMAPP_OWN_PROBE_STORAGE_HISTORY: String(probeStorageHistory), MMAPP_OWN_PROBE_STORAGE_FRESH: String(probeStorageFresh), MMAPP_OWN_PROBE_STORAGE_JOURNAL: String(probeStorageJournal || probeStorageFresh), MMAPP_OWN_CONTROLLED_SCHEMA_REFERENCE: String(controlledSchemaReference), MMAPP_OWN_CONTROLLED_MIGRATIONS: String(controlledMigrations), MMAPP_OWN_DATABASE_SCHEMA_CONTROL: String(databaseSchemaControl), MMAPP_OWN_MIGRATION_DATA_INVENTORY: String(migrationDataInventory), MMAPP_OWN_MIGRATION_SCHEMA_INVENTORY: String(migrationSchemaInventory), MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_NETWORK_NATIVE: String(routingNetworkNative), MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_RESERVATIONS: String(routingReservations || routingReservationRuntime), MMAPP_OWN_COLLECTOR_PARTITION_WRITERS: String(collectorPartitionWriters), MMAPP_OWN_SERVER_POLL_STORAGE_FRESH: String(serverPollStorageFresh), MMAPP_OWN_SERVER_POLL_STORAGE: String(serverPollStorage), MMAPP_OWN_SERVER_POLL_DURABLE: String(serverPollDurable), MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_RECOVERY_AUTHORITY: String(routingRecoveryAuthority), MMAPP_OWN_LEGACY_FLOW_REBUILD: String(legacyFlowRebuild), MMAPP_OWN_PROBE_JOURNAL: String(probeJournal), MMAPP_MODULE_COMPLETION_ONLY: String(moduleCompletion), MMAPP_MODULE_COMPLETION_TARGET: completionTarget, MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_HOST_KEYS: String(flowHostKeys), MMAPP_OWN_MCP_FLOW_REBUILD: String(flowRebuildMcp), MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_WRITES: String(flowWrites), MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_REBUILD: String(flowRebuild) },
+        MCP_PUBLIC_URL: 'http://localhost:8000/mcp', NODE_ENV: 'test', PATH: testPath, NODE_OPTIONS: pollMemory ? '' : process.env.NODE_OPTIONS, MMAPP_OWN_PRINCIPAL_SECURITY_SOURCE: String(principalSecuritySource), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_JOURNAL_SNAPSHOT: String(pollJournalSnapshot), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_MEMORY: String(pollMemory), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_BOOTSTRAP: String(pollMemoryBootstrap), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_COST_DIAGNOSTICS: String(pollMemoryCost), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_ARCHIVE_CLAIM_LOSS: String(pollArchiveClaimLoss), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_ARCHIVE_HISTORY: String(pollArchiveHistory), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_ARCHIVE_COLD: String(pollArchiveCold), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_ARCHIVE_LOST_ACK: String(pollArchiveLostAck), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_TERMINAL_ARCHIVE: String(pollTerminalArchive), MMAPP_OWN_POLL_ARCHIVE_SCHEMA: String(pollArchiveSchema), MMAPP_OWN_TELEMETRY_SETTINGS_CONFIGURATION: String(telemetrySettingsConfiguration), MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_RESERVATION_SCHEMA: String(routingReservationSchema), MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_FORWARD_ROUNDS: String(routingForwardRounds), MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_ACTIVE_SERVICES: String(flowActiveServices), MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_ACTIVE_REBUILD: String(flowActiveRebuild), MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_QUALITY: String(flowQuality), MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_WORKER_IPC: String(flowWorkerIpc), MMAPP_OWN_MANUAL_UPTIME: String(manualUptime), MMAPP_OWN_MANUAL_PING_GROUP: String(manualPingGroup), MMAPP_OWN_MANUAL_TRAFFIC: String(manualTraffic), MMAPP_OWN_MANUAL_API_PING: String(manualApiPing), MMAPP_OWN_SIMPLE_SPEED: String(simpleSpeed), MMAPP_OWN_SIMPLE_SPEED_CHR: String(simpleSpeedChr), MMAPP_OWN_DIAGNOSTIC_CANCEL_HOST: String(diagnosticCancelHost), MMAPP_OWN_OPERATOR_DOCKER_SQL: String(operatorDockerSql), MMAPP_OWN_PUBLIC_REGISTRY_METADATA: String(publicRegistryMetadata), MMAPP_OWN_OPERATOR_PEER_METADATA: String(operatorPeerMetadata), MMAPP_OWN_EXTERNAL_PEER_METADATA: String(externalPeerMetadata), MMAPP_OWN_BANDWIDTH_EXTERNAL_REGISTRY: String(externalPeerMetadata || operatorPeerMetadata || publicRegistryMetadata || operatorDockerSql || mcpSpeedOriginal || bandwidthSpeedWorkflow || bandwidthExternalRegistry), MMAPP_OWN_BANDWIDTH_SPEED_WORKFLOW: String(bandwidthSpeedWorkflow), MMAPP_OWN_REST_SPEED_ORIGINAL: String(restSpeedOriginal), MMAPP_OWN_MCP_OPERATION_ORIGIN: String(mcpOperationOrigin), MMAPP_OWN_PROBE_OPERATION_RETIREMENT: String(probeOperationRetirement), MMAPP_OWN_MCP_SPEED_ORIGINAL: String(mcpSpeedOriginal), MMAPP_OWN_SCHEDULED_SPEED_ORIGINAL: String(scheduledSpeedOriginal), MMAPP_TEST_ROUTER_GUARD_OWNED: String(routerConfigurationGuard), MMAPP_TEST_ROUTER_GUARD_CLUSTER_DISPOSABLE: String(routerConfigurationGuard), MMAPP_TEST_ROUTER_GUARD_ADMIN_URL: routerConfigurationGuard ? `postgresql://mcp_test:${password}@127.0.0.1:${port}/postgres` : '', MMAPP_OWN_BANDWIDTH_ADMISSION: String(externalPeerMetadata || operatorPeerMetadata || publicRegistryMetadata || operatorDockerSql || mcpOperationOrigin || mcpSpeedOriginal || scheduledSpeedOriginal || bandwidthSpeedWorkflow || restSpeedOriginal || bandwidthExternalRegistry || operationLocks || serviceExecutionOrigin || bandwidthAdmission || bandwidthControlSource || bandwidthNodeRegistry || bandwidthNodeSource), MMAPP_OWN_BANDWIDTH_RESTORE: String((bandwidthAdmission || bandwidthControlSource || bandwidthNodeRegistry || bandwidthNodeSource) && process.argv.includes('--restore')), MMAPP_OWN_IPSEC_EXPORT_HTTP: String(ipsecExportHttp), MMAPP_OWN_IPSEC_EXPORT_JOURNAL: String(ipsecExportJournal), MMAPP_OWN_SQL_DB: 'postgres', MMAPP_OWN_PROBE_LEGACY_ORPHANS: String(probeLegacyOrphans), MMAPP_OWN_PROBE_STORAGE_HISTORY: String(probeStorageHistory), MMAPP_OWN_PROBE_STORAGE_FRESH: String(probeStorageFresh), MMAPP_OWN_PROBE_STORAGE_JOURNAL: String(probeStorageJournal || probeStorageFresh), MMAPP_OWN_CONTROLLED_SCHEMA_REFERENCE: String(controlledSchemaReference), MMAPP_OWN_CONTROLLED_MIGRATIONS: String(controlledMigrations), MMAPP_OWN_DATABASE_SCHEMA_CONTROL: String(databaseSchemaControl), MMAPP_OWN_MIGRATION_DATA_INVENTORY: String(migrationDataInventory), MMAPP_OWN_MIGRATION_SCHEMA_INVENTORY: String(migrationSchemaInventory), MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_NETWORK_NATIVE: String(routingNetworkNative), MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_RESERVATIONS: String(routingReservations || routingReservationRuntime), MMAPP_OWN_COLLECTOR_PARTITION_WRITERS: String(collectorPartitionWriters), MMAPP_OWN_SERVER_POLL_STORAGE_FRESH: String(serverPollStorageFresh), MMAPP_OWN_SERVER_POLL_STORAGE: String(serverPollStorage), MMAPP_OWN_SERVER_POLL_DURABLE: String(serverPollDurable), MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_RECOVERY_AUTHORITY: String(routingRecoveryAuthority), MMAPP_OWN_LEGACY_FLOW_REBUILD: String(legacyFlowRebuild), MMAPP_OWN_PROBE_JOURNAL: String(probeJournal), MMAPP_MODULE_COMPLETION_ONLY: String(moduleCompletion), MMAPP_MODULE_COMPLETION_TARGET: completionTarget, MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_HOST_KEYS: String(flowHostKeys), MMAPP_OWN_MCP_FLOW_REBUILD: String(flowRebuildMcp), MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_WRITES: String(flowWrites), MMAPP_OWN_FLOW_REBUILD: String(flowRebuild) },
     })
     child.once('error', reject); child.once('exit', code => resolve(code ?? 1))
   })
@@ -286,6 +289,9 @@ try {
   else if (result === 0 && operatorPeerMetadata) console.log('Operator peer metadata: actual managed endpoint SQL and genuine localhost license origin; synthetic Q, external metadata and full operator window remain open')
   else if (result === 0 && publicRegistryMetadata) console.log('Public registry metadata: actual owned PostgreSQL and same physical lease; no secret/Q/native/write authority or backend-window acceptance')
   else if (result === 0 && operatorDockerSql) console.log('Operator Docker SQL: actual owned PostgreSQL with mocked Docker HTTP only; not a real Docker/backend-window acceptance')
+  else if (result === 0 && ordinaryOperationRetirement) console.log('Ordinary operation retirement: owned actual logs-settings apply and worker')
+  else if (result === 0 && pollOperationRetirement) console.log('Poll operation retirement: owned authenticated historical fixtures and current reader/GC')
+  else if (result === 0 && probeOperationRetirement) console.log('Diagnostic retirement: actual owned worker tick, PostgreSQL and product read/replay; no live scheduling')
   else if (result === 0 && mcpOperationOrigin) console.log('MCP operation root: owned PostgreSQL ordinary runner provenance; no restore/recovery, global writer activation, CHR or deployment')
   else if (result === 0 && mcpSpeedOriginal) console.log('MCP speed: genuine trusted service context with real connection/grant/SQL, host receipt and localhost native; synthetic Q/mapping; not a public MCP runner/action acceptance')
   else if (result === 0 && routerConfigurationGuard) console.log('Router configuration guard: dedicated owned databases/roles and localhost native fixture; no application migration, production activation or real CHR')

backend/scripts/test-routing-controller-baseline.mjs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import EmbeddedPostgres from 'embedded-postgres'
 import { createRequire } from 'node:module'
 import { mkdir, mkdtemp, readdir, readFile, writeFile, cp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'
-import { resolve, join, relative, dirname } from 'node:path'
+import { resolve, join, relative, dirname, basename } from 'node:path'
 import { randomBytes, createHash } from 'node:crypto'
 import { createServer } from 'node:net'
 import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ await readFile(join(root, 'backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-main-transition.ts'))
 await readFile(join(root, 'backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-controller-baseline-acceptance.ts'))
 if (process.argv.includes('--check-only')) { console.log(JSON.stringify({ mode, sourcePresent: true, acceptanceExecuted: false, productionApplied: false })); process.exit(0) }
 await mkdir(join(root, 'tmp'), { recursive: true })
-const directory = await mkdtemp(join(root, 'tmp/routing-controller-baseline-owned-')), output = join(directory, 'dist'), sourcePins = []
+const ownedPrefix = 'mm-mcp-test-routing-controller-baseline-'
+const directory = await mkdtemp(join(root, 'tmp', ownedPrefix)), output = join(directory, 'dist'), sourcePins = []
 const hash = buffer => createHash('sha256').update(buffer).digest('hex')
 async function compile(sourceDirectory) {
   for (const entry of await readdir(sourceDirectory, { withFileTypes: true })) {
@@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ try {
   // embedded-postgres waits for a new exit event; avoid waiting again if its
   // owned child has already exited. This never targets another database.
   if (postgres.process?.exitCode === null) await postgres.stop()
-  if (dirname(resolve(directory)) !== resolve(root, 'tmp') || !directory.includes('routing-controller-baseline-owned-')) throw new Error('Owned routing cleanup boundary changed')
+  if (dirname(resolve(directory)) !== resolve(root, 'tmp') || !basename(directory).startsWith(ownedPrefix)) throw new Error('Owned routing cleanup boundary changed')
   await rm(join(directory, 'pg'), { recursive: true, force: true, maxRetries: 20, retryDelay: 100 })
   console.log('Owned routing PostgreSQL stopped and its data removed; snapshot/log evidence retained')
 }

backend/scripts/vrf-production-profile.mjs

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ export function projectVrfDiagnostics(log, privateValues = [], expectedSlice = n
     if (Array.isArray(value.accepted)) { row.finalCaseCount = value.accepted.length; if (expectedSlice !== null && value.slice === expectedSlice) finalComponentPresent = true }
     if (['planned','queued','running','applied','failed','cancelled','unknown','expired','rejected','unconfirmed'].includes(value.operationState)) row.operationState = value.operationState
     for (const key of ['phase', 'elapsedMs', 'nativeReads', 'nativeWrites', 'roundTrips', 'lastSqlMs', 'totalSqlMs', 'maxSqlMs']) if (Number.isSafeInteger(value[key]) && value[key] >= 0) row[key] = value[key]
+    if (Number.isSafeInteger(value.wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks) && value.wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks > 0 && value.wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks <= 10000) row.wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks = value.wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks
     if (value.diagnosticWaitSql === true) row.diagnosticWaitSql = true
     if (value.diagnosticError === true) { row.diagnosticError = true; row.safeName = diagnosticNames.has(value.safeName) ? value.safeName : 'other'; row.safeCode = diagnosticCodes.has(value.safeCode) ? value.safeCode : 'other' }
     if (!Object.keys(row).length) { omittedLines++; continue }
@@ -47,10 +48,10 @@ export function projectVrfDiagnostics(log, privateValues = [], expectedSlice = n
 }
 export function vrfSliceDiagnostic(result, log, childBudgetMs, privateValues = []) {
   assert(result && typeof result === 'object')
-  assert(['baseline','physical','vlan','disabled','mixed','reconcile','sql-journal','guards','coexistence','alias'].includes(result.slice))
+  assert(['baseline','physical','vlan','disabled','mixed','reconcile','sql-journal','guards','coexistence','alias','gre'].includes(result.slice))
   assert(Number.isSafeInteger(result.code) && typeof result.childExitConfirmed === 'boolean')
   assert(Number.isSafeInteger(result.caseCount) && result.caseCount >= 0)
-  assert.equal(childBudgetMs, result.slice === 'baseline' ? 240000 : 120000)
+  assert.equal(childBudgetMs, result.slice === 'baseline' ? 240000 : result.slice === 'disabled' ? 180000 : 120000)
   assert(result.failure === null || ['child-deadline','child-log-limit','child-signal','child-error','child-error-after-pid','child-exit-unconfirmed','missing-component-receipt'].includes(result.failure))
   assert(result.accepted === (result.code === 0 && result.failure === null && result.childExitConfirmed))
   return { ...result, capMs: childBudgetMs, diagnostics: projectVrfDiagnostics(log, privateValues, result.slice), scope: 'same-owned-PG-test-only', actualRouter: false, forwardingVerified: false }
@@ -88,10 +89,14 @@ export async function runOwnedVrfProductionProfile({ directory, database, databa
   const report = fileURLToPath(new URL('../../docs/mcp-chr-vrf-companion-native-v5.json', import.meta.url))
   const loader = pathToFileURL(createRequire(import.meta.url).resolve('tsx')).href
   const safe = Object.fromEntries(['SystemRoot', 'WINDIR', 'TEMP', 'TMP', 'LANG', 'LC_ALL'].filter(key => typeof process.env[key] === 'string').map(key => [key, process.env[key]]))
-  for (const slice of ['baseline', 'physical', 'vlan', 'disabled', 'mixed', 'reconcile', 'sql-journal', 'guards', 'coexistence', 'alias']) {
+  // Diagnose the disabled lifecycle first, then the synthetic GRE extension.
+  // Every original case remains required by the same full74 gate and caps.
+  for (const slice of ['disabled', 'gre', 'baseline', 'physical', 'vlan', 'mixed', 'reconcile', 'sql-journal', 'guards', 'coexistence', 'alias']) {
     currentSlice = slice; currentChildExitConfirmed = false; lastSliceResult = null
     await persist(slice + '-started.json', { version: 1, slice, status: 'running', accepted: false, childExitConfirmed: false })
-    const childBudgetMs = slice === 'baseline' ? 240000 : 120000
+    // Nine disabled lifecycle operations need their own aggregate child cap;
+    // measured seven operations alone consumed 105.5s under the original120s.
+    const childBudgetMs = slice === 'baseline' ? 240000 : slice === 'disabled' ? 180000 : 120000
     const cwd = join(owned, 'vrf-production-' + slice), rel = relative(owned, cwd)
     assert(rel && !rel.startsWith('..') && !isAbsolute(rel)); await mkdir(cwd)
     assert.equal(await realpath(cwd), cwd); assert(!(await lstat(cwd)).isSymbolicLink())
@@ -121,9 +126,10 @@ export async function runOwnedVrfProductionProfile({ directory, database, databa
       unknownTimer = setTimeout(() => { if (!exited) { stop('child-exit-unconfirmed'); resolveExit(1) } }, childBudgetMs + 15000)
     })
     clearTimeout(deadline); clearTimeout(stopTimer); clearTimeout(unknownTimer)
-    const expectedCases = { baseline: 11, physical: 7, vlan: 9, disabled: 9, mixed: 7, reconcile: 6, 'sql-journal': 1, guards: 11, coexistence: 3, alias: 4 }
+    const expectedCases = { baseline: 11, physical: 7, vlan: 9, disabled: 9, mixed: 7, reconcile: 6, 'sql-journal': 1, guards: 11, coexistence: 3, alias: 4, gre: 6 }
     const component = log.trim().split(/\r?\n/).flatMap(line => { try { return [JSON.parse(line)] } catch { return [] } }).findLast(value => value.slice === slice && Array.isArray(value.accepted))
     if (!component || component.accepted.length !== expectedCases[slice] || component.actualSql !== true || component.actualCrypto !== true || component.actualAuthPolicyApprovalRuntime !== true || component.fakeVerifier !== false || component.actualRouter !== false || component.forwardingVerified !== false) failure ??= 'missing-component-receipt'
+    if (slice === 'gre' && (!Number.isSafeInteger(component?.wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks) || component.wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks <= 6 || component.wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks > 10000)) failure ??= 'missing-component-receipt'
     const result = { slice, accepted: code === 0 && !failure && exited, caseCount: component?.accepted?.length ?? 0, code, failure, childPid: child.pid ?? null, childExitConfirmed: exited }
     lastSliceResult = result; currentChildExitConfirmed = exited
     const diagnostic = vrfSliceDiagnostic(result, log, childBudgetMs, [databaseUrl, target.password, decodeURIComponent(target.password), authSecret])
@@ -135,8 +141,8 @@ export async function runOwnedVrfProductionProfile({ directory, database, databa
     console.log(JSON.stringify({ profile: 'test:vrf:production', ...result }))
     if (!result.accepted) break
   }
-  const receipt = { accepted: results.length === 10 && results.every(result => result.accepted), childExitConfirmed: results.every(result => result.childExitConfirmed), sameOwnedPg: true, actualRouter: false, forwardingVerified: false, results }
+  const receipt = { accepted: results.length === 11 && results.every(result => result.accepted), childExitConfirmed: results.every(result => result.childExitConfirmed), sameOwnedPg: true, actualRouter: false, forwardingVerified: false, results }
-  await persist('terminal.json', { version: 1, status: 'terminal', ...receipt, requiredCases: 68, completedCases: results.reduce((sum, value) => sum + value.caseCount, 0), diagnosticDirectory: diagnosticPath })
+  await persist('terminal.json', { version: 1, status: 'terminal', ...receipt, requiredCases: 74, completedCases: results.reduce((sum, value) => sum + value.caseCount, 0), diagnosticDirectory: diagnosticPath })
   await writeFile(join(owned, 'vrf-production-acceptance.json'), JSON.stringify(receipt, null, 2))
   return receipt
   } catch {

backend/scripts/vrf-production-profile.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import { test } from 'node:test'
+import { vrfSliceDiagnostic } from './vrf-production-profile.mjs'
+
+test('only the nine-operation disabled slice receives its measured aggregate budget', () => {
+  for (const [slice, capMs] of [['disabled', 180000], ['gre', 120000], ['baseline', 240000]]) {
+    const result = { slice, accepted: false, caseCount: 0, code: 1, failure: 'child-deadline', childExitConfirmed: true }
+    assert.equal(vrfSliceDiagnostic(result, '', capMs).capMs, capMs)
+    for (const otherCap of [120000, 180000, 240000].filter(value => value !== capMs)) assert.throws(() => vrfSliceDiagnostic(result, '', otherCap))
+  }
+})
+
+test('GRE lifecycle diagnostic retains the six-case receipt with existing privacy bounds', () => {
+  const accepted = ['vrf-create', 'vrf-rename', 'vrf-disable', 'vrf-reenable', 'vrf-membership-transfer-a-to-b', 'vrf-delete-addresses-remain']
+  const result = { slice: 'gre', accepted: true, caseCount: 6, code: 0, failure: null, childExitConfirmed: true }
+  const log = accepted.map((acceptedCase, index) => JSON.stringify({ slice: 'gre', acceptedCase, nativeWrites: 1, wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks: (index + 1) * 4, password: 'fixture-private-value' }))
+  log.push(JSON.stringify({ slice: 'gre', accepted, wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks: 24, rawShape: 'synthetic GRE lifecycle', password: 'fixture-private-value' }))
+  const diagnostic = vrfSliceDiagnostic(result, log.join('\n'), 120000, ['fixture-private-value'])
+  assert.deepEqual(diagnostic.diagnostics.acceptedCaseSequence, accepted)
+  assert.equal(diagnostic.diagnostics.finalComponentPresent, true)
+  assert.equal(diagnostic.diagnostics.rawLogRetained, false)
+  assert.deepEqual(diagnostic.diagnostics.records.map(row => row.wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks), [4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 24])
+  assert.equal(diagnostic.actualRouter, false)
+  assert.equal(diagnostic.forwardingVerified, false)
+  assert.equal(JSON.stringify(diagnostic).includes('fixture-private-value'), false)
+  assert.throws(() => vrfSliceDiagnostic(result, '', 240000))
+})
+
+test('peer telemetry diagnostic rejects nonnumeric and out-of-budget values', () => {
+  const result = { slice: 'gre', accepted: false, caseCount: 0, code: 1, failure: 'missing-component-receipt', childExitConfirmed: true }
+  for (const wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks of [0, -1, 10001, 1.5, 'private-raw-value', { secret: 'private-raw-value' }]) {
+    const diagnostic = vrfSliceDiagnostic(result, JSON.stringify({ slice: 'gre', wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks }), 120000)
+    assert.equal(diagnostic.diagnostics.records.some(row => Object.hasOwn(row, 'wireguardPeerTelemetryTicks')), false)
+    assert.equal(JSON.stringify(diagnostic).includes('private-raw-value'), false)
+  }
+})
+
+test('a partial GRE lifecycle is diagnostic evidence without a final component receipt', () => {
+  const result = { slice: 'gre', accepted: false, caseCount: 0, code: 1, failure: 'child-deadline', childExitConfirmed: true }
+  const diagnostic = vrfSliceDiagnostic(result, JSON.stringify({ slice: 'gre', acceptedCase: 'vrf-create' }), 120000)
+  assert.equal(diagnostic.accepted, false)
+  assert.equal(diagnostic.diagnostics.finalComponentPresent, false)
+  assert.equal(diagnostic.diagnostics.lastAcceptedCase, 'vrf-create')
+  assert.equal(diagnostic.capMs, 120000)
+})

backend/src/db/migration-manifest.test.ts

@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ const reviewed = (source: string, extra: Partial<MigrationReview> = {}) => {
   const bytes = Buffer.from(source), file = "9000_fixture.sql"
   return () => analyzeMigration(file, bytes, { file, sha256: createHash("sha256").update(bytes).digest("hex"), transaction: "owner-transaction", selfMarker: false, opaqueBodies: 0, bodyReview: [], effects: ["Explicit inert fixture review"], ...extra })
 }
-await test("all44 exact file pins and every top-level schema operation are inventoried", () => {
+await test("all 56 exact file pins and every top-level schema operation are inventoried", () => {
-  assert.equal(inventory.length, 44); assert.equal(MIGRATION_MANIFEST.length, 44)
+  assert.equal(inventory.length, 56); assert.equal(MIGRATION_MANIFEST.length, 56)
   assert.equal(inventory.filter(file => file.transaction === "owner-transaction").length, 17)
-  assert.equal(inventory.filter(file => file.transaction === "self-managed-single-transaction").length, 27)
+  assert.equal(inventory.filter(file => file.transaction === "self-managed-single-transaction").length, 39)
   assert(inventory.every(file => file.operations.length === file.statementCount && file.effects.length > 0))
   let tables = new Set<string>()
   for (const file of inventory) {
@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ await test("DO BEGIN and stored function BEGIN are never transaction boundaries"
   assert.equal(endpoint.topLevelTransactionControls.length, 2); assert.equal(endpoint.opaqueBodies.length, 2)
   assert.deepEqual(endpoint.opaqueBodies.map(body => body.kind), ["stored-function-body", "executed-do-body"])
 })
-await test("0035 through0044 have exact atomic file-owned terminal markers", () => {
+await test("0035 through 0056 have exact atomic file-owned terminal markers", () => {
-  assert.deepEqual(inventory.filter(file => file.selfMarker).map(file => file.id), ["0035_server_probe_journal", "0036_diagnostic_cancellations", "0037_server_probe_storage_v2", "0038_server_poll_journal_and_writer_guards", "0039_server_poll_storage", "0040_mcp_routing_reservations", "0041_server_poll_terminal_archives", "0042_server_poll_settings_epoch", "0043_mcp_routing_forward_charges", "0044_mcp_routing_manual_inverse_charges"])
+  assert.deepEqual(inventory.filter(file => file.selfMarker).map(file => file.id), ["0035_server_probe_journal", "0036_diagnostic_cancellations", "0037_server_probe_storage_v2", "0038_server_poll_journal_and_writer_guards", "0039_server_poll_storage", "0040_mcp_routing_reservations", "0041_server_poll_terminal_archives", "0042_server_poll_settings_epoch", "0043_mcp_routing_forward_charges", "0044_mcp_routing_manual_inverse_charges", "0045_mcp_operation_replay_tombstones", "0046_server_poll_operation_retirement", "0047_server_poll_retirement_claims", "0048_mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims", "0049_mcp_ordinary_telemetry_retirement", "0050_server_probe_retired_sources", "0051_server_probe_retirement_claims", "0052_server_probe_retired_gc", "0053_server_probe_terminal_proofs", "0054_mcp_geoip_retirement", "0055_mcp_backup_schedule_retirement", "0056_mcp_manual_inverse_recovery_v8"])
   for (const file of inventory.filter(file => file.selfMarker)) { assert.equal(file.selfMarker!.atomicWithAllFileEffects, true); assert.equal(file.selfMarker!.statement, file.statementCount - 2); assert.equal(file.currentOuterMarkerGap, false) }
   assert.equal(inventory.filter(file => file.currentOuterMarkerGap).length, 34)
 })
@@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ await test("poll storage enrollment refuses history before any change and preser
   for(const name of ["server_poll_executions","server_poll_intents","server_poll_acks","server_poll_receipts","server_poll_quarantines"])assert(guard.includes(`EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM ${name})`))
   for(const name of ["server_poll_storage_admissions","server_poll_storage_usage"])assert(guard.includes("'"+name+"'")&&CURRENT_REQUIRED_TABLES.includes(name))
   const bodies=(list:ReturnType<typeof parseMigrationStatements>)=>list.filter(statement=>statement.tokens[0].value==="CREATE").flatMap(statement=>statement.tokens.filter(token=>token.kind==="dollar").map(token=>token.value))
-  assert.deepEqual(bodies(statements),bodies(historical));assert.equal(bodies(statements).length,5)
+  const comparableBodies=(list:ReturnType<typeof parseMigrationStatements>)=>bodies(list).map(body=>body.replace(/\r\n/g,"\n"))
+  assert.deepEqual(comparableBodies(statements),comparableBodies(historical));assert.equal(bodies(statements).length,5)
   assert(bodies(statements)[0].includes("mcp_settings.id=1 FOR SHARE"),"Predicate itself fences current retention, including direct guarded deletes")
   assert.deepEqual(migration.operations.filter(operation=>operation.command==="INSERT").map(operation=>operation.target),["server_poll_storage_usage","schema_migrations"])
   assert.equal(migration.operations.some(operation=>["UPDATE","DELETE","DROP"].includes(operation.command)),false)
@@ -227,4 +228,20 @@ await test("0044 adds only a fixed manual inverse ledger and current-version int
   assert(!pin.operations.some(operation => operation.command === "UPDATE" || operation.command === "DELETE"))
 })
 
+await test("0056 changes only live manual inverse recovery version guards", async () => {
+  const migration = inventory.find(file => file.id === "0056_mcp_manual_inverse_recovery_v8")!
+  assert.equal(migration.statementCount, 5)
+  assert.equal(migration.opaqueBodies.length, 2)
+  assert.equal(migration.selfMarker?.atomicWithAllFileEffects, true)
+  const oldSql = await readFile(new URL("../../drizzle/0044_mcp_routing_manual_inverse_charges.sql", import.meta.url), "utf8")
+  const newSql = await readFile(new URL("../../drizzle/0056_mcp_manual_inverse_recovery_v8.sql", import.meta.url), "utf8")
+  for (const name of ["mcp_routing_manual_inverse_charge_source", "mcp_scoped_recovery_manual_version"]) {
+    const definition = new RegExp(`CREATE(?: OR REPLACE)? FUNCTION public\\.${name}\\(\\)[\\s\\S]*?END \\$\\$;`)
+    const original = oldSql.match(definition)?.[0]?.replaceAll("\r\n", "\n")
+    assert.ok(original)
+    assert.equal(newSql.match(definition)?.[0]?.replaceAll("\r\n", "\n"), original.replace("CREATE FUNCTION", "CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION")
+      .replace("p.operation_id='operations.recover' AND p.operation_version=7", "p.operation_id='operations.recover' AND p.operation_version=8"))
+  }
+})
+
 console.log(`migration-manifest: ${cases} inert parser/inventory/baseline scenarios passed; ${inventory.length} exact files`)

backend/src/db/migration-manifest.ts

@@ -702,6 +702,172 @@ const classifiedMigrationPins: readonly MigrationReview[] = [
       "Adds one one-unit immutable manual inverse charge table, two charge indexes, one manual-history page index, and four triggers. Existing43 bytes, reserved2 and generic debit ownership remain unchanged.",
       "No inferred/backfilled identity, legacy timestamp debit, permission change, source enrollment, public controller activation or READY. Full RT3/all-writer/family-deletion proof remains open."
     ]
+  },
+  {
+    "file": "0045_mcp_operation_replay_tombstones.sql",
+    "sha256": "8edf5b074c7eef49dad7835c44ac2539df4347f19eb9dd9b2aa7005bafaadbc0",
+    "transaction": "self-managed-single-transaction",
+    "selfMarker": true,
+    "opaqueBodies": 0,
+    "bodyReview": [],
+    "effects": [
+      "Adds one empty replay identity table with plan/operation uniqueness and connection-scoped idempotency digest uniqueness.",
+      "Table creation refuses an unmarked collision; the exact marker commits with the schema. No backfill, operation deletion, or worker activation."
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "file": "0046_server_poll_operation_retirement.sql",
+    "sha256": "75d7956ea8134b01bcc88da083b77eb52f6e1ad70ad854918ed3380cb0e8cf88",
+    "transaction": "self-managed-single-transaction",
+    "selfMarker": true,
+    "opaqueBodies": 4,
+    "bodyReview": [
+      "Archive guard permits only fixed receipt-scoped V1 to V2 updates with matching approved terminal operation, tombstone and SQL 180-day cutoff.",
+      "Deferred guard independently requires the tombstone, physically absent operation and plan, and exact ledger accounting.",
+      "Admission guard retains existing paths and applies exact V2 archive-byte delta to both owners without changing row charges or lifetime fields.",
+      "Existing GC retains its authority/activity cutoff and admits retired identity only with exact poll tombstone and compatible V2 archive when present."
+    ],
+    "effects": [
+      "Extends the same archive table to a bounded version 2, changes three guards and adds one deferred retirement guard.",
+      "No automatic conversion, worker activation, operation deletion or retention-window adjustment in migration."
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "file": "0047_server_poll_retirement_claims.sql",
+    "sha256": "8c01ab14d241f715af021e8a7d7f5bb273b450b32f566140359260282524e01d",
+    "transaction": "self-managed-single-transaction",
+    "selfMarker": true,
+    "opaqueBodies": 2,
+    "bodyReview": [
+      "Protects exact current-transaction V1 claim insertion and permits deletion only as the owning admission is cascaded by GC.",
+      "Requires exact receipt, V1 archive proof and claim token already committed in another transaction before V2 update."
+    ],
+    "effects": [
+      "Adds one durable one-shot poll retirement claim per admission, cascading only with that admission's existing guarded GC.",
+      "No migration-time conversion, backfill, dispatch, or quota change."
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "file": "0048_mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims.sql",
+    "sha256": "5bc3598c9f5d09611e98d05345accda6d39b199a583bba789b97a24140fafbfd",
+    "transaction": "self-managed-single-transaction",
+    "selfMarker": true,
+    "opaqueBodies": 1,
+    "bodyReview": [
+      "Makes ordinary claims immutable and allows insert only for the exact linked settled and aged logs.settings.update v1 operation."
+    ],
+    "effects": [
+      "Adds one durable ordinary-operation claim with an authenticated source digest. No migration-time data purge or backfill."
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "file": "0049_mcp_ordinary_telemetry_retirement.sql",
+    "sha256": "68993e924d20db6b08973846a0da367fe89fe2948c414c810e9b171dbbae6761",
+    "transaction": "self-managed-single-transaction",
+    "selfMarker": true,
+    "opaqueBodies": 1,
+    "bodyReview": [
+      "Extends the same immutable ordinary claim guard to four explicitly versioned settled telemetry settings families."
+    ],
+    "effects": [
+      "Replaces only the ordinary claim guard function. No backfill, data purge, or changes to poll or diagnostic storage."
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "file": "0050_server_probe_retired_sources.sql",
+    "sha256": "0468ac7e53638b532557273f55d065ff4cde092d8b08073f5860bab35263aead",
+    "transaction": "self-managed-single-transaction",
+    "selfMarker": true,
+    "opaqueBodies": 1,
+    "bodyReview": [
+      "Refuses update, delete, and truncate of a signed retired diagnostic source pending a separately reviewed lifecycle."
+    ],
+    "effects": [
+      "Creates empty bounded storage linking exact diagnostic admission and replay tombstone IDs. No backfill, retirement, or GC activation."
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "file": "0051_server_probe_retirement_claims.sql",
+    "sha256": "b38876b5da44cf14e20a9df0baaa233ea4de81e471b38dddd370e149c8116243",
+    "transaction": "self-managed-single-transaction",
+    "selfMarker": true,
+    "opaqueBodies": 2,
+    "bodyReview": [
+      "Restricts diagnostic claims to their original settled 180-day source and makes each claim permanent.",
+      "Restricts archival insertion to the exact committed claim and current original source and tombstone identity."
+    ],
+    "effects": [
+      "Creates empty diagnostic retirement claims and guards the archive insert. No conversion, backfill, or GC activation."
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "file": "0052_server_probe_retired_gc.sql",
+    "sha256": "ea56a1f1bdabfce606bdfec56b6a7b31d45b0187fbea4c900bc656ae320f2fdd",
+    "transaction": "self-managed-single-transaction",
+    "selfMarker": true,
+    "opaqueBodies": 3,
+    "bodyReview": [
+      "Validates the exact retired diagnostic identity and the later of current and persisted retention plus the original safety window.",
+      "Only permits archive removal during an exact guarded admission cascade after journal removal.",
+      "Adds the exact retired GC branch while retaining the live admission eligibility predicate."
+    ],
+    "effects": [
+      "Changes only the retired source admission FK to guarded cascade and adds an explicit exact GC path. No collection runs during migration."
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "file": "0053_server_probe_terminal_proofs.sql",
+    "sha256": "759ec8c349fcb24c43af410ad6ade714432678b3a021c94bd982080d6a8986be",
+    "transaction": "self-managed-single-transaction",
+    "selfMarker": true,
+    "opaqueBodies": 2,
+    "bodyReview": [
+      "Pins terminal proof to the current retained original on insert and an exact committed retirement claim on delete.",
+      "Extends claims only to the identical signed terminal proof when the original diagnostic admission is gone."
+    ],
+    "effects": [
+      "Creates empty bounded private terminal proof storage. Existing payload retention, scheduler, and archive GC remain unchanged."
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "file": "0054_mcp_geoip_retirement.sql",
+    "sha256": "680390f98076e3047dbb5a34eab417b253853703932d16c17e4fa3a11060accc",
+    "transaction": "self-managed-single-transaction",
+    "selfMarker": true,
+    "opaqueBodies": 1,
+    "bodyReview": [
+      "Adds only exact settled GeoIP settings version 1 to the existing immutable ordinary retirement claim guard."
+    ],
+    "effects": [
+      "Replaces the ordinary claim guard function without changing settings or retiring existing rows during migration."
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "file": "0055_mcp_backup_schedule_retirement.sql",
+    "sha256": "07e63c1245ea547176d613933a81ad354e734fa64218dadced67ee8f965c01b6",
+    "transaction": "self-managed-single-transaction",
+    "selfMarker": true,
+    "opaqueBodies": 1,
+    "bodyReview": [
+      "Adds only exact settled backup schedule settings version 1 to the existing immutable ordinary retirement claim guard."
+    ],
+    "effects": [
+      "Replaces the ordinary claim guard function without changing backup settings, metadata or entries during migration."
+    ]
+  },
+  {
+    "file": "0056_mcp_manual_inverse_recovery_v8.sql",
+    "sha256": "1dece1d9c5a9cf69e51336f35f868561dad9da6d21556ea31ef5b102634ed9ee",
+    "transaction": "self-managed-single-transaction",
+    "selfMarker": true,
+    "opaqueBodies": 2,
+    "bodyReview": [
+      "The manual inverse charge-source guard requires recovery version 8 and preserves its pending operation, source version, owner and profile checks.",
+      "The manual inverse intent guard requires recovery version 8 and preserves its advisory lock and exact running service intent checks."
+    ],
+    "effects": [
+      "Replaces the two live version guard functions and preserves existing charges, intents, and plans."
+    ]
   }
 ]
 
@@ -724,7 +890,7 @@ export const migrationManifestDigest = () => hash(JSON.stringify(MIGRATION_MANIF
 // resetting the accumulated public table set at the reviewed destructive0002.
 // This is a necessary presence check, not a substitute for exact live column,
 // constraint/index/function/trigger comparison by the control protocol.
-export const CURRENT_REQUIRED_TABLES: readonly string[] = Object.freeze(["acme_settings","alert_engine_confirm_pending","alert_engine_cursor","alert_engine_prev_live","alert_engine_state","alert_groups","alert_history","alert_outbox","alert_rule_conditions","alert_rule_targets","alert_rules","alert_telegram_settings","app_users","backup_entries","backup_schedule_settings","backup_storage_settings","certificate_issue_jobs","certificate_renew_settings","config_revisions","data_migration","events","evobgp_settings","filter_rules","flow_asn_meta","flow_buckets","flow_daily_dims","flow_daily_facts","flow_hour_facts","flow_ip_meta","flow_minute_dims","flow_minute_stats","flow_settings_intents","flow_write_receipts","geoip_settings","internet_path_settings","internet_path_snapshots","mcp_artifacts","mcp_audit","mcp_budget_buckets","mcp_connections","mcp_credentials","mcp_diagnostic_cancellations","mcp_drift","mcp_grants","mcp_management_channels","mcp_oauth_clients","mcp_oauth_requests","mcp_operation_checkpoints","mcp_operation_steps","mcp_operations","mcp_owner_revocations","mcp_path_checks","mcp_plans","mcp_portal_events","mcp_protections","mcp_read_leases","mcp_recovery_intents","mcp_requests","mcp_routing_forward_charges","mcp_routing_manual_inverse_charges","mcp_routing_observations","mcp_routing_profiles","mcp_routing_reservation_slots","mcp_routing_reservations","mcp_scoped_recovery_intents","mcp_secrets","mcp_settings","mcp_unauthorized_buckets","recursive_routes","router_log_collection_state","router_log_entries","router_log_settings","scheduler_runs","schema_migrations","server_poll_acks","server_poll_archives","server_poll_executions","server_poll_intents","server_poll_quarantines","server_poll_receipts","server_poll_storage_admissions","server_poll_storage_usage","server_probe_execution_payloads","server_probe_execution_quarantines","server_probe_execution_stages","server_probe_executions","server_probe_storage_admissions","server_probe_storage_usage","server_snapshots","servers","servers_api_ping_settings","servers_rest_ping_samples","traffic_collection_state","traffic_flow_settings","traffic_samples","traffic_settings","uptime_probe_samples","uptime_probes","uptime_resource_samples","uptime_settings","uptime_speed_probes","uptime_speed_test_runs","user_interface_bindings","vrf_production_tickets"])
+export const CURRENT_REQUIRED_TABLES: readonly string[] = Object.freeze(["acme_settings","alert_engine_confirm_pending","alert_engine_cursor","alert_engine_prev_live","alert_engine_state","alert_groups","alert_history","alert_outbox","alert_rule_conditions","alert_rule_targets","alert_rules","alert_telegram_settings","app_users","backup_entries","backup_schedule_settings","backup_storage_settings","certificate_issue_jobs","certificate_renew_settings","config_revisions","data_migration","events","evobgp_settings","filter_rules","flow_asn_meta","flow_buckets","flow_daily_dims","flow_daily_facts","flow_hour_facts","flow_ip_meta","flow_minute_dims","flow_minute_stats","flow_settings_intents","flow_write_receipts","geoip_settings","internet_path_settings","internet_path_snapshots","mcp_artifacts","mcp_audit","mcp_budget_buckets","mcp_connections","mcp_credentials","mcp_diagnostic_cancellations","mcp_drift","mcp_grants","mcp_management_channels","mcp_oauth_clients","mcp_oauth_requests","mcp_operation_checkpoints","mcp_operation_replay_tombstones","mcp_operation_steps","mcp_operations","mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims","mcp_owner_revocations","mcp_path_checks","mcp_plans","mcp_portal_events","mcp_protections","mcp_read_leases","mcp_recovery_intents","mcp_requests","mcp_routing_forward_charges","mcp_routing_manual_inverse_charges","mcp_routing_observations","mcp_routing_profiles","mcp_routing_reservation_slots","mcp_routing_reservations","mcp_scoped_recovery_intents","mcp_secrets","mcp_settings","mcp_unauthorized_buckets","recursive_routes","router_log_collection_state","router_log_entries","router_log_settings","scheduler_runs","schema_migrations","server_poll_acks","server_poll_archives","server_poll_executions","server_poll_intents","server_poll_quarantines","server_poll_receipts","server_poll_retirement_claims","server_poll_storage_admissions","server_poll_storage_usage","server_probe_execution_payloads","server_probe_execution_quarantines","server_probe_execution_stages","server_probe_executions","server_probe_retired_sources","server_probe_retirement_claims","server_probe_storage_admissions","server_probe_storage_usage","server_probe_terminal_proofs","server_snapshots","servers","servers_api_ping_settings","servers_rest_ping_samples","traffic_collection_state","traffic_flow_settings","traffic_samples","traffic_settings","uptime_probe_samples","uptime_probes","uptime_resource_samples","uptime_settings","uptime_speed_probes","uptime_speed_test_runs","user_interface_bindings","vrf_production_tickets"])
 
 export interface LegacyBaselineEvidence {
   inventoryComplete: boolean; databaseGeneration: string; unresolvedAttemptIds: readonly string[]

backend/src/modules/mcp/action-types.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import type { ConnectionRow, McpPrincipal } from "./store.js"
 import type { RosSnapshot, RosStep } from "./resources.js"
 
 export interface ActionContext {
-  connection: ConnectionRow; principal: McpPrincipal; signal?: AbortSignal
+  connection: ConnectionRow; principal: McpPrincipal; signal?: AbortSignal; logsFollowMaintenance?: AbortSignal
   /** Process-internal persistent controller identity; never parsed from tool JSON. */
   persistentRoutingProfile?: { id: string; version: number }
   /** Available only during target resolution, never retained by the read/prepare handler. */

backend/src/modules/mcp/actions.ts

@@ -9,14 +9,17 @@ import { registerIpsecExistingCertificateExportActions } from "./ipsec-existing-
 import { registerIpsecUserUpdateActions } from "./ipsec-user-update-actions.js"
 import { prepareIpsecNativeWrite } from "./ipsec-native-write-actions.js"
 import { isIP } from "node:net"
+import { setTimeout as sleep } from "node:timers/promises"
+import { logsFollowCancellation } from "./logs-follow-cancellation.js"
 import { z } from "zod"
 import { logFiltersSchema, logSettingsPatchSchema } from "@mmapp/contracts"
 import { appUserCreateSchema, appUserUpdateSchema, appUserRoleSchema, sectionPermSchema, serverPermSchema, userBindingCreateSchema } from "@mmapp/contracts/users"
 import type { McpOperationDescriptor } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp"
 import { hasPermission } from "../../lib/permissions.js"
+import { assertOperationReplayScope, findOperationReplayTombstone, operationHistoryExpired } from "./operation-replay-tombstones.js"
 import { pool } from "../../db/index.js"
 import { getServerReadById } from "../servers/service/servers-service.js"
-import { listUsers, getUserById, listInterfaceCatalog, getInterfaceCatalogState } from "../users/service/users-service.js"
+import { listUsers, getUserById, listInterfaceCatalog, getInterfaceCatalogState, validateUserBindingCreate, UsersServiceError } from "../users/service/users-service.js"
 import { getLogSettings } from "../../services/router-logs-collector.js"
 import { readLogPage, readLogSummary, readLogContext, readLogEntry } from "../../services/router-logs-query.js"
 import { logWhere } from "../../services/router-logs-model.js"
@@ -103,6 +106,7 @@ import { registerRecursiveRecovery } from "./recursive-recovery.js"
 import { registerNetworkHostActions } from "./network-host-actions.js"
 import { registerBgpFilterBindingActions } from "./bgp-filter-binding-actions.js"
 import { registerBgpCommunityPolicyActions } from "./bgp-community-policy-actions.js"
+import { registerBridgeVlanActions, prepareGenericBridgeVlanChange } from "./bridge-vlan-actions.js"
 
 const serverId = z.number().int().positive().max(Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER)
 const rowId = z.string().trim().min(1).max(200)
@@ -126,6 +130,7 @@ registerRecursiveRecovery(add)
 registerNetworkHostActions(add)
 registerBgpFilterBindingActions(add)
 registerBgpCommunityPolicyActions(add)
+registerBridgeVlanActions(add)
 registerTrafficHistoryActions(add)
 registerSidebarCountsActions(add)
 registerLogArtifactActions(add)
@@ -153,7 +158,7 @@ for (const resource of rosResources) {
     const delegated = resource.id === "wireguard" && action !== "create" || resource.id === "wireguard_peer" || resource.id === "gre" && action !== "create" || resource.id === "ipsec_peer" && action !== "create" || resource.id === "certificate" && action === "delete" || resource.id === "container" && action === "delete"
     const previousVersion = action === "create" ? (["ospf_template", "wireguard_peer", "wireguard"].includes(resource.id) ? 3 : 2) : resource.id === "ipsec_peer" || resource.id === "certificate" && action === "delete" ? 2 : resource.id === "wireguard" && action === "update" ? 3 : resource.id === "ospf_template" && action !== "delete" || resource.id === "wireguard_peer" || resource.id === "wireguard" ? 2 : 1
     add(`ros.${resource.id}.${action}`, `mm_${resource.id}_${action}_plan`, `${resource.title}: ${action}`, resource.permission.split(":")[1], resource.id === "certificate" && action === "update" ? ["mm:certificates:write", "mm:network:write"] : resource.permission + ":write", "write", "servers", schema, {
-      version: resource.id === "ipsec_peer" ? (action === "create" ? 5 : 3) : resource.id === "certificate" ? (action === "update" ? 4 : 3) : previousVersion + (delegated ? 0 : 1) + (resource.id === "ospf_template" ? 1 : 0) + (resource.id === "vrf" ? 1 : 0),
+      version: resource.id === "ipsec_peer" ? (action === "create" ? 5 : 3) : resource.id === "certificate" ? (action === "update" ? 4 : 3) : previousVersion + (delegated ? 0 : 1) + (resource.id === "ospf_template" ? 1 : 0) + (resource.id === "vrf" ? (action === "delete" ? 3 : 2) : 0) + (["bridge", "bridge_port", "bridge_vlan"].includes(resource.id) ? 1 : 0),
       prepare: async (input, context) => {
         if (resource.id === "vrf" && input.productionAdmission !== true) throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", "VRF требует явного productionAdmission:true для проверенного native executor; raw план недоступен", 409)
         const sid = Number(input.serverId), id = input.id as string | undefined
@@ -249,13 +254,24 @@ for (const resource of rosResources) {
             if (dependent) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Объект используется: сначала подготовьте явное изменение зависимостей", 409)
           }
         }
+        const linkedVlan = await prepareGenericBridgeVlanChange({ serverId: sid, resource: resource.id, action, id, fields }, context)
+        if (linkedVlan) {
+          const captured = new Map(snapshots.map(snapshot => [snapshot.resource, snapshot]))
+          for (const snapshot of linkedVlan.snapshots) {
+            const previous = captured.get(snapshot.resource)
+            if (previous && (previous.fingerprint !== snapshot.fingerprint || previous.sourceProof !== snapshot.sourceProof)) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Зависимости VLAN изменились во время подготовки", 409)
+            captured.set(snapshot.resource, snapshot)
+          }
+          const objects = new Map([...references, ...linkedVlan.objects].map(object => [`${object.serverId}/${object.kind}/${object.id}`, object]))
+          return { ...linkedVlan, snapshots: [...captured.values()], objects: [...objects.values()] }
+        }
         const placeBeforeId = resource.id === "vrf" && action === "create" ? before.rows[0]?.[".id"] : undefined
         if (resource.id === "vrf" && action === "create" && typeof placeBeforeId !== "string") throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Не подтверждён порядок существующих VRF", 409)
         return { target: { scope: "servers", serverIds: [sid] }, objects: references, snapshots,
           ...(resource.id === "vrf" && input.productionAdmission === true ? { vrfProductionAdmission: true as const } : {}),
           steps: splitOspfPassiveUpdate({ serverId: sid, resource: resource.id, action, id, fields, ...(typeof placeBeforeId === "string" ? { placeBeforeId } : {}) }).map(step => ({ kind: "ros" as const, step })),
           requiresHuman: true,
-          warnings: ["Нативное изменение может затронуть управление устройством и требует подтверждения человеком.", "Автоматическое каскадное изменение зависимостей не выполняется.", ...(placeBeforeId ? [`VRF создаётся перед записью ${placeBeforeId}; порядок определяет принадлежность интерфейсов.`] : [])],
+          warnings: ["Нативное изменение может затронуть управление устройством и требует подтверждения человеком.", "Автоматическое каскадное изменение зависимостей не выполняется.", ...(resource.id === "vrf" && action === "delete" ? ["При удалении VRF RouterOS может удалить автоматический IPv6 link-local и его connected-маршрут пустого bridge; статические адреса сохраняются."] : []), ...(placeBeforeId ? [`VRF создаётся перед записью ${placeBeforeId}; порядок определяет принадлежность интерфейсов.`] : [])],
         }
       },
     })
@@ -267,7 +283,7 @@ for (const definition of [
   { id: "firewall.update", tool: "mm_firewall_rule_update_plan", title: "План изменения правила firewall", resources: ["ip_filter", "ip_nat", "ip_mangle", "ip_raw", "ipv6_filter", "ipv6_nat", "ipv6_mangle", "ipv6_raw"] },
 ] as const) {
   add(definition.id, definition.tool, definition.title, "network", "mm:network:write", "write", "servers", z.object({ serverId, resource: z.enum(definition.resources), id: rowId, fields: z.record(z.string().max(100), z.union([z.string().max(1000), z.number().finite(), z.boolean()])) }).strict(), {
-    version: definition.id === "interfaces.update" ? 4 : 2,
+    version: definition.id === "interfaces.update" ? 5 : 2,
     prepare: async (input, context) => {
       const resource = resourceById(String(input.resource)), fields = resource.fields.safeParse(input.fields)
       if (!fields.success) throw new McpError("INVALID_INPUT", "Поля не соответствуют типизированной схеме выбранного объекта", 400)
@@ -321,6 +337,21 @@ for (const action of ["create", "update", "delete", "binding_add", "binding_remo
       const ids = [...new Set([...(user?.servers ?? []).map(server => Number(server.serverId)), ...(binding?.serverId ? [binding.serverId] : []),
         ...(before?.bindings ?? []).map(binding => binding.serverId), ...(before?.servers ?? []).map(server => Number(server.serverId))])]
       if (ids.some(id => !context.connection.policy.scope.serverIds.includes(id))) throw new McpError("SERVER_DENIED", "Сервер не разрешён")
+      if (action === "binding_remove" && !before?.bindings.some(binding => binding.id === input.bindingId)) {
+        throw new McpError("NOT_FOUND", "Привязка не найдена", 404)
+      }
+      if (action === "binding_add") {
+        try {
+          await validateUserBindingCreate(String(input.id), userBindingCreateSchema.parse(input.binding), { signal: context.signal })
+        } catch (error) {
+          if (error instanceof UsersServiceError) {
+            if (error.status === 409) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", error.message, 409)
+            if (error.status === 400) throw new McpError("INVALID_INPUT", error.message, 400)
+            if (error.status === 404) throw new McpError("NOT_FOUND", error.message, 404)
+          }
+          throw error
+        }
+      }
       return { target: { scope: "global" }, objects: [{ kind: "user", id: String(input.id ?? "new") }, ...ids.map(id => ({ kind: "server", id: String(id), serverId: id }))], snapshots: [], before,
         steps: [{ kind: "service", service: `users.${action}`, input }], warnings: ["Изменение /users не меняет JWT-права портала."] }
     },
@@ -349,16 +380,17 @@ function logFilters(input: Record<string, unknown>, context: ActionContext) {
 }
 add("logs.query", "mm_logs_query", "История логов", "logs", "mm:servers:read", "read", "servers", logInput, {
   read: async (input, context) => {
-    const filters = logFilters(input, context), generation = await accessGeneration()
+    const generation = await accessGeneration()
+    let filters: ReturnType<typeof logFilters>
     let cursor: string | undefined, watermark: string | undefined
     if (input.cursor) {
       try {
         const state = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(String(input.cursor))) as { generation: string; scope: string; cursor: string; watermark: string; from: string }
-        if (input.from === undefined) filters.from = state.from
+        filters = logFilters({ ...input, from: input.from ?? state.from }, context)
         if (state.generation !== generation || state.scope !== fingerprint({ filters, connection: context.connection.id })) throw new Error("cursor")
         cursor = state.cursor; watermark = state.watermark
       } catch { throw new McpError("RESET_REQUIRED", "Курсор устарел или относится к другим фильтрам", 409) }
-    }
+    } else filters = logFilters(input, context)
     const result = await readLogPage(filters, { cursor, watermark, limit: Number(input.limit) })
     return { ...result, nextCursor: result.nextCursor ? await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify({ generation, scope: fingerprint({ filters, connection: context.connection.id }), cursor: result.nextCursor, watermark: result.watermark, from: filters.from })) : null }
   },
@@ -373,30 +405,41 @@ for (const context of [false, true]) add(context ? "logs.context" : "logs.get",
     return context ? readLogContext(String(input.id)) : entry
   },
 })
-add("logs.follow", "mm_logs_follow", "Новые события", "logs", "mm:servers:read", "read", "servers", logInput.safeExtend({ serverId, cursor: z.string().max(8192).optional(), waitSeconds: z.number().int().min(0).max(30).default(30) }), {
+add("logs.follow", "mm_logs_follow", "Новые события", "logs", "mm:servers:read", "read", "servers", logInput.safeExtend({ serverId, limit: logInput.shape.limit.default(200), cursor: z.string().max(8192).optional(), waitSeconds: z.number().int().min(0).max(30).default(30) }), {
   read: async (input, context) => {
+    const maintenance = context.logsFollowMaintenance
+    const signal = context.signal
+    const waitSignal = maintenance && signal ? AbortSignal.any([maintenance, signal]) : maintenance ?? signal
+    const assertActive = () => { const failure = logsFollowCancellation(maintenance, signal); if (failure) throw failure }
+    assertActive()
     const { server } = await routerClient(Number(input.serverId)); void server
+    assertActive()
     const release = subscribeLogDevice(Number(input.serverId)), until = Date.now() + Number(input.waitSeconds) * 1000
     try {
-      const filters = logFilters(input, context), generation = await accessGeneration()
+      const generation = await accessGeneration()
+      let filters: ReturnType<typeof logFilters>
       let cursor = "0"
       if (input.cursor) {
         try {
           const saved = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(String(input.cursor)))
-          filters.from = saved.from
+          filters = logFilters({ ...input, from: input.from ?? saved.from }, context)
           if (saved.kind !== "follow" || saved.generation !== generation || saved.scope !== fingerprint({ filters, connection: context.connection.id }) || !/^\d{1,20}$/.test(saved.cursor)) throw new Error("cursor")
           cursor = saved.cursor
         } catch { throw new McpError("RESET_REQUIRED", "Курсор follow устарел или относится к другим фильтрам", 409) }
       } else {
+        filters = logFilters(input, context)
         cursor = (await pool.query("SELECT COALESCE(max(id),0)::text AS cursor FROM router_log_entries WHERE server_id=$1", [input.serverId])).rows[0].cursor
       }
       while (true) {
+        assertActive()
         const current = await validatePrincipal(context.principal)
+        assertActive()
         if (current.policy.version !== context.connection.policy.version) throw new McpError("RESET_REQUIRED", "Права или область доступа изменились; начните новое чтение", 409)
-        const batch = await readLogStream(filters, cursor)
+        const batch = await readLogStream(filters, cursor, Number(input.limit))
+        assertActive()
         cursor = batch.cursor
-        if (batch.entries.length || !batch.enabled || Date.now() >= until || context.signal?.aborted) return { ...batch, cursor: await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify({ kind: "follow", generation, scope: fingerprint({ filters, connection: context.connection.id }), cursor, from: filters.from })) }
+        if (batch.entries.length || !batch.enabled || Date.now() >= until) return { ...batch, cursor: await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify({ kind: "follow", generation, scope: fingerprint({ filters, connection: context.connection.id }), cursor, from: filters.from })) }
-        await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 1000))
+        await sleep(1000, undefined, { signal: waitSignal })
       }
     } finally { release() }
   },
@@ -473,7 +516,12 @@ add("changes.cancel", "mm_change_cancel", "Отменить свой незап
 add("operations.read", "mm_operation_get", "Результат своей операции", "mcp", null, "read", "connection", z.object({ operationId: z.string().uuid() }).strict(), {
   read: async (input, context) => {
     const { rows: [operation] } = await pool.query("SELECT * FROM mcp_operations WHERE id=$1 AND connection_id=$2", [input.operationId, context.connection.id])
-    if (!operation) throw new McpError("NOT_FOUND", "Операция не найдена", 404)
+    if (!operation) {
+      const tombstone = await findOperationReplayTombstone(pool, context.connection.id, String(input.operationId))
+      if (!tombstone) throw new McpError("NOT_FOUND", "Операция не найдена", 404)
+      assertOperationReplayScope(tombstone, context.connection)
+      operationHistoryExpired()
+    }
     await assertPlanReadScope(await (await import("./runtime.js")).loadPlan(operation.plan_id), context)
     const { rows: steps } = await pool.query("SELECT * FROM mcp_operation_steps WHERE operation_id=$1 ORDER BY step_index", [input.operationId])
     return { ...operation, steps }

backend/src/modules/mcp/application-adapters-http.test.ts

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ try{
   await pool.query("INSERT INTO backup_storage_settings(id) VALUES(1) ON CONFLICT(id) DO NOTHING")
   await updateMcpSettings({enabled:true},actor)
   app=await buildApp({startScheduler:false});await app.ready()
+  await (await import("../../test/mcp-users-bindings.js")).verifyMcpUserBindings(actor)
   await (await import("./routing-community-context-acceptance.js")).acceptRouteCommunityContextMcp(actor)
   await (await import("../../test/mcp-acme-test.js")).verifyMcpAcmeTest(actor)
   await (await import("../../test/mcp-acme-settings.js")).verifyMcpAcmeSettings(actor)

backend/src/modules/mcp/bridge-vlan-actions.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+import { z } from "zod"
+import { isIP } from "node:net"
+import { bridgeVlanConfigurationRequestSchema } from "@mmapp/contracts/bridge-vlan"
+import { buildBridgeVlanConfiguration, bridgeVlanCurrentDesired, BridgeVlanConfigurationError, type BridgeVlanState } from "../../services/bridge-vlan-configuration.js"
+import { readRosSnapshot, routerClient, rosSnapshotSourceProof, type RosSnapshot, type RosStep } from "./resources.js"
+import { verifyBridgeManagementChannel } from "./management.js"
+import { McpError } from "./security.js"
+import { canonicalBridgeVlanValue } from "../../services/bridge-vlan-values.js"
+import type { ActionContext, ChangeEvidence } from "./action-types.js"
+import type { add } from "./actions.js"
+
+const interfaceResources = ["ethernet", "bridge", "vlan", "gre", "wireguard", "vxlan"]
+const resources = [...interfaceResources, "bridge_port", "bridge_vlan", "ipv4_address", "ipv6_address"]
+export async function readBridgeVlanState(serverId: number, context: Pick<ActionContext, "signal">): Promise<{ state: BridgeVlanState; snapshots: RosSnapshot[] }> {
+  const snapshots: RosSnapshot[] = []
+  const active = async () => { if (context.signal?.aborted) throw new McpError("READ_CANCELLED", "Чтение конфигурации VLAN отменено", 409) }
+  // Bind every catalogue to the same configured device source. The executor
+  // rechecks these complete configuration snapshots before each native write.
+  for (const resource of resources) snapshots.push(await readRosSnapshot(serverId, resource, active, snapshots[0]?.sourceProof))
+  const rows = (resource: string) => snapshots.find(snapshot => snapshot.resource === resource)!.rows
+  const state: BridgeVlanState = {
+    bridges: rows("bridge"), ports: rows("bridge_port"), vlans: rows("bridge_vlan"),
+    interfaces: snapshots.filter(snapshot => interfaceResources.includes(snapshot.resource)).flatMap(snapshot => snapshot.rows.map(row => ({
+      resource: snapshot.resource, id: String(row[".id"]), name: String(row.name), disabled: row.disabled,
+    }))),
+    vlanInterfaces: rows("vlan"), ipv4Addresses: rows("ipv4_address"), ipv6Addresses: rows("ipv6_address"),
+  }
+  return { state, snapshots }
+}
+
+export async function prepareBridgeVlanConfiguration(raw: unknown, context: ActionContext): Promise<ChangeEvidence> {
+  const input = bridgeVlanConfigurationRequestSchema.parse(raw)
+  let management: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof verifyBridgeManagementChannel>> | undefined
+  try { management = await verifyBridgeManagementChannel(input.serverId) }
+  catch (error) {
+    // Only lack of a current alternate channel permits primary-path admission.
+    // Identity, transport and other verification failures stay fail-closed.
+    if (!(error instanceof McpError) || error.code !== "APPROVAL_REQUIRED") throw error
+  }
+  const { state, snapshots } = await readBridgeVlanState(input.serverId, context)
+  const primaryManagement = management === undefined
+  if (!management) {
+    const { server } = await routerClient(input.serverId)
+    if (!isIP(server.host)) throw new McpError("MANAGEMENT_UNSAFE", "Основной адрес управления должен быть буквальным IP, подтверждённым в конфигурации устройства", 409)
+    if (!snapshots[0]?.sourceProof || await rosSnapshotSourceProof(server) !== snapshots[0].sourceProof) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Источник основного управления изменился во время подготовки VLAN", 409)
+    const expiresAt = Math.min(Date.parse(context.connection.policy.expiresAt), context.connection.owner_valid_until.getTime(), Date.parse(context.principal.credentialExpiresAt))
+    if (!Number.isFinite(expiresAt) || expiresAt <= Date.now()) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Нет действующего допуска для основного канала управления", 409)
+    management = { channelId: "primary", serverId: input.serverId, host: server.host, expiresAt: new Date(expiresAt).toISOString() }
+  }
+  try {
+    const plan = buildBridgeVlanConfiguration({ ...input, state, management, now: Date.now() })
+    if (!plan.steps.length) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Конфигурация VLAN уже соответствует плану", 409)
+    return {
+      target: { scope: "servers", serverIds: [input.serverId] }, objects: plan.objects,
+      snapshots, steps: plan.steps.map(step => ({ kind: "ros" as const, step })),
+      requiresHuman: true, validUntil: management.expiresAt,
+      ...(primaryManagement ? {} : { managementChannels: [{ channelId: management.channelId, serverId: management.serverId, expiresAt: management.expiresAt }] }),
+      warnings: ["Связанный план изменяет VLAN memberships и PVID в указанном порядке; включение filtering выполняется последним.",
+        "Каждая подтверждённая запись проверяется до следующей. При неизвестном результате дальнейшие записи останавливаются.",
+        primaryManagement ? "Используется основной адрес управления; независимость канала не подтверждена. Обязательно подтверждение человеком; каждый префикс плана сохраняет подтверждённый management-доступ."
+          : "Проверяется конфигурация и доступность зарегистрированного management-канала. Передача пользовательского трафика требует отдельной сетевой проверки."],
+    }
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof BridgeVlanConfigurationError) throw new McpError(error.code, error.message, 409)
+    throw error
+  }
+}
+
+/** A legacy single-row tool must pass the same effective-state checks, but may
+ * not acquire authority to edit other resource kinds through this delegation. */
+export async function prepareGenericBridgeVlanChange(step: RosStep, context: ActionContext): Promise<ChangeEvidence | undefined> {
+  const sensitive = step.resource === "bridge" ? ["pvid", "vlan-filtering", "frame-types", "ingress-filtering"] : step.resource === "bridge_port"
+    ? ["bridge", "interface", "pvid", "ingress-filtering", "frame-types", "disabled"] : ["bridge", "vlan-ids", "tagged", "untagged", "disabled"]
+  if (!["bridge", "bridge_port", "bridge_vlan"].includes(step.resource) || step.resource === "bridge" && step.action !== "update"
+    || step.action === "update" && !Object.keys(step.fields).some(key => sensitive.includes(key))) return undefined
+  const { state } = await readBridgeVlanState(step.serverId, context)
+  const rows = step.resource === "bridge" ? state.bridges : step.resource === "bridge_port" ? state.ports : state.vlans
+  const row = rows.find(item => item[".id"] === step.id)
+  const bridgeName = step.resource === "bridge" ? row?.name : step.fields.bridge ?? row?.bridge
+  const bridges = state.bridges.filter(item => item.name === bridgeName)
+  if (bridges.length !== 1 || step.resource !== "bridge" && row && row.bridge !== bridgeName) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Смена bridge требует отдельных явных планов удаления и добавления порта", 409)
+  const bridgeId = String(bridges[0][".id"])
+  try {
+    const desired = bridgeVlanCurrentDesired(state, bridgeId)
+    const bool = (value: unknown): boolean => {
+      if (value === "true" || value === true) return true
+      if (value === "false" || value === false) return false
+      throw new McpError("INVALID_INPUT", "Нужны явные параметры порта VLAN", 400)
+    }
+    const ref = (name: unknown) => {
+      const matches = state.interfaces.filter(iface => iface.name === name)
+      if (matches.length !== 1) throw new McpError("INVALID_INPUT", "Не подтверждён стабильный ID участника VLAN", 400)
+      return { resource: matches[0].resource, id: matches[0].id }
+    }
+    if (step.resource === "bridge") {
+      if (Object.keys(step.fields).some(key => !sensitive.includes(key))) throw new McpError("INVALID_INPUT", "Подготовьте свойства bridge и VLAN filtering отдельными планами", 400)
+      if (step.fields.pvid !== undefined) desired.pvid = Number(step.fields.pvid)
+      if (step.fields["vlan-filtering"] !== undefined) desired.filtering = bool(step.fields["vlan-filtering"])
+      if (step.fields["frame-types"] !== undefined) desired.frameTypes = bridgeVlanConfigurationRequestSchema.shape.desired.shape.frameTypes.parse(step.fields["frame-types"])
+      if (step.fields["ingress-filtering"] !== undefined) desired.ingressFiltering = bool(step.fields["ingress-filtering"])
+    } else if (step.resource === "bridge_port") {
+      const index = desired.ports.findIndex(port => port.id === step.id)
+      if (step.action === "delete") {
+        if (index < 0) throw new McpError("NOT_FOUND", "Статический порт не найден", 404)
+        desired.ports.splice(index, 1); desired.removePortIds.push(step.id!)
+      } else {
+        const effective = { ...row, ...step.fields }
+        const port = { ...(step.action === "update" ? { id: step.id } : {}), interface: ref(effective.interface), pvid: Number(effective.pvid),
+          ingressFiltering: bool(effective["ingress-filtering"]), frameTypes: effective["frame-types"], disabled: bool(effective.disabled),
+          ...(effective.comment === undefined ? {} : { comment: effective.comment }) }
+        const parsed = bridgeVlanConfigurationRequestSchema.shape.desired.shape.ports.element.parse(port)
+        if (step.action === "create") desired.ports.push(parsed)
+        else { if (index < 0) throw new McpError("NOT_FOUND", "Статический порт не найден", 404); desired.ports[index] = parsed }
+      }
+    } else {
+      const index = desired.vlans.findIndex(vlan => vlan.id === step.id)
+      if (step.action === "delete") {
+        if (index < 0) throw new McpError("NOT_FOUND", "Статическая VLAN membership не найдена", 404)
+        desired.vlans.splice(index, 1); desired.removeVlanIds.push(step.id!)
+      } else {
+        const effective = { ...row, ...step.fields }
+        const members = (value: unknown) => value === undefined || value === "" ? [] : String(value).split(",").map(ref)
+        const vlan = { ...(step.action === "update" ? { id: step.id } : {}), vlanIds: effective["vlan-ids"], tagged: members(effective.tagged), untagged: members(effective.untagged),
+          disabled: effective.disabled === undefined && step.action === "create" ? false : bool(effective.disabled), ...(effective.comment === undefined ? {} : { comment: effective.comment }) }
+        const parsed = bridgeVlanConfigurationRequestSchema.shape.desired.shape.vlans.element.parse(vlan)
+        if (step.action === "create") desired.vlans.push(parsed)
+        else { if (index < 0) throw new McpError("NOT_FOUND", "Статическая VLAN membership не найдена", 404); desired.vlans[index] = parsed }
+      }
+    }
+    const evidence = await prepareBridgeVlanConfiguration({ serverId: step.serverId, bridgeId, desired }, context)
+    if (evidence.steps.length !== 1 || evidence.steps[0].kind !== "ros" || evidence.steps[0].step.resource !== step.resource || evidence.steps[0].step.action !== step.action || evidence.steps[0].step.id !== step.id) {
+      throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Для связанных изменений используйте явный план mm_bridge_vlan_configuration_plan с соответствующим разрешением", 409)
+    }
+    const native = evidence.steps[0].step
+    if (step.action === "update" && Object.entries(native.fields).some(([key, value]) => !Object.hasOwn(step.fields, key)
+      || (step.resource === "bridge_vlan" ? canonicalBridgeVlanValue(key, value) !== canonicalBridgeVlanValue(key, step.fields[key]) : value !== step.fields[key]))) {
+      throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Состояние VLAN изменилось во время подготовки; незапрошенные поля не будут перезаписаны", 409)
+    }
+    return evidence
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof BridgeVlanConfigurationError) throw new McpError(error.code, error.message, 409)
+    throw error
+  }
+}
+
+export function registerBridgeVlanActions(register: typeof add) {
+  register("network.bridge-vlan.read", "mm_bridge_vlan_configuration_get", "Полная конфигурация bridge VLAN и стабильные ID участников", "network", "mm:network:read", "read", "servers", z.object({ serverId: z.number().int().positive() }).strict(), {
+    read: async (input, context) => ({ state: (await readBridgeVlanState(Number(input.serverId), context)).state }),
+  })
+  register("network.bridge-vlan.configure", "mm_bridge_vlan_configuration_plan", "Связанный план VLAN membership, PVID и bridge filtering", "network", "mm:network:write", "write", "servers", bridgeVlanConfigurationRequestSchema, {
+    prepare: prepareBridgeVlanConfiguration,
+  })
+}

backend/src/modules/mcp/bridge-vlan-configuration-http.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict"
+process.env.AUTH_REQUIRED = "true"
+process.env.AUTH_JWT_SECRET = "bridge-vlan-owned-acceptance-secret"
+process.env.AUTH_ISSUER = "https://auth.test.local"
+const { pool, closePool } = await import("../../db/index.js")
+const { applySqlMigrations } = await import("../../db/migrate.js")
+const { updateMcpSettings } = await import("./store.js")
+const { buildApp } = await import("../../index.js")
+const actor = { id: "bridge-vlan-owner", email: "bridge@example.invalid", name: "Bridge VLAN owner", apps: ["mm"], permissions: ["mm:settings:admin", "mm:network:admin"], expiresAt: Date.now() + 3600000 }
+let app: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof buildApp>> | undefined
+try {
+  await applySqlMigrations(pool)
+  assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM servers")).rows[0].n, 0, "Disposable empty database required")
+  await updateMcpSettings({ enabled: true }, actor)
+  app = await buildApp({ startScheduler: false }); await app.ready()
+  await (await import("../../test/mcp-bridge-vlan-configuration.js")).verifyMcpBridgeVlanConfiguration(actor, app)
+} finally {
+  await (await import("../../services/scheduler.js")).stopSchedulerForDatabaseOperation()
+  await (await import("../../services/traffic-flow-ingest.js")).stopTrafficFlowListenerForDatabaseOperation()
+  await app?.close(); await closePool()
+}

backend/src/modules/mcp/bridge-vlan-projection.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict"
+import test from "node:test"
+import { configurationRows, resourceById, rosSnapshotVersion, type ConfigurationRow, type RosSnapshot, type RosStep } from "./resources.js"
+import { createRosPrefix } from "./ros-prefix.js"
+import { verifyRosStepSnapshots } from "./ros-step-verification.js"
+import { fingerprint, McpError } from "./security.js"
+
+const snapshot = (resource: string, raw: ConfigurationRow[]): RosSnapshot => {
+  const rows = configurationRows(resourceById(resource), raw)
+  return { serverId: 1, resource, rows, fingerprint: fingerprint(rows), sourceProof: "a".repeat(64), projectionVersion: rosSnapshotVersion(resource) }
+}
+const membership = { ".id": "*1", bridge: "br", "vlan-ids": "20-22", tagged: "ether2,ether3", dynamic: "false", disabled: "false" }
+
+test("VLAN readback accepts equivalent VID/member sets and omitted empty fields, retaining exact native identity", () => {
+  const before = snapshot("bridge_vlan", [membership])
+  const after = snapshot("bridge_vlan", [{ ...membership, "vlan-ids": "22,20,21", tagged: "ether3,ether2" }])
+  const step: RosStep = { serverId: 1, resource: "bridge_vlan", action: "update", id: "*1", fields: { "vlan-ids": "20-22", tagged: "ether3,ether2", untagged: "", comment: "" } }
+  assert.equal(verifyRosStepSnapshots(step, {}, before, after), true)
+  assert.equal(verifyRosStepSnapshots(step, {}, before, snapshot("bridge_vlan", [{ ...membership, "vlan-ids": "20-23" }])), false)
+  assert.equal(verifyRosStepSnapshots(step, {}, before, snapshot("bridge_vlan", [{ ...membership, ".id": "*2" }])), false)
+  assert.throws(() => snapshot("bridge_vlan", [{ ...membership, "vlan-ids": "20,20-22" }]), /Недостоверная/)
+})
+
+test("PVID-generated rows may change while the sealed static VLAN configuration remains exact", async () => {
+  const port = { ".id": "*2", bridge: "br", interface: "ether2", pvid: "10", disabled: "false" }
+  const dynamic = { ".id": "*D", bridge: "br", "vlan-ids": "10", untagged: "ether2", dynamic: "true" }
+  const raw = new Map<string, ConfigurationRow[]>([["bridge_port", [port]], ["bridge_vlan", [membership, dynamic]]])
+  const initial = [...raw].map(([resource, rows]) => snapshot(resource, rows))
+  const read = async (_server: number, resource: string, active: () => Promise<unknown> = async () => {}) => { await active(); return snapshot(resource, raw.get(resource)!) }
+  const prefix = createRosPrefix(initial, read)
+  await prefix.check()
+  raw.set("bridge_port", [{ ...port, pvid: "20" }])
+  raw.set("bridge_vlan", [membership, { ...dynamic, ".id": "*E", "vlan-ids": "20" }])
+  const step: RosStep = { serverId: 1, resource: "bridge_port", action: "update", id: "*2", fields: { pvid: "20" } }
+  await prefix.advance(step, {}, await read(1, "bridge_port"))
+  await prefix.check()
+  raw.set("bridge_vlan", [{ ...membership, tagged: "ether2" }, dynamic])
+  await assert.rejects(prefix.check(), error => error instanceof McpError && error.code === "STATE_CONFLICT")
+})
+
+test("full VLAN ranges and long sparse VID sets stay representable in plans and inverse snapshots", () => {
+  const resource = resourceById("bridge_vlan")
+  const expanded = Array.from({ length: 4094 }, (_, index) => String(index + 1)).join(",")
+  const sparse = Array.from({ length: 2047 }, (_, index) => String(index * 2 + 1)).join(",")
+  assert.ok(sparse.length > 100)
+  for (const value of ["1-4094", sparse]) assert.equal(resource.fields.safeParse({ "vlan-ids": value }).success, true)
+  for (const value of ["0", "4095", "10-9", "10,10-12"]) assert.equal(resource.fields.safeParse({ "vlan-ids": value }).success, false)
+  const before = snapshot("bridge_vlan", [membership])
+  const after = snapshot("bridge_vlan", [{ ...membership, "vlan-ids": expanded }])
+  assert.equal(after.rows[0]["vlan-ids"], "1-4094", "Native expansion must not overflow the public inverse DTO")
+  assert.equal(verifyRosStepSnapshots({ serverId: 1, resource: "bridge_vlan", action: "update", id: "*1", fields: { "vlan-ids": "1-4094" } }, {}, before, after), true)
+})
+
+test("unknown dynamic flags are retained; only explicit RouterOS-generated VLAN rows are excluded", () => {
+  assert.equal(snapshot("bridge_vlan", [{ ...membership, dynamic: "unknown" }]).rows.length, 1)
+  for (const dynamic of [true, "true", "yes"]) assert.equal(snapshot("bridge_vlan", [{ ...membership, dynamic }]).rows.length, 0)
+  assert.equal(snapshot("bridge_vlan", [{ ...membership, dynamic: "false" }]).rows.length, 1)
+})
+
+test("old bridge CPU, port and VLAN projection contracts cannot execute after semantic projection changes", () => {
+  for (const resource of ["bridge", "bridge_port", "bridge_vlan"]) {
+    const current = snapshot(resource, resource === "bridge_vlan" ? [membership] : [{ ".id": "*2", bridge: "br", interface: "ether2", pvid: "10" }])
+    assert.equal(current.projectionVersion, 4)
+    assert.throws(() => createRosPrefix([{ ...current, projectionVersion: 3 }]), error => error instanceof McpError && error.code === "PLAN_EXPIRED")
+  }
+})
+test("CPU frame admission and MVRP configuration are sealed, with no MVRP write permission", () => {
+  const bridge = { ".id": "*1", name: "br", pvid: "10", "vlan-filtering": "true", "frame-types": "admit-all", "ingress-filtering": "true", mvrp: "false", running: "true" }
+  const original = snapshot("bridge", [bridge])
+  for (const field of ["frame-types", "ingress-filtering", "mvrp"]) {
+    const changed = snapshot("bridge", [{ ...bridge, [field]: field === "frame-types" ? "admit-only-vlan-tagged" : "false" === bridge[field as keyof typeof bridge] ? "true" : "false" }])
+    assert.notEqual(changed.fingerprint, original.fingerprint)
+  }
+  assert.equal(snapshot("bridge", [{ ...bridge, running: "false" }]).fingerprint, original.fingerprint)
+  assert.equal(resourceById("bridge").fields.safeParse({ mvrp: true }).success, false)
+})

backend/src/modules/mcp/bridge-vlan-recovery.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+import { bridgeVlanStateSchema, type BridgeVlanDesired, type BridgeVlanState } from "@mmapp/contracts/bridge-vlan"
+import { bridgeVlanCurrentDesired } from "../../services/bridge-vlan-configuration.js"
+import type { ActionContext, ChangeEvidence } from "./action-types.js"
+import { prepareBridgeVlanConfiguration, readBridgeVlanState } from "./bridge-vlan-actions.js"
+import { acknowledgedCreateId, assertNoCallerCreateId, recoveryRosStepId } from "./native-create-identity.js"
+import { readRosSnapshot, rosSnapshotVersion, type RosSnapshot, type RosStep } from "./resources.js"
+import { verifyRosStepSnapshots } from "./ros-step-verification.js"
+import { decryptSecret, fingerprint, McpError } from "./security.js"
+
+type Checkpoint = { step_index: number; before_sealed: string; after_sealed: string | null }
+type Intended = { step_index: number; state: string; result: unknown }
+const key = (snapshot: Pick<RosSnapshot, "serverId" | "resource">) => `${snapshot.serverId}:${snapshot.resource}`
+function conflict(message: string): never { throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", message, 409) }
+
+export function needsBridgeVlanRecovery(sourceAction: string, evidence: ChangeEvidence): boolean {
+  if (sourceAction === "network.bridge-vlan.configure") return true
+  return evidence.steps.some(change => {
+    if (change.kind !== "ros") return false
+    const step = change.step
+    if (step.resource === "bridge") return step.action === "update" && Object.keys(step.fields).some(field => ["pvid", "vlan-filtering", "frame-types", "ingress-filtering"].includes(field))
+    const sensitive = step.resource === "bridge_port" ? ["bridge", "interface", "pvid", "ingress-filtering", "frame-types", "disabled"]
+      : step.resource === "bridge_vlan" ? ["bridge", "vlan-ids", "tagged", "untagged", "disabled"] : []
+    return sensitive.length > 0 && (step.action !== "update" || Object.keys(step.fields).some(field => sensitive.includes(field)))
+  })
+}
+
+function validSnapshot(snapshot: RosSnapshot): boolean {
+  return snapshot.projectionVersion === rosSnapshotVersion(snapshot.resource) && !!snapshot.sourceProof && Array.isArray(snapshot.rows) && snapshot.fingerprint === fingerprint(snapshot.rows)
+}
+function sameSnapshot(left: RosSnapshot, right: RosSnapshot): boolean {
+  return validSnapshot(left) && validSnapshot(right) && key(left) === key(right) && left.fingerprint === right.fingerprint && left.sourceProof === right.sourceProof
+}
+function stateFromSnapshots(serverId: number, snapshots: Map<string, RosSnapshot>): BridgeVlanState {
+  const rows = (resource: string) => {
+    const snapshot = snapshots.get(key({ serverId, resource }))
+    if (!snapshot || !validSnapshot(snapshot)) conflict("Нет полного исходного снимка bridge VLAN с актуальной проекцией")
+    return snapshot.rows
+  }
+  return bridgeVlanStateSchema.parse({ bridges: rows("bridge"), ports: rows("bridge_port"), vlans: rows("bridge_vlan"),
+    vlanInterfaces: rows("vlan"), ipv4Addresses: rows("ipv4_address"), ipv6Addresses: rows("ipv6_address"),
+    interfaces: ["ethernet", "bridge", "vlan", "gre", "wireguard", "vxlan"].flatMap(resource => rows(resource).map(row => ({ resource, id: String(row[".id"]), name: String(row.name), disabled: row.disabled }))),
+  })
+}
+
+/** Fresh typed inverse of a completely verified transition. Deleted port/VLAN
+ * rows are recreated without their old IDs; new rows are removed only by ACK. */
+export async function prepareBridgeVlanRecovery(input: {
+  operationId: string; evidence: ChangeEvidence; checkpoints: Checkpoint[]; intended: Intended[];
+}, context: ActionContext): Promise<ChangeEvidence> {
+  const { operationId, evidence, checkpoints, intended } = input
+  if (!evidence.steps.length || evidence.steps.some(change => change.kind !== "ros" || !["bridge", "bridge_port", "bridge_vlan"].includes(change.step.resource))) {
+    throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", "Обратный VLAN план не поддерживает смешанные ресурсы", 409)
+  }
+  const native = evidence.steps.map(change => (change as { kind: "ros"; step: RosStep }).step)
+  if (native.some(step => step.resource === "bridge" && step.action !== "update")) {
+    throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", "Создание или удаление самого bridge не поддерживает типизированный обратный VLAN план", 409)
+  }
+  const serverIds = [...new Set(native.map(step => step.serverId))]
+  if (serverIds.length !== 1 || evidence.target.scope !== "servers" || evidence.target.serverIds.length !== 1 || evidence.target.serverIds[0] !== serverIds[0]) conflict("Нет однозначного сервера исходного VLAN плана")
+  const serverId = serverIds[0]
+  if (!context.connection.policy.scope.serverIds.includes(serverId)) throw new McpError("SERVER_DENIED", "VLAN сервер вне текущего допуска")
+  if (intended.length !== native.length || checkpoints.length !== native.length || new Set(intended.map(item => item.step_index)).size !== native.length || new Set(checkpoints.map(item => item.step_index)).size !== native.length) conflict("Нет полного набора подтверждённых шагов VLAN")
+  const baseline = new Map<string, RosSnapshot>()
+  for (const snapshot of evidence.snapshots) {
+    if (snapshot.serverId !== serverId || !validSnapshot(snapshot) || baseline.has(key(snapshot))) conflict("Исходные VLAN снимки или их версии не подтверждены")
+    baseline.set(key(snapshot), snapshot)
+  }
+  const baselineState = stateFromSnapshots(serverId, baseline), expected = new Map(baseline)
+  const created: Array<{ resource: "bridge_port" | "bridge_vlan"; id: string }> = []
+  const deleted: Array<{ resource: "bridge_port" | "bridge_vlan"; id: string }> = []
+  for (let index = 0; index < native.length; index++) {
+    const step = native[index], checkpoint = checkpoints.find(item => item.step_index === index), receipt = intended.find(item => item.step_index === index)
+    assertNoCallerCreateId(step)
+    if (!checkpoint?.before_sealed || !checkpoint.after_sealed || receipt?.state !== "verified") conflict("Нет полного проверенного checkpoint VLAN; требуется ручная сверка")
+    const before = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(checkpoint.before_sealed)) as RosSnapshot
+    const after = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(checkpoint.after_sealed)) as RosSnapshot
+    const previous = expected.get(key({ serverId, resource: step.resource }))
+    if (!previous || !sameSnapshot(previous, before) || !validSnapshot(after) || before.sourceProof !== after.sourceProof || !verifyRosStepSnapshots(step, receipt.result, before, after)) conflict("Исходный переход VLAN или источник не подтверждён")
+    if (step.action === "create") {
+      const ack = acknowledgedCreateId(receipt.result), actual = recoveryRosStepId(step, before.rows, after.rows)
+      if (!ack || actual !== ack || !["bridge_port", "bridge_vlan"].includes(step.resource)) conflict("Нет точного ACK и checkpoint ID созданного VLAN объекта")
+      created.push({ resource: step.resource as "bridge_port" | "bridge_vlan", id: ack })
+    } else if (step.action === "delete") {
+      if (!step.id || !["bridge_port", "bridge_vlan"].includes(step.resource)) conflict("Не подтверждён ID удалённого VLAN объекта")
+      deleted.push({ resource: step.resource as "bridge_port" | "bridge_vlan", id: step.id })
+    }
+    expected.set(key(after), after)
+  }
+  const bridgeNames = new Set(native.map(step => {
+    const rows = step.resource === "bridge" ? baselineState.bridges : step.resource === "bridge_port" ? baselineState.ports : baselineState.vlans
+    const row = rows.find(item => item[".id"] === step.id)
+    const name = step.resource === "bridge" ? row?.name : step.fields.bridge ?? row?.bridge
+    if (typeof name !== "string" || !name) conflict("Не подтверждён исходный bridge VLAN")
+    return name
+  }))
+  const bridges = baselineState.bridges.filter(row => bridgeNames.has(String(row.name)))
+  if (bridgeNames.size !== 1 || bridges.length !== 1) conflict("Обратный VLAN план требует один однозначный bridge")
+  const bridgeId = String(bridges[0][".id"]), desired: BridgeVlanDesired = bridgeVlanCurrentDesired(baselineState, bridgeId)
+  for (const item of deleted) {
+    const terminal = expected.get(key({ serverId, resource: item.resource }))
+    const original = item.resource === "bridge_port" ? desired.ports.find(row => row.id === item.id) : desired.vlans.find(row => row.id === item.id)
+    if (!original || !terminal || terminal.rows.some(row => row[".id"] === item.id)) conflict("Нет подтверждённого удаления исходной VLAN identity")
+    delete original.id
+  }
+  for (const item of created) {
+    const originalRows = baseline.get(key({ serverId, resource: item.resource }))!.rows
+    const terminalRows = expected.get(key({ serverId, resource: item.resource }))!.rows
+    if (originalRows.some(row => row[".id"] === item.id) || !terminalRows.some(row => row[".id"] === item.id)) conflict("ACK ID VLAN не является подтверждённым новым объектом")
+    if (item.resource === "bridge_port") desired.removePortIds.push(item.id)
+    else desired.removeVlanIds.push(item.id)
+  }
+  const compare = async (snapshots: RosSnapshot[]): Promise<RosSnapshot[]> => {
+    const captured = new Map(snapshots.map(snapshot => [key(snapshot), snapshot]))
+    for (const snapshot of snapshots) {
+      const terminal = expected.get(key(snapshot))
+      if (!terminal || !sameSnapshot(terminal, snapshot)) conflict("После операции изменились VLAN конфигурация, зависимости или источник; обратный план запрещён")
+    }
+    for (const [resourceKey, terminal] of expected) {
+      const current = captured.get(resourceKey) ?? await readRosSnapshot(serverId, terminal.resource, undefined, terminal.sourceProof)
+      if (!sameSnapshot(terminal, current)) conflict("После операции обнаружен drift зависимости VLAN; обратный план запрещён")
+      captured.set(resourceKey, current)
+    }
+    return [...captured.values()]
+  }
+  await compare((await readBridgeVlanState(serverId, context)).snapshots)
+  // Reconstruct through the same model, with a freshly verified management
+  // channel. Old receipts never confer authority to run the inverse.
+  const inverse = await prepareBridgeVlanConfiguration({ serverId, bridgeId, desired }, context)
+  const snapshots = await compare(inverse.snapshots)
+  const objects = new Map([...evidence.objects, ...inverse.objects].map(object => [`${object.serverId}/${object.kind}/${object.id}`, object]))
+  return { ...inverse, snapshots, objects: [...objects.values()], requiresHuman: true,
+    warnings: [`Типизированный обратный VLAN план операции ${operationId}; все исходные шаги и ACK проверены.`, ...inverse.warnings,
+      "Удалённые port/VLAN rows создаются с новыми ID RouterOS. Unknown операции не повторяются; восстановление самого bridge не поддерживается."],
+  }
+}

backend/src/modules/mcp/diagnostic-cancellation-source.test.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 import assert from "node:assert/strict"
 import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto"
-import { createDiagnosticCancellationSourceForTests, createReadServerProbeExecutionSourceForTests } from "./diagnostic-cancellation-source.js"
+import { mkdtemp, readdir, rm, rmdir } from "node:fs/promises"
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os"
+import { join } from "node:path"
+import { createDiagnosticCancellationSourceForTests, createReadServerProbeExecutionSourceForTests, readServerProbeExecutionSource } from "./diagnostic-cancellation-source.js"
 import { fingerprint, redact } from "./security.js"
 
 const proof = async (value: unknown) => createHash("sha256").update(fingerprint(value)).digest("hex")
@@ -25,6 +28,7 @@ function fixture() {
     return { rows }
   } }
   return { load: () => load(client, operationId, owner), read: () => read(snapshot, operationId, owner), readSql,
+    readWithExistingKey: () => readServerProbeExecutionSource(snapshot, operationId, owner),
     refresh, binding, input, evidence, row, sealed, setRows: (value: typeof rows) => { rows=value }, calls: () => calls, operationId, credentialId }
 }
 {
@@ -100,4 +104,22 @@ for (const mutate of mutations) {
   assert.equal(source.originalContext.tool, "bandwidth"); assert.equal(source.stageBudget, 1)
   assert.equal(source.originalContext.identity.credentialId, f.credentialId)
 }
-console.log(`diagnostic-cancellation-source: locked/read-only source, expired original contexts and ${mutations.length} shared tamper checks passed`)
+{
+  const state = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "mm-legacy-source-test-"))
+  const previousState = process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR
+  process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR = state
+  try {
+    const f = fixture()
+    await f.refresh()
+    f.row.evidence = { sealed: Buffer.alloc(32).toString("base64") }
+    await assert.rejects(f.readWithExistingKey, { code: "STATE_CONFLICT" })
+    assert.equal(f.readSql.length, 1)
+    assert.deepEqual(await readdir(state), [], "Historical source reads must leave missing encryption state untouched")
+  } finally {
+    if (previousState === undefined) delete process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR
+    else process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR = previousState
+    await rm(join(state, "encryption-key"), { force: true })
+    await rmdir(state)
+  }
+}
+console.log(`diagnostic-cancellation-source: locked/read-only source, missing key, expired original contexts and ${mutations.length} shared tamper checks passed`)

backend/src/modules/mcp/diagnostic-cancellation-source.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import type { ProbeStorageScope, ProbeStorageSql } from "../../services/server-p
 import type { ServerProbeJournalContext } from "../../services/server-probe-journal.js"
 import { SERVER_PROBE_OPERATION } from "../../services/server-probe-authority.js"
 import { openServerProbeMcpBinding } from "./server-probe-actions.js"
-import { decryptSecret, fingerprint, privateSecretFingerprint, redact, McpError } from "./security.js"
+import { decryptSecret, decryptSecretExisting, fingerprint, privateFingerprinterExisting, privateSecretFingerprint, redact, McpError } from "./security.js"
 
 const MAX_BYTES = 2097152
 const uuid = z.string().uuid()
@@ -113,5 +113,14 @@ export const loadDiagnosticCancellationSource = sourceLoader(productionCrypto)
 /** Test-only crypto seam. Never accept these dependencies from tool JSON. */
 export const createDiagnosticCancellationSourceForTests = sourceLoader
 /** Historical authentication only; confers no execution/cancellation grant. */
-export const readServerProbeExecutionSource = readSourceLoader(productionCrypto)
+export const readServerProbeExecutionSource = readSourceLoader({
+  open: decryptSecretExisting,
+  proof: async value => (await privateFingerprinterExisting("server-probe-mcp-binding-v1"))(fingerprint(value)),
+})
 export const createReadServerProbeExecutionSourceForTests = readSourceLoader
+/** Exact previously locked source projection for private history conversion. */
+export function authenticateServerProbeExecutionSourceRow(row: Record<string, unknown>, operationId: string,
+  owner: Readonly<DiagnosticCancellationOwner>) {
+  checkLookup(operationId, owner)
+  return validateSourceRow(row, operationId, owner, productionCrypto)
+}

backend/src/modules/mcp/global-reconciliation-actions.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict"
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"
+import { test } from "node:test"
+import type { McpAction, ActionContext } from "./action-types.js"
+import { registerGlobalReconciliationActionsForTests } from "./global-reconciliation-actions.js"
+
+type Register = Parameters<typeof registerGlobalReconciliationActionsForTests>[0]
+type Dependencies = Parameters<typeof registerGlobalReconciliationActionsForTests>[1]
+
+function fixture() {
+  const connectionId = randomUUID(), operationId = randomUUID(), ownerId = "current-retired-owner"
+  const context = { principal: { connectionId }, connection: { id: connectionId, owner_id: ownerId, owner_permissions: ["mm:servers:write"],
+    policy: { permissions: ["mm:servers:write"], scope: { allowGlobal: true, operationIds: ["servers.poll", "operations.global.reconcile"], serverIds: [1, 2] } } } } as ActionContext
+  let action!: Pick<McpAction, "target" | "read">
+  let history: { affectedServerIds: number[] } | undefined = { affectedServerIds: [1, 2] }
+  let revoke = false, retiredCalls = 0, live = false
+  const deps = {
+    connection: async () => {
+      if (revoke) throw Error("revoked-current-grant")
+      return structuredClone(context.connection)
+    },
+    query: async (sql: string) => {
+      if (sql.startsWith("SELECT id FROM servers")) return [{ id: 1 }]
+      if (live) return [{ id: operationId, state: "applied", operation_id: "servers.poll", evidence: { sealed: "live" } }]
+      return []
+    },
+    operation: (id: string) => ({ id, scope: "global", requiredPermissions: ["mm:servers:write"] }),
+    service: () => ({ reconcile: async () => ({ matchesDesiredState: true, matchesOriginalState: false }) }),
+    decrypt: async () => JSON.stringify({ target: { scope: "global" }, objects: [{ serverId: 1 }], steps: [{ kind: "service", service: "servers.poll", input: {} }] }),
+    retired: async (identity, authorize) => {
+      retiredCalls++
+      assert.deepEqual(identity, { operationId, connectionId, ownerId })
+      await authorize()
+      return history
+    },
+  } satisfies Omit<Dependencies, "operation" | "service"> & Partial<Record<"operation" | "service", unknown>>
+  registerGlobalReconciliationActionsForTests(((...args: Parameters<Register>) => { action = args[8] }) as Register, deps as unknown as Dependencies)
+  return { context, operationId, history: (value: typeof history) => { history = value }, live: () => { live = true },
+    revoke: () => { revoke = true }, calls: () => retiredCalls, read: () => action.read!({ operationId }, context),
+    target: () => action.target({ operationId }, context) }
+}
+
+test("global action reconciles retired poll only under current ownership and returns no archived material", async () => {
+  const f = fixture()
+  assert.deepEqual(await f.target(), { scope: "global" })
+  const result = await f.read() as { observedAt: string }
+  const { observedAt, ...rest } = result
+  assert(Number.isFinite(Date.parse(observedAt)))
+  assert.deepEqual(rest, { operationId: f.operationId, state: "applied", automaticRetry: false,
+    results: [{ stepIndex: 0, service: "servers.poll", matchesDesiredState: true, matchesOriginalState: false }] })
+  assert.equal(f.calls(), 2)
+})
+
+test("global action refuses missing or inaccessible retired history", async () => {
+  const f = fixture()
+  f.history(undefined)
+  await assert.rejects(f.read(), { code: "NOT_FOUND" })
+  f.history({ affectedServerIds: [1, 2] })
+  f.context.connection.policy.scope.serverIds = [1]
+  await assert.rejects(f.read(), { code: "SERVER_DENIED" })
+  f.context.connection.policy.scope.serverIds = [1, 2]
+  f.context.connection.policy.scope.operationIds = ["operations.global.reconcile"]
+  await assert.rejects(f.read(), { code: "PERMISSION_DENIED" })
+  f.revoke()
+  await assert.rejects(f.read(), /revoked-current-grant/)
+})
+
+test("global action uses the live reconciliation path while original source exists", async () => {
+  const f = fixture()
+  f.live()
+  await f.read()
+  assert.equal(f.calls(), 0)
+})

backend/src/modules/mcp/global-reconciliation-actions.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { z } from "zod"
 import { pool } from "../../db/index.js"
+import { readRetiredServerPollHistory } from "../../services/server-poll-history-reader.js"
 import { hasPermission } from "../../lib/permissions.js"
 import { effectiveMcpConnection } from "./store.js"
 import { decryptSecret, fingerprint, McpError } from "./security.js"
@@ -7,40 +8,84 @@ import { findMcpOperation } from "./registry.js"
 import { findMcpService } from "./service-registry.js"
 import type { add } from "./actions.js"
 import type { ActionContext, ChangeEvidence } from "./action-types.js"
+import type { ConnectionRow } from "./store.js"
 
-async function authorizedSource(operationId: string, context: ActionContext) {
+const production = {
+  connection: effectiveMcpConnection,
+  query: async (sql: string, values: unknown[] = []) => (await pool.query(sql, values)).rows,
+  operation: findMcpOperation,
+  service: findMcpService,
+  decrypt: decryptSecret,
+  retired: readRetiredServerPollHistory,
+}
+type Dependencies = typeof production
+const notFound = () => new McpError("NOT_FOUND", "Операция не найдена", 404)
+
+async function currentAccess(context: ActionContext, deps: Dependencies) {
   context.signal?.throwIfAborted()
-  const current = await effectiveMcpConnection(context.principal)
+  const current = await deps.connection(context.principal)
   if (!current.policy.scope.allowGlobal || fingerprint(current.policy) !== fingerprint(context.connection.policy) || fingerprint(current.owner_permissions) !== fingerprint(context.connection.owner_permissions)) throw new McpError("PERMISSION_DENIED", "Глобальный допуск сверки изменился", 403)
-  const ids = (await pool.query("SELECT id FROM servers ORDER BY id LIMIT 1001")).rows.map(row => Number(row.id))
+  const ids = (await deps.query("SELECT id FROM servers ORDER BY id LIMIT 1001")).map(row => Number(row.id))
   if (ids.length > 1000) throw new McpError("LIMIT_EXCEEDED", "Каталог глобальной сверки превышает лимит", 409)
   if (ids.some(id => !current.policy.scope.serverIds.includes(id))) throw new McpError("SERVER_DENIED", "Глобальная сверка требует доступа ко всему каталогу серверов", 403)
-  const row = (await pool.query("SELECT o.id,o.state,p.operation_id,p.evidence FROM mcp_operations o JOIN mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id WHERE o.id=$1 AND o.connection_id=$2", [operationId, current.id])).rows[0]
+  return current
-  if (!row) throw new McpError("NOT_FOUND", "Операция не найдена", 404)
+}
-  const original = findMcpOperation(row.operation_id)
+
+function requireOriginal(actionId: string, current: ConnectionRow, deps: Dependencies) {
+  const original = deps.operation(actionId)
   if (!original || original.scope !== "global" || !current.policy.scope.operationIds.includes(original.id) || original.requiredPermissions.some(permission => !hasPermission(current.policy.permissions, permission) || !hasPermission(current.owner_permissions, permission))) throw new McpError("PERMISSION_DENIED", "Утрачено право на исходную глобальную операцию", 403)
-  const evidence = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(row.evidence.sealed)) as ChangeEvidence
+}
-  if (evidence.target.scope !== "global" || !evidence.steps.length || evidence.steps.some(step => step.kind !== "service" || !findMcpService(step.service)?.reconcile)) throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", "Для глобальной операции нет безопасной read-only сверки", 409)
+
-  const declared = evidence.objects.flatMap(object => object.serverId === undefined ? [] : [object.serverId])
+function requireServerScope(declared: number[], current: ConnectionRow) {
   if (declared.some(id => !current.policy.scope.serverIds.includes(id))) throw new McpError("SERVER_DENIED", "Зависимость операции вне текущего глобального допуска", 403)
+}
+
+async function authorizedSource(operationId: string, context: ActionContext, deps: Dependencies) {
+  const current = await currentAccess(context, deps)
+  const row = (await deps.query("SELECT o.id,o.state,p.operation_id,p.evidence FROM mcp_operations o JOIN mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id WHERE o.id=$1 AND o.connection_id=$2", [operationId, current.id]))[0]
+  if (!row) {
+    const authorize = async () => {
+      const fresh = await currentAccess(context, deps)
+      if (fresh.id !== current.id || fresh.owner_id !== current.owner_id) throw notFound()
+    }
+    const archived = await deps.retired({ operationId, connectionId: current.id, ownerId: current.owner_id }, authorize,
+      { deadlineAt: Date.now() + 10000, signal: context.signal })
+    context.signal?.throwIfAborted()
+    if (!archived) throw notFound()
+    requireOriginal("servers.poll", current, deps)
+    requireServerScope(archived.affectedServerIds, current)
+    return { kind: "retired-poll" as const }
+  }
+  requireOriginal(row.operation_id, current, deps)
+  const evidence = JSON.parse(await deps.decrypt(row.evidence.sealed)) as ChangeEvidence
+  if (evidence.target.scope !== "global" || !evidence.steps.length || evidence.steps.some(step => step.kind !== "service" || !deps.service(step.service)?.reconcile)) throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", "Для глобальной операции нет безопасной read-only сверки", 409)
+  requireServerScope(evidence.objects.flatMap(object => object.serverId === undefined ? [] : [object.serverId]), current)
   if (["pending", "running"].includes(row.state)) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Операция ещё выполняется", 409)
   context.signal?.throwIfAborted()
-  return { row, evidence }
+  return { kind: "live" as const, row, evidence }
 }
-export function registerGlobalReconciliationActions(register: typeof add) {
+
+function registerActions(register: typeof add, deps: Dependencies) {
   register("operations.global.reconcile", "mm_global_operation_reconcile", "Сверить глобальную сервисную операцию без повторной записи", "mcp", null, "read", "global", z.object({ operationId: z.string().uuid() }).strict(), {
-    target: async (input, context) => { await authorizedSource(String(input.operationId), context); return { scope: "global" } },
+    target: async (input, context) => { await authorizedSource(String(input.operationId), context, deps); return { scope: "global" } },
     read: async (input, context) => {
-      const { row, evidence } = await authorizedSource(String(input.operationId), context)
+      const operationId = String(input.operationId)
-      const authorize = async () => { await authorizedSource(String(input.operationId), context) }
+      const source = await authorizedSource(operationId, context, deps)
+      if (source.kind === "retired-poll") return { operationId, state: "applied", observedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+        results: [{ stepIndex: 0, service: "servers.poll", matchesDesiredState: true, matchesOriginalState: false }], automaticRetry: false }
+      const { row, evidence } = source
+      const authorize = async () => { if ((await authorizedSource(operationId, context, deps)).kind !== "live") throw notFound() }
       const results = []
       for (const [index, step] of evidence.steps.entries()) {
         if (step.kind !== "service") throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", "Нативная глобальная сверка недоступна", 409)
         await authorize()
-        results.push({ stepIndex: index, service: step.service, ...await findMcpService(step.service)!.reconcile!(step.input, authorize) })
+        results.push({ stepIndex: index, service: step.service, ...await deps.service(step.service)!.reconcile!(step.input, authorize) })
       }
       await authorize()
       return { operationId: row.id, state: row.state, observedAt: new Date().toISOString(), results, automaticRetry: false }
     },
   })
 }
+
+export const registerGlobalReconciliationActions = (register: typeof add) => registerActions(register, production)
+export const registerGlobalReconciliationActionsForTests = registerActions

backend/src/modules/mcp/integration.test.ts

@@ -2889,6 +2889,53 @@ try {
     assert.ok(!result.isError)
     console.log("✓ Official SDK HTTP initialize, filtered tools/list and tools/call")
   } finally { await client.close() }
+  {
+    const access = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({
+      ...input, name: "Logs follow maintenance", permissions: ["mm:servers:read"],
+      scope: { serverIds: [1], operationIds: ["logs.follow"], allowGlobal: false },
+    }), actor)
+    const follower = new Client({ name: "logs-follow-maintenance", version: "1.0.0" })
+    const { sharedDatabaseGate } = await import("../../services/shared-database-gate.js")
+    const original = pool.query
+    let arrived!: () => void, release!: () => void
+    const reading = new Promise<void>(resolve => { arrived = resolve })
+    const held = new Promise<void>(resolve => { release = resolve })
+    try {
+      await follower.connect(new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(new URL(endpoint), { requestInit: { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${access.token}` } } }))
+      pool.query = (async (...args: Parameters<typeof original>) => {
+        const text = typeof args[0] === "string" ? args[0] : args[0]?.text
+        const result = await Reflect.apply(original, pool, args)
+        if (typeof text === "string" && text.startsWith("SELECT GREATEST(COALESCE(max(id),0)")) {
+          arrived()
+          await held
+        }
+        return result
+      }) as typeof original
+      const following = follower.callTool({ name: "mm_logs_follow", arguments: { serverId: 1, waitSeconds: 30 } })
+      try {
+        const observation = new AbortController()
+        try {
+          await Promise.race([reading, following.then(() => { throw new Error("Follow finished before its stream query") }),
+            delay(5000, undefined, { signal: observation.signal }).then(() => { throw new Error("Follow stream query was not observed") })])
+        } finally { observation.abort() }
+        let exclusiveEntered = false
+        const maintenance = sharedDatabaseGate.exclusive(async () => { exclusiveEntered = true }, 5000)
+        try {
+          await delay(25)
+          assert.equal(exclusiveEntered, false, "maintenance must wait for the pending database read")
+        } finally {
+          release()
+          await maintenance
+        }
+        const result = await following
+        assert.equal(result.isError, true)
+        assert.match(JSON.stringify(result), /RESET_REQUIRED/)
+        assert.doesNotMatch(JSON.stringify(result), /"cursor"/)
+        assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS count FROM mcp_read_leases WHERE connection_id=$1", [access.connection.id])).rows[0].count, 0)
+      } finally { release(); await following.catch(() => undefined) }
+    } finally { pool.query = original; await follower.close() }
+  }
+  await (await import("./logs-follow-sdk-cancellation-acceptance.js")).verifyLogsFollowSdkCancellation(app, endpoint, actor)
   const stdio = new Client({ name: "stdio-integration", version: "1.0.0" })
   try {
     await stdio.connect(new StdioClientTransport({ command: process.execPath, args: ["--import", "tsx", fileURLToPath(new URL("../../scripts/mcp-stdio.ts", import.meta.url))], env: { MCP_URL: endpoint, MCP_TOKEN: rotated.token }, stderr: "pipe" }))
@@ -2907,17 +2954,41 @@ try {
   await (await import("../../test/mcp-host-files.js")).verifyMcpHostFiles(actor,app)
   const readinessAccess = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ ...input, name: "Actual readiness handshake", scope: { ...input.scope, operationIds: ["servers.list"] } }), actor)
   const readinessHeaders = { authorization: "Bearer " + jwt }
+  const simulatorHeaders = { authorization: "Bearer " + await new SignJWT({ sub: "policy-preview-admin", apps: ["mm"], permissions: ["mm:mcp:admin"] })
+    .setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" }).setIssuer(env.authIssuer).setExpirationTime("1h").sign(new TextEncoder().encode(env.jwtSecret)) }
+  const policyPreview = (payload: Record<string, unknown>) => app!.inject({ method: "POST", url: "/api/mcp/policy/preview", headers: simulatorHeaders, payload })
+  const simulatedServerRead = { connectionId: readinessAccess.connection.id, operationId: "servers.list", target: { scope: "servers", serverIds: [1] } }
+  const simulation = await policyPreview(simulatedServerRead)
+  assert.equal(simulation.statusCode, 200, simulation.body)
+  assert.equal(simulation.json().result.decision, "allowed", "an administrator simulates the stored owner's rights, not the administrator's rights")
+  assert.equal(simulation.json().executionAvailable, false)
+  assert.equal((await policyPreview({ ...simulatedServerRead, ownerPermissions: ["mm:settings:admin"] })).statusCode, 400)
   const ready = await app.inject({ method: "POST", url: `/api/mcp/connections/${readinessAccess.connection.id}/check`, headers: readinessHeaders, payload: {} })
   assert.equal(ready.statusCode, 200, ready.body)
   assert.equal(ready.json().ok, true, ready.body); assert.equal(ready.json().checks.protocolHandshake, true)
   assert.equal(ready.json().protocolProbe.status, "passed"); assert.equal(ready.json().protocolProbe.clientCredentialsVerified, false)
+  assert.equal(ready.json().protocolProbe.capabilitiesRead, "skipped")
   assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_credentials WHERE connection_id=$1 AND client_id='mcp-readiness-probe'", [readinessAccess.connection.id])).rows[0].n, 0)
   assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_grants WHERE connection_id=$1", [readinessAccess.connection.id])).rows[0].n, 0)
   const duplicateReady = await app.inject({ method: "POST", url: `/api/mcp/connections/${readinessAccess.connection.id}/check`, headers: readinessHeaders, payload: {} })
   assert.equal(duplicateReady.statusCode, 429)
   await setConnectionStatus(readinessAccess.connection.id, "paused", actor)
+  const pausedSimulation = await policyPreview(simulatedServerRead)
+  assert.equal(pausedSimulation.statusCode, 200, pausedSimulation.body)
+  assert.equal(pausedSimulation.json().result.decision, "denied")
+  assert.ok(pausedSimulation.json().result.reasons.some((reason: { code: string }) => reason.code === "CONNECTION_INACTIVE"))
   const pausedReady = await app.inject({ method: "POST", url: `/api/mcp/connections/${readinessAccess.connection.id}/check`, headers: readinessHeaders, payload: {} })
   assert.equal(pausedReady.statusCode, 200); assert.equal(pausedReady.json().protocolProbe.status, "skipped")
+  const readableAccess = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ ...input, name: "Actual readiness capability read", scope: { ...input.scope, operationIds: ["servers.list", "capabilities.read"] } }), actor)
+  const readable = await app.inject({ method: "POST", url: `/api/mcp/connections/${readableAccess.connection.id}/check`, headers: readinessHeaders, payload: {} })
+  assert.equal(readable.statusCode, 200, readable.body)
+  assert.equal(readable.json().ok, true, readable.body)
+  assert.equal(readable.json().protocolProbe.capabilitiesRead, "passed")
+  assert.equal(readable.json().protocolProbe.credentialType, "temporary-capabilities-read")
+  const readinessReads = (await pool.query("SELECT tool FROM mcp_requests WHERE connection_id=$1 AND tool NOT LIKE 'protocol:%'", [readableAccess.connection.id])).rows
+  assert.deepEqual(readinessReads.map(row => row.tool), ["mm_capabilities_get"])
+  assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_credentials WHERE connection_id=$1 AND client_id='mcp-readiness-probe'", [readableAccess.connection.id])).rows[0].n, 0)
+  assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_grants WHERE connection_id=$1", [readableAccess.connection.id])).rows[0].n, 0)
   const emptyGrantAccess = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ ...input, name: "Readiness has no operation authority" }), actor)
   const { withMcpProbeCredential } = await import("./readiness.js")
   let endedProbeToken = ""
@@ -2933,7 +3004,7 @@ try {
   assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_grants WHERE connection_id=$1", [emptyGrantAccess.connection.id])).rows[0].n, 0)
   const readinessAudit = (await pool.query("SELECT payload FROM mcp_audit WHERE connection_id=$1", [emptyGrantAccess.connection.id])).rows
   assert.ok(!JSON.stringify(readinessAudit).includes(endedProbeToken))
-  console.log("✓ Actual readiness initialize/tools-list over public HTTP: temporary empty grant, no tool authority, cleanup on success/error, cooldown and paused precheck skip")
+  console.log("✓ Actual readiness initialize/tools-list and optional capabilities read over public HTTP: narrow grant, cleanup on success/error, cooldown and paused precheck skip")
   const deviceConnection = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ ...input, name: "Web interfaces", scope: { ...input.scope, operationIds: ["ros.bridge.list", "ros.bridge.create"] } }), actor)
   const deviceHeaders = { authorization: "Bearer " + jwt }
   const deviceCatalog = await app.inject({ url: "/api/mcp/devices/catalog?connectionId=" + deviceConnection.connection.id, headers: deviceHeaders })

backend/src/modules/mcp/logs-follow-cancellation.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+import { McpError } from "./security.js"
+
+export function logsFollowCancellation(maintenance?: AbortSignal, caller?: AbortSignal): McpError | undefined {
+  if (maintenance?.aborted) return maintenance.reason
+  if (caller?.aborted) return new McpError("READ_CANCELLED", "Ожидание новых событий отменено", 409)
+}

backend/src/modules/mcp/logs-follow-sdk-cancellation-acceptance.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict"
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"
+import type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from "node:http"
+import { setTimeout as delay } from "node:timers/promises"
+import type { FastifyInstance } from "fastify"
+import { Client, StreamableHTTPClientTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client"
+import { mcpConnectionCreateSchema } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp"
+import { pool } from "../../db/index.js"
+import type { AuthUser } from "../../lib/permissions.js"
+import { createMcpConnection } from "./store.js"
+
+export async function verifyLogsFollowSdkCancellation(app: FastifyInstance, endpoint: string, actor: AuthUser) {
+  const access = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({
+    name: "Logs follow SDK cancellation", mode: "approval", permissions: ["mm:servers:read"],
+    expiresAt: new Date(Math.min(actor.expiresAt ?? Infinity, Date.now() + 600_000)).toISOString(),
+    scope: { serverIds: [1], operationIds: ["logs.follow", "logs.query"], allowGlobal: false },
+  }), actor)
+  const client = new Client({ name: "logs-follow-sdk-cancellation", version: "1.0.0" }, {
+    versionNegotiation: { mode: { pin: "2026-07-28" } },
+  })
+  const caller = new AbortController(), bound = new AbortController()
+  const deadline = delay(5000, undefined, { signal: bound.signal }).then(() => { throw new Error("SDK cancellation fixture deadline") })
+  void deadline.catch(() => undefined)
+  let entered!: () => void, release!: () => void, closed!: () => void
+  const enteredRead = new Promise<void>(resolve => { entered = resolve })
+  const holdRead = new Promise<void>(resolve => { release = resolve })
+  const responseClosed = new Promise<void>(resolve => { closed = resolve })
+  let readCount = 0
+  const originalQuery = pool.query
+  const observeClose = (request: IncomingMessage, response: ServerResponse) => {
+    if (request.method === "POST" && request.url === "/mcp") {
+      response.once("close", () => { if (!response.writableFinished) closed() })
+    }
+  }
+  try {
+    await client.connect(new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(new URL(endpoint), {
+      requestInit: { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${access.token}` } },
+    }))
+    app.server.on("request", observeClose)
+    pool.query = (async (...args: unknown[]) => {
+      const query = args[0]
+      const sql = typeof query === "object" && query !== null && "text" in query ? query.text : query
+      const result = await Reflect.apply(originalQuery, pool, args)
+      if (typeof sql === "string" && sql.startsWith("SELECT GREATEST(COALESCE(max(id),0)")) {
+        readCount++
+        entered()
+        await holdRead
+      }
+      return result
+    }) as typeof originalQuery
+    const follow = client.callTool({ name: "mm_logs_follow", arguments: { serverId: 1, waitSeconds: 30 } }, { signal: caller.signal })
+    const refused = assert.rejects(follow)
+    try {
+      await Promise.race([enteredRead, deadline])
+      caller.abort()
+      await Promise.race([Promise.all([refused, responseClosed]), deadline])
+      const live = await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS count FROM mcp_read_leases WHERE connection_id=$1", [access.connection.id])
+      assert.equal(live.rows[0].count, 1, "caller cancellation must wait for the pending read before releasing the lease")
+      release()
+      for (;;) {
+        const { rows: [audit] } = await pool.query(
+          "SELECT status,error_code,result FROM mcp_requests WHERE connection_id=$1 AND tool='mm_logs_follow'", [access.connection.id],
+        )
+        const protocol = await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS count FROM mcp_requests WHERE connection_id=$1 AND tool='protocol:tools/call' AND finished_at IS NOT NULL", [access.connection.id])
+        if (audit && audit.status !== "running" && protocol.rows[0].count === 1) {
+          assert.equal(audit.status, "error")
+          assert.equal(audit.error_code, "READ_CANCELLED")
+          assert.doesNotMatch(JSON.stringify(audit.result), /"cursor"/)
+          break
+        }
+        await Promise.race([delay(25), deadline])
+      }
+      assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS count FROM mcp_read_leases WHERE connection_id=$1", [access.connection.id])).rows[0].count, 0)
+      assert.equal(readCount, 1, "cancelled follow does not dispatch a second read")
+    } finally {
+      caller.abort()
+      release()
+      await refused.catch(() => undefined)
+    }
+    pool.query = originalQuery
+    const from = "2000-01-01T00:00:00Z", to = "2000-01-01T00:30:00Z"
+    const followOnce = (filters: { from?: string; cursor?: string }) => client.callTool({
+      name: "mm_logs_follow", arguments: { serverId: 1, waitSeconds: 0, to, ...filters },
+    })
+    const initial = await followOnce({ from })
+    assert.ok(!initial.isError)
+    const cursor = (initial.structuredContent as { result?: { cursor?: unknown } } | undefined)?.result?.cursor
+    assert.ok(typeof cursor === "string" && cursor.length > 0)
+    assert.ok(!(await followOnce({ from, cursor })).isError)
+    assert.ok(!(await followOnce({ cursor })).isError, "omitting from must resume the historical cursor's period")
+    const changed = await followOnce({ from: "2000-01-01T00:01:00Z", cursor })
+    assert.equal(changed.isError, true)
+    assert.match(JSON.stringify(changed), /RESET_REQUIRED/)
+    assert.doesNotMatch(JSON.stringify(changed), /"cursor"/)
+    console.log("✓ MCP logs follow: historical cursor resumes, changed from requires reset")
+
+    const marker = `mcp-logs-cursor-${randomUUID()}`
+    const readFollowPage = async (options: { cursor?: string; limit?: number }) => {
+      const result = await client.callTool({ name: "mm_logs_follow", arguments: { serverId: 1, from, to, q: marker, waitSeconds: 0, ...options } })
+      assert.ok(!result.isError)
+      return (result.structuredContent as { result: { entries: { id: string }[]; cursor: string } }).result
+    }
+    const start = await readFollowPage({})
+    assert.deepEqual(start.entries, [])
+    try {
+      await pool.query(`INSERT INTO router_log_entries(server_id,server_name,host,router_id,raw_time,received_at,effective_at,topics,level,message,generation)
+        SELECT 1,'cursor fixture','127.0.0.1','fixture','00:02:00',now(),$1::timestamptz+n*interval '2 minutes',ARRAY['system'],'info',$2,0
+        FROM generate_series(1,2) AS n`, [from, marker])
+      const defaultFollow = await readFollowPage({ cursor: start.cursor })
+      assert.equal(defaultFollow.entries.length, 2)
+      const firstFollow = await readFollowPage({ cursor: start.cursor, limit: 1 })
+      const secondFollow = await readFollowPage({ cursor: firstFollow.cursor, limit: 1 })
+      assert.equal(firstFollow.entries.length, 1)
+      assert.equal(secondFollow.entries.length, 1)
+      assert.deepEqual([...firstFollow.entries, ...secondFollow.entries].map(row => row.id), defaultFollow.entries.map(row => row.id))
+      assert.deepEqual((await readFollowPage({ cursor: secondFollow.cursor, limit: 1 })).entries, [])
+      console.log("✓ MCP logs follow: requested batch limit and lossless cursor progression")
+      const query = (filters: { from?: string; cursor?: string }) => client.callTool({
+        name: "mm_logs_query", arguments: { serverId: 1, q: marker, limit: 1, to, ...filters },
+      })
+      type Page = { entries: { id: string }[]; nextCursor: string | null }
+      const first = await query({ from })
+      assert.ok(!first.isError)
+      const firstPage = (first.structuredContent as { result: Page }).result
+      assert.equal(firstPage.entries.length, 1)
+      assert.ok(firstPage.nextCursor)
+      const next = await query({ cursor: firstPage.nextCursor })
+      assert.ok(!next.isError)
+      const nextPage = (next.structuredContent as { result: Page }).result
+      assert.equal(nextPage.entries.length, 1)
+      assert.notEqual(nextPage.entries[0].id, firstPage.entries[0].id)
+      assert.equal(nextPage.nextCursor, null)
+      console.log("✓ MCP logs query: historical pagination resumes without resending from")
+    } finally {
+      await pool.query("DELETE FROM router_log_entries WHERE server_id=1 AND message=$1", [marker])
+    }
+  } finally {
+    bound.abort()
+    pool.query = originalQuery
+    app.server.off("request", observeClose)
+    await client.close()
+  }
+}

backend/src/modules/mcp/management.ts

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ export async function registerManagementChannel(raw: unknown, actor: AuthUser) {
   })
   return { id, serverId: input.serverId, expiresAt: input.expiresAt, verification: "identity-and-reachability", independence: "human-attestation" }
 }
-export async function verifyManagementChannel(serverId: number, requiredId?: string) {
+async function verifiedManagementChannel(serverId: number, requiredId?: string) {
   const { rows: [row] } = await pool.query("SELECT * FROM mcp_management_channels WHERE server_id=$1 AND revoked_at IS NULL AND expires_at>now()", [serverId])
   if (!row || requiredId && row.id !== requiredId || row.generation !== await accessGeneration()) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Нет актуального проверенного независимого канала управления", 409)
   const config = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(row.config_sealed)) as MikrotikConnectParams
@@ -50,7 +50,17 @@ export async function verifyManagementChannel(serverId: number, requiredId?: str
   if (hashes.some(value => value !== row.identity_hash)) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Идентичность основного или management-канала изменилась", 409)
   const changed = await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_management_channels SET verified_at=now() WHERE id=$1 AND revoked_at IS NULL AND expires_at>now() RETURNING id", [row.id])
   if (!changed.rowCount) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Допуск management-канала был отозван во время проверки", 409)
-  return { channelId: row.id as string, serverId, expiresAt: row.expires_at.toISOString() as string }
+  return { channelId: row.id as string, serverId, expiresAt: row.expires_at.toISOString() as string, host: config.host }
+}
+export async function verifyManagementChannel(serverId: number, requiredId?: string) {
+  const { host: _host, ...receipt } = await verifiedManagementChannel(serverId, requiredId)
+  return receipt
+}
+/** Internal VLAN preparation uses the verified endpoint to trace its actual
+ * address/interface. It is not accepted from tool input or returned in the
+ * public channel receipt. */
+export async function verifyBridgeManagementChannel(serverId: number, requiredId?: string) {
+  return verifiedManagementChannel(serverId, requiredId)
 }
 export async function managementEvidence(serverIds: number[]) {
   try { return { requiresHuman: false, managementChannels: await Promise.all([...new Set(serverIds)].map(serverId => verifyManagementChannel(serverId))) } }

backend/src/modules/mcp/native-create-identity.test.ts

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ const creates = rosResources.filter(resource => !resource.readOnly && resource.c
 assert.equal(creates.length, 30)
 for (const resource of creates) {
   const action = findAction(`mm_${resource.id}_create_plan`)
-  assert.equal(action.operation.version, ["ospf_template", "ipsec_peer"].includes(resource.id) ? 5 : ["wireguard", "vrf"].includes(resource.id) ? 4 : 3)
+  assert.equal(action.operation.version, ["ospf_template", "ipsec_peer", "vrf"].includes(resource.id) ? 5 : ["wireguard", "bridge", "bridge_port", "bridge_vlan"].includes(resource.id) ? 4 : 3)
   assert.equal(action.schema.safeParse({ serverId: 1, fields: {} }).success, true)
   for (const id of ["*OLD", undefined, null, ""]) {
     const rejected = action.schema.safeParse({ serverId: 1, fields: {}, id })

backend/src/modules/mcp/operation-execution-origin.sql.test.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ await prepareOwnedBandwidthState()
 const { pool, closePool } = await import("../../db/index.js")
 try {
   const { applySqlMigrations } = await import("../../db/migrate.js"); await applySqlMigrations(pool)
+  const { acceptOperationReplayTombstones } = await import("./operation-replay-tombstones.sql-helper.js")
+  await acceptOperationReplayTombstones()
   const { acceptOwnedMcpOperationRoot } = await import("./operation-execution-origin.sql-helper.js")
   console.log("Owned actual MCP operation root:", JSON.stringify(await acceptOwnedMcpOperationRoot()))
 } finally { await closePool() }

backend/src/modules/mcp/operation-replay-tombstones.sql-helper.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict"
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"
+import { assertOwnedBandwidthSql } from "../../services/bandwidth-admission-process.sql-helper.js"
+
+export async function acceptOperationReplayTombstones() {
+  assertOwnedBandwidthSql()
+  assert.equal(process.env.MMAPP_OWN_MCP_OPERATION_ORIGIN, "true")
+  const { pool } = await import("../../db/index.js")
+  const { mcpConnectionCreateSchema } = await import("@mmapp/contracts/mcp")
+  const { createMcpConnection, authenticateMcpToken } = await import("./store.js")
+  const { applyPlan, invokeMcpTool } = await import("./runtime.js")
+  const { operationIdempotencyDigest } = await import("./operation-replay-tombstones.js")
+  const { encryptSecret, McpError } = await import("./security.js")
+  const { default: Fastify } = await import("fastify")
+  const { default: authPlugin } = await import("../../plugins/auth.js")
+  const { createMcpRoutes } = await import("../../routes/mcp.js")
+  const { env } = await import("../../config.js")
+  const { SignJWT } = await import("jose")
+  const makeConnection = async () => {
+    const actor = { id: randomUUID(), email: "owned-tombstone@example.test", name: "Owned replay fixture", apps: ["mm"],
+      permissions: ["mm:users:write", "mm:mcp:read"], issuedAt: Date.now()-1000, expiresAt: Date.now()+300000 }
+    const issued = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ name: actor.name, mode: "approval",
+      permissions: actor.permissions, expiresAt: new Date(actor.expiresAt).toISOString(),
+      scope: { serverIds: [], operationIds: ["users.create", "operations.read", "changes.apply"], allowGlobal: true },
+      limits: { callsPerMinute: 100, mutationsPerHour: 10 } }), actor)
+    return { actor, principal: await authenticateMcpToken(issued.token) }
+  }
+  const app = Fastify()
+  const ids: string[] = []
+  const matches = (code: string, status: number) => (error: unknown) =>
+    error instanceof McpError && error.code === code && error.statusCode === status
+  await pool.query("UPDATE public.mcp_settings SET enabled=true WHERE id=1")
+  try {
+    const owner = await makeConnection(), foreign = await makeConnection()
+    // A real completed plan has already initialized the owned encryption state.
+    // The fixture seeds its tombstone directly, so exercise the same initializer.
+    await encryptSecret("owned replay fixture state")
+    const connectionId = owner.principal.connectionId
+    ids.push(connectionId, foreign.principal.connectionId)
+    const operationId = randomUUID(), planId = randomUUID(), key = "owned-replay-" + randomUUID()
+    await pool.query(`INSERT INTO public.mcp_operation_replay_tombstones
+      (operation_id,plan_id,connection_id,idempotency_digest,action_id,target_server_ids,target_global)
+      VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4,'users.create','{}',true)`, [operationId, planId, connectionId, operationIdempotencyDigest(connectionId,key)])
+    await assert.rejects(applyPlan(owner.principal, planId, key), matches("OPERATION_HISTORY_EXPIRED",410))
+    await assert.rejects(applyPlan(owner.principal, planId, randomUUID()), matches("OPERATION_HISTORY_EXPIRED",410))
+    await assert.rejects(applyPlan(owner.principal, randomUUID(), key), matches("STATE_CONFLICT",409))
+    await assert.rejects(applyPlan(foreign.principal, planId, key), matches("NOT_FOUND",404))
+    await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(owner.principal,"mm_change_apply",{ planId,idempotencyKey:key }), matches("OPERATION_HISTORY_EXPIRED",410))
+    await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(owner.principal,"mm_operation_get",{ operationId }), matches("OPERATION_HISTORY_EXPIRED",410))
+    await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(foreign.principal,"mm_operation_get",{ operationId }), matches("NOT_FOUND",404))
+    await app.register(authPlugin)
+    await app.register(createMcpRoutes(async () => {}))
+    for (const subject of [owner, foreign]) {
+      const token = await new SignJWT({ sub: subject.actor.id, email: subject.actor.email, name: subject.actor.name,
+        apps: subject.actor.apps, permissions: subject.actor.permissions })
+        .setProtectedHeader({ alg:"HS256" }).setIssuer(env.authIssuer).setIssuedAt().setExpirationTime("4m")
+        .sign(new TextEncoder().encode(env.jwtSecret))
+      const reply = await app.inject({ method: "POST", url: "/mcp/plans/"+planId+"/apply", headers: { authorization:"Bearer "+token } })
+      assert.equal(reply.statusCode, subject === owner ? 410 : 404)
+      assert.equal(reply.json().code, subject === owner ? "OPERATION_HISTORY_EXPIRED" : "NOT_FOUND")
+    }
+    await pool.query("UPDATE public.mcp_connections SET policy=jsonb_set(policy,'{scope,allowGlobal}','false') WHERE id=$1", [connectionId])
+    await assert.rejects(applyPlan(owner.principal, planId, key), matches("NOT_FOUND",404))
+    await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(owner.principal,"mm_operation_get",{ operationId }), matches("NOT_FOUND",404))
+    const { rows:[proof] } = await pool.query(`SELECT
+      NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_operations WHERE connection_id=ANY($1::uuid[])) AS no_operation,
+      NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_budget_buckets WHERE connection_id=ANY($1::uuid[]) AND kind='mutations') AS no_write_budget`, [ids])
+    assert.deepEqual(proof,{no_operation:true,no_write_budget:true})
+    console.log("Owned operation tombstones: scoped MCP and Web 410, replay conflict and no dispatch")
+  } finally {
+    await app.close()
+    await pool.query("DELETE FROM public.mcp_operation_replay_tombstones WHERE connection_id=ANY($1::uuid[])", [ids])
+  }
+}

backend/src/modules/mcp/operation-replay-tombstones.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto"
+import type { PoolClient } from "pg"
+import { hasPermission } from "../../lib/permissions.js"
+import { listActions } from "./actions.js"
+import { McpError } from "./security.js"
+import { effectiveMcpConnection, type ConnectionRow, type McpPrincipal } from "./store.js"
+
+type Query = Pick<PoolClient, "query">
+export interface OperationReplayTombstone {
+  operation_id: string
+  plan_id: string
+  connection_id: string
+  action_id: string
+  target_server_ids: string[]
+  target_global: boolean
+}
+
+// Idempotency tokens are caller input and already stored in plaintext on live
+// operations. This domain-separated digest avoids copying that plaintext and
+// survives DB restore and access-key rotation. It is not a keyed secret proof.
+export function operationIdempotencyDigest(connectionId: string, key: string): string {
+  return createHash("sha256").update("mcp-operation-replay-v1\0").update(connectionId).update("\0").update(key).digest("hex")
+}
+
+export function operationHistoryExpired(): never {
+  throw new McpError("OPERATION_HISTORY_EXPIRED", "Срок хранения завершённой операции истёк. Повторное применение запрещено.", 410)
+}
+
+export function assertOperationReplayScope(row: OperationReplayTombstone, connection: ConnectionRow): void {
+  const scope = connection.policy.scope
+  if (row.connection_id !== connection.id || !scope.operationIds.includes(row.action_id)) throw operationReplayNotFound()
+  const action = listActions().find(candidate => candidate.operation.id === row.action_id)
+  if (!action || action.operation.requiredPermissions.some(permission =>
+    !hasPermission(connection.policy.permissions, permission) || !hasPermission(connection.owner_permissions, permission))) throw operationReplayNotFound()
+  if (row.target_global && !scope.allowGlobal || row.target_server_ids.some(id => !scope.serverIds.some(server => String(server) === id))) throw operationReplayNotFound()
+}
+
+function operationReplayNotFound(): McpError {
+  return new McpError("NOT_FOUND", "Операция не найдена", 404)
+}
+
+const projection = "t.operation_id,t.plan_id,t.connection_id,t.action_id,t.target_server_ids::text[] AS target_server_ids,t.target_global"
+
+export async function findOperationReplayTombstone(db: Query, connectionId: string, operationId: string) {
+  return (await db.query<OperationReplayTombstone>(`SELECT ${projection} FROM mcp_operation_replay_tombstones t
+    WHERE t.connection_id=$1 AND t.operation_id=$2`, [connectionId, operationId])).rows[0]
+}
+
+export async function findOwnerPlanReplayTombstone(db: Query, ownerId: string, planId: string) {
+  return (await db.query<OperationReplayTombstone>(`SELECT ${projection} FROM mcp_operation_replay_tombstones t
+    JOIN mcp_connections c ON c.id=t.connection_id WHERE c.owner_id=$1 AND t.plan_id=$2`, [ownerId, planId])).rows[0]
+}
+
+export async function refuseExpiredOperationReplay(db: Query, principal: McpPrincipal, connectionId: string, planId: string, key: string): Promise<void> {
+  const rows = (await db.query<OperationReplayTombstone>(`SELECT ${projection} FROM mcp_operation_replay_tombstones t
+    WHERE t.connection_id=$1 AND (t.plan_id=$2 OR t.idempotency_digest=$3)`,
+  [connectionId, planId, operationIdempotencyDigest(connectionId, key)])).rows
+  if (!rows.length) return
+  const conflict = rows.find(row => row.plan_id !== planId.toLowerCase())
+  const current = await effectiveMcpConnection(principal, db)
+  assertOperationReplayScope(conflict ?? rows[0], current)
+  if (conflict) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Ключ уже используется другим планом", 409)
+  operationHistoryExpired()
+}

backend/src/modules/mcp/operation-revisions.test.ts

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ assert.throws(() => action.schema.parse({ serverId: 1, expectedServerProof: "for
 assert.throws(() => action.schema.parse({ serverId: 1, version: 1 }))
 assert.equal(action.schema.parse({ serverId: 1 }).family, "ipv4")
 assert.equal(findAction("mm_routing_measurement_plan").operation.version, 2)
-assert.equal(findAction("mm_operation_recovery_plan").operation.version, 7)
+assert.equal(findAction("mm_operation_recovery_plan").operation.version, 8)
 assert.equal(findAction("mm_ospf_template_create_plan").operation.version, 5)
 assert.equal(findAction("mm_ospf_template_update_plan").operation.version, 4)
 assert.equal(findAction("mm_ospf_template_delete_plan").operation.version, 3)
@@ -49,11 +49,11 @@ assert.equal(findAction("mm_wireguard_update_plan").operation.version, 3)
 assert.equal(findAction("mm_wireguard_interface_edit_plan").operation.version, 3)
 assert.equal(findAction("mm_wireguard_interface_create_plan").operation.version, 3)
 assert.equal(findAction("mm_wireguard_create_plan").operation.version, 4)
-assert.equal(findAction("mm_interfaces_update_plan").operation.version, 4)
+assert.equal(findAction("mm_interfaces_update_plan").operation.version, 5)
 assert.equal(findAction("mm_ipsec_peer_delete_plan").operation.version, 3)
 assert.equal(findAction("mm_ipsec_peer_update_plan").operation.version, 3)
 assert.equal(findAction("mm_certificate_delete_plan").operation.version, 3)
-for (const [tool, version] of [["mm_route_optimizer_plan", 7], ["mm_route_profile_save_plan", 4], ["mm_route_path_verify", 2], ["mm_operation_recovery_plan", 7], ["mm_ecmp_plan", 2], ["mm_rpf_plan", 2], ["mm_vrf_plan", 3], ["mm_firewall_rule_update_plan", 2]] as const) {
+for (const [tool, version] of [["mm_route_optimizer_plan", 7], ["mm_route_profile_save_plan", 4], ["mm_route_path_verify", 2], ["mm_operation_recovery_plan", 8], ["mm_ecmp_plan", 2], ["mm_rpf_plan", 2], ["mm_vrf_plan", 4], ["mm_firewall_rule_update_plan", 2]] as const) {
   const routed = findAction(tool)
   assert.equal(routed.operation.version, version)
   assert.equal(findMcpOperation(routed.operation.id)?.version, version)

backend/src/modules/mcp/ordinary-operation-retirement.owned.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict"
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"
+import { setTimeout as delay } from "node:timers/promises"
+import { assertOwnedBandwidthSql,prepareOwnedBandwidthState } from "../../services/bandwidth-admission-process.sql-helper.js"
+
+assertOwnedBandwidthSql()
+assert.equal(process.env.MMAPP_OWN_MCP_OPERATION_ORIGIN,"true")
+await prepareOwnedBandwidthState()
+const {pool,closePool}=await import("../../db/index.js")
+const {applySqlMigrations}=await import("../../db/migrate.js")
+const {mcpConnectionCreateSchema}=await import("@mmapp/contracts/mcp")
+const {createMcpConnection,authenticateMcpToken}=await import("./store.js")
+const {invokeMcpTool,approvePlan,applyPlan}=await import("./runtime.js")
+const {OrdinaryRetirementCommitUnknown,retireOrdinaryMcpOperations}=await import("./ordinary-operation-retirement.js")
+const {tickMcpWorkers}=await import("./workers.js")
+const {pauseSchedulerJobsAndWait,resumeSchedulerJobs}=await import("../../services/scheduler-running.js")
+const {Client}=await import("pg")
+const {McpError}=await import("./security.js")
+const {touchGeoipRunMeta}=await import("../../services/geoip-settings.js")
+const {touchBackupScheduleRunMeta}=await import("../../services/backup-service.js")
+const errorIs=(code:string,status:number)=>(error:unknown)=>error instanceof McpError&&error.code===code&&error.statusCode===status
+
+try {
+  await applySqlMigrations(pool)
+  await pauseSchedulerJobsAndWait()
+  await pool.query("UPDATE public.mcp_settings SET enabled=true WHERE id=1")
+  const serverId=Number((await pool.query("INSERT INTO servers(name,host,enabled) VALUES('owned logs retention','127.0.0.1',false) RETURNING id")).rows[0].id)
+  async function access(){
+    const actor={id:randomUUID(),email:"owned-logs-retirement@example.test",name:"Owned settings retention",apps:["mm"],
+      permissions:["mm:settings:admin","mm:mcp:approve","mm:traffic:write","mm:uptime:write","mm:servers:write","mm:network:write","mm:backups:write"],
+      issuedAt:Date.now()-1000,expiresAt:Date.now()+300000}
+    const issued=await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({name:actor.name,mode:"approval",
+      permissions:actor.permissions,expiresAt:new Date(actor.expiresAt).toISOString(),
+      scope:{serverIds:[serverId],operationIds:["logs.settings.update","traffic.settings.update","uptime.settings.update",
+        "servers.api-ping.settings.update","internet-path.settings.update","geoip.settings.update","backups.schedule.update","operations.read","changes.apply"],allowGlobal:true},
+      limits:{callsPerMinute:100,mutationsPerHour:20}}),actor)
+    return {actor,principal:await authenticateMcpToken(issued.token)}
+  }
+  const {actor,principal}=await access(),foreign=(await access()).principal
+  async function operation(retentionDays:number,ageMs:number,tool="mm_logs_settings_update_plan",
+    settings:Record<string,unknown>={retentionDays}){
+    const plan=await invokeMcpTool(principal,tool,{settings}) as {planId:string;state:string}
+    if(tool==="mm_geoip_settings_update_plan"||tool==="mm_backup_schedule_update_plan")assert.equal(plan.state,"awaiting-approval")
+    if(plan.state==="awaiting-approval")await approvePlan(plan.planId,actor,true)
+    const key=randomUUID(),applied=await applyPlan(principal,plan.planId,key)
+    let terminal
+    for(const deadline=Date.now()+15000;Date.now()<deadline;){
+      terminal=(await pool.query("SELECT state,verification,error_code FROM mcp_operations WHERE id=$1",[applied.id])).rows[0]
+      if(terminal&&!["pending","running"].includes(terminal.state))break
+      await delay(50)
+    }
+    assert.deepEqual(terminal,{state:"applied",verification:"passed",error_code:null})
+    // Only the disposable fixture ages rows, after real authenticated apply.
+    // No cutoff override or production encryption/approval bypass.
+    const finished=new Date(Date.now()-ageMs),created=new Date(finished.getTime()-1000)
+    await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET created_at=$2,approved_at=$2,expires_at=$3 WHERE id=$1",
+      [plan.planId,created,new Date(finished.getTime()+1000)])
+    await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operations SET created_at=$2,finished_at=$3 WHERE id=$1",[applied.id,created,finished])
+    await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operation_steps SET created_at=$2,finished_at=$3 WHERE operation_id=$1",[applied.id,created,finished])
+    return {id:applied.id,planId:plan.planId,key}
+  }
+  const age=180*86400000
+  const held=await operation(51,age+180000),spent=await operation(52,age+120000)
+  const due=await operation(53,age+60000),young=await operation(54,age-60000)
+  const boundary=await pool.connect()
+  try{
+    await boundary.query("BEGIN")
+    await boundary.query("UPDATE mcp_operations SET finished_at=transaction_timestamp()-interval '180 days' WHERE id=$1",[young.id])
+    await assert.rejects(boundary.query(`INSERT INTO mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims
+      (operation_id,plan_id,connection_id,source_proof,claim_token) VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4,$5)`,
+    [young.id,young.planId,principal.connectionId,"a".repeat(64),randomUUID()]),/cannot be replaced or reopened/)
+  }finally{await boundary.query("ROLLBACK");boundary.release()}
+  await pool.query("INSERT INTO mcp_drift(id,operation_id,expected,observed) VALUES($1,$2,'{}','{}')",[randomUUID(),held.id])
+  const ids=[held.id,spent.id,due.id,young.id]
+  const projection=async()=>(await pool.query(`SELECT i.id,o.state,p.state AS plan_state,s.state AS step_state,
+    k.operation_id AS checkpoint,t.operation_id AS tombstone,c.claim_token
+    FROM unnest($1::uuid[]) i(id)
+    LEFT JOIN mcp_operations o ON o.id=i.id LEFT JOIN mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id
+    LEFT JOIN mcp_operation_steps s ON s.operation_id=i.id LEFT JOIN mcp_operation_checkpoints k ON k.operation_id=i.id
+    LEFT JOIN mcp_operation_replay_tombstones t ON t.operation_id=i.id
+    LEFT JOIN mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims c ON c.operation_id=i.id ORDER BY i.id`,[ids])).rows
+  const originalQuery=Client.prototype.query
+  let commits=0
+  try{
+    Client.prototype.query=function(this:InstanceType<typeof Client>,...args:unknown[]){
+      if((args[0] as {text?:string})?.text==="COMMIT"&&++commits===3)
+        return Promise.reject(Error("owned ordinary destructive COMMIT transport loss"))
+      return Reflect.apply(originalQuery,this,args)
+    } as typeof Client.prototype.query
+    await assert.rejects(retireOrdinaryMcpOperations(),
+      (error:unknown)=>error instanceof OrdinaryRetirementCommitUnknown&&error.automaticReplay===false)
+  }finally{Client.prototype.query=originalQuery}
+  assert.equal(commits,3)
+  const before=await projection(),spentBefore=before.find(row=>row.id===spent.id)
+  assert.equal(spentBefore?.state,"applied");assert(spentBefore?.claim_token);assert.equal(spentBefore?.tombstone,null)
+  await tickMcpWorkers()
+  const after=await projection()
+  assert.deepEqual(after.filter(row=>row.id!==due.id),before.filter(row=>row.id!==due.id))
+  const retired=after.find(row=>row.id===due.id)
+  assert(retired?.claim_token);assert.equal(retired?.tombstone,due.id)
+  for(const field of ["state","plan_state","step_state","checkpoint"])assert.equal(retired[field],null)
+  assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT 1 FROM mcp_plans WHERE id=$1",[due.planId])).rows.length,0)
+  assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT retention_days FROM router_log_settings WHERE id=1")).rows[0].retention_days,54)
+  await tickMcpWorkers()
+  assert.deepEqual(await projection(),after)
+  await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal,due.planId,due.key),errorIs("OPERATION_HISTORY_EXPIRED",410))
+  await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal,randomUUID(),due.key),errorIs("STATE_CONFLICT",409))
+  await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(foreign,"mm_operation_get",{operationId:due.id}),errorIs("NOT_FOUND",404))
+  const telemetry=[
+    {action:"traffic.settings.update",version:2,record:await operation(55,age+60000,"mm_traffic_settings_update_plan")},
+    {action:"uptime.settings.update",version:2,record:await operation(56,age+60000,"mm_uptime_settings_update_plan",{enabled:false,retentionDays:56})},
+    {action:"servers.api-ping.settings.update",version:2,record:await operation(0,age+60000,"mm_servers_api_ping_settings_update_plan",{intervalSec:123})},
+    {action:"internet-path.settings.update",version:1,record:await operation(57,age+60000,"mm_internet_path_settings_update_plan")},
+  ]
+  const telemetryRows=async()=>(await pool.query(`SELECT p.operation_id,p.operation_version,o.id
+    FROM mcp_operations o JOIN mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id WHERE o.id=ANY($1::uuid[]) ORDER BY p.operation_id`,
+  [telemetry.map(item=>item.record.id)])).rows
+  assert.deepEqual((await telemetryRows()).map(row=>[row.operation_id,row.operation_version]),
+    telemetry.map(item=>[item.action,item.version]).sort((a,b)=>String(a[0]).localeCompare(String(b[0]))))
+  const telemetrySettings=async()=>(await pool.query(`SELECT to_jsonb(t) AS traffic,to_jsonb(u) AS uptime,
+    to_jsonb(a) AS api_ping,to_jsonb(i) AS internet FROM traffic_settings t,uptime_settings u,
+    servers_api_ping_settings a,internet_path_settings i WHERE t.id=1 AND u.id=1 AND a.id=1 AND i.id=1`)).rows[0]
+  const settingsBefore=await telemetrySettings()
+  const traffic=telemetry[0].record
+  const {rows:[originalStep]}=await pool.query("SELECT result FROM mcp_operation_steps WHERE operation_id=$1",[traffic.id])
+  await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operation_steps SET result=jsonb_set(result,'{retentionDays}','999') WHERE operation_id=$1",[traffic.id])
+  await tickMcpWorkers()
+  assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT 1 FROM mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims WHERE operation_id=$1",[traffic.id])).rows.length,0)
+  assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT 1 FROM mcp_operations WHERE id=$1",[traffic.id])).rows.length,1)
+  await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operation_steps SET result=$2 WHERE operation_id=$1",[traffic.id,originalStep.result])
+  await tickMcpWorkers()
+  await tickMcpWorkers()
+  // The keyset owner may need one tick to wrap after the rejected oldest row.
+  await tickMcpWorkers()
+  assert.deepEqual(await telemetryRows(),[])
+  assert.deepEqual(await telemetrySettings(),settingsBefore)
+  for(const {action,record} of telemetry){
+    const {rows:[proof]}=await pool.query(`SELECT t.action_id,t.target_global,t.target_server_ids::text[] AS server_ids,
+      NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM mcp_plans WHERE id=$2) AS plan_gone,
+      NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM mcp_operation_steps WHERE operation_id=$1) AS step_gone,
+      NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM mcp_operation_checkpoints WHERE operation_id=$1) AS checkpoint_gone
+      FROM mcp_operation_replay_tombstones t WHERE t.operation_id=$1 AND t.plan_id=$2`,[record.id,record.planId])
+    assert.deepEqual(proof,{action_id:action,target_global:true,server_ids:[String(serverId)],plan_gone:true,step_gone:true,checkpoint_gone:true})
+    await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal,record.planId,record.key),errorIs("OPERATION_HISTORY_EXPIRED",410))
+    await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(foreign,"mm_operation_get",{operationId:record.id}),errorIs("NOT_FOUND",404))
+  }
+  // Keep the owned fixture offline even if a product scheduler refresh occurs.
+  await pool.query("UPDATE geoip_settings SET enabled=false WHERE id=1")
+  await touchGeoipRunMeta({lastCheckAt:new Date().toISOString(),lastError:"owned GeoIP metadata",etags:{"owned-test":"unchanged"}})
+  const geoip=await operation(0,age+60000,"mm_geoip_settings_update_plan",{enabled:false,updateIntervalSec:86400})
+  const geoipState=async()=>(await pool.query("SELECT to_jsonb(g) AS row FROM geoip_settings g WHERE id=1")).rows[0].row
+  const geoipBefore=await geoipState()
+  assert.equal(geoipBefore.enabled,false);assert.equal(geoipBefore.update_interval_sec,86400)
+  assert.equal(geoipBefore.last_error,"owned GeoIP metadata");assert.deepEqual(geoipBefore.etags_json,{"owned-test":"unchanged"})
+  const {rows:[geoipStep]}=await pool.query("SELECT result FROM mcp_operation_steps WHERE operation_id=$1",[geoip.id])
+  const assertGeoipUnclaimed=async()=>{
+    assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT 1 FROM mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims WHERE operation_id=$1",[geoip.id])).rows.length,0)
+    assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT 1 FROM mcp_operations WHERE id=$1",[geoip.id])).rows.length,1)
+    assert.deepEqual(await geoipState(),geoipBefore)
+  }
+  await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operation_steps SET result=jsonb_set(result,'{settings,updateIntervalSec}','172800') WHERE operation_id=$1",[geoip.id])
+  await tickMcpWorkers();await tickMcpWorkers();await assertGeoipUnclaimed()
+  await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operation_steps SET result=$2 WHERE operation_id=$1",[geoip.id,geoipStep.result])
+  const geoipHold=randomUUID()
+  await pool.query("INSERT INTO mcp_drift(id,operation_id,expected,observed) VALUES($1,$2,'{}','{}')",[geoipHold,geoip.id])
+  await tickMcpWorkers();await assertGeoipUnclaimed()
+  await pool.query("DELETE FROM mcp_drift WHERE id=$1",[geoipHold])
+  await tickMcpWorkers();await tickMcpWorkers()
+  const {rows:[geoipTombstone]}=await pool.query(`SELECT t.action_id,t.target_global,t.target_server_ids::text[] AS server_ids,
+    NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM mcp_operations WHERE id=$1) AS operation_gone,
+    NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM mcp_plans WHERE id=$2) AS plan_gone,
+    NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM mcp_operation_steps WHERE operation_id=$1) AS step_gone,
+    NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM mcp_operation_checkpoints WHERE operation_id=$1) AS checkpoint_gone
+    FROM mcp_operation_replay_tombstones t WHERE t.operation_id=$1 AND t.plan_id=$2`,[geoip.id,geoip.planId])
+  assert.deepEqual(geoipTombstone,{action_id:"geoip.settings.update",target_global:true,server_ids:[String(serverId)],
+    operation_gone:true,plan_gone:true,step_gone:true,checkpoint_gone:true})
+  await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal,geoip.planId,geoip.key),errorIs("OPERATION_HISTORY_EXPIRED",410))
+  await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal,randomUUID(),geoip.key),errorIs("STATE_CONFLICT",409))
+  await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(foreign,"mm_operation_get",{operationId:geoip.id}),errorIs("NOT_FOUND",404))
+  assert.deepEqual(await geoipState(),geoipBefore)
+  await pool.query("UPDATE backup_schedule_settings SET enabled=false,server_ids_json='[]' WHERE id=1")
+  await touchBackupScheduleRunMeta({lastRunAt:new Date().toISOString(),lastDurationMs:123,lastError:"owned backup scheduler metadata"})
+  await pool.query(`INSERT INTO backup_entries(id,server_id,server_name,filename,size_bytes,kind,notes,created_at)
+    VALUES($1,$2,'owned fixture','owned-retention.rsc',123,'auto','keep',clock_timestamp())`,[randomUUID(),serverId])
+  const backupState=async()=>(await pool.query(`SELECT to_jsonb(s) AS schedule,
+    (SELECT jsonb_agg(to_jsonb(b) ORDER BY id) FROM backup_entries b) AS entries
+    FROM backup_schedule_settings s WHERE id=1`)).rows[0]
+  const backupOutside=await operation(0,age+120000,"mm_backup_schedule_update_plan",{enabled:false,serverIds:[String(serverId+1000)]})
+  const outsideState=await backupState()
+  await tickMcpWorkers();await tickMcpWorkers()
+  assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT 1 FROM mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims WHERE operation_id=$1",[backupOutside.id])).rows.length,0)
+  assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT 1 FROM mcp_operations WHERE id=$1",[backupOutside.id])).rows.length,1)
+  assert.deepEqual(await backupState(),outsideState)
+  await pool.query("UPDATE backup_schedule_settings SET server_ids_json='[]' WHERE id=1")
+  const backup=await operation(0,age+60000,"mm_backup_schedule_update_plan",{enabled:false,keepCount:9,serverIds:[String(serverId)]})
+  const backupBefore=await backupState()
+  assert.equal(backupBefore.schedule.enabled,false);assert.equal(backupBefore.schedule.keep_count,9)
+  assert.deepEqual(backupBefore.schedule.server_ids_json,[String(serverId)])
+  assert.equal(backupBefore.schedule.last_duration_ms,123);assert.equal(backupBefore.schedule.last_error,"owned backup scheduler metadata")
+  assert.deepEqual(backupBefore.entries,outsideState.entries)
+  const {rows:[backupStep]}=await pool.query("SELECT result FROM mcp_operation_steps WHERE operation_id=$1",[backup.id])
+  await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operation_steps SET result=jsonb_set(result,'{keepCount}','10') WHERE operation_id=$1",[backup.id])
+  await tickMcpWorkers();await tickMcpWorkers()
+  assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT 1 FROM mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims WHERE operation_id=$1",[backup.id])).rows.length,0)
+  assert.deepEqual(await backupState(),backupBefore)
+  await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operation_steps SET result=$2 WHERE operation_id=$1",[backup.id,backupStep.result])
+  await tickMcpWorkers();await tickMcpWorkers()
+  const {rows:[backupTombstone]}=await pool.query(`SELECT t.action_id,t.target_global,t.target_server_ids::text[] AS server_ids,
+    NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM mcp_operations WHERE id=$1) AS operation_gone,
+    NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM mcp_plans WHERE id=$2) AS plan_gone,
+    NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM mcp_operation_steps WHERE operation_id=$1) AS step_gone,
+    NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM mcp_operation_checkpoints WHERE operation_id=$1) AS checkpoint_gone
+    FROM mcp_operation_replay_tombstones t WHERE t.operation_id=$1 AND t.plan_id=$2`,[backup.id,backup.planId])
+  assert.deepEqual(backupTombstone,{action_id:"backups.schedule.update",target_global:true,server_ids:[String(serverId)],
+    operation_gone:true,plan_gone:true,step_gone:true,checkpoint_gone:true})
+  await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal,backup.planId,backup.key),errorIs("OPERATION_HISTORY_EXPIRED",410))
+  await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal,randomUUID(),backup.key),errorIs("STATE_CONFLICT",409))
+  await assert.rejects(invokeMcpTool(foreign,"mm_operation_get",{operationId:backup.id}),errorIs("NOT_FOUND",404))
+  assert.deepEqual(await backupState(),backupBefore)
+  await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_connections SET policy=jsonb_set(policy,'{scope,serverIds}','[]') WHERE id=$1",[principal.connectionId])
+  await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal,due.planId,due.key),errorIs("NOT_FOUND",404))
+  for(const {record} of telemetry)await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal,record.planId,record.key),errorIs("NOT_FOUND",404))
+  await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal,geoip.planId,geoip.key),errorIs("NOT_FOUND",404))
+  await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal,backup.planId,backup.key),errorIs("NOT_FOUND",404))
+  console.log("Owned settings operations: seven exact families, authenticated apply, physical 180-day purge, preserved settings and scoped replay")
+}finally{resumeSchedulerJobs();await closePool()}

backend/src/modules/mcp/ordinary-operation-retirement.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"
+import { logSettingsPatchSchema, logSettingsSchema } from "@mmapp/contracts"
+import { geoipSettingsDtoSchema, geoipSettingsPatchSchema } from "@mmapp/contracts/geoip"
+import { backupScheduleSettingsDtoSchema, putBackupScheduleSettingsSchema } from "@mmapp/contracts/backups"
+import { z } from "zod"
+import { connectProbeStorage } from "../../services/server-probe-storage-connection.js"
+import type { ProbeStorageSql } from "../../services/server-probe-journal-maintenance.js"
+import { sharedDatabaseGate } from "../../services/shared-database-gate.js"
+import { operationIdempotencyDigest } from "./operation-replay-tombstones.js"
+import { decryptSecretExisting, fingerprint, privateFingerprinterExisting, redact } from "./security.js"
+
+const uuid = z.string().uuid()
+const positive = z.number().int().positive().safe()
+const object = z.record(z.string(),z.unknown())
+const sealed = z.object({sealed:z.string().min(1).max(262144)}).strict()
+const ids = z.array(positive).max(1000)
+const retention = z.number().int().min(1).max(365)
+const bool = z.boolean()
+const interval = (min:number,max:number)=>z.number().int().min(min).max(max)
+const backupServerIds=z.array(z.string().regex(/^[1-9]\d{0,15}$/).refine(value=>Number.isSafeInteger(Number(value))))
+  .max(1000).refine(values=>new Set(values).size===values.length)
+const backupSchedule=backupScheduleSettingsDtoSchema.extend({serverIds:backupServerIds}).strict()
+const backupBefore=z.object({value:backupSchedule,serverIds:ids}).strict()
+// Drizzle's string-mode timestamptz keeps PostgreSQL's space and hour-only
+// offset. Accept that exact wire form as well as an ISO timestamptz.
+const timestamp = z.string().regex(/^\d{4}-\d\d-\d\d[ T]\d\d:\d\d:\d\d(?:\.\d{1,6})?(?:Z|[+-]\d\d(?::\d\d)?)$/)
+  .refine(value=>Number.isFinite(Date.parse(value.replace(" ","T").replace(/([+-]\d\d)$/,"$1:00"))))
+const metadata = {
+  id:z.literal(1),createdAt:timestamp,updatedAt:timestamp,
+  lastCollectedAt:timestamp.nullable(),lastDurationMs:z.number().int().safe().nullable(),
+  lastError:z.string().max(16384).nullable(),
+}
+function telemetryFamily(version:number,domain:string,settings:z.ZodObject,hasEpoch:boolean,hasConfigurationProof:boolean){
+  const originalSettings=hasConfigurationProof?settings.extend({configurationProof:z.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/)}):settings
+  const effect=settings.extend({...metadata,...(hasEpoch?{pollConfigurationEpoch:uuid}:{})}).strict()
+  return {version,domain,patch:settings.partial().strict().refine(value=>Object.keys(value).length>0),
+    before:z.object({value:originalSettings.strict(),serverIds:ids}).strict(),effect}
+}
+const families={
+  "logs.settings.update":{version:1,domain:null,patch:logSettingsPatchSchema,before:logSettingsSchema.strict(),effect:logSettingsSchema.strict()},
+  "traffic.settings.update":telemetryFamily(2,"traffic-settings",z.object({enabled:bool,intervalSec:interval(5,3600),retentionDays:retention}),true,true),
+  "uptime.settings.update":telemetryFamily(2,"uptime-settings",z.object({enabled:bool,resourcesEnabled:bool,pingEnabled:bool,
+    speedEnabled:bool,intervalSec:interval(5,86400),probeIntervalSec:interval(5,86400),speedIntervalSec:interval(10,86400),retentionDays:retention}),true,true),
+  "servers.api-ping.settings.update":telemetryFamily(2,"servers-api-ping-settings",z.object({enabled:bool,intervalSec:interval(10,86400)}),false,true),
+  "internet-path.settings.update":telemetryFamily(1,"internet-path-settings",z.object({enabled:bool,intervalSec:interval(30,86400),retentionDays:retention}),true,false),
+  "geoip.settings.update":{
+    version:1,domain:"geoip-settings",
+    patch:geoipSettingsPatchSchema.strict().refine(value=>Object.keys(value).length>0),
+    before:z.object({value:z.object({enabled:bool,updateIntervalSec:positive}).strict(),serverIds:ids}).strict(),
+    effect:z.object({settings:geoipSettingsDtoSchema.strict(),verificationScope:z.literal("configuration-persistence")})
+      .strict().transform(result=>result.settings),
+  },
+  "backups.schedule.update":{
+    version:1,domain:"backup-schedule",
+    patch:putBackupScheduleSettingsSchema.extend({serverIds:backupServerIds.optional()}).strict().refine(value=>Object.keys(value).length>0),
+    before:backupBefore,effect:backupSchedule,
+  },
+} as const
+const planEvidence = z.object({
+  target:z.object({scope:z.literal("global")}).strict(),
+  objects:z.array(z.object({kind:z.string(),id:z.string(),serverId:positive.optional()}).strict()).max(1001),
+  steps:z.tuple([z.object({kind:z.literal("service"),service:z.string(),input:z.object({settings:object}).strict()}).strict()]),
+  snapshots:z.tuple([]),before:object,warnings:z.array(z.string()).max(8),
+  verificationScope:z.literal("configuration").optional(),
+  requiresHuman:z.literal(true).optional(),
+}).strict()
+
+class RetirementRefused extends Error {}
+export class OrdinaryRetirementCommitUnknown extends Error {
+  readonly automaticReplay = false
+  constructor() { super("Ordinary operation retirement outcome unknown; automatic replay forbidden") }
+}
+const requireThat: (value: unknown) => asserts value = value => {
+  if (!value) throw new RetirementRefused()
+}
+
+// Fixed reviewed settings families without artifact, historic receipt or
+// inverse-plan consumers. Other action families need separate review.
+const ELIGIBLE = `FROM public.mcp_operations o
+ JOIN public.mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id
+ JOIN public.mcp_operation_steps s ON s.operation_id=o.id AND s.step_index=0
+ JOIN public.mcp_operation_checkpoints k ON k.operation_id=o.id AND k.step_index=0
+ WHERE (p.operation_id,p.operation_version) IN (
+   ('logs.settings.update',1),('traffic.settings.update',2),('uptime.settings.update',2),
+   ('servers.api-ping.settings.update',2),('internet-path.settings.update',1),('geoip.settings.update',1),('backups.schedule.update',1)
+ ) AND p.state='completed'
+ AND o.state='applied' AND o.verification='passed' AND o.error_code IS NULL
+ AND isfinite(o.finished_at) AND o.finished_at<transaction_timestamp()-interval '180 days'
+ AND isfinite(p.expires_at) AND p.expires_at<transaction_timestamp()
+ AND s.state='verified' AND s.server_id IS NULL AND isfinite(s.finished_at)
+ AND k.after_sealed IS NOT NULL
+ AND (SELECT count(*) FROM public.mcp_operation_steps WHERE operation_id=o.id)=1
+ AND (SELECT count(*) FROM public.mcp_operation_checkpoints WHERE operation_id=o.id)=1
+ AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_drift WHERE operation_id=o.id)
+ AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_recovery_intents WHERE operation_id=o.id)
+ AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_scoped_recovery_intents WHERE source_operation_id=o.id OR recovery_operation_id=o.id)
+ AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_routing_reservations WHERE source_operation_id=o.id OR source_plan_id=p.id)
+ AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_routing_forward_charges WHERE source_operation_id=o.id OR source_plan_id=p.id)
+ AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_routing_manual_inverse_charges WHERE source_operation_id=o.id OR recovery_operation_id=o.id OR source_plan_id=p.id OR recovery_plan_id=p.id)
+ AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_diagnostic_cancellations WHERE operation_id=o.id)
+ AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_probe_storage_admissions WHERE identity_kind='mcp' AND execution_id=o.id)
+ AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.server_poll_storage_admissions WHERE identity_kind='mcp' AND execution_id=o.id)
+ AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.vrf_production_tickets WHERE plan_id=p.id)`
+const CANDIDATES = `SELECT o.id,o.connection_id,o.finished_at::text AS finished_at ${ELIGIBLE}
+ AND NOT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM public.mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims WHERE operation_id=o.id)
+ AND ($1::timestamptz IS NULL OR (o.finished_at,o.id)>($1::timestamptz,$2::uuid))
+ ORDER BY o.finished_at,o.id LIMIT 8`
+const SOURCE = `SELECT to_jsonb(o) AS operation,to_jsonb(p) AS plan,to_jsonb(s) AS step,to_jsonb(k) AS checkpoint ${ELIGIBLE}
+ AND o.id=$1 AND o.connection_id=$2
+ AND octet_length(to_jsonb(o)::text)+octet_length(to_jsonb(p)::text)+octet_length(to_jsonb(s)::text)+octet_length(to_jsonb(k)::text)<=1048576
+ FOR UPDATE OF o,p,s,k NOWAIT`
+
+async function transaction<T>(deadlineAt:number, work:(sql:ProbeStorageSql)=>Promise<T>):Promise<T> {
+  const sql = await connectProbeStorage({deadlineAt})
+  let committing=false,committed=false
+  try {
+    await sql.query("BEGIN")
+    await sql.query("SELECT set_config('TimeZone','UTC',true),set_config('statement_timeout','5000ms',true),set_config('lock_timeout','1000ms',true)")
+    const result=await work(sql)
+    committing=true
+    await sql.query("COMMIT")
+    committed=true
+    return result
+  } catch(error) {
+    if(committing)throw new OrdinaryRetirementCommitUnknown()
+    try{await sql.query("ROLLBACK")}catch{/* Destroy this checkout. */}
+    throw error
+  } finally {
+    sql.release(!committed)
+  }
+}
+
+async function prepare(sql:ProbeStorageSql, operationId:string, connectionId:string) {
+  requireThat((await sql.query("SELECT id FROM public.mcp_connections WHERE id=$1 FOR UPDATE NOWAIT",[connectionId])).rows.length===1)
+  requireThat((await sql.query("SELECT pg_try_advisory_xact_lock(hashtextextended($1,0)) AS locked",["mcp-operation:"+operationId])).rows[0]?.locked===true)
+  const rows=(await sql.query(SOURCE,[operationId,connectionId])).rows
+  requireThat(rows.length===1)
+  const raw=rows[0], operation=object.parse(raw.operation), plan=object.parse(raw.plan)
+  const step=object.parse(raw.step),checkpoint=object.parse(raw.checkpoint)
+  const open=async(value:unknown)=>JSON.parse(await decryptSecretExisting(sealed.parse(value).sealed))
+  const original=planEvidence.parse(await open(plan.evidence))
+  const action=z.enum(Object.keys(families) as [keyof typeof families,...(keyof typeof families)[]]).parse(plan.operation_id)
+  const family=families[action],service=original.steps[0]
+  requireThat(plan.operation_version===family.version&&service.service===action)
+  requireThat(fingerprint(await open(plan.payload))===fingerprint(service.input))
+  requireThat(fingerprint(step.intended_state)===fingerprint(redact(service)))
+  const patch=object.parse(family.patch.parse(service.input.settings))
+  const effect=object.parse(family.effect.parse(step.result))
+  requireThat(Object.entries(patch).every(([key,value])=>fingerprint(effect[key])===fingerprint(value)))
+  requireThat(fingerprint(operation.result)===fingerprint({confirmedWrites:1,verificationScope:"configuration"}))
+  for(const value of [checkpoint.before_sealed,checkpoint.after_sealed]){
+    requireThat(typeof value==="string"&&value.length<=1024&&fingerprint(await open({sealed:value}))===fingerprint([]))
+  }
+  const serverObjects=original.objects.filter(item=>item.kind==="server")
+  const serverIds=ids.parse(serverObjects.map(item=>item.serverId))
+  requireThat(new Set(serverIds).size===serverIds.length&&serverObjects.every(item=>item.id===String(item.serverId)))
+  const domainObjects=original.objects.filter(item=>item.kind!=="server")
+  const before=family.before.parse(original.before)
+  if(family.domain===null){
+    requireThat(domainObjects.length===0&&original.requiresHuman===undefined)
+  }else{
+    requireThat(original.requiresHuman===true&&original.verificationScope==="configuration"
+      &&domainObjects.length===1&&domainObjects[0].kind===family.domain&&domainObjects[0].id==="1"&&domainObjects[0].serverId===undefined)
+    requireThat("serverIds" in before&&fingerprint(before.serverIds)===fingerprint(serverIds))
+  }
+  if(action==="backups.schedule.update"){
+    const scope=new Set(serverIds.map(String))
+    requireThat([...backupBefore.parse(before).value.serverIds,...backupSchedule.parse(effect).serverIds].every(id=>scope.has(id)))
+  }
+  const signer=await privateFingerprinterExisting("mcp-ordinary-retirement-source-v1")
+  return {planId:uuid.parse(plan.id),action,serverIds,key:z.string().min(1).max(200).parse(operation.idempotency_key),proof:signer(fingerprint(raw))}
+}
+
+async function retire(operationId:string,connectionId:string,deadlineAt:number) {
+  const token=randomUUID()
+  await transaction(deadlineAt,async sql=>{
+    const source=await prepare(sql,operationId,connectionId)
+    const claim=await sql.query(`INSERT INTO public.mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims(operation_id,plan_id,connection_id,source_proof,claim_token)
+      VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4,$5) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING RETURNING operation_id`,[operationId,source.planId,connectionId,source.proof,token])
+    requireThat(claim.rows.length===1&&claim.rows[0].operation_id===operationId)
+  })
+  await transaction(deadlineAt,async sql=>{
+    const claim=(await sql.query(`SELECT source_proof,plan_id FROM public.mcp_ordinary_retirement_claims
+      WHERE operation_id=$1 AND connection_id=$2 AND claim_token=$3 AND claim_xid<>pg_current_xact_id()`,[operationId,connectionId,token])).rows
+    requireThat(claim.length===1)
+    const source=await prepare(sql,operationId,connectionId)
+    requireThat(claim[0].source_proof===source.proof&&claim[0].plan_id===source.planId)
+    const tombstone=await sql.query(`INSERT INTO public.mcp_operation_replay_tombstones
+      (operation_id,plan_id,connection_id,idempotency_digest,action_id,target_server_ids,target_global)
+      VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,true) RETURNING operation_id`,
+    [operationId,source.planId,connectionId,operationIdempotencyDigest(connectionId,source.key),source.action,source.serverIds])
+    requireThat(tombstone.rows.length===1&&tombstone.rows[0].operation_id===operationId)
+    const checkpoint=await sql.query("DELETE FROM public.mcp_operation_checkpoints WHERE operation_id=$1 AND step_index=0 RETURNING operation_id",[operationId])
+    const step=await sql.query("DELETE FROM public.mcp_operation_steps WHERE operation_id=$1 AND step_index=0 RETURNING operation_id",[operationId])
+    const operation=await sql.query("DELETE FROM public.mcp_operations WHERE id=$1 AND connection_id=$2 AND plan_id=$3 RETURNING id AS operation_id",[operationId,connectionId,source.planId])
+    const plan=await sql.query("DELETE FROM public.mcp_plans WHERE id=$1 AND connection_id=$2 RETURNING id AS plan_id",[source.planId,connectionId])
+    requireThat([checkpoint,step,operation].every(result=>result.rows.length===1&&result.rows[0].operation_id===operationId)
+      &&plan.rows.length===1&&plan.rows[0].plan_id===source.planId)
+  })
+}
+
+let cursor:{finishedAt:string;operationId:string}|undefined
+export function retireOrdinaryMcpOperations() {
+  return sharedDatabaseGate.request(async()=>{
+    const deadlineAt=Date.now()+15000
+    const rows=await transaction(deadlineAt,async sql=>(await sql.query(CANDIDATES,[cursor?.finishedAt??null,cursor?.operationId??null])).rows)
+    requireThat(rows.length<=8)
+    let scanned=0,retired=0
+    for(const row of rows){
+      if(Date.now()>=deadlineAt-2000||retired>=2)break
+      const id=uuid.parse(row.id),connectionId=uuid.parse(row.connection_id)
+      requireThat(typeof row.finished_at==="string"&&Number.isFinite(Date.parse(row.finished_at)))
+      cursor={finishedAt:row.finished_at,operationId:id}
+      scanned++
+      try{await retire(id,connectionId,deadlineAt);retired++}
+      catch(error){if(error instanceof OrdinaryRetirementCommitUnknown)throw error}
+    }
+    if(scanned===rows.length&&rows.length<8)cursor=undefined
+    return {scanned,retired,automaticReplay:false as const}
+  })
+}

backend/src/modules/mcp/ospf-owner-graph.test.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import assert from "node:assert/strict"
 import { createOspfOwnerSourceGuard, verifyOspfOwnerGraph, verifyOspfOwnerGraphAtPhase } from "./ospf-owner-graph.js"
 import { fingerprint, McpError, redact } from "./security.js"
 import { createRosPrefix } from "./ros-prefix.js"
-import { ROS_SNAPSHOT_VERSION, type RosSnapshot } from "./resources.js"
+import { rosSnapshotVersion, type RosSnapshot } from "./resources.js"
 
 const ids = [1, 2, 3]
 const graph = { family: "ipv4" as const, sourceSecretProofs: ids.map(serverId => ({ serverId, proof: fingerprint({ serverId }) })), instances: ids.map(serverId => ({ serverId, fingerprint: fingerprint({ serverId, native: "instances" }) })) }
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ const catalogAuthorize = async () => {
   await sourceGuard()
 }
 const catalogRows = [{ ".id": "*A", name: "keep", disabled: "false" }]
-const catalog: RosSnapshot = { serverId: 1, resource: "bridge", rows: catalogRows, fingerprint: fingerprint(catalogRows), projectionVersion: ROS_SNAPSHOT_VERSION, sourceProof: "a".repeat(64) }
+const catalog: RosSnapshot = { serverId: 1, resource: "bridge", rows: catalogRows, fingerprint: fingerprint(catalogRows), projectionVersion: rosSnapshotVersion("bridge"), sourceProof: "a".repeat(64) }
 reads = []
 const catalogPrefix = createRosPrefix([catalog], async (_id, _resource, beforeRead = async () => {}) => {
   // Match readRosSnapshot's normal three grant/source fences without polling a

backend/src/modules/mcp/path-proof-purpose.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { z } from "zod"
 export const pathProofPurposeSchema = z.enum(["community", "control-path"])
 export type PathProofPurpose = z.infer<typeof pathProofPurposeSchema>
 export const PATH_PROOF_VERSION = 2
+export const COMMUNITY_PATH_MAX_AGE_MS = 90000
 export const pathProofTag = (purpose: PathProofPurpose) => "path-check:" + purpose + ":v" + PATH_PROOF_VERSION + ":"
 export function isCommunityPathEvidence(value: Record<string, unknown>) {
   return value.proofPurpose === "community" && value.proofVersion === PATH_PROOF_VERSION

backend/src/modules/mcp/path-verification.ts

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { fingerprint, McpError } from "./security.js"
 import { readRouteCommunityContext, routeContextAccess, type RouteContextOptions } from "./routing-community-context.js"
 import type { add } from "./actions.js"
 import { readControlPathContext } from "./control-path-context.js"
-import { isCommunityPathEvidence, PATH_PROOF_VERSION, pathProofPurposeSchema, type PathProofPurpose } from "./path-proof-purpose.js"
+import { COMMUNITY_PATH_MAX_AGE_MS, isCommunityPathEvidence, PATH_PROOF_VERSION, pathProofPurposeSchema, type PathProofPurpose } from "./path-proof-purpose.js"
 
 export function inspectControlPing(rows: Parameters<typeof parsePing>[0]) {
   const parsed = parsePing(rows)
@@ -107,10 +107,10 @@ export function registerPathActions(register: typeof add) {
 export async function requireRecentPath(profile: RouteAiProfile, candidateId: string, connectionId: string, options: RouteContextOptions = {}) {
   // Compare the database timestamp with the database clock. The signed
   // observedAt below is independently checked against the application clock.
-  const { rows: [row] } = await pool.query("SELECT id,status,created_at,evidence,created_at BETWEEN clock_timestamp()-interval '90 seconds' AND clock_timestamp() AS database_fresh FROM mcp_path_checks WHERE connection_id=$1 AND profile_hash=$2 AND candidate_id=$3 AND evidence->>'proofPurpose'='community' AND evidence->>'proofVersion'='2' ORDER BY created_at DESC,id DESC LIMIT 1", [connectionId, fingerprint(profile), candidateId])
+  const { rows: [row] } = await pool.query("SELECT id,status,created_at,evidence,created_at BETWEEN clock_timestamp()-$4::int * interval '1 millisecond' AND clock_timestamp() AS database_fresh FROM mcp_path_checks WHERE connection_id=$1 AND profile_hash=$2 AND candidate_id=$3 AND evidence->>'proofPurpose'='community' AND evidence->>'proofVersion'='2' ORDER BY created_at DESC,id DESC LIMIT 1", [connectionId, fingerprint(profile), candidateId, COMMUNITY_PATH_MAX_AGE_MS])
   if (!row || row.status !== "passed" || row.database_fresh !== true) throw new McpError("MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN", "Нет свежего подтверждения контрольного пути", 409)
   const { proof, ...evidence } = row.evidence ?? {}
-  if (!isCommunityPathEvidence(evidence) || evidence.id !== row.id || evidence.connectionId !== connectionId || evidence.profileHash !== fingerprint(profile) || evidence.candidateId !== candidateId || evidence.status !== "passed" || !Array.isArray(evidence.sourceProofs) || !evidence.sourceProofs.length || !Number.isFinite(Date.parse(evidence.observedAt)) || Date.now() - Date.parse(evidence.observedAt) > 90000 || Date.parse(evidence.observedAt) > Date.now()) throw new McpError("MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN", "Подтверждение пути не связано с Community purpose, источником и контекстом", 409)
+  if (!isCommunityPathEvidence(evidence) || evidence.id !== row.id || evidence.connectionId !== connectionId || evidence.profileHash !== fingerprint(profile) || evidence.candidateId !== candidateId || evidence.status !== "passed" || !Array.isArray(evidence.sourceProofs) || !evidence.sourceProofs.length || !Number.isFinite(Date.parse(evidence.observedAt)) || Date.now() - Date.parse(evidence.observedAt) > COMMUNITY_PATH_MAX_AGE_MS || Date.parse(evidence.observedAt) > Date.now()) throw new McpError("MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN", "Подтверждение пути не связано с Community purpose, источником и контекстом", 409)
   const current = await readRouteCommunityContext(profile, { ...options, selectedCandidateId: candidateId, expectedSources: evidence.sourceProofs })
   if (!current.verifyEvidence(evidence, proof)) throw new McpError("MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN", "Зависимости пути или сохранённое подтверждение изменились", 409)
   return row.id as string

backend/src/modules/mcp/plan-expiry.test.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ import { preparedPlanExpiry } from "./plan-expiry.js"
 const iso = (milliseconds: number) => new Date(Date.now() + milliseconds).toISOString()
 const poll = (validUntil?: string) => preparedPlanExpiry("servers.poll", "servers", { validUntil })
 
+test("Community honors sealed validity but keeps the ordinary lifetime without a bound", () => {
+  const bound = iso(90000)
+  assert.equal(preparedPlanExpiry("routing.community.switch", "network", { validUntil: bound })?.toISOString(), bound)
+  assert.equal(preparedPlanExpiry("routing.community.switch", "network", { validUntil: iso(-1000) }), null)
+  const before = Date.now(), manual = preparedPlanExpiry("routing.community.switch", "network", {})!.getTime()
+  assert(manual >= before + 300000 && manual <= Date.now() + 300000)
+})
+
 test("Poll uses its existing sealed five-minute validity as the nominal window", () => {
   const bound = iso(300000)
   assert.equal(poll(bound)?.toISOString(), bound)

backend/src/modules/mcp/plan-expiry.ts

@@ -3,11 +3,13 @@ import type { ChangeEvidence } from "./action-types.js"
 
 /** Internal value calculation only; evidence comes from action.prepare, never
  * caller JSON. Generic plans may outlive their preparation access credential.
- * A missing result makes the runtime refuse Poll before storing a new plan. */
+ * A missing result refuses a time-bound plan before storage. */
 export function preparedPlanExpiry(operationId: string, section: string, evidence: Pick<ChangeEvidence, "validUntil">): Date | null {
   const now = Date.now(), ordinaryExpiry = now + (section === "network" ? 300000 : 900000)
-  if (operationId !== "servers.poll") return new Date(ordinaryExpiry)
+  if (operationId !== "servers.poll" && operationId !== "routing.community.switch") return new Date(ordinaryExpiry)
-  const validity = z.string().datetime({ offset: true }).safeParse(evidence.validUntil)
+  const validUntil = evidence.validUntil
+  if (operationId === "routing.community.switch" && validUntil === undefined) return new Date(ordinaryExpiry)
+  const validity = z.string().datetime({ offset: true }).safeParse(validUntil)
   const bound = validity.success ? Date.parse(validity.data) : NaN
   if (!Number.isFinite(bound) || bound <= now) return null
   return new Date(Math.min(ordinaryExpiry, bound))

backend/src/modules/mcp/readiness-http.test.ts

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ test("failed/malformed/redirected and stalled protocol probes are bounded and ne
   try {
     for (const state of ["malformed", "redirect", "large", "announced", "stalled"]) {
       mode = state
-      const started = performance.now(), result = await runMcpProtocolProbe(endpoint, "private-readiness-fixture", 300)
+      const started = performance.now(), result = await runMcpProtocolProbe(endpoint, "private-readiness-fixture", { timeoutMs: 300 })
       assert.equal(result.status, "failed", state)
       assert.ok(performance.now() - started < 3000, state)
       assert.ok(!JSON.stringify(result).includes("private-readiness-fixture"))
@@ -29,3 +29,49 @@ test("failed/malformed/redirected and stalled protocol probes are bounded and ne
     assert.equal(forwarded, 0); assert.ok(requests >= 5)
   } finally { server.closeAllConnections(); await new Promise<void>(resolve => server.close(() => resolve())) }
 })
+
+test("capabilities readiness refuses widened scope and checks the tool result", async () => {
+  const capability = { id: "capabilities.read", toolName: "mm_capabilities_get" }
+  const tool = { name: capability.toolName, inputSchema: { type: "object" } }
+  let mode = "extra-tool", calls = 0
+  const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
+    if (req.method !== "POST") { res.writeHead(405).end(); return }
+    const chunks: Buffer[] = []
+    for await (const chunk of req) chunks.push(chunk)
+    const { id, method, params } = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString())
+    if (id === undefined) { res.writeHead(202).end(); return }
+    let result: unknown
+    if (method === "initialize") result = { protocolVersion: params.protocolVersion, capabilities: { tools: {} }, serverInfo: { name: "fixture", version: "1.0.0" } }
+    if (method === "tools/list") result = { tools: mode === "extra-tool" ? [tool, { ...tool, name: "mm_servers_list" }] : [tool] }
+    if (method === "tools/call") {
+      calls++
+      assert.equal(params.name, capability.toolName)
+      if (mode === "timeout") { res.writeHead(200, { "content-type": "application/json" }).write("{"); return }
+      const operations = mode === "extra-operation" ? [capability, { id: "servers.list" }] : [capability]
+      result = { content: [], isError: mode === "tool-error", structuredContent: { result: { schemaVersion: 1, operations } } }
+    }
+    res.writeHead(200, { "content-type": "application/json" }).end(JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id, result }))
+  })
+  await new Promise<void>(resolve => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve))
+  const endpoint = new URL(`http://127.0.0.1:${(server.address() as { port: number }).port}/mcp`)
+  const probe = () => runMcpProtocolProbe(endpoint, "private-readiness-fixture", { timeoutMs: 400, readCapabilities: true })
+  try {
+    const widened = await probe()
+    assert.equal(widened.reason, "SCOPE_NOT_ENFORCED")
+    assert.equal(widened.capabilitiesRead, "skipped")
+    assert.equal(calls, 0)
+    for (const state of ["tool-error", "extra-operation", "timeout"]) {
+      mode = state
+      const result = await probe()
+      assert.equal(result.status, "failed", state)
+      assert.equal(result.capabilitiesRead, "failed", state)
+      assert.equal(result.reason, state === "timeout" ? "TIMEOUT" : "CAPABILITIES_READ_FAILED", state)
+    }
+    mode = "valid"
+    const valid = await probe()
+    assert.equal(valid.status, "passed")
+    assert.equal(valid.capabilitiesRead, "passed")
+    assert.equal(valid.clientCredentialsVerified, false)
+    assert.equal(calls, 4)
+  } finally { server.closeAllConnections(); await new Promise<void>(resolve => server.close(() => resolve())) }
+})

backend/src/modules/mcp/readiness.ts

@@ -9,15 +9,19 @@ export interface ProtocolProbe {
   status: "passed" | "failed" | "skipped";
   elapsedMs: number;
   reason?: string;
-  credentialType: "temporary-no-operations";
+  credentialType: "temporary-no-operations" | "temporary-capabilities-read";
+  capabilitiesRead: "passed" | "failed" | "skipped";
   clientCredentialsVerified: false;
 }
 
-/** A temporary access credential may negotiate metadata, but its empty grant
+const capabilitiesOperation = "capabilities.read"
- * permits no tools. The ordinary connection credentials are never recovered. */
+const capabilitiesTool = "mm_capabilities_get"
-export async function withMcpProbeCredential<T>(connectionId: string, actor: AuthUser, work: (token: string) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+
+/** The probe may read its own narrowed capabilities when the connection grants
+ * that operation. The ordinary connection credentials are never recovered. */
+export async function withMcpProbeCredential<T>(connectionId: string, actor: AuthUser, work: (token: string, readCapabilities: boolean) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
   const credentialId = randomUUID(), grantId = randomUUID(), token = randomToken("access")
-  await transaction(async client => {
+  const readCapabilities = await transaction(async client => {
     await client.query("SELECT id FROM mcp_connections WHERE id=$1 FOR UPDATE", [connectionId])
     const connection = await getConnection(connectionId, client)
     assertConnectionVisible(connection, actor)
@@ -27,14 +31,16 @@ export async function withMcpProbeCredential<T>(connectionId: string, actor: Aut
     const expired = (await client.query("DELETE FROM mcp_credentials WHERE connection_id=$1 AND client_id='mcp-readiness-probe' AND expires_at<=now() RETURNING id", [connectionId])).rows.map(row => row.id)
     if (expired.length) await client.query("DELETE FROM mcp_grants WHERE connection_id=$1 AND payload->>'credentialId'=ANY($2::text[])", [connectionId, expired])
     const expiresAt = new Date(Math.min(Date.now() + 20000, Date.parse(connection.policy.expiresAt), connection.owner_valid_until.getTime())).toISOString()
-    const grant = mcpTemporaryGrantSchema.parse({ id: grantId, startsAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000).toISOString(), expiresAt, scope: { serverIds: [], operationIds: [], allowGlobal: false } })
+    const allowed = connection.policy.scope.operationIds.includes(capabilitiesOperation)
+    const grant = mcpTemporaryGrantSchema.parse({ id: grantId, startsAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000).toISOString(), expiresAt, scope: { serverIds: [], operationIds: allowed ? [capabilitiesOperation] : [], allowGlobal: false } })
     await client.query("INSERT INTO mcp_credentials(id,connection_id,digest,kind,expires_at,audience,client_id) VALUES($1,$2,$3,'access',$4,$5,'mcp-readiness-probe')", [credentialId, connectionId, tokenDigest(token), expiresAt, canonicalMcpUrl().href])
     await client.query("INSERT INTO mcp_grants(id,connection_id,payload) VALUES($1,$2,$3::jsonb)", [grantId, connectionId, JSON.stringify({ ...grant, credentialId })])
     await validatePrincipal({ connectionId, credentialId, credentialExpiresAt: expiresAt }, client)
     await audit(client, actor.id, "connection.handshake.start", connectionId, { credentialId, expiresAt })
+    return allowed
   })
   let completed = false
-  try { const result = await work(token); completed = true; return result }
+  try { const result = await work(token, readCapabilities); completed = true; return result }
   finally {
     await transaction(async client => {
       await client.query("DELETE FROM mcp_grants WHERE id=$1 AND connection_id=$2", [grantId, connectionId])
@@ -45,11 +51,12 @@ export async function withMcpProbeCredential<T>(connectionId: string, actor: Aut
 }
 
 /** One deadline covers negotiation, metadata and HTTP response bodies. */
-export async function runMcpProtocolProbe(endpoint: URL, token: string, timeoutMs = 8000): Promise<ProtocolProbe> {
+export async function runMcpProtocolProbe(endpoint: URL, token: string, { timeoutMs = 8000, readCapabilities = false } = {}): Promise<ProtocolProbe> {
   const started = performance.now(), controller = new AbortController()
   const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs)
   const client = new Client({ name: "MikrotikManager readiness", version: "1.0.0" })
-  const result = (status: ProtocolProbe["status"], reason?: string): ProtocolProbe => ({ status, reason, elapsedMs: Math.round(performance.now() - started), credentialType: "temporary-no-operations", clientCredentialsVerified: false })
+  let capabilitiesRead: ProtocolProbe["capabilitiesRead"] = "skipped"
+  const result = (status: ProtocolProbe["status"], reason?: string): ProtocolProbe => ({ status, reason, elapsedMs: Math.round(performance.now() - started), credentialType: readCapabilities ? "temporary-capabilities-read" : "temporary-no-operations", capabilitiesRead, clientCredentialsVerified: false })
   try {
     const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(endpoint, { requestInit: { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, redirect: "error" }, redirectPolicy: "follow",
       fetch: async (url, init) => {
@@ -67,13 +74,22 @@ export async function runMcpProtocolProbe(endpoint: URL, token: string, timeoutM
       } })
     await client.connect(transport, { timeout: timeoutMs })
     const tools = await client.listTools({}, { timeout: timeoutMs })
-    if (tools.tools.length !== 0 || tools.nextCursor) return result("failed", "SCOPE_NOT_ENFORCED")
+    const expectedTools = readCapabilities ? [capabilitiesTool] : []
+    if (tools.nextCursor || tools.tools.length !== expectedTools.length || tools.tools.some((tool, index) => tool.name !== expectedTools[index])) return result("failed", "SCOPE_NOT_ENFORCED")
+    if (readCapabilities) {
+      capabilitiesRead = "failed"
+      const call = await client.callTool({ name: capabilitiesTool, arguments: {} }, { timeout: timeoutMs })
+      const output = (call.structuredContent as { result?: { schemaVersion?: unknown; operations?: unknown } } | undefined)?.result
+      const operations = output?.operations
+      if (call.isError || output?.schemaVersion !== 1 || !Array.isArray(operations) || operations.length !== 1 || operations[0]?.id !== capabilitiesOperation || operations[0]?.toolName !== capabilitiesTool) return result("failed", "CAPABILITIES_READ_FAILED")
+      capabilitiesRead = "passed"
+    }
     return result("passed")
-  } catch { return result("failed", controller.signal.aborted ? "TIMEOUT" : "TRANSPORT_FAILED") }
+  } catch { return result("failed", controller.signal.aborted ? "TIMEOUT" : capabilitiesRead === "failed" ? "CAPABILITIES_READ_FAILED" : "TRANSPORT_FAILED") }
   finally { clearTimeout(timer); controller.abort(); await client.close().catch(() => {}) }
 }
 
 export async function checkMcpProtocol(connectionId: string, actor: AuthUser) {
   const endpoint = canonicalMcpUrl()
-  return withMcpProbeCredential(connectionId, actor, token => runMcpProtocolProbe(endpoint, token))
+  return withMcpProbeCredential(connectionId, actor, (token, readCapabilities) => runMcpProtocolProbe(endpoint, token, { readCapabilities }))
 }

backend/src/modules/mcp/recovery-actions.ts

@@ -6,13 +6,14 @@ import { decryptSecret, fingerprint, McpError } from "./security.js"
 import { effectiveMcpConnection } from "./store.js"
 import { findMcpService } from "./service-registry.js"
 import { findMcpOperation } from "./registry.js"
-import { readRosSnapshot, resourceById, routerClient, validateRosStep, splitOspfPassiveUpdate, ROS_SNAPSHOT_VERSION, type RosSnapshot, type RosStep } from "./resources.js"
+import { readRosSnapshot, resourceById, routerClient, validateRosStep, splitOspfPassiveUpdate, rosSnapshotVersion, type RosSnapshot, type RosStep } from "./resources.js"
 import { verifyRosStepSnapshots } from "./ros-step-verification.js"
 import type { add } from "./actions.js"
 import type { ActionContext, ChangeEvidence, ChangeStep } from "./action-types.js"
 import { loadScopedRecoverySource } from "./routing-community-scoped-recovery-source.js"
 import { prepareScopedRecovery, registerScopedRecoveryService } from "./routing-community-scoped-recovery.js"
 import { reconcileVrfProductionStep } from "../../services/vrf-production-execution.js"
+import { needsBridgeVlanRecovery, prepareBridgeVlanRecovery } from "./bridge-vlan-recovery.js"
 
 async function source(operationId: string, context: ActionContext, allowServices = false) {
   const { rows: [row] } = await pool.query("SELECT o.*,p.operation_id AS source_action,p.operation_version AS source_version,p.evidence FROM mcp_operations o JOIN mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id WHERE o.id=$1 AND o.connection_id=$2", [operationId, context.connection.id])
@@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ export function registerRecoveryActions(register: typeof add) {
     },
   })
   register("operations.recover", "mm_operation_recovery_plan", "Подготовить отдельный обратный план сетевой операции", "network", "mm:network:write", "write", "servers", z.object({ operationId: z.string().uuid() }).strict(), {
-    version: 7,
+    version: 8,
     target: async (input, context) => {
       const { evidence } = await source(String(input.operationId), context, true)
       if (evidence.steps.some(step => step.kind === "ros" && step.step.resource === "vrf")) throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", "VRF не имеет проверенной обратной ревизии; используйте read-only сверку и отдельный approved план", 409)
@@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ export function registerRecoveryActions(register: typeof add) {
       const checkpoints = (await pool.query("SELECT step_index,before_sealed,after_sealed FROM mcp_operation_checkpoints WHERE operation_id=$1 ORDER BY step_index DESC", [row.id])).rows
       const intended = (await pool.query("SELECT step_index,state,result FROM mcp_operation_steps WHERE operation_id=$1 ORDER BY step_index DESC", [row.id])).rows
       if (!intended.length || intended.some(step => step.state !== "verified") || intended.length !== checkpoints.length || checkpoints.some(checkpoint => !checkpoint.after_sealed)) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Нет полного набора подтверждённых снимков; требуется ручная сверка", 409)
+      if (needsBridgeVlanRecovery(row.source_action, evidence)) return prepareBridgeVlanRecovery({ operationId: row.id, evidence, checkpoints, intended }, context)
       const snapshots = new Map<string, RosSnapshot>(), steps: ChangeStep[] = [], objects: ChangeEvidence["objects"] = [...evidence.objects]
       for (const checkpoint of checkpoints) {
         const original = evidence.steps[checkpoint.step_index]
@@ -113,7 +115,7 @@ export function registerRecoveryActions(register: typeof add) {
         const step = original.step, resource = resourceById(step.resource)
         if (!context.connection.policy.scope.serverIds.includes(step.serverId)) throw new McpError("SERVER_DENIED", "Зависимость вне допуска")
         const before = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(checkpoint.before_sealed)) as RosSnapshot, after = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(checkpoint.after_sealed)) as RosSnapshot
-        if (before.projectionVersion !== ROS_SNAPSHOT_VERSION || after.projectionVersion !== ROS_SNAPSHOT_VERSION || !before.sourceProof || before.sourceProof !== after.sourceProof || before.fingerprint !== fingerprint(before.rows) || after.fingerprint !== fingerprint(after.rows) || !verifyRosStepSnapshots(step, intended.find(item => item.step_index === checkpoint.step_index)?.result, before, after)) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Исходный переход каталога или источник не подтверждён; обратный план запрещён", 409)
+        if (before.projectionVersion !== rosSnapshotVersion(step.resource) || after.projectionVersion !== rosSnapshotVersion(step.resource) || !before.sourceProof || before.sourceProof !== after.sourceProof || before.fingerprint !== fingerprint(before.rows) || after.fingerprint !== fingerprint(after.rows) || !verifyRosStepSnapshots(step, intended.find(item => item.step_index === checkpoint.step_index)?.result, before, after)) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Исходный переход каталога или источник не подтверждён; обратный план запрещён", 409)
         const key = `${step.serverId}:${step.resource}`
         if (!snapshots.has(key)) {
           const current = await readRosSnapshot(step.serverId, step.resource, undefined, after.sourceProof)
@@ -143,7 +145,7 @@ export function registerRecoveryActions(register: typeof add) {
         const key = `${dependency.serverId}:${dependency.resource}`
         if (snapshots.has(key)) continue
         const current = await readRosSnapshot(dependency.serverId, dependency.resource, undefined, dependency.sourceProof)
-        if (current.fingerprint !== dependency.fingerprint || current.sourceProof !== dependency.sourceProof || dependency.projectionVersion !== ROS_SNAPSHOT_VERSION) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Зависимость или источник исходного плана изменились", 409)
+        if (current.fingerprint !== dependency.fingerprint || current.sourceProof !== dependency.sourceProof || dependency.projectionVersion !== rosSnapshotVersion(dependency.resource)) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Зависимость или источник исходного плана изменились", 409)
         snapshots.set(key, current)
       }
       objects.push(...[...new Set([...snapshots.values()].map(snapshot => snapshot.serverId))].map(serverId => ({ kind: "server", id: String(serverId), serverId })))

backend/src/modules/mcp/resources.ts

@@ -5,14 +5,19 @@ import { eq } from "drizzle-orm"
 import { db } from "../../db/index.js"
 import { servers } from "../../db/schema.js"
 import { MikrotikClient } from "../../services/mikrotik.js"
+import { readRouterOsSnapshotGet } from "../../services/routeros-snapshot-read.js"
 import { McpError, fingerprint, privateSecretFingerprint } from "./security.js"
 import { readOspfEffectiveDisabled } from "../../services/ospf-effective-disabled.js"
 import { greNativeFieldsSchema } from "../../services/gre-mutation-input.js"
 import { canonicalVrfMembers } from "../../services/vrf-members.js"
+import { canonicalBridgeVlanValue } from "../../services/bridge-vlan-values.js"
 
 const text = z.string().max(1000)
 const name = z.string().trim().min(1).max(100)
 const bool = z.boolean()
+const vlanIds = z.string().min(1).max(16384).refine(value => {
+  try { canonicalBridgeVlanValue("vlan-ids", value); return true } catch { return false }
+}, "Требуется непересекающийся список VLAN ID/диапазонов 1..4094")
 const integer = (min: number, max: number) => z.number().int().min(min).max(max)
 const common = { name: name.optional(), comment: text.optional(), disabled: bool.optional() }
 const ipv4 = name.refine(value => isIP(value) === 4, "Требуется IPv4 router/area ID")
@@ -31,13 +36,15 @@ const route = {
 export interface RosResourceSpec {
   id: string; path: string; title: string; permission: string; fields: z.ZodObject;
   create: boolean; remove: boolean; requiredOnCreate?: string[]; readOnly?: boolean
+  /** Native configuration sealed for drift checks, never accepted as writes. */
+  observeFields?: readonly string[]
 }
 export const rosResources: RosResourceSpec[] = [
   { id: "routing_filter", path: "/routing/filter/rule", title: "Фильтры маршрутизации", permission: "mm:filters", fields: z.object({ chain: text.optional(), rule: text.optional(), comment: text.optional(), disabled: bool.optional() }).strict(), create: false, remove: false, readOnly: true },
   { id: "ethernet", path: "/interface/ethernet", title: "Ethernet", permission: "mm:network", fields: z.object({ ...common, mtu: integer(68, 65535).optional(), "auto-negotiation": bool.optional() }).strict(), create: false, remove: false },
-  { id: "bridge", path: "/interface/bridge", title: "Bridge", permission: "mm:network", fields: z.object({ ...common, mtu: integer(68, 65535).optional(), "vlan-filtering": bool.optional(), pvid: integer(1, 4094).optional(), "protocol-mode": z.enum(["none", "stp", "rstp", "mstp"]).optional() }).strict(), create: true, remove: true, requiredOnCreate: ["name"] },
+  { id: "bridge", path: "/interface/bridge", title: "Bridge", permission: "mm:network", fields: z.object({ ...common, mtu: integer(68, 65535).optional(), "vlan-filtering": bool.optional(), pvid: integer(1, 4094).optional(), "frame-types": z.enum(["admit-all", "admit-only-vlan-tagged", "admit-only-untagged-and-priority-tagged"]).optional(), "ingress-filtering": bool.optional(), "protocol-mode": z.enum(["none", "stp", "rstp", "mstp"]).optional() }).strict(), observeFields: ["mvrp"], create: true, remove: true, requiredOnCreate: ["name"] },
   { id: "bridge_port", path: "/interface/bridge/port", title: "Порты bridge", permission: "mm:network", fields: z.object({ bridge: name.optional(), interface: name.optional(), pvid: integer(1, 4094).optional(), "ingress-filtering": bool.optional(), "frame-types": z.enum(["admit-all", "admit-only-vlan-tagged", "admit-only-untagged-and-priority-tagged"]).optional(), disabled: bool.optional(), comment: text.optional() }).strict(), create: true, remove: true, requiredOnCreate: ["bridge", "interface"] },
-  { id: "bridge_vlan", path: "/interface/bridge/vlan", title: "Bridge VLAN membership", permission: "mm:network", fields: z.object({ bridge: name.optional(), "vlan-ids": name.optional(), tagged: text.optional(), untagged: text.optional(), disabled: bool.optional(), comment: text.optional() }).strict(), create: true, remove: true, requiredOnCreate: ["bridge", "vlan-ids"] },
+  { id: "bridge_vlan", path: "/interface/bridge/vlan", title: "Bridge VLAN membership", permission: "mm:network", fields: z.object({ bridge: name.optional(), "vlan-ids": vlanIds.optional(), tagged: text.optional(), untagged: text.optional(), disabled: bool.optional(), comment: text.optional() }).strict(), create: true, remove: true, requiredOnCreate: ["bridge", "vlan-ids"] },
   { id: "vlan", path: "/interface/vlan", title: "VLAN", permission: "mm:network", fields: z.object({ ...common, interface: name.optional(), "vlan-id": integer(1, 4094).optional(), mtu: integer(68, 65535).optional(), "use-service-tag": bool.optional() }).strict(), create: true, remove: true, requiredOnCreate: ["name", "interface", "vlan-id"] },
   { id: "ipv4_address", path: "/ip/address", title: "IPv4-адреса", permission: "mm:network", fields: z.object({ address: name.optional(), interface: name.optional(), network: name.optional(), comment: text.optional(), disabled: bool.optional() }).strict(), create: true, remove: true, requiredOnCreate: ["address", "interface"] },
   { id: "ipv6_address", path: "/ipv6/address", title: "IPv6-адреса", permission: "mm:network", fields: z.object({ address: name.optional(), interface: name.optional(), advertise: bool.optional(), comment: text.optional(), disabled: bool.optional() }).strict(), create: true, remove: true, requiredOnCreate: ["address", "interface"] },
@@ -70,6 +77,7 @@ export const rosResources: RosResourceSpec[] = [
 export type ConfigurationRow = Record<string, unknown>
 export interface RosStep { serverId: number; resource: string; action: "create" | "update" | "delete"; id?: string; fields: Record<string, string>; placeBeforeId?: string; expectedCost?: number; expectedServerProof?: string }
 export const ROS_SNAPSHOT_VERSION = 3
+export const rosSnapshotVersion = (resource: string): number => ["bridge", "bridge_port", "bridge_vlan"].includes(resource) ? 4 : ROS_SNAPSHOT_VERSION
 export interface RosSnapshot { serverId: number; resource: string; rows: ConfigurationRow[]; fingerprint: string; projectionVersion?: number; sourceProof?: string }
 export function resourceById(id: string): RosResourceSpec {
   const resource = rosResources.find(item => item.id === id)
@@ -93,13 +101,21 @@ export function configurationRows(resource: RosResourceSpec, payload: unknown):
   // RouterOS creates/removes IPv6 link-local rows with interface runtime state.
   // They cannot be configured independently and must not invalidate a sealed
   // inverse plan when its own GRE is disabled. Explicit addresses remain sealed.
-  const configuration = rows.filter(row => !(resource.id === "ipv6_address" && [true, "true"].includes((row as ConfigurationRow).dynamic as boolean | string) && /^fe80:/i.test(String((row as ConfigurationRow).address))))
+  const configuration = rows.filter(row => !(resource.id === "ipv6_address" && [true, "true"].includes((row as ConfigurationRow).dynamic as boolean | string) && /^fe80:/i.test(String((row as ConfigurationRow).address)))
+    // These rows are generated from bridge/port PVID, not independently
+    // configurable VLAN entries. Their inputs remain sealed in bridge/ports.
+    && !(resource.id === "bridge_vlan" && [true, "true", "yes"].includes((row as ConfigurationRow).dynamic as boolean | string)))
   const selectedRows = configuration.map(row => {
-    const selected = Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(row as ConfigurationRow).filter(([key]) => [".id", "dynamic", "builtin", "default", ...fields].includes(key)))
+    const selected = Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(row as ConfigurationRow).filter(([key]) => [".id", "dynamic", "builtin", "default", ...fields, ...(resource.observeFields ?? [])].includes(key)))
     // RouterOS 7.24.5 returns an explicit empty fib flag for non-FIB tables.
     // Normalize only this observed field; missing values must remain unknown.
     if (resource.id === "routing_table" && selected.fib === "") selected.fib = "false"
     if (resource.id === "vrf" && selected.interfaces !== undefined) selected.interfaces = canonicalVrfMembers(selected.interfaces)
+    if (["bridge_port", "bridge_vlan"].includes(resource.id) && selected.comment === undefined) selected.comment = ""
+    if (resource.id === "bridge_vlan") {
+      try { for (const field of ["vlan-ids", "tagged", "untagged"]) selected[field] = canonicalBridgeVlanValue(field, selected[field]) }
+      catch { throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Недостоверная конфигурация VLAN membership", 409) }
+    }
     return selected
   })
   // Reordering an ordered catalog changes configuration even with unchanged rows.
@@ -118,10 +134,10 @@ export async function readRosSnapshot(serverId: number, resourceId: string, befo
   const payload = resourceId === "ospf_template" ? await client.getOspfInterfaceTemplates(checkSource) : ["ospf_instance", "ospf_area", "bgp_instance", "bgp_connection"].includes(resourceId) ? await readOspfEffectiveDisabled(await client.get<unknown>(resource.path), async id => {
     await checkSource()
     return client.post(resource.path + "/get", { ".id": id, "value-name": "disabled" })
-  }) : await client.get<unknown>(resource.path)
+  }) : await readRouterOsSnapshotGet<unknown>({ client, path: resource.path, assertCurrent: checkSource })
   await checkSource()
   const rows = configurationRows(resource, payload)
-  return { serverId, resource: resourceId, rows, fingerprint: fingerprint(rows), projectionVersion: ROS_SNAPSHOT_VERSION, sourceProof }
+  return { serverId, resource: resourceId, rows, fingerprint: fingerprint(rows), projectionVersion: rosSnapshotVersion(resourceId), sourceProof }
 }
 export async function rosSnapshotSourceProof(server: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof routerClient>>["server"]): Promise<string> {
   return privateSecretFingerprint(fingerprint({ id: server.id, enabled: server.enabled, host: server.host, port: server.port, useSsl: server.useSsl, verifySsl: server.verifySsl, username: server.username, password: server.password, epoch: server.routingEndpointEpoch }), "mcp-ros-snapshot-source-v3")

backend/src/modules/mcp/ros-prefix.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 import { fingerprint, McpError } from "./security.js"
-import { readRosSnapshot, ROS_SNAPSHOT_VERSION, type RosSnapshot, type RosStep } from "./resources.js"
+import { readRosSnapshot, rosSnapshotVersion, type RosSnapshot, type RosStep } from "./resources.js"
 import { verifyRosStepSnapshots } from "./ros-step-verification.js"
 import { acknowledgedCreateId } from "./native-create-identity.js"
 
 const key = (snapshot: Pick<RosSnapshot, "serverId" | "resource">) => `${snapshot.serverId}:${snapshot.resource}`
 function valid(snapshot: RosSnapshot): boolean {
-  if (snapshot.projectionVersion !== ROS_SNAPSHOT_VERSION || typeof snapshot.sourceProof !== "string" || !/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(snapshot.sourceProof) || !Array.isArray(snapshot.rows) || snapshot.fingerprint !== fingerprint(snapshot.rows)) return false
+  if (snapshot.projectionVersion !== rosSnapshotVersion(snapshot.resource) || typeof snapshot.sourceProof !== "string" || !/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(snapshot.sourceProof) || !Array.isArray(snapshot.rows) || snapshot.fingerprint !== fingerprint(snapshot.rows)) return false
   if (["ip_settings", "ipv6_settings"].includes(snapshot.resource)) return snapshot.rows.length === 1 && !!snapshot.rows[0] && typeof snapshot.rows[0] === "object" && !Array.isArray(snapshot.rows[0])
   const ids = snapshot.rows.map(acknowledgedCreateId)
   return ids.every(id => id !== undefined) && new Set(ids).size === ids.length

backend/src/modules/mcp/ros-step-verification.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { isDeepStrictEqual } from "node:util"
 import { acknowledgedCreateId } from "./native-create-identity.js"
+import { canonicalBridgeVlanValue } from "../../services/bridge-vlan-values.js"
 import { isOrderedRosResource, resourceById, type ConfigurationRow, type RosResourceSpec, type RosSnapshot, type RosStep } from "./resources.js"
 
 function booleanValue(value: unknown): unknown {
@@ -23,6 +24,9 @@ function requested(resource: RosResourceSpec, fields: RosStep["fields"], row: Co
     const schema = resource.fields.shape[key]
     if (!schema || typeof value !== "string" || !Object.hasOwn(row, key) || row[key] === undefined || row[key] === null) return false
     if (schema.safeParse(true).success) return ["true", "false"].includes(value) && booleanValue(row[key]) === (value === "true")
+    if (resource.id === "bridge_vlan" && ["vlan-ids", "tagged", "untagged"].includes(key)) {
+      try { return canonicalBridgeVlanValue(key, row[key]) === canonicalBridgeVlanValue(key, value) } catch { return false }
+    }
     return String(row[key]) === value
   })
 }

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-community-reserved-source.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 import assert from "node:assert/strict"
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises"
 import { test } from "node:test"
+import { runInNewContext } from "node:vm"
+import ts from "typescript"
 import type { ActionContext } from "./action-types.js"
 import { loadReservedScopedRecoverySource } from "./routing-community-scoped-recovery-source.js"
 import { executeReservedScopedRecovery, scopedRecoveryIntentFromCheckpoint, validateReservedInverseVerified } from "./routing-community-scoped-recovery.js"
@@ -16,6 +19,67 @@ test("a serialized allocation cannot enter the shared inverse engine", async ()
   await assert.rejects(executeReservedScopedRecovery(forged, {} as Parameters<typeof executeReservedScopedRecovery>[1]), /capability/)
 })
 
+test("confirmed inverse spend quarantines the exact slot on post-spend refusal without replay", async () => {
+  // Execute the actual boundary body with only its I/O dependencies substituted.
+  // This does not mint a production capability or claim native/SQL acceptance.
+  const source = ts.createSourceFile("routing-community-scoped-recovery.ts",
+    await readFile(new URL("./routing-community-scoped-recovery.ts", import.meta.url), "utf8"), ts.ScriptTarget.ES2022)
+  const declaration = source.statements.find(node => ts.isFunctionDeclaration(node) && node.name?.text === "executeReservedScopedRecovery")
+  assert(declaration)
+  const compiled = ts.transpileModule(declaration.getText(source), { compilerOptions: { module: ts.ModuleKind.CommonJS, target: ts.ScriptTarget.ES2022 } }).outputText
+  const allocation = Object.freeze({ kind: "routing-reserved-inverse-allocation" })
+  const execution = Object.freeze({ kind: "routing-reserved-inverse-execution" })
+  const principal = { connectionId: "owned", credentialId: "original" }
+  const original = new Error("original authority failure"), result = Object.freeze({ outcome: "recovered" })
+  const scenarios = {
+    spend: ["spend"],
+    inspect: ["spend", "inspect", "quarantine"],
+    authority: ["spend", "inspect", "authority", "quarantine"],
+    source: ["spend", "inspect", "authority", "source", "quarantine"],
+    proof: ["spend", "inspect", "authority", "source", "proof", "quarantine"],
+    engine: ["spend", "inspect", "authority", "source", "proof", "engine", "quarantine"],
+    success: ["spend", "inspect", "authority", "source", "proof", "engine"],
+  } as const
+  for (const [scenario, expected] of Object.entries(scenarios)) {
+    const events: string[] = [], exports: Record<string, unknown> = {}, capabilities = new WeakMap()
+    let request: object | undefined
+    const at = (phase: string) => { events.push(phase); if (phase === scenario) throw original }
+    runInNewContext(compiled, {
+      exports, reservedExecutions: capabilities, fingerprint: JSON.stringify,
+      createRoutingReservationStore: () => ({
+        async beginInverseAttempt(value: unknown) {
+          assert.equal(value, allocation); at("spend"); return { reservationId: "spent-slot", execution }
+        },
+        async inspectInverseExecution(value: unknown) {
+          assert.equal(value, execution); at("inspect")
+          return { principal, sourceOperationId: "source", deadline: "2026-10-29T01:00:00.000Z" }
+        },
+        async markUnknown(id: string, lane: string) {
+          assert.equal(id, "spent-slot"); assert.equal(lane, "inverse"); at("quarantine")
+          throw new Error("quarantine persistence unavailable")
+        },
+      }),
+      effectiveMcpConnection: async () => { at("authority"); return { owner_id: "owner", policy: {}, owner_permissions: [] } },
+      loadReservedScopedRecoverySource: async () => {
+        at("source"); return { profile: { serverId: 1 }, input: {}, configuration: { packet: {} } }
+      },
+      accessGeneration: async () => "generation",
+      deadline: () => Date.parse("2026-10-29T01:00:00.000Z"),
+      sealedProof: async () => { at("proof"); return "proof" },
+      executeScopedRecovery: async (value: object) => {
+        request = value; assert.equal(capabilities.get(value), execution); at("engine"); return result
+      },
+    })
+    const execute = exports.executeReservedScopedRecovery as
+      (allocation: unknown, expected: { sourceOperationId: string; principal: typeof principal }) => Promise<unknown>
+    const outcome = execute(allocation, { sourceOperationId: "source", principal })
+    if (scenario === "success") assert.equal(await outcome, result)
+    else await assert.rejects(outcome, error => error === original)
+    assert.deepEqual(events, expected, scenario)
+    if (request) assert.equal(capabilities.has(request), false)
+  }
+})
+
 test("configuration equality or generic VERIFIED cannot replace reserved signed receipts", async () => {
   const expected = {} as Parameters<typeof validateReservedInverseVerified>[1]
   for (const row of [{}, { state: "verified", phase: "RECOVERY_VERIFIED", configurationVerified: true }, { inverse_intent_sealed: "x".repeat(524289) }]) {

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-community-scoped-acceptance.ts

@@ -22,33 +22,38 @@ import { compileManagedFilterRules } from "../../services/filter-rules-write-mod
 import { attestRoutingFixture } from "../../test/mcp-routing-fixture.js"
 import { createMcpConnection, authenticateMcpToken, setConnectionStatus, effectiveMcpConnection } from "./store.js"
 import { invokeMcpTool, approvePlan, applyPlan, publicPlan, loadPlan } from "./runtime.js"
-import { accessGeneration, decryptSecret, fingerprint, McpError } from "./security.js"
+import { accessGeneration, decryptSecret, encryptSecret, fingerprint, McpError } from "./security.js"
 import type { McpPrincipal } from "./store.js"
 import { loadScopedRecoverySource } from "./routing-community-scoped-recovery-source.js"
 import { findMcpService } from "./service-registry.js"
 import { prepareScopedCommunitySwitch } from "./routing-community-scoped-service.js"
-import { resolveRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext, resolveRoutingNetworkConfigurationContextFromSharedContext, consumeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext, closeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext,
+import { resolveRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext, consumeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext, closeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext } from "./routing-network-configuration-bridge.js"
-  resolveRoutingNetworkForwardRoundConfigurationContext, closeRoutingNetworkForwardRoundConfigurationContext } from "./routing-network-configuration-bridge.js"
 import { createRoutingNetworkNativeSession } from "./routing-network-native-session.js"
 import { requireRecentPath } from "./path-verification.js"
 import { registerManagementChannel } from "./management.js"
 import { isSchedulerJobsPaused, pauseSchedulerJobsAndWait, resumeSchedulerJobs } from "../../services/scheduler-running.js"
 
 /** Disposable SQL + loopback HTTP only. Does not access or configure CHR. */
-export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options: { originalEffectsOnly?: boolean; originalCredentialRevocationOnly?: boolean; forwardRoundsOnly?: boolean; manualInverseChargeOnly?: boolean; manualInverseChargeCase?: "positive" | "quota" | "concurrent" | "unknown" | "revoked" | "nonpersistent" | "mixed-forward" } = {}) {
+export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options: { originalEffectsOnly?: boolean; controllerFailoverOnly?: boolean; originalCredentialRevocationOnly?: boolean; forwardRoundsOnly?: boolean; manualInverseChargeOnly?: boolean; manualInverseChargeCase?: "positive" | "quota" | "concurrent" | "unknown" | "revoked" | "nonpersistent" | "mixed-forward"; lateInverseAuthorityChange?: "edit" | "disable" | "grant" } = {}) {
-  const sid = 131, writer: AuthUser = { ...actor, permissions: [...new Set([...actor.permissions, "mm:filters:write"])] }
+  const sid = options.lateInverseAuthorityChange ? { edit: 131, disable: 132, grant: 133 }[options.lateInverseAuthorityChange] : 131
+  const writer: AuthUser = { ...actor, permissions: [...new Set([...actor.permissions, "mm:filters:write"])] }
   const initial = compileManagedFilterRules([{ community: "65000:10", gateway: "192.0.2.1", outIface: "", action: "route", description: "" }, { community: "65000:20", gateway: "192.0.2.5", outIface: "", action: "route", description: "" }])
   const filters = ["a", "b"].map(key => ({ ".id": "*f" + key, chain: "custom-" + key, rule: initial, disabled: "false", comment: managedComment("NEVER_SCOPED_COMMENT_" + key), opaque: "NEVER_SCOPED_OPAQUE" }))
   let mode: "normal" | "ignored" | "lost" | "collateral" | "post-failed" | "post-unknown" = "normal", writes = 0, requests = 0
+  let controllerProbeUnknown = false
+  let controllerFailoverProbeSources: string[] | undefined
+  let controllerFailoverReserveHealthy = true
   let pendingPostCheckpoint = false, postCheckpointsObserved = 0
   let afterForwardWrite: (() => Promise<void>) | undefined
   let afterConfigurationCheckpoint: ((operationId: string) => Promise<void>) | undefined
   let forwardRoundBulk = 0, afterRoundLogRead: (() => Promise<void>) | undefined
   let primaryDown = false, primaryControlRequests = 0, pendingInversePost = false, inversePostChecks = 0
   const observedVrfs = new Set<string>()
-  // Only this separately selected SQL/localhost phase changes its wire data.
+  const paddedEffectResources = new Set(["/routing/route", "/routing/bgp/session", "/routing/bfd/session", "/log"])
-  // These are declared synthetic RouterOS responses, never actual CHR facts.
+  // Persistent fixtures need an original RIB selection. These are declared
+  // synthetic RouterOS responses, never actual CHR facts.
   let originalEffectCase: "transition" | "no-op" | "ambiguous" = "transition"
+  let exposeEffectCatalogue = false
   const originalEffectWire: Array<{ method: string; path: string; afterPatch: boolean }> = []
   const originalEffectChanged = () => originalEffectCase === "no-op" || filters[0].rule !== initial
   const effectRoutes = () => {
@@ -62,25 +67,31 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
   const effectConnection = { ".id": "*ca", name: "peer-a", instance: "default", vrf: "main", "routing-table": "tenant-a", afi: "ip",
     "input.filter": "custom-a", "output.filter-chain": "", templates: "", disabled: "false", "use-bfd": "false",
     "local.address": "198.18.0.1", "remote.address": "198.18.0.2", "remote.as": "65001" }
+  const { vrf: effectTransportVrf, ...effectSessionFields } = effectConnection
+  const effectSession = { ...effectSessionFields, ".id": "*sa", "local.afi": "ip", "remote.afi": "ip", established: "true",
+    "local.address": `${effectConnection["local.address"]}@${effectTransportVrf}`, "remote.address": `${effectConnection["remote.address"]}@${effectTransportVrf}` }
   const collections = (path: string): Record<string, unknown>[] => ({
     "/system/resource": [{ version: "7.20.1" }],
-    ...Object.fromEntries(["/routing/route", "/routing/bgp/session", "/routing/bfd/session", "/log"].map(resource => [resource,
+    "/routing/table": ["main", "tenant-a", "tenant-b", "probe-a", "probe-b"].map((name, index) => ({ ".id": "*t" + index, name, fib: "true", disabled: "false", invalid: "false" })),
-      Array.from({ length: forwardRoundBulk }, (_, index) => ({ ".id": "*" + index, synthetic: "bounded owned budget payload" }))])),
-    "/routing/table": ["main", "tenant-a", "tenant-b", "probe-a", "probe-b"].map((name, index) => ({ ".id": "*t" + index, name, fib: "true" })),
     "/ip/vrf": ["a", "b"].map(key => ({ ".id": "*v" + key, name: "probe-" + key, interfaces: "wan-" + key, disabled: "false" })).concat([{ ".id": "*vm", name: "main", interfaces: "all", disabled: "false" }]),
-    "/routing/bgp/connection": ["a", "b"].map(key => ({ ".id": "*c" + key, name: "peer-" + key, instance: "default", vrf: "main", "routing-table": "tenant-" + key, afi: "ip", "input.filter": "custom-" + key, "output.filter-chain": "", templates: "", disabled: "false" })),
+    "/routing/bgp/connection": [effectConnection, { ...effectConnection, ".id": "*cb", name: "peer-b", "routing-table": "tenant-b", "input.filter": "custom-b" }],
     "/routing/bgp/instance": [{ ".id": "*i", name: "default", vrf: "main", "routing-table": "main", disabled: "false" }],
     "/routing/bgp/template": [], "/routing/filter/rule": filters,
-    "/ip/route": [1, 9].map(value => ({ ".id": "*r" + value, "dst-address": "192.0.2." + value + "/32", "routing-table": "main", disabled: "false", comment: managedComment("recursive"), opaque: "NEVER_SCOPED_ROUTE" })),
+    "/ip/route": (controllerFailoverProbeSources ? [1, 9, 10, 11] : [1, 9]).map(value => ({ ".id": "*r" + value, "dst-address": "192.0.2." + value + "/32", "routing-table": "main", disabled: "false",
+      "immediate-gw": "203.0.113." + value + "%wan-a", comment: managedComment("recursive"), opaque: "NEVER_SCOPED_ROUTE" })),
     "/interface": ["wan-a", "wan-b", "hop", "target"].map((name, index) => ({ ".id": "*if" + index, name, disabled: "false", running: "true" })),
-    "/ip/address": ["wan-a", "wan-b", "hop", "target"].map((name, index) => ({ ".id": "*ad" + index, interface: name, address: "198.51.100." + (index + 1) + "/32", disabled: "false", invalid: "false" })),
+    "/ip/address": [
+      ...["wan-a", "wan-b", "hop", "target"].map((name, index) => ({ ".id": "*ad" + index, interface: name, address: "198.51.100." + (index + 1) + "/32", disabled: "false", invalid: "false" })),
+      ...(controllerFailoverProbeSources ? [11, 12, 13].map(index => ({ ".id": "*ad" + index, interface: "wan-a", address: "198.51.100." + index + "/32", disabled: "false", invalid: "false" })) : []),
+    ],
     ...(options.originalEffectsOnly ? {
       "/routing/table": ["main", "tenant-a", "tenant-b", "probe-a", "probe-b"].map((name, index) => ({ ".id": "*t" + index, name, fib: "", disabled: "false", invalid: "false" })),
-      "/routing/route": effectRoutes(), "/routing/bgp/connection": [effectConnection],
+      "/routing/bgp/connection": [effectConnection],
-      "/routing/bgp/session": [{ ...effectConnection, ".id": "*sa", "local.afi": "ip", "remote.afi": "ip", established: "true" }],
+      "/log": [{ ".id": "*l1", topics: "bgp,route,info", message: "Declared synthetic localhost effect observation; interval coverage unknown" }],
-      "/routing/bfd/session": [], "/log": [{ ".id": "*l1", topics: "bgp,route,info", message: "Declared synthetic localhost effect observation; interval coverage unknown" }],
+    } : {}),
-      "/ip/route": [1, 9].map(value => ({ ".id": "*r" + value, "dst-address": "192.0.2." + value + "/32", "routing-table": "main", disabled: "false",
+    ...(exposeEffectCatalogue || options.originalEffectsOnly ? {
-        "immediate-gw": "203.0.113." + value + "%wan-a", comment: managedComment("recursive"), opaque: "NEVER_SCOPED_ROUTE" })),
+      "/routing/route": effectRoutes(),
+      "/routing/bgp/session": [effectSession],
     } : {}),
   } as Record<string, Record<string, unknown>[]>)[path] ?? []
   let requestFailure: { error: unknown } | undefined
@@ -92,7 +103,7 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
     }
     let raw = ""; for await (const chunk of req) raw += chunk
     const args = raw ? JSON.parse(raw) : {}, path = decodeURIComponent((req.url ?? "").replace(/^\/rest/, ""))
-    if (options.originalEffectsOnly) originalEffectWire.push({ method: req.method ?? "", path, afterPatch: filters[0].rule !== initial })
+    if (options.originalEffectsOnly || options.forwardRoundsOnly) originalEffectWire.push({ method: req.method ?? "", path, afterPatch: filters[0].rule !== initial })
     if (req.socket.localAddress === "127.0.0.1") {
       if (/^\/(routing|tool)\//.test(path) || path === "/system/license") primaryControlRequests++
       if (primaryDown) { req.socket.destroy(); return }
@@ -101,28 +112,36 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
     if (req.method === "GET") {
       const payload = collections(path)
       if (path === "/log" && afterRoundLogRead) { const hook = afterRoundLogRead; afterRoundLogRead = undefined; await hook() }
-      res.end(JSON.stringify(payload)); return
+      // Force the cumulative 10,000-row budget without exceeding the native
+      // cap of 1,000 rows on any individual response.
+      const padding = forwardRoundBulk && paddedEffectResources.has(path)
+        ? Array.from({ length: 1000 - payload.length }, (_, index) => ({ ".id": "*padding" + index })) : []
+      res.end(JSON.stringify(padding.length ? [...payload, ...padding] : payload)); return
     }
     if (req.method === "POST" && path.endsWith("/get")) { const row = collections(path.slice(0, -4)).find(row => row[".id"] === args[".id"]), value = row?.[args["value-name"]]; res.end(JSON.stringify(value === undefined ? [] : { ret: value })); return }
     if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/tool/ping") {
       if (pendingInversePost) {
-        const intents = (await pool.query("SELECT source_operation_id FROM mcp_scoped_recovery_intents WHERE state='intent'")).rows
+        assert.ok(connectionId)
+        const intents = (await pool.query("SELECT i.source_operation_id FROM mcp_scoped_recovery_intents i JOIN mcp_operations o ON o.id=i.recovery_operation_id WHERE i.state='intent' AND o.connection_id=$1", [connectionId])).rows
         assert.equal(intents.length, 1, "Post-inverse probe must follow one durable single-use inverse intent")
         pendingInversePost = false; inversePostChecks++
       }
       if (pendingPostCheckpoint) {
-        const checkpoint = (await pool.query("SELECT c.configuration_sealed,c.configuration_proof FROM mcp_operation_checkpoints c JOIN mcp_operations o ON o.id=c.operation_id WHERE o.state='running' AND c.configuration_sealed IS NOT NULL")).rows
+        assert.ok(connectionId)
+        const checkpoint = (await pool.query("SELECT c.configuration_sealed,c.configuration_proof FROM mcp_operation_checkpoints c JOIN mcp_operations o ON o.id=c.operation_id WHERE o.state='running' AND c.configuration_sealed IS NOT NULL AND o.connection_id=$1", [connectionId])).rows
         assert.equal(checkpoint.length, 1, "Exact CONFIG_APPLIED must commit before the post-change network probe")
         const packet = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(checkpoint[0].configuration_sealed))
         assert.equal(packet.phase, "CONFIG_APPLIED"); assert.equal(packet.originalRule, initial)
-        assert.equal(packet.originalCandidateId, "a"); assert.equal(packet.desiredCandidateId, "b")
+        assert.equal(packet.originalCandidateId, "a"); assert.equal(packet.desiredCandidateId, controllerFailoverProbeSources ? "d" : "b")
         assert.equal(packet.desiredRule, filters.find(row => row[".id"] === packet.nativeId)!.rule)
         assert.ok(checkpoint[0].configuration_proof); pendingPostCheckpoint = false; postCheckpointsObserved++
         const sharedCheck = afterConfigurationCheckpoint; afterConfigurationCheckpoint = undefined
         await sharedCheck?.(packet.operationId)
       }
       observedVrfs.add(args.vrf)
-      res.end(JSON.stringify(mode === "post-unknown" && writes ? [{ message: "unsupported fixture output" }] : [{ sent: "3", received: mode === "post-failed" && writes ? "0" : "3", "packet-loss": mode === "post-failed" && writes ? "100" : "0", "avg-rtt": "1ms" }]))
+      if (controllerFailoverProbeSources) controllerFailoverProbeSources.push(args["src-address"])
+      const probeFailed = controllerFailoverProbeSources && (!controllerFailoverReserveHealthy || args["src-address"] !== "198.51.100.13") || mode === "post-failed" && writes
+      res.end(JSON.stringify(controllerProbeUnknown || mode === "post-unknown" && writes ? [{ message: "unsupported fixture output" }] : [{ sent: "3", received: probeFailed ? "0" : "3", "packet-loss": probeFailed ? "100" : "0", "avg-rtt": "1ms" }]))
       return
     }
     if (req.method === "POST" && path === "/tool/traceroute") { observedVrfs.add(args.vrf); res.end(JSON.stringify([3, 4].map(index => ({ address: "198.51.100." + index, sent: "1", loss: "0" })))); return }
@@ -180,15 +199,16 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
     } while(!workerLocked)
     await pool.query("INSERT INTO servers(id,name,host,port,use_ssl,password) VALUES($1,'scoped-route','127.0.0.1',$2,false,'NEVER_SCOPED_PASSWORD')", [sid, (router.address() as { port: number }).port])
     insertedServer = true
-    const access = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ name: "Scoped manual", mode: "approval", expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 1800000).toISOString(), permissions: ["mm:network:read", "mm:network:write", "mm:filters:write"], scope: { serverIds: [sid], operationIds: ["routing.analyze", "routing.path.verify", "routing.community.switch", "operations.reconcile", "operations.recover"], allowGlobal: false }, limits: { callsPerMinute: 1000, mutationsPerHour: 300 } }), writer)
+    const access = await createMcpConnection(mcpConnectionCreateSchema.parse({ name: "Scoped manual", mode: "approval", expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 1800000).toISOString(), permissions: ["mm:network:read", "mm:network:write", "mm:filters:write"], scope: { serverIds: [sid], operationIds: ["routing.analyze", "routing.path.verify", "routing.community.switch", "routing.profiles.save", "operations.reconcile", "operations.recover"], allowGlobal: false }, limits: { callsPerMinute: 1000, mutationsPerHour: 300 } }), writer)
     connectionId = access.connection.id; const principal = await authenticateMcpToken(access.token)
-    const profile = (key: string) => routeAiProfileSchema.parse({ name: "independent " + key, maxLossPct: 5, serverId: sid, family: "ipv4", community: "65000:10", table: "tenant-" + key, probeVrf: "probe-" + key, bgpContext: { connectionId: "*c" + key, instance: "default", vrf: "main", inputChain: "custom-" + key }, candidates: [1, 9].map(value => ({ id: value === 1 ? "a" : "b", jumpHostId: sid, exitNodeId: sid, wanInterface: "wan-" + key, downstreamInterface: "hop", gateway: "192.0.2." + value, gatewayRef: { resource: "ipv4_route", id: "*r" + value }, controlProbe: { targetInterface: "target", expectedHops: [{ serverId: sid, interface: "hop" }, { serverId: sid, interface: "target" }] } })) })
+    const profile = (key: string) => routeAiProfileSchema.parse({ name: "independent " + key, maxLossPct: 5, serverId: sid, family: "ipv4", community: "65000:10", table: "tenant-" + key, probeVrf: "probe-" + key, bgpContext: { connectionId: "*c" + key, instance: "default", vrf: "main", inputChain: "custom-" + key }, candidates: [1, 9].map(value => ({ id: value === 1 ? "a" : "b", jumpHostId: sid, exitNodeId: sid, wanInterface: "wan-" + key, downstreamInterface: "hop", gateway: "192.0.2." + value, gatewayRef: { resource: "ipv4_route", id: "*r" + value }, controlProbe: { targetInterface: "target", sourceAddress: key === "a" ? "198.51.100.1" : "198.51.100.2", expectedHops: [{ serverId: sid, interface: "hop" }, { serverId: sid, interface: "target" }] } })) })
     for (const key of ["a", "b"]) for (const iface of ["wan-" + key, "hop"]) {
       const id = randomUUID(); await pool.query("INSERT INTO mcp_routing_observations(id,src_server_id,dst_server_id,src_interface,dst_interface,family,routing_table,ping_ms,loss_pct,dl_mbps,ul_mbps,ping_at,bandwidth_at,context_verified,source) VALUES($1,$2,$2,$3,'peer','ipv4',$4,1,0,100,100,now(),now(),true,'fixture')", [id, sid, iface, "tenant-" + key]); await attestRoutingFixture(id)
     }
     await pool.query("INSERT INTO filter_rules(server_id,sort_order,community,community_name,action,gateway,gateway_tunnel_id,description) VALUES($1,77,'65000:10','NEVER_SCOPED_SQL_NAME','route','203.0.113.99','NEVER_SCOPED_SQL_TUNNEL','NEVER_SCOPED_SQL_DESCRIPTION')", [sid])
     const dbBefore = (await pool.query("SELECT * FROM filter_rules WHERE server_id=$1 ORDER BY id", [sid])).rows
-    const prepare = async (key = "a", persistent?: { id: string; version: number }, exactProfile?: ReturnType<typeof profile>, assertApprovalRequired = false) => {
+    const prepare = async (key = "a", persistent?: { id: string; version: number }, exactProfile?: ReturnType<typeof profile>, assertApprovalRequired = false, approver: AuthUser | null = writer) => {
+      exposeEffectCatalogue = !!persistent
       const current = exactProfile === undefined ? profile(key) : routeAiProfileSchema.parse(exactProfile)
       assert.equal((await invokeMcpTool(principal, "mm_route_path_verify", { profile: current, candidateId: "b" }) as { status: string }).status, "passed")
       const plan = await invokeMcpTool(principal, "mm_route_optimizer_plan", { profile: current, candidateId: "b" }, undefined,
@@ -209,15 +229,20 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
         await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal, plan.planId, randomUUID()), (error: unknown) => error instanceof McpError && error.code === "APPROVAL_REQUIRED")
         assert.deepEqual({ writes, requests }, beforeApproval)
       }
-      await approvePlan(plan.planId, writer, true); return { plan, input }
+      if (approver) await approvePlan(plan.planId, approver, true)
+      return { plan, input, evidence }
     }
-    const execute = async (planId: string, executingPrincipal: McpPrincipal = principal) => {
+    const waitForOperation = async (operationId: string) => {
-      const op = await applyPlan(executingPrincipal, planId, randomUUID()); let state = ""
+      let state = ""
       const deadline = Date.now() + 140000
-      do { state = (await pool.query("SELECT state FROM mcp_operations WHERE id=$1", [op.id])).rows[0].state; if (!["pending", "running"].includes(state)) break; await delay(20) } while (Date.now() < deadline)
+      do { state = (await pool.query("SELECT state FROM mcp_operations WHERE id=$1", [operationId])).rows[0].state; if (!["pending", "running"].includes(state)) break; await delay(20) } while (Date.now() < deadline)
       if(requestFailure)throw requestFailure.error
       assert.ok(!["pending", "running"].includes(state), "The bounded executor must reach a terminal state before assertions or fixture cleanup")
-      return { ...op, state }
+      return state
+    }
+    const execute = async (planId: string, executingPrincipal: McpPrincipal = principal) => {
+      const op = await applyPlan(executingPrincipal, planId, randomUUID())
+      return { ...op, state: await waitForOperation(op.id) }
     }
     const reconcile = async (operationId: string) => (await invokeMcpTool(principal, "mm_operation_reconcile", { operationId }) as { results: Array<{ matchesDesiredState: boolean; configurationMatchesDesired: boolean; configurationCheckpointAvailable: boolean }> }).results[0]
     const reset = () => { filters.forEach(row => { row.rule = initial; row.opaque = "NEVER_SCOPED_OPAQUE" }); mode = "normal"; pendingPostCheckpoint = false; pendingInversePost = false; primaryDown = false }
@@ -225,8 +250,8 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
       await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_observations SET ping_at=now(),bandwidth_at=now(),loss_pct=0 WHERE src_server_id=$1", [sid])
       for (const row of (await pool.query("SELECT id FROM mcp_routing_observations WHERE src_server_id=$1", [sid])).rows) await attestRoutingFixture(row.id)
     }
-    // Persistent enabled rows here are synthetic authority fixtures only. The
+    // Seed authority for fault cases. The public save/approval path is
-    // public scoped controller enable guard is not removed or exercised.
+    // exercised separately below without inserting a profile directly.
     const persistentFixture = async (config = profile("a")) => {
       const id = randomUUID(), current = await effectiveMcpConnection(principal)
       const expiry = new Date(Math.min(Date.now() + 600000, current.owner_valid_until.getTime(), Date.parse(principal.credentialExpiresAt), Date.parse(current.policy.expiresAt)))
@@ -241,33 +266,197 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
       return { id, version: 1 }
     }
     const disablePersistent = (id: string) => pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET enabled=false WHERE id=$1", [id])
+    const executeWithCheckpointObservation = async (planId: string, check: (operationId: string) => Promise<void>) => {
+      const observer = observeCommittedScopedCheckpoint(pool, check, {
+        databaseUrl: process.env.DATABASE_URL ?? "", stateDir: process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR ?? "",
+      })
+      try {
+        const operation = await execute(planId)
+        observer.assertCompleted()
+        return operation
+      } finally { observer.close() }
+    }
+    const acceptControllerFailover = async () => {
+      reset(); await refresh(); exposeEffectCatalogue = true; originalEffectCase = "transition"
+      controllerFailoverProbeSources = []
+      const profileId = randomUUID(), initialWrites = writes
+      persistentProfileIds.push(profileId)
+      try {
+        const configured = profile("a"), original = configured.candidates[0]
+        configured.candidates = [1, 10, 11, 9].map((gateway, index) => ({ ...original,
+          id: ["a", "b", "c", "d"][index], gateway: "192.0.2." + gateway,
+          gatewayRef: { resource: "ipv4_route", id: "*r" + gateway },
+          controlProbe: { ...original.controlProbe!, sourceAddress: "198.51.100." + [1, 11, 12, 13][index] },
+        }))
+        const analysis = await invokeMcpTool(principal, "mm_route_optimizer_analyze", { profile: configured }) as { currentCandidateId: string; ranking: Array<{ eligible: boolean; candidate: { id: string } }> }
+        assert.equal(analysis.currentCandidateId, "a")
+        assert.deepEqual(analysis.ranking.filter(row => row.eligible).map(row => row.candidate.id), ["a", "b", "c", "d"])
+        const enrollment = await invokeMcpTool(principal, "mm_route_profile_save_plan", {
+          profileId, profile: configured, enabled: true, expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 600000).toISOString(),
+        }) as { planId: string }
+        await approvePlan(enrollment.planId, writer, true)
+        assert.equal((await execute(enrollment.planId)).state, "applied")
+        const readController = async () => (await pool.query("SELECT enabled,state FROM mcp_routing_profiles WHERE id=$1", [profileId])).rows[0]
+        const failures = new Set<string>()
+        let switchPlanId: string | undefined
+        for (const [index, alternate] of [12, 13, 13, 12, 13].entries()) {
+          // Drive the normal scheduled entry point without waiting a minute.
+          await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET state=state-'probedAt' WHERE id=$1", [profileId])
+          controllerFailoverProbeSources.length = 0
+          // The previously passing reserve must be rechecked, and its prior
+          // pass cannot authorize failover if the current check fails.
+          controllerFailoverReserveHealthy = index !== 2
+          await tickRoutingProfiles()
+          const row = await readController()
+          assert.equal(row.enabled, true, String(row.state.pausedReason))
+          assert.deepEqual(controllerFailoverProbeSources, [1, 11, alternate].map(last => "198.51.100." + last))
+          failures.add(row.state.failureKey)
+          assert.equal(failures.size, index + 1, "Each counted failure must come from a distinct path check")
+          assert.equal(writes, initialWrites)
+          if (index < 4) {
+            assert.equal(row.state.failureCount, index + 1)
+            assert.equal(row.state.planId, undefined, "Earlier healthy reserve evidence cannot replace a fresh passing probe")
+          } else {
+            assert.equal(row.state.candidateId, "d")
+            switchPlanId = row.state.planId
+          }
+        }
+        assert.ok(switchPlanId)
+        assert.equal((await loadPlan(switchPlanId)).state, "awaiting-approval")
+        await tickRoutingProfiles()
+        assert.equal(writes, initialWrites)
+        await approvePlan(switchPlanId, writer, true)
+        await tickRoutingProfiles()
+        const operationId: string = (await readController()).state.operationId
+        assert.ok(operationId)
+        assert.equal(await waitForOperation(operationId), "applied")
+        await tickRoutingProfiles()
+        const completed = await readController()
+        assert.equal(completed.enabled, true, String(completed.state.pausedReason))
+        assert.equal(completed.state.baseline.packet.candidateId, "d")
+        assert.equal(completed.state.baseline.packet.transition.operationId, operationId)
+        assert.equal(completed.state.failoverReserveCursor, undefined)
+        assert.equal(writes, initialWrites + 1)
+        const result = { accepted: true, stableRanking: ["a", "b", "c", "d"], selectedReserve: "d", probeCallsPerTick: 3,
+          distinctFailuresBeforePlan: failures.size, priorPassedProbeNotReused: true, humanApproval: true, nativeWrites: 1 }
+        console.log("Bounded controller reserve SQL/HTTP:", JSON.stringify(result))
+        return result
+      } finally { await disablePersistent(profileId); controllerFailoverProbeSources = undefined; controllerFailoverReserveHealthy = true }
+    }
+    if (options.controllerFailoverOnly) return { ...await acceptControllerFailover(), persistentAuthorityCases: 0 }
     if (options.originalEffectsOnly) {
       const cases: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = []
       let publicManualRevision2: Record<string, unknown> | undefined
-      for (const scenario of ["transition", "no-op", "ambiguous", "public-manual-rev2"] as const) {
+      const delegatedAdmin: AuthUser = { ...writer, id: "scoped-delegated-approval-admin", permissions: [...new Set([...writer.permissions, "mm:mcp:admin", "mm:mcp:approve"])] }
+      const snapshotApprovalAndAdmission = async (planId: string) => (await pool.query(`SELECT
+        (SELECT count(*)::int FROM mcp_operations WHERE plan_id=$1) AS operations,
+        (SELECT count(*)::int FROM mcp_routing_forward_charges WHERE source_plan_id=$1) AS forward_charges,
+        (SELECT COALESCE(jsonb_object_agg(bucket,used),'{}'::jsonb) FROM mcp_budget_buckets WHERE connection_id=$2 AND kind='mutations') AS mutation_buckets,
+        (SELECT count(*)::int FROM mcp_audit WHERE connection_id=$2 AND action='plan.approve' AND payload->>'planId'=$1::text) AS approval_audit`, [planId, connectionId])).rows[0]
+      const assertOwnerApproval = async (planId: string) => {
+        const nativeBefore = { requests, writes }
+        const before = await snapshotApprovalAndAdmission(planId)
+        assert.equal(before.operations, 0); assert.equal(before.forward_charges, 0); assert.equal(before.approval_audit, 0)
+        await assert.rejects(approvePlan(planId, delegatedAdmin, true), (error: unknown) => error instanceof McpError && error.code === "PERMISSION_DENIED")
+        const denied = await loadPlan(planId)
+        assert.equal(denied.state, "awaiting-approval"); assert.equal(denied.approved_by, null)
+        assert.deepEqual(await snapshotApprovalAndAdmission(planId), before)
+        // Simulate a delegated approval stored by an older deployment.
+        await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET state='approved',approved_by=$2,approved_at=now() WHERE id=$1", [planId, delegatedAdmin.id])
+        try {
+          await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal, planId, randomUUID()), (error: unknown) => error instanceof McpError && error.code === "APPROVAL_REQUIRED")
+          const stale = await loadPlan(planId)
+          assert.equal(stale.state, "approved"); assert.equal(stale.approved_by, delegatedAdmin.id)
+          assert.deepEqual(await snapshotApprovalAndAdmission(planId), before)
+          assert.deepEqual({ requests, writes }, nativeBefore)
+        } finally {
+          await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET state='awaiting-approval',approved_by=NULL,approved_at=NULL WHERE id=$1", [planId])
+        }
+        await approvePlan(planId, writer, true)
+      }
+      for (const scenario of ["transition", "no-op", "ambiguous", "baseline-drift", "public-manual-rev2"] as const) {
         const manual = scenario === "public-manual-rev2"
-        const effectCase = manual ? "transition" : scenario
+        const effectCase = manual || scenario === "baseline-drift" ? "transition" : scenario
         reset(); await refresh(); originalEffectCase = effectCase
         const config = profile("a")
-        for (const candidate of config.candidates) candidate.controlProbe!.sourceAddress = "198.51.100.1"
         assert.equal(config.autoRecovery, false)
         // The baseline and persistent authority are issued by the SAME actual
         // fixed readers/CAS used by existing tests, not hand-written proofs.
         const persistent = manual ? undefined : await persistentFixture(config)
         try {
-          const { plan, input } = await prepare("a", persistent, config, manual)
+          const { plan, input, evidence } = await prepare("a", persistent, config, manual, manual ? delegatedAdmin : scenario === "transition" ? null : writer)
+          if (scenario === "transition") await assertOwnerApproval(plan.planId)
           assert.equal(input.manualEffectPolicy, manual ? "observational-v1" : undefined)
           if (manual) assert.equal(input.persistentProfileAuthority, undefined)
           const sealedSelection = originalEffectSelectionSchema.parse(input.originalEffectSelection)
           assert.equal(sealedSelection.status, effectCase === "ambiguous" ? "unknown" : "prepared")
           const storedPlan = await loadPlan(plan.planId)
-          assert.equal(storedPlan.approved_by, writer.id)
+          assert.equal(storedPlan.approved_by, manual ? delegatedAdmin.id : writer.id)
+          if (manual) assert.equal(evidence.validUntil, undefined, "Manual scoped plans keep their existing preparation lifetime")
+          if (scenario === "transition") {
+            type ProbeRow = { created_at: Date; evidence: { observedAt: string } }
+            const probe: ProbeRow = (await pool.query<ProbeRow>(
+              "SELECT created_at,evidence FROM mcp_path_checks WHERE id=$1 AND connection_id=$2", [input.pathCheckId, connectionId])).rows[0]
+            const probeDeadline = Math.min(probe.created_at.getTime(), Date.parse(probe.evidence.observedAt)) + 90_000
+            const authorityDeadline = Date.parse(input.persistentProfileAuthority.packet.validUntil)
+            assert(probeDeadline < authorityDeadline, "The fixture must exercise the probe cap, not the authority cap")
+            assert.equal(evidence.validUntil, new Date(probeDeadline).toISOString())
+            assert.equal(storedPlan.expires_at.getTime(), probeDeadline)
+
+            // A newer successful observation cannot extend an already approved plan.
+            const newerProbe = await invokeMcpTool(principal, "mm_route_path_verify", { profile: config, candidateId: "b" }) as { id: string; status: string; observedAt: string }
+            assert.equal(newerProbe.status, "passed")
+            assert.notEqual(newerProbe.id, input.pathCheckId)
+            assert(Date.parse(newerProbe.observedAt) + 90_000 > probeDeadline + 1)
+            const nativeBefore = { requests, writes }, admissionBefore = await snapshotApprovalAndAdmission(plan.planId)
+            const refuseAfterProbeDeadline = async (code: string) => {
+              const realNow = Date.now
+              try {
+                Date.now = () => probeDeadline + 1
+                await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal, plan.planId, randomUUID()), (error: unknown) => error instanceof McpError && error.code === code)
+              } finally { Date.now = realNow }
+              assert.deepEqual(await snapshotApprovalAndAdmission(plan.planId), admissionBefore)
+              assert.deepEqual({ requests, writes }, nativeBefore)
+              assert.equal((await loadPlan(plan.planId)).state, "approved")
+            }
+            await refuseAfterProbeDeadline("PLAN_EXPIRED")
+
+            // The old deployment stored only the authority deadline in evidence.
+            const legacyValidity = input.persistentProfileAuthority.packet.validUntil as string
+            const legacyEvidence = { sealed: await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify({ ...evidence, validUntil: legacyValidity })) }
+            await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET expires_at=$2,evidence=$3::jsonb WHERE id=$1", [plan.planId, legacyValidity, JSON.stringify(legacyEvidence)])
+            try {
+              await refuseAfterProbeDeadline("MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN")
+            } finally {
+              await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET expires_at=$2,evidence=$3::jsonb WHERE id=$1", [plan.planId, storedPlan.expires_at, JSON.stringify(storedPlan.evidence)])
+            }
+            cases.push({ case: "expired-approved-probe", newerProbeCannotRenew: true, scopedPlanCode: "PLAN_EXPIRED", legacyPlanCode: "MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN", nativeRequests: 0, nativeWrites: 0, admissions: 0 })
+          }
           const publicProjection = JSON.stringify(await publicPlan(storedPlan))
           assert(!publicProjection.includes("originalEffectSelection"))
           assert(!publicProjection.includes("manualEffectPolicy"))
           const beforeWrites = writes, wireStart = originalEffectWire.length
+          const configurationIntents = async () => (await pool.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_audit
+            WHERE connection_id=$1 AND action='configuration.intent'`, [connectionId])).rows[0].n
+          const intentsBefore = await configurationIntents()
+          if (scenario === "baseline-drift") originalEffectCase = "no-op"
           const operation = await execute(plan.planId)
-          assert.equal(operation.state, "applied", "Optional effect unknown must preserve genuine manual configuration/probe acceptance")
+          if (scenario === "ambiguous" || scenario === "baseline-drift") {
+            assert.equal(operation.state, "unknown")
+            const { rows: [refusal] } = await pool.query("SELECT error_code FROM mcp_operations WHERE id=$1", [operation.id])
+            assert.equal(refusal.error_code, "MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN")
+            assert.equal(writes, beforeWrites)
+            assert.equal(filters[0].rule, initial)
+            assert.equal(await configurationIntents(), intentsBefore)
+            const receiptCount: number = (await pool.query<{ n: number }>(`SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_audit
+              WHERE connection_id=$1 AND action='routing.scoped.attempt' AND payload->>'receiptId'=$2`, [connectionId, input.receiptId])).rows[0].n
+            assert.equal(receiptCount, 0)
+            const runningWire = originalEffectWire.slice(wireStart)
+            assert.equal(runningWire.filter(row => row.method === "GET" && row.path === "/routing/route").length, scenario === "baseline-drift" ? 1 : 0)
+            cases.push({ case: scenario, state: operation.state, errorCode: refusal.error_code, nativeWrites: 0, attemptReceipts: 0 })
+            continue
+          }
+          assert.equal(operation.state, "applied")
           assert.equal(writes - beforeWrites, 1)
           const rows: Array<{ created_at: Date; state: string; operation_id: string; operation_version: number; step_state: string;
             result: { configurationVerified: boolean; controlProbeVerified: boolean; originalEffects: unknown } }> = (await pool.query(`SELECT o.created_at,o.state,p.operation_id,p.operation_version,s.state AS step_state,s.result
@@ -293,8 +482,8 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
           console.log("Owned original effect diagnostic:", JSON.stringify({ case: scenario, state: operation.state,
             status: report.status, reason: report.reason, rounds: report.rounds.length, budget: report.budget ?? null,
             ribBefore, ribAfter, runtimeNativeRequests: runningWire.length, lastNativePaths: runningWire.slice(-8).map(row => row.path) }))
-          assert.equal(ribBefore, effectCase === "ambiguous" ? 0 : 1)
+          assert.equal(ribBefore, 1)
-          assert.equal(ribAfter, effectCase === "ambiguous" ? 0 : 2)
+          assert.equal(ribAfter, 2)
           assert.equal(report.status, effectCase === "transition" ? "observed-expected" : "unknown")
           assert.equal(report.switchEffectObserved, effectCase === "transition")
           assert.equal(report.logCoverage, "unknown"); assert.equal(report.routeOriginVerified, false)
@@ -353,24 +542,95 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
           assert.equal(repeated.state, "applied")
           assert.equal(Number((await pool.query("SELECT count(*) AS n FROM mcp_operations WHERE plan_id=$1", [plan.planId])).rows[0].n), 1)
           assert.equal(writes - beforeWrites, 1); assert.equal(requests, repeatReads, "Completed approved plan cannot repeat native work")
-          // Preserve the existing scoped-controller activation guard. A real
+          // Link the applied operation as the controller does when it issues
-          // tick pauses HERE before effect dispatch; never call this an
+          // a plan. This checks both outcomes at the real worker boundary.
-          // effect-triggered scheduler pause or enable that unsupported lane.
+          await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET state=state || $2::jsonb WHERE id=$1", [persistent.id, JSON.stringify({ planId: plan.planId, candidateId: "b" })])
           await tickRoutingProfiles()
-          const paused = (await pool.query("SELECT enabled,state FROM mcp_routing_profiles WHERE id=$1", [persistent.id])).rows[0]
+          const completed = (await pool.query("SELECT enabled,state FROM mcp_routing_profiles WHERE id=$1", [persistent.id])).rows[0]
-          assert.equal(paused.enabled, false); assert.equal(typeof paused.state.pausedReason, "string")
+          if (effectCase === "transition") {
-          assert.deepEqual(paused.state.baseline, row.state.baseline)
+            assert.equal(completed.enabled, true)
+            assert.equal(completed.state.baseline.packet.transition.operationId, operation.id)
+            assert.equal(completed.state.expectedCandidateId, "b")
+          } else {
+            assert.equal(completed.enabled, false)
+            assert.equal(completed.state.pausedReason, "STATE_CONFLICT")
+            assert.deepEqual(completed.state.baseline, row.state.baseline)
+          }
           cases.push({ case: effectCase, manualState: operation.state, configurationCheckpoint: true, actualPrivateExecutionOrigin: true,
             effectStatus: report.status, observedFibTransition: report.switchEffectObserved, nativeRibBefore: ribBefore, nativeRibAfter: ribAfter,
             sharedBudget: report.budget ?? null, effectBaselineAdvanceAccepted: effectCase === "transition", effectGateNativeReads: effectCase === "transition" ? "fresh-native-checked" : 0,
-            actualTickPausedByExistingScopedGuard: true, tickEffectPauseAccepted: false, publicManualRevision2EffectOwnerAccepted: false })
+            tickEffectPauseAccepted: effectCase !== "transition", publicManualRevision2EffectOwnerAccepted: false })
         } finally { if (persistent) await disablePersistent(persistent.id) }
       }
       assert(publicManualRevision2)
+      reset(); await refresh(); originalEffectCase = "transition"; exposeEffectCatalogue = true
+      const controllerConfig = profile("a")
+      controllerConfig.confirmationSamples = 1
+      controllerConfig.weights = { ping: 100, speed: 0, loss: 0 }
+      controllerConfig.candidates[1].downstreamInterface = "target"
+      const fast = randomUUID()
+      await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_observations SET ping_ms=100 WHERE src_server_id=$1 AND routing_table='tenant-a' AND src_interface='hop'", [sid])
+      await pool.query("INSERT INTO mcp_routing_observations(id,src_server_id,dst_server_id,src_interface,dst_interface,family,routing_table,ping_ms,loss_pct,dl_mbps,ul_mbps,ping_at,bandwidth_at,context_verified,source) VALUES($1,$2,$2,'target','peer','ipv4','tenant-a',1,0,100,100,now(),now(),true,'fixture')", [fast, sid])
+      await refresh()
+      const activeProfileId = randomUUID(), beforeControllerWrites = writes
+      persistentProfileIds.push(activeProfileId)
+      const saveProfile = (config: typeof controllerConfig) => invokeMcpTool(principal, "mm_route_profile_save_plan", {
+        profileId: activeProfileId, profile: config, enabled: true, expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 600000).toISOString(),
+      }) as Promise<{ planId: string }>
+      for (const invalid of [
+        { ...controllerConfig, bgpContext: undefined },
+        { ...controllerConfig, autoRecovery: true },
+        { ...controllerConfig, candidates: controllerConfig.candidates.map(candidate => ({ ...candidate, controlProbe: { ...candidate.controlProbe!, sourceAddress: undefined } })) },
+      ]) {
+        await assert.rejects(saveProfile(invalid), (error: unknown) => error instanceof McpError && error.code === "UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY")
+      }
+      const savedProfile = await saveProfile(controllerConfig)
+      assert.equal((await loadPlan(savedProfile.planId)).state, "awaiting-approval")
+      await approvePlan(savedProfile.planId, writer, true)
+      assert.equal((await execute(savedProfile.planId)).state, "applied")
+      const readController = async () => (await pool.query("SELECT enabled,state FROM mcp_routing_profiles WHERE id=$1", [activeProfileId])).rows[0]
+      const enrolled = await readController()
+      assert.equal(enrolled.enabled, true); assert.equal(enrolled.state.baseline.packet.candidateId, "a")
+      controllerProbeUnknown = true
+      try { await tickRoutingProfiles() } finally { controllerProbeUnknown = false }
+      const waitingForProbe = await readController()
+      assert.equal(waitingForProbe.enabled, true, String(waitingForProbe.state.pausedReason))
+      assert.equal(waitingForProbe.state.planId, undefined)
+      assert.equal(waitingForProbe.state.pendingCandidateId, "b", String(waitingForProbe.state.reason))
+      assert.equal(writes, beforeControllerWrites)
+      // Let the next tick run without waiting for the production polling interval.
+      await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET state=state-'probedAt' WHERE id=$1", [activeProfileId])
+      await tickRoutingProfiles()
+      const proposed = await readController()
+      assert.equal(proposed.enabled, true, String(proposed.state.pausedReason))
+      assert.equal(proposed.state.candidateId, "b", String(proposed.state.reason))
+      const switchPlanId: string = proposed.state.planId
+      assert.equal((await loadPlan(switchPlanId)).state, "awaiting-approval")
+      await tickRoutingProfiles()
+      assert.equal(writes, beforeControllerWrites)
+      assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_operations WHERE plan_id=$1", [switchPlanId])).rows[0].n, 0)
+      await approvePlan(switchPlanId, writer, true)
+      await tickRoutingProfiles()
+      const pendingSwitch = await readController()
+      const switchOperationId: string = pendingSwitch.state.operationId
+      assert.ok(switchOperationId, String(pendingSwitch.state.pausedReason))
+      assert.equal(await waitForOperation(switchOperationId), "applied")
+      await tickRoutingProfiles()
+      const switched = await readController()
+      assert.equal(switched.enabled, true, String(switched.state.pausedReason))
+      assert.equal(switched.state.planId, undefined)
+      assert.equal(switched.state.expectedCandidateId, "b")
+      assert.equal(switched.state.baseline.packet.candidateId, "b")
+      assert.equal(switched.state.baseline.packet.previousProof, enrolled.state.baseline.proof)
+      assert.equal(switched.state.baseline.packet.transition.operationId, switchOperationId)
+      assert.equal(switched.state.baseline.packet.transition.planId, switchPlanId)
+      assert.equal(writes - beforeControllerWrites, 1)
+      await disablePersistent(activeProfileId)
+      const boundedReserveFailover = await acceptControllerFailover()
       assert.deepEqual((await pool.query("SELECT * FROM filter_rules WHERE server_id=$1 ORDER BY id", [sid])).rows, dbBefore)
-      const result = { accepted: true, cases, publicManualRevision2, persistentAuthorityCases: 0, realMcpDispatcher: true, realSql: true, routerOsTransport: "declared-synthetic-localhost-http",
+      const result = { accepted: true, cases, publicManualRevision2, boundedReserveFailover, persistentAuthorityCases: 0, realMcpDispatcher: true, realSql: true, routerOsTransport: "declared-synthetic-localhost-http",
         genuineApprovedRunningOrigin: true, actualConfigurationCheckpoint: true, signedEffectTamperRejected: true,
-        originalAutoRecoveryEnabled: false, fullRoutingAccepted: false, scopedControllerEnabled: false, nativeChrAccepted: false, forwardingVerified: false }
+        originalAutoRecoveryEnabled: false, fullRoutingAccepted: false, scopedControllerEnabled: true, publicScopedControllerLifecycle: true, nativeChrAccepted: false, forwardingVerified: false }
       console.log("Original effect SQL/runtime component:", JSON.stringify(result))
       return result
     }
@@ -423,8 +683,9 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
       await assertOriginalCredentialRevocation()
       return {accepted:true,originalCredentialRevocation:true,unauthorized401:true,fullAdmissionRollback:true,nativeReads:0,nativeWrites:0,realSql:true,allWriterLedgerComplete:false}
     }
-    if (options.manualInverseChargeOnly) {
+    if (options.manualInverseChargeOnly || options.lateInverseAuthorityChange) {
       const chargeCase = options.manualInverseChargeCase ?? "positive"
+      if (options.lateInverseAuthorityChange) assert.equal(chargeCase, "positive")
       const persistent = chargeCase !== "nonpersistent"
       // Same genuine fixed-reader baseline/CAS used by the existing persistent
       // acceptance below. No hand-written baseline, sealed plan or authority.
@@ -520,10 +781,20 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
       const recovery = await invokeMcpTool(principal, "mm_operation_recovery_plan", { operationId: source.id }) as { planId: string; state: string }
       assert.equal(recovery.state, "awaiting-approval")
       assert.equal((await loadPlan(recovery.planId)).operation_id, "operations.recover")
-      assert.equal((await loadPlan(recovery.planId)).operation_version, 7)
+      assert.equal((await loadPlan(recovery.planId)).operation_version, 8)
       await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal, recovery.planId, randomUUID()))
       assert.deepEqual(await snapshot(), afterForward, "No approval means no debit/charge/native write")
       await approvePlan(recovery.planId, writer, true)
+      if (chargeCase === "positive" && !options.lateInverseAuthorityChange) {
+        await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET operation_version=7 WHERE id=$1", [recovery.planId])
+        try {
+          await assert.rejects(applyPlan(principal, recovery.planId, randomUUID()), { code: "PLAN_EXPIRED" })
+          assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT id FROM mcp_operations WHERE plan_id=$1", [recovery.planId])).rowCount, 0)
+          assert.deepEqual(await snapshot(), afterForward, "Superseded approved inverse cannot create an operation, debit or native write")
+        } finally {
+          await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET operation_version=8 WHERE id=$1", [recovery.planId])
+        }
+      }
       if (chargeCase === "mixed-forward") {
         assert(competingForward)
         const attempts = [
@@ -573,6 +844,48 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
           realSql: true, allWriterLedgerComplete: false, reservedDispatchEnabled: false, autoRecoveryEnabled: false }
       }
       console.log(JSON.stringify({ stage: "manual-inverse:human-recovery-apply" }))
+      const lateChange = options.lateInverseAuthorityChange
+      if (lateChange) {
+        const priorIntent = (await pool.query("SELECT coalesce(max(id),0)::text AS id FROM mcp_audit WHERE connection_id=$1 AND action='configuration.intent'", [connectionId])).rows[0].id
+        let writeId: string | undefined
+        afterIntent = async () => {
+          const intents = (await pool.query(`SELECT payload FROM mcp_audit WHERE connection_id=$1 AND id>$2::bigint
+            AND action='configuration.intent' AND payload->>'path'=$3`,
+          [connectionId, priorIntent, "/routing/filter/rule/" + loaded.configuration.packet.nativeId])).rows
+          assert.equal(intents.length, 1)
+          assert.equal(intents[0].payload.method, "PATCH")
+          assert.equal(intents[0].payload.serverId, sid)
+          writeId = intents[0].payload.writeId
+          assert.match(writeId ?? "", /^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/)
+          const sql = {
+            edit: "UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET version=version+1,config=jsonb_set(config,'{name}','\"late inverse edit\"') WHERE id=$1",
+            disable: "UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET enabled=false WHERE id=$1",
+            grant: "UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET grant_expires_at=clock_timestamp()-interval '1 second' WHERE id=$1",
+          }[lateChange]
+          assert.equal((await pool.query(sql, [id])).rowCount, 1)
+        }
+        const inverse = await execute(recovery.planId)
+        assert.equal(afterIntent, undefined)
+        assert.ok(writeId)
+        assert.notEqual(inverse.state, "applied")
+        assert.equal(writes, afterForward.writes)
+        assert.equal(inversePostChecks, 0)
+        const auditRows = (await pool.query(`SELECT action FROM mcp_audit WHERE connection_id=$1 AND payload->>'writeId'=$2
+          ORDER BY id`, [connectionId, writeId])).rows
+        assert.deepEqual(auditRows.map(row => row.action), ["configuration.intent", "configuration.unconfirmed"])
+        const refusal = (await pool.query(`SELECT payload->>'phase' AS phase, payload->>'code' AS code
+          FROM mcp_audit WHERE connection_id=$1 AND action='routing.scoped.recovery-unconfirmed'`, [connectionId])).rows
+        assert.deepEqual(refusal, [{ phase: "before-dispatch-context", code: "STATE_CONFLICT" }])
+        assert.deepEqual((await pool.query(`SELECT state,verified_sealed FROM mcp_scoped_recovery_intents
+          WHERE source_operation_id=$1 AND recovery_operation_id=$2`, [source.id, inverse.id])).rows,
+        [{ state: "unknown", verified_sealed: null }])
+        assert.equal((await pool.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_operation_checkpoints
+          WHERE operation_id=$1 AND configuration_sealed IS NOT NULL`, [inverse.id])).rows[0].n, 0)
+        assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT error_code FROM mcp_operations WHERE id=$1", [inverse.id])).rows[0].error_code,
+          "MUTATION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN")
+        return { accepted: true, lateInverseAuthorityChange: lateChange, durableIntents: 1, inverseNativeWrites: 0,
+          realSql: true, realMcpDispatcher: true, fullInverseLifecycleRepeated: false }
+      }
       if (chargeCase === "quota" || chargeCase === "revoked") {
         if (chargeCase === "revoked") await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET enabled=false WHERE id=$1", [id])
         const beforeOperations = (await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_operations WHERE connection_id=$1", [connectionId])).rows[0].n
@@ -605,9 +918,14 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
       assert.equal(afterInverse.forward, persistent ? 1 : 0); assert.equal(afterInverse.manualInverse, persistent ? 1 : 0); assert.equal(afterInverse.total, persistent ? 2 : 0)
       assert.equal(afterInverse.reserved, 0); assert.equal(afterInverse.legacy, 0)
       assert.equal(afterInverse.writes, 2); if (chargeCase !== "unknown") assert.equal(inversePostChecks, 1)
-      const charges = (await pool.query("SELECT recovery_operation_id,recovery_plan_id,source_operation_id,profile_id,charge_units FROM mcp_routing_manual_inverse_charges WHERE source_operation_id=$1", [source.id])).rows
+      const charges = (await pool.query("SELECT recovery_operation_id,recovery_plan_id,source_operation_id,profile_id,charge_units,binding_sealed FROM mcp_routing_manual_inverse_charges WHERE source_operation_id=$1", [source.id])).rows
       assert.equal(charges.length, persistent ? 1 : 0);
-      if (persistent) { assert.equal(charges[0].recovery_operation_id, inverse.id); assert.equal(charges[0].recovery_plan_id, inverse.plan_id); assert.equal(charges[0].profile_id,id); assert.equal(charges[0].charge_units,1) }
+      if (persistent) {
+        assert.equal(charges[0].recovery_operation_id, inverse.id); assert.equal(charges[0].recovery_plan_id, inverse.plan_id); assert.equal(charges[0].profile_id,id); assert.equal(charges[0].charge_units,1)
+        const binding = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(charges[0].binding_sealed))
+        assert.equal(binding.operationVersion, 8)
+        assert.equal(binding.sourceVersion, 7)
+      }
       const intent = (await pool.query("SELECT state,verified_sealed,recovery_operation_id,authority_profile_id,authority_profile_version,reservation_id FROM mcp_scoped_recovery_intents WHERE source_operation_id=$1 AND source_step_index=0", [source.id])).rows
       assert.equal(intent.length, 1); assert.equal(intent[0].state, chargeCase === "unknown" ? "unknown" : "verified"); assert.equal(intent[0].recovery_operation_id, inverse.id)
       assert.equal(intent[0].authority_profile_id, null); assert.equal(intent[0].authority_profile_version, persistent ? 1 : null); assert.equal(intent[0].reservation_id, null)
@@ -659,156 +977,59 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
     if (options.forwardRoundsOnly) {
       const accepted: string[] = []
       for (const scenario of ["two-rounds", "native-drift", "checkpoint-tamper", "late-revoke", "row-budget"] as const) {
-        console.log("Routing forward rounds stage:", scenario, "prepare")
+        reset(); await refresh()
-        filters.forEach(row => { row.rule = initial; row.opaque = "NEVER_SCOPED_OPAQUE" })
+        const persistent = await persistentFixture(), { plan, input } = await prepare("a", persistent)
-        pendingPostCheckpoint = false; pendingInversePost = false; forwardRoundBulk = 0
+        const beforeWrites = writes, wireStart = originalEffectWire.length
-        await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_observations SET ping_at=now(),bandwidth_at=now(),loss_pct=0 WHERE src_server_id=$1", [sid])
+        let faultReached = false
-        for (const row of (await pool.query("SELECT id FROM mcp_routing_observations WHERE src_server_id=$1", [sid])).rows) await attestRoutingFixture(row.id)
-        // Same synthetic persistent authority fixture used by the original
-        // acceptance. CONFIG_APPLIED itself is produced ONLY by real runtime.
-        const profileId = randomUUID(), current = await effectiveMcpConnection(principal)
-        const expiry = new Date(Math.min(Date.now() + 600000, current.owner_valid_until.getTime(), Date.parse(principal.credentialExpiresAt), Date.parse(current.policy.expiresAt)))
-        // Explicit trusted test-host enrollment only. Public nonmain activation
-        // stays disabled. Real human-principal fixed native issuer and normal CAS
-        // supply the private baseline; no MAC/checkpoint is manufactured here.
-        await withApplicationMutationLock(() => withConfigMutationLock([sid], async () => {
-          const baseline=await prepareRoutingControllerBaseline(profileId,1,profile("a"),expiry.toISOString(),{principal,connection:current})
-          const saved=await saveControllerProfileCas(pool,{profileId,connectionId,expectedVersion:null,profile:profile("a"),enabled:true,expiresAt:expiry.toISOString(),credentialId:principal.credentialId,generation:await accessGeneration(),policyVersion:current.policy.version,baseline})
-          assert.equal(saved?.version,1)
-        }))
-        persistentProfileIds.push(profileId)
-        const { plan } = await prepare("a", { id: profileId, version: 1 }), beforeWrites = writes
-        let checked = false, callbackStage = "not-entered"
-        const startedAt = Date.now()
-        const sourceDiagnostic = async (operationId: string, stage: string) => {
-          const row = (await pool.query(`SELECT o.state,o.error_code,s.state AS step_state,s.result IS NULL AS result_null,
-            p.operation_id,p.operation_version,p.approved_by IS NOT NULL AS approved,
-            o.created_at,p.expires_at FROM mcp_operations o JOIN mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id
-            JOIN mcp_operation_steps s ON s.operation_id=o.id AND s.step_index=0 WHERE o.id=$1`, [operationId])).rows[0]
-          console.log("Routing forward rounds source:", JSON.stringify({ scenario, stage, elapsedMs: Date.now() - startedAt, ...row }))
-          return row
-        }
-        const observeConfiguration = async (operationId: string) => {
-          callbackStage = "outside-http-before-constructor"
-          const source = await sourceDiagnostic(operationId, callbackStage)
-          const action = { principal, connection: await effectiveMcpConnection(principal) }
-          const session = await createRoutingNetworkNativeSession({ sourceOperationId: operationId, context: action,
-            authorize: async () => {}, deadline: Math.min(source.created_at.getTime() + 115000, Date.now() + 90000), manifest: { servers: [sid], probes: [] } })
-          await sourceDiagnostic(operationId, "after-constructor")
-          let configuration: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof resolveRoutingNetworkForwardRoundConfigurationContext>> | undefined
-          const saved = (await pool.query("SELECT configuration_proof FROM mcp_operation_checkpoints WHERE operation_id=$1", [operationId])).rows[0]
-          const originalRule = filters[0].rule
         try {
-            callbackStage = "baseline-snapshot"
-            await session.readSnapshot("before")
-            callbackStage = "resolve-configuration-capability"
-            configuration = await resolveRoutingNetworkForwardRoundConfigurationContext(session.sharedContext, action)
-            await assert.rejects(resolveRoutingNetworkForwardRoundConfigurationContext(session.sharedContext, { ...action, principal: { ...principal, connectionId: randomUUID() } }))
-            // The previous mismatched-principal admission does not own/close
-            // this session; the genuine capability is still the sole owner.
           if (scenario === "row-budget") forwardRoundBulk = 1000
-            callbackStage = "first-bound-round"
+          const operation = await executeWithCheckpointObservation(plan.planId, async operationId => {
-            const first = await session.readConfigurationBoundForwardSnapshot(configuration)
+            const reads = requests, connection = await effectiveMcpConnection(principal)
-            assert.equal(first.round, 1); assert.equal(first.securityProof, false); assert.equal(first.forwardingVerified, false)
+            await assert.rejects(resolveRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(operationId, {
-            assert.equal(first.logCoverage, "unknown"); assert.equal(first.configurationReadbacks.before.operationId, operationId)
+              principal: { ...principal, connectionId: randomUUID() }, connection,
-            assert.equal(first.configurationReadbacks.after.sharedNetworkBudgetVerified, true)
+            }))
-            assert.equal(first.budget.calls, session.readBudget().calls); assert.equal(first.budget.rows, session.readBudget().rows)
+            assert.equal(requests, reads, "A mismatched principal cannot read native state")
-            if (["native-drift", "checkpoint-tamper", "late-revoke"].includes(scenario)) afterRoundLogRead = async () => {
+            if (scenario !== "two-rounds") afterRoundLogRead = async () => {
+              faultReached = true
               if (scenario === "native-drift") filters[0].rule = "reject;"
               if (scenario === "checkpoint-tamper") await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operation_checkpoints SET configuration_proof=$2 WHERE operation_id=$1", [operationId, "0".repeat(64)])
-              if (scenario === "late-revoke") await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET enabled=false WHERE id=$1", [profileId])
+              if (scenario === "late-revoke") await disablePersistent(persistent.id)
             }
+          })
+          assert.equal(faultReached, scenario !== "two-rounds")
+          const wire = originalEffectWire.slice(wireStart)
+          const originalRib = wire.filter(row => row.method === "GET" && row.path === "/routing/route" && !row.afterPatch)
+          const forwardRib = wire.filter(row => row.method === "GET" && row.path === "/routing/route" && row.afterPatch)
+          assert.equal(originalRib.length, 1); assert.equal(writes, beforeWrites + 1)
+          const { rows: [terminal] } = await pool.query("SELECT o.error_code,s.result FROM mcp_operations o JOIN mcp_operation_steps s ON s.operation_id=o.id AND s.step_index=0 WHERE o.id=$1", [operation.id])
           if (scenario === "two-rounds" || scenario === "row-budget") {
-              callbackStage = "second-bound-round"
+            assert.equal(operation.state, "applied"); assert.equal(forwardRib.length, 2)
-              const second = await session.readConfigurationBoundForwardSnapshot(configuration)
+            const report = originalEffectReportSchema.parse(terminal.result.originalEffects)
-              assert.equal(second.round, 2); assert(second.budget.calls > first.budget.calls)
+            const network = await loadScopedNetworkCheckpoint(input, await assertScopedCommunityRequest(input))
-              assert.equal(second.budget.calls, session.readBudget().calls); assert.equal(second.budget.rows, session.readBudget().rows)
+            assert(network); assert.equal(network.status, "passed"); assert.deepEqual(network.originalEffects, report)
-              if (scenario === "row-budget") {
+            assert.equal(report.semanticProof, false); assert.equal(report.forwardingVerified, false); assert.equal(report.logCoverage, "unknown")
-                await assert.rejects(session.readConfigurationBoundForwardSnapshot(configuration), (error: unknown) => (error as { code?: string }).code === "LIMIT_EXCEEDED")
+            if (scenario === "two-rounds") {
-                assert(session.readBudget().rows > 10000)
+              assert.equal(report.status, "observed-expected"); assert.equal(report.rounds.length, 2)
+              assert(report.budget && report.budget.calls > 0 && report.budget.calls <= 256 && report.budget.rows <= 10000)
+            } else {
+              assert.equal(report.status, "unknown"); assert.equal(report.rounds.length, 0)
+              assert.equal(report.reason, "original-effect-rounds-unavailable:LIMIT_EXCEEDED")
+              assert.equal(report.budget, undefined)
             }
-            } else await assert.rejects(session.readConfigurationBoundForwardSnapshot(configuration))
+          } else {
-            if (scenario !== "two-rounds") {
+            assert.equal(operation.state, "unknown"); assert.equal(forwardRib.length, 1)
-              assert.equal(session.readBudget().closed, true)
+            assert.equal(terminal.error_code, "MUTATION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN")
-              const stopped = requests
-              await assert.rejects(session.readSnapshot("after-forward")); assert.equal(requests, stopped)
           }
-            assert.equal(writes, beforeWrites + 1); checked = true; callbackStage = "checked"
+          const readsBeforeReplay = requests
+          const replay = await applyPlan(principal, plan.planId, randomUUID())
+          assert.equal(replay.id, operation.id); assert.equal(requests, readsBeforeReplay); assert.equal(writes, beforeWrites + 1)
+          accepted.push(scenario)
+          console.log(JSON.stringify({ scenario, state: operation.state, errorCode: terminal.error_code, forwardRibReads: forwardRib.length, nativeWrites: 1 }))
         } finally {
           afterRoundLogRead = undefined; forwardRoundBulk = 0
-            filters[0].rule = originalRule
+          await disablePersistent(persistent.id)
-            await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operation_checkpoints SET configuration_proof=$2 WHERE operation_id=$1", [operationId, saved.configuration_proof])
-            await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET enabled=true WHERE id=$1", [profileId])
-            if (configuration) closeRoutingNetworkForwardRoundConfigurationContext(configuration)
-            session.close()
         }
       }
-        // Capture only a real row lock inside the post-CONFIG_APPLIED HTTP
-        // callback, then return its response immediately. The long acquisition
-        // runs outside HTTP while the genuine generic runtime UPDATE waits.
-        let blocker: PoolClient | undefined, blockerPid: number | undefined, capturedOperationId: string | undefined, admissionError: unknown
-        afterConfigurationCheckpoint = async operationId => {
-          try {
-            blocker = await pool.connect()
-            await blocker.query("BEGIN"); await blocker.query("SET LOCAL lock_timeout='3s'")
-            const held = await blocker.query(`SELECT s.operation_id FROM mcp_operation_steps s JOIN mcp_operations o ON o.id=s.operation_id
-              WHERE s.operation_id=$1 AND s.step_index=0 AND o.state='running' AND s.state='intent' AND s.result IS NULL FOR UPDATE OF s`, [operationId])
-            assert.equal(held.rowCount, 1, "Only the genuine running intent with null result can be held")
-            blockerPid = Number((await blocker.query("SELECT pg_backend_pid() AS pid")).rows[0].pid)
-            capturedOperationId = operationId; callbackStage = "row-lock-captured-http-returning"
-            console.log("Routing forward rounds stage:", scenario, callbackStage, "elapsedMs", Date.now() - startedAt)
-          } catch (error) { admissionError = error }
-        }
-        console.log("Routing forward rounds stage:", scenario, "apply")
-        let operationOutcome: { ok: true; value: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof execute>> } | { ok: false; error: unknown } | undefined
-        const execution = execute(plan.planId).then(value => ({ ok: true as const, value }), error => ({ ok: false as const, error }))
-        let settled = false
-        void execution.then(() => { settled = true })
-        try {
-          const admissionDeadline = Date.now() + 60000
-          while (true) {
-            if (admissionError) throw admissionError
-            if (settled) {
-              const terminal = await execution
-              if (!terminal.ok) throw terminal.error
-              await sourceDiagnostic(terminal.value.id, "terminated-before-row-lock-observation")
-              assert.fail("Original operation ended before its genuine running intent could be observed")
-            }
-            if (capturedOperationId && blockerPid !== undefined) {
-              const waiters = await pool.query(`SELECT pid FROM pg_stat_activity WHERE datname=current_database() AND usename='mcp_test'
-                AND state='active' AND wait_event_type='Lock' AND query ~* '^UPDATE mcp_operation_steps SET state='
-                AND $1::int=ANY(pg_blocking_pids(pid))`, [blockerPid])
-              if (waiters.rowCount) break
-            }
-            assert(Date.now() < admissionDeadline, "Generic runtime did not reach its real source-step UPDATE behind the owned row lock")
-            await delay(20)
-          }
-          assert(capturedOperationId)
-          await sourceDiagnostic(capturedOperationId, "generic-step-update-blocked-no-http-pending")
-          await observeConfiguration(capturedOperationId)
-        } finally {
-          afterConfigurationCheckpoint = undefined
-          // A row lock is only an observation fixture. It never changes a
-          // state/result or renews authority, deadline, intent or checkpoint.
-          try {
-            if (blocker) { try { await blocker.query("ROLLBACK") } finally { blocker.release() } }
-          } finally { operationOutcome = await execution }
-        }
-        assert(operationOutcome)
-        if (!operationOutcome.ok) throw operationOutcome.error
-        const operation = operationOutcome.value
-        const diagnostic = (await pool.query(`SELECT o.state,o.error_code,o.verification,
-          EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM mcp_operation_checkpoints c WHERE c.operation_id=o.id AND c.configuration_sealed IS NOT NULL) AS configuration_checkpoint,
-          ARRAY(SELECT s.state FROM mcp_operation_steps s WHERE s.operation_id=o.id ORDER BY s.step_index) AS step_states
-          FROM mcp_operations o WHERE o.id=$1`, [operation.id])).rows[0]
-        // Fixed stage labels, counters and generic persisted status only. Never
-        // log native bodies, endpoint credentials or encrypted plan contents.
-        console.log("Routing forward rounds terminal:", JSON.stringify({ scenario, callbackStage, checked,
-          writesSinceApply: writes - beforeWrites, ...diagnostic }))
-        assert.equal(checked, true); assert.equal(operation.state, "applied"); assert.equal(writes, beforeWrites + 1)
-        await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET enabled=false WHERE id=$1", [profileId])
-        accepted.push(scenario)
-      }
       console.log(JSON.stringify({ forwardRoundCases: accepted, actualGenuineConfigApplied: true, sharedBudget: true,
         securityProof: false, logCoverage: "unknown", forwardingVerified: false }))
       return { accepted: true, forwardRoundCases: accepted, securityProof: false, forwardingVerified: false }
@@ -1048,45 +1269,60 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
     reset(); await refresh()
     {
       const persistent = await persistentFixture(), { plan, input } = await prepare("a", persistent), before = writes
-      const op = await execute(plan.planId); assert.equal(op.state, "applied"); assert.equal(writes, before + 1)
+      const checkBridge = async (operationId: string) => {
+        const action = { principal, connection: await effectiveMcpConnection(principal) }
+        const bridge = await resolveRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(operationId, action)
+        const current = await consumeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(bridge)
+        assert.equal(current.operationId, operationId); assert.equal(current.securityProof, false); assert.equal(current.sharedNetworkBudgetVerified, false)
+        assert.equal(current.configuration.nativeId, input.nativeId); assert.equal(current.configuration.dependencyIdentity, input.dependencyProof)
+        const afterReads = requests
+        await assert.rejects(consumeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(bridge))
+        await assert.rejects(consumeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(bridge))))
+        await assert.rejects(resolveRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(operationId, action), /source already issued/)
+        assert.equal(requests, afterReads); assert.equal(writes, before + 1)
+      }
+      // The production forward rounds use the same one-time bridge issuance.
+      // Exercise the independent bridge at the committed checkpoint first.
+      const op = await executeWithCheckpointObservation(plan.planId, checkBridge)
+      assert.equal(op.state, "applied"); assert.equal(writes, before + 1)
       const row = (await pool.query("SELECT c.configuration_sealed,s.result FROM mcp_operation_checkpoints c JOIN mcp_operation_steps s USING(operation_id,step_index) WHERE c.operation_id=$1", [op.id])).rows[0]
       const packet = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(row.configuration_sealed))
       assert.equal(packet.revision, 2); assert.equal(row.result.proofRevision, 3)
       assert.equal(fingerprint(packet.persistentProfileAuthority), fingerprint(input.persistentProfileAuthority))
       assert.equal(packet.persistentProfileAuthority.packet.credentialId, principal.credentialId)
       assert.equal((await reconcile(op.id)).matchesDesiredState, true)
-      const bridge = await resolveRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(op.id, { principal, connection: await effectiveMcpConnection(principal) })
-      const current = await consumeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(bridge)
-      assert.equal(current.operationId, op.id); assert.equal(current.securityProof, false); assert.equal(current.sharedNetworkBudgetVerified, false)
-      assert.equal(current.configuration.nativeId, packet.nativeId); assert.equal(current.configuration.dependencyIdentity, packet.dependencyProof)
-      const afterReads = requests
-      await assert.rejects(consumeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(bridge))
-      await assert.rejects(consumeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(bridge))))
-      assert.equal(requests, afterReads); assert.equal(writes, before + 1)
       persistentCases.push("genuine-configuration-bridge-one-consume-no-clone-grant")
       await disablePersistent(persistent.id); persistentCases.push("persistent-forward-request3-checkpoint2")
     }
     for (const change of ["closed", "disabled", "checkpoint-tamper"] as const) {
       reset(); await refresh()
       const persistent = await persistentFixture(), { plan } = await prepare("a", persistent), before = writes
-      const op = await execute(plan.planId); assert.equal(op.state, "applied"); assert.equal(writes, before + 1)
+      const op = await executeWithCheckpointObservation(plan.planId, async operationId => {
-      const bridge = await resolveRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(op.id, { principal, connection: await effectiveMcpConnection(principal) })
+        const bridge = await resolveRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(operationId, { principal, connection: await effectiveMcpConnection(principal) })
+        const { rows: [checkpoint] } = await pool.query("SELECT configuration_proof FROM mcp_operation_checkpoints WHERE operation_id=$1", [operationId])
+        try {
           if (change === "closed") closeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(bridge)
           if (change === "disabled") await disablePersistent(persistent.id)
-      if (change === "checkpoint-tamper") await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operation_checkpoints SET configuration_proof=$2 WHERE operation_id=$1", [op.id, "f".repeat(64)])
+          if (change === "checkpoint-tamper") await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operation_checkpoints SET configuration_proof=$2 WHERE operation_id=$1", [operationId, "f".repeat(64)])
           const beforeReads = requests
           await assert.rejects(consumeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(bridge))
           assert.equal(requests, beforeReads); assert.equal(writes, before + 1)
+        } finally {
+          if (change === "disabled") await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET enabled=true WHERE id=$1", [persistent.id])
+          if (change === "checkpoint-tamper") await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operation_checkpoints SET configuration_proof=$2 WHERE operation_id=$1", [operationId, checkpoint.configuration_proof])
+          closeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(bridge)
+        }
+      })
+      assert.equal(op.state, "applied"); assert.equal(writes, before + 1)
       await disablePersistent(persistent.id)
       persistentCases.push("genuine-configuration-bridge-denies:" + change)
     }
     {
       reset(); await refresh()
       const persistent = await persistentFixture(), { plan } = await prepare("a", persistent), before = writes
-      let sharedChecks = 0
+      // The production effect reader already owns this operation's native
-      // This is an out-of-band running-checkpoint check, not RouterOS ping work.
+      // session. A second reader must fail before any native request.
-      // Do not put two full SQL/native reads inside the timed HTTP response.
+      const op = await executeWithCheckpointObservation(plan.planId, async operationId => {
-      const checkpointObserver = observeCommittedScopedCheckpoint(pool, async operationId => {
         assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT plan_id FROM mcp_operations WHERE id=$1", [operationId])).rows[0]?.plan_id, plan.planId)
         if(process.env.MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_WORKER_REPRO==="true") {
           await (await import("./workers.js")).tickMcpWorkers()
@@ -1095,23 +1331,22 @@ export async function acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor: AuthUser, options:
           console.log("Worker exclusion preserved exact running CONFIG_APPLIED profile")
         }
         const action = { principal, connection: await effectiveMcpConnection(principal) }
-        const session = await createRoutingNetworkNativeSession({ sourceOperationId: operationId, context: action,
+        // Reuse the approved plan's original deadline: now +90s would extend
-          authorize: async () => {}, deadline: Date.now() + 90000, manifest: { servers: [sid], probes: [] } })
+        // its preparation-time probe horizon and mask the duplicate-owner guard.
-        try {
+        const deadline = (await loadPlan(plan.planId)).expires_at.getTime()
-          const context = await resolveRoutingNetworkConfigurationContextFromSharedContext(session.sharedContext, action)
+        const reads = requests
-          const result = await consumeRoutingNetworkConfigurationContext(context)
+        await assert.rejects(createRoutingNetworkNativeSession({ sourceOperationId: operationId, context: action,
-          assert.equal(result.operationId, operationId); assert.equal(result.sharedNetworkBudgetVerified, true); assert.equal(result.securityProof, false)
+          authorize: async () => {}, deadline, manifest: { servers: [sid], probes: [] } }), /Source native session уже создавалась/)
-          const budget = session.readBudget()
+        assert.equal(requests, reads); assert.equal(writes, before + 1)
-          assert(budget.calls > 0 && budget.calls <= 256); assert(budget.bytes > 0 && budget.rows > 0)
+      })
-          assert.equal(budget.closed, false); assert.equal(writes, before + 1)
+      assert.equal(op.state, "applied"); assert.equal(writes, before + 1)
-          sharedChecks++
+      const { rows: [step] } = await pool.query("SELECT result FROM mcp_operation_steps WHERE operation_id=$1 AND step_index=0", [op.id])
-        } finally { session.close() }
+      const effects = originalEffectReportSchema.parse(step.result.originalEffects)
-      }, { databaseUrl: process.env.DATABASE_URL ?? "", stateDir: process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR ?? "" })
+      assert.equal(effects.status, "observed-expected")
-      try {
+      assert.equal(effects.rounds.length, 2)
-        const op = await execute(plan.planId)
+      assert.equal(effects.semanticProof, false)
-        checkpointObserver.assertCompleted()
+      assert(effects.budget && effects.budget.calls > 0 && effects.budget.calls <= 256)
-        assert.equal(op.state, "applied"); assert.equal(sharedChecks, 1); assert.equal(writes, before + 1)
+      assert(effects.budget.bytes > 0 && effects.budget.rows > 0)
-      } finally { checkpointObserver.close() }
       await disablePersistent(persistent.id)
       persistentCases.push("genuine-running-config-bridge-uses-one-shared-native-owner")
     }

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-community-scoped-recovery.ts

@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ async function checkpoint(value: Session, intent: Intent, phase: Checkpoint["pha
 export async function executeReservedScopedRecovery(allocation: RoutingReservedInverseAllocation, expected: { sourceOperationId: string; principal: McpPrincipal }) {
   const store = createRoutingReservationStore(), spent = await store.beginInverseAttempt(allocation)
   const execution = spent.execution
+  try {
     const binding = await store.inspectInverseExecution(execution)
     if (binding.sourceOperationId !== expected.sourceOperationId || fingerprint(binding.principal) !== fingerprint(expected.principal)) throw fail("Reserved runner identity differs")
     const current = await effectiveMcpConnection(binding.principal)
@@ -273,8 +274,13 @@ export async function executeReservedScopedRecovery(allocation: RoutingReservedI
     input.requestProof = await sealedProof(input, "request")
     reservedExecutions.set(input, execution)
     try { return await executeScopedRecovery(input) }
-  catch (error) { await store.markUnknown(binding.reservationId, "inverse").catch(() => {}); throw error }
     finally { reservedExecutions.delete(input) }
+  } catch (error) {
+    // Acknowledged spend owns this exact slot even when its authority can no
+    // longer be inspected. A refused or uncertain spend never enters here.
+    await store.markUnknown(spent.reservationId, "inverse").catch(() => {})
+    throw error
+  }
 }
 
 /** Fixed-domain receipt verifier used by the reservation store. It recognizes

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-community-scoped-request.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,18 @@
+import type { PoolClient } from "pg"
+import { COMMUNITY_PATH_MAX_AGE_MS } from "./path-proof-purpose.js"
 import { fingerprint, McpError, privateSecretFingerprint } from "./security.js"
 
+export async function readScopedPathCheckpoint(db: Pick<PoolClient, "query">, id: string, connectionId: string, phase: "admission" | "configuration" = "admission") {
+  const { rows: [row] } = await db.query("SELECT id,connection_id,profile_hash,candidate_id,status,created_at,evidence FROM mcp_path_checks WHERE id=$1 AND connection_id=$2", [id, connectionId])
+  const now = Date.now(), createdAt = row?.created_at.getTime(), observedAt = Date.parse(row?.evidence?.observedAt)
+  const validUntil = Math.min(createdAt, observedAt) + COMMUNITY_PATH_MAX_AGE_MS
+  if (!row || row.status !== "passed" || createdAt > now || phase === "admission" &&
+    (!Number.isFinite(validUntil) || observedAt > now || validUntil <= now)) {
+    throw new McpError("MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN", "Контрольное подтверждение пути устарело", 409)
+  }
+  return { proof: await privateSecretFingerprint(fingerprint(row), "route-ai-scoped-path-checkpoint-v1"), validUntil }
+}
+
 /** One request domain for forward execution and trusted recovery resolution. */
 export async function assertScopedCommunityRequest(input: Record<string, unknown>) {
   const { requestProof: _proof, ...request } = input

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-community-scoped-service.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import { createRoutingNetworkSessionForCurrentExecution } from "./routing-network-execution-session.js"
 import { readRoutingNetworkScopedCommunityContext } from "./routing-network-scoped-context.js"
 import { resolveRoutingNetworkForwardRoundConfigurationContext, closeRoutingNetworkForwardRoundConfigurationContext } from "./routing-network-configuration-bridge.js"
-import { originalEffectSelectionSchema, unknownOriginalEffects, originalEffectBaselineMatches, inspectOriginalEffectRounds, type OriginalEffectReport } from "./routing-original-effects.js"
+import { originalEffectReportSchema, originalEffectSelectionSchema, unknownOriginalEffects, originalEffectBaselineMatches, inspectOriginalEffectRounds, type OriginalEffectReport } from "./routing-original-effects.js"
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"
 import { z } from "zod"
 import { routeAiProfileSchema } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp-routing"
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import { withApplicationMutationLock, withConfigMutationLock } from "../../servi
 import { effectiveMcpConnection, audit } from "./store.js"
 import { accessGeneration, decryptSecret, encryptSecret, fingerprint, McpError, privateSecretFingerprint, redact } from "./security.js"
 import { saveScopedConfigurationCheckpoint, loadScopedConfigurationCheckpoint, saveScopedNetworkCheckpoint, loadScopedNetworkCheckpoint } from "./routing-community-scoped-checkpoint.js"
-import { assertScopedCommunityRequest as sealedInput } from "./routing-community-scoped-request.js"
+import { assertScopedCommunityRequest as sealedInput, readScopedPathCheckpoint } from "./routing-community-scoped-request.js"
 import { prepareManagementTransportBinding } from "./management-transport.js"
 import { readRouteCommunityContext } from "./routing-community-context.js"
 import { candidateMatchesGateway } from "./routing-community-context-model.js"
@@ -37,12 +37,6 @@ const effectReadFailure = (stage: "original-effect-rounds-unavailable" | "effect
 export const scopedProfileIds = (profile: z.infer<typeof routeAiProfileSchema>) => [...new Set([profile.serverId, ...profile.candidates.flatMap(candidate => [candidate.jumpHostId, candidate.exitNodeId])])].sort((a, b) => a - b)
 const publicRule = (rule: { community: string; gateway: string; outIface: string }) => ({ community: rule.community, action: "route", gateway: rule.gateway, gatewayTunnelId: rule.outIface })
 type ObservationPhase = "admission" | "configuration"
-async function pathCheckpoint(id: string, connectionId: string, phase: ObservationPhase = "admission") {
-  const row = (await pool.query("SELECT id,connection_id,profile_hash,candidate_id,status,created_at,evidence FROM mcp_path_checks WHERE id=$1 AND connection_id=$2", [id, connectionId])).rows[0]
-  if (!row || row.status !== "passed" || row.created_at.getTime() > Date.now() || phase === "admission" && Date.now() - row.created_at.getTime() > 90000) throw fail("Контрольное подтверждение пути устарело", "MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN")
-  return privateSecretFingerprint(fingerprint(row), "route-ai-scoped-path-checkpoint-v1")
-}
-
 async function access(input: Record<string, unknown>, signal?: AbortSignal, verified = false, phase: ObservationPhase = "admission") {
   if (signal?.aborted) throw fail("Операция отменена", "READ_CANCELLED")
   if (verified) await assertVerifiedConfigurationAccess()
@@ -58,7 +52,7 @@ async function access(input: Record<string, unknown>, signal?: AbortSignal, veri
     const ranked = rankRoutingCandidates(profile, await readRoutingObservations(ids))
     if (!ranked.find(row => row.candidate.id === input.candidateId)?.eligible) throw fail("Нет свежего SLA выбранного пути", "MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN")
   }
-  if (input.pathCheckId !== undefined && await pathCheckpoint(String(input.pathCheckId), principal.connectionId, phase) !== input.pathCheckpointProof) throw fail("Подтверждение пути изменилось", "MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN")
+  if (input.pathCheckId !== undefined && (await readScopedPathCheckpoint(pool, String(input.pathCheckId), principal.connectionId, phase)).proof !== input.pathCheckpointProof) throw fail("Подтверждение пути изменилось", "MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN")
   return { principal, current, profile, ids }
 }
 
@@ -117,7 +111,8 @@ export async function prepareScopedCommunitySwitch(input: Record<string, unknown
     await access(request, action.signal)
   }
   const pathCheckId = await requireRecentPath(profile, String(input.candidateId), action.connection.id, { authorize: async () => { await access(request, action.signal) }, signal: action.signal })
-  const withPath = { ...request, pathCheckId, pathCheckpointProof: await pathCheckpoint(pathCheckId, action.connection.id) }
+  const checkpoint = await readScopedPathCheckpoint(pool, pathCheckId, action.connection.id)
+  const withPath = { ...request, pathCheckId, pathCheckpointProof: checkpoint.proof }
   const value = await observe(withPath, action.signal), owned = value.context.ownedTarget!
   if (!value.candidate.controlProbe) throw fail("Scoped переключение требует свежий control probe", "MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN")
   await requireRecentPath(value.profile, value.candidate.id, action.connection.id, { authorize: value.authorize, signal: action.signal })
@@ -149,9 +144,12 @@ export async function prepareScopedCommunitySwitch(input: Record<string, unknown
   sealed.requestProof = await privateSecretFingerprint(fingerprint(sealed), `route-ai-scoped-request-v${sealed.proofRevision}`)
   await value.context.fence()
   await access(sealed, action.signal)
+  const authorityValidUntil = persistent ? routingProfileAuthorityBindingSchema.parse(sealed.persistentProfileAuthority).packet.validUntil : undefined
+  const validUntil = authorityValidUntil && !profile.autoRecovery
+    ? new Date(Math.min(Date.parse(authorityValidUntil), checkpoint.validUntil)).toISOString() : authorityValidUntil
   return { target: { scope: "servers", serverIds: scopedProfileIds(value.profile) }, objects: [{ kind: "routing_filter", serverId: value.profile.serverId, id: owned.nativeId }, ...scopedProfileIds(value.profile).map(serverId => ({ kind: "server" as const, serverId, id: String(serverId) }))], snapshots: [], before: sealed.beforeRules,
     steps: [{ kind: "service", service: "routing.community.scoped", input: sealed }], requiresHuman: true, mutationCost: 2, verificationScope: "configuration",
-    ...(persistent ? { validUntil: routingProfileAuthorityBindingSchema.parse(sealed.persistentProfileAuthority).packet.validUntil } : {}),
+    ...(validUntil ? { validUntil } : {}),
     warnings: ["Одна запись owned фильтра; SQL метаданные фильтров сохраняются.", "SLA и свежая preflight-проба обязательны до отправки PATCH. После записи подтверждение конфигурации сохраняется независимо от новых SLA-измерений; контрольная проба и её результат проверяются отдельно.", "Подтверждается конфигурация и control probe; сквозной и обратный трафик требуют отдельной приёмки.", managementBindingCiphertext ? "Заранее закреплён независимый транспорт для отдельного обратного плана; автоматический inverse не включён." : "Независимый transport не закреплён; отдельный обратный план потребует доступного primary.", "Неизвестный результат не повторяется; сверка только читает состояние."] }
 }
 
@@ -166,7 +164,9 @@ export function registerScopedCommunityService() {
       }
       await original(input, true)
       if (await receiptExists(input, "routing.scoped.attempt")) throw fail("Повтор PATCH запрещён", "MUTATION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN")
-      await receipt(input, "routing.scoped.attempt")
+      const requiresEffectBaseline = input.proofRevision === 3 && !routeAiProfileSchema.parse(input.profile).autoRecovery
+      let attemptRecorded = !requiresEffectBaseline
+      if (attemptRecorded) await receipt(input, "routing.scoped.attempt")
       const before = await original(input, true), owned = before.context.ownedTarget!
       let effectSession: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createRoutingNetworkSessionForCurrentExecution>> | undefined
       let effectBaseline: Parameters<typeof originalEffectBaselineMatches>[1] | undefined
@@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ export function registerScopedCommunityService() {
       const effectSelection = originalEffectSelectionSchema.safeParse(input.originalEffectSelection)
       if (effectSelection.success) originalEffects = unknownOriginalEffects(effectSelection.data.status === "unknown" ? effectSelection.data.reason : "effect-acquisition-unavailable")
       try {
-        // Optional original-effect vector is never an extra write/recovery grant.
+        // The persistent controller needs a baseline it can advance after the
-        // Old manual configuration+probe acceptance remains authoritative.
+        // write. Manual plans still treat the effect vector as observational.
         if (context?.phase === "forward" && (input.proofRevision === 3 || input.proofRevision === 2 && input.manualEffectPolicy === "observational-v1") && effectSelection.success && effectSelection.data.status === "prepared") {
           try {
             const selected = effectSelection.data
@@ -188,6 +188,11 @@ export function registerScopedCommunityService() {
             }
           } catch { effectSession?.close(); effectSession = undefined }
         }
+        if (requiresEffectBaseline) {
+          if (!effectSession) throw fail("Исходное состояние изменяемого префикса не подтверждено", "MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN")
+          await receipt(input, "routing.scoped.attempt")
+          attemptRecorded = true
+        }
         await executeGuardedConfigurationWrite(before.profile.serverId, "PATCH", "/routing/filter/rule/" + owned.nativeId, async () => {
           // This runs AFTER the durable configuration.intent, immediately before transport.
           const fresh = await original(input, true); await before.context.fence()
@@ -208,8 +213,7 @@ export function registerScopedCommunityService() {
             roundContext = await resolveRoutingNetworkForwardRoundConfigurationContext(effectSession.sharedContext, action)
             const first = await effectSession.readConfigurationBoundForwardSnapshot(roundContext)
             const second = await effectSession.readConfigurationBoundForwardSnapshot(roundContext)
-            const observed = await inspectOriginalEffectRounds(effectSelection.data, [first, second], effectBaseline), budget = effectSession.readBudget()
+            originalEffects = await inspectOriginalEffectRounds(effectSelection.data, [first, second], effectBaseline)
-            originalEffects = { ...observed, budget: { deadline: budget.deadline, calls: budget.calls, bytes: budget.bytes, rows: budget.rows } }
           } catch (error) { originalEffects = effectReadFailure("original-effect-rounds-unavailable", error) }
           finally { if (roundContext) closeRoutingNetworkForwardRoundConfigurationContext(roundContext) }
         }
@@ -221,8 +225,6 @@ export function registerScopedCommunityService() {
             const published = await readRoutingNetworkScopedCommunityContext(effectSession.sharedContext)
             if (!matches(input, published).configurationMatchesDesired) throw fail("Состояние изменилось после effect-check")
             await published.fence()
-            const budget = effectSession.readBudget()
-            originalEffects = { ...originalEffects!, budget: { deadline: budget.deadline, calls: budget.calls, bytes: budget.bytes, rows: budget.rows } }
             sharedPublication = true
           } catch (error) { originalEffects = effectReadFailure("effect-publication-revalidation-unavailable", error) }
         }
@@ -235,12 +237,16 @@ export function registerScopedCommunityService() {
           await final.context.fence()
         }
         if (effectSession && originalEffects) {
-          const budget = effectSession.readBudget()
+          const { deadline, calls, bytes, rows } = effectSession.readBudget()
-          originalEffects = { ...originalEffects, budget: { deadline: budget.deadline, calls: budget.calls, bytes: budget.bytes, rows: budget.rows } }
+          const budget = originalEffectReportSchema.shape.budget.safeParse({ deadline, calls, bytes, rows })
+          if (budget.success) originalEffects = { ...originalEffects, budget: budget.data }
         }
         await saveScopedNetworkCheckpoint(input, await sealedInput(input), { ...check, status: check.status }, originalEffects)
         return verifiedResult(input)
-      } catch { throw fail("Результат переключения не подтверждён; повтор запрещён, требуется сверка", "MUTATION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN") }
+      } catch (error) {
+        if (!attemptRecorded) throw error
+        throw fail("Результат переключения не подтверждён; повтор запрещён, требуется сверка", "MUTATION_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN")
+      }
       finally { effectSession?.close() }
     })),
     verify: async (input, result) => {

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-controller-overlap.test.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises"
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"
 import ts from "typescript"
 import { z } from "zod"
-import { routeAiProfileSchema } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp-routing"
+import { routeAiControllerBlockReason, routeAiProfileSchema, usesScopedRouteAiContext } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp-routing"
 import { fingerprint, McpError } from "./security.js"
 
 type Handler = { prepare?: (input: Record<string, unknown>, context: unknown) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>>; execute?: (input: Record<string, unknown>) => Promise<unknown> }
@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ async function fixture() {
   const profileModule = await load("./routing-profiles.ts", {
     "./routing-controller-overlap.js": overlap, "./security.js": { fingerprint, McpError, accessGeneration: async () => "g" },
     "./routing-controller-baseline.js": { prepareRoutingControllerBaseline: async () => { baselinePreparations++; return { packet: {}, proof: "inert-baseline" } }, assertRoutingControllerBaseline: async () => {}, routingControllerBaselinePrincipal: async () => principal, advanceRoutingControllerBaseline: async () => {} },
-    "./routing-community-public.js": { publicRoutingControllerState: () => ({}) }, "node:crypto": { randomUUID }, zod: { z }, "@mmapp/contracts/mcp-routing": { routeAiProfileSchema }, "../../db/index.js": { pool },
+    "./routing-community-public.js": { publicRoutingControllerState: () => ({}) }, "node:crypto": { randomUUID }, zod: { z }, "@mmapp/contracts/mcp-routing": { routeAiControllerBlockReason, routeAiProfileSchema, usesScopedRouteAiContext }, "../../db/index.js": { pool },
     "./service-registry.js": { registerMcpService: (name: string, handler: Handler) => services.set(name, handler) },
     "./store.js": { audit: async () => {}, validatePrincipal: async () => connection }, "./routing-model.js": { decideRoutingSwitch: () => ({}) },
-    "./routing-community-context-model.js": { routeContextExecutionReason: () => null },
+    "./path-proof-purpose.js": { COMMUNITY_PATH_MAX_AGE_MS: 90000 },
     "./routing-controller-fence.js": { saveControllerProfileCas: async () => { casWrites++; return { id: "saved", version: 1 } } },
     "./routing-reservation-store.js": { createRoutingReservationStore: () => { throw new Error("Overlap-only fixture must not read or mutate routing charges") } },
   })

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-controls.ts

@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ export function registerRoutingControls(register: typeof add) {
     },
   })
   register("routing.vrf.update", "mm_vrf_plan", "Проверенный состав существующего VRF", "network", "mm:network:write", "write", "servers", z.object({ serverId, id: objectId, interfaces: z.array(text).min(1).max(100).refine(values => new Set(values).size === values.length) }).strict(), {
-    version: 3,
+    version: 4,
     prepare: async (input, context) => {
       const sid = Number(input.serverId), { client } = await routerClient(sid), snapshot = await readRosSnapshot(sid, "vrf"), current = snapshot.rows.find(row => row[".id"] === input.id)
       if (!current || current.name === "main" || !hasManagedCommentPrefix(String(current.comment ?? ""))) throw new McpError("PROTECTED_OBJECT", "Изменять состав можно только у существующего VRF приложения")

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-forward-transport-charge.test.cjs

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ function fixture(service='routing.community') {
   const principal={connectionId:id(3), credentialId:id(4), credentialExpiresAt:'2026-11-02T13:00:00.000Z'};
   const authority={packet:{profileId:id(5),profileVersion:7,connectionId:id(3),credentialId:id(4),ownerId:'owner'}, proof:'a'.repeat(64)};
   const metadata={operationId:id(1),planId:id(2),operationName:'routing.community.switch',operationVersion:7,ownerId:'owner',phase:'forward',stepIndex:0,serviceName:service,principal,policyVersion:2,generation:'generation',originalExpiresAt:now.getTime()+60000,sealedEvidenceProof:sha('evidence'),sealedPayloadProof:sha('payload'),serviceInput:{profile:{autoRecovery:false},persistentProfileAuthority:authority}};
-  const source={operation_state:'running',plan_state:'executing',policy_version:2,generation:'generation',approved_by:'human',observed_at:now,evidence_sealed:'evidence',payload_sealed:'payload',step_state:'intent',intended_state:redact({kind:'service',service,input:metadata.serviceInput})};
+  const source={operation_state:'running',plan_state:'executing',policy_version:2,generation:'generation',approved_by:service==='routing.community.scoped'?'owner':'human',observed_at:now,evidence_sealed:'evidence',payload_sealed:'payload',step_state:'intent',intended_state:redact({kind:'service',service,input:metadata.serviceInput})};
   const binding={revision:1,operationId:id(1),planId:id(2),stepIndex:0,profileId:id(5),profileVersion:7,connectionId:id(3),ownerId:'owner',principal,service,operationVersion:7,authorityProof:authority.proof,evidenceProof:fingerprint('evidence'),payloadProof:fingerprint('payload'),scope:[1],createdAt:now.toISOString(),chargeUnits:1};
   const row={source_operation_id:id(1),source_plan_id:id(2),source_step_index:0,profile_id:id(5),connection_id:id(3),charge_units:1,binding_sealed:null,binding_proof:null,created_at:now};
   let chargeRows=[row], sourceRows=[source], reservedRows=[], decryptCalls=0, nativeWrites=0, keyUnavailable=false;
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ function fixture(service='routing.community') {
     run:async()=>{await verifier(db,metadata,'owner');nativeWrites++;},writes:()=>nativeWrites,decryptCalls:()=>decryptCalls};
 }
 for(const service of ['routing.community','routing.community.scoped'])test(`exact ${service} running charge passes without mutation`,async()=>{const f=fixture(service);await f.run();assert.equal(f.writes(),1);assert.equal(f.queries.length,3);assert.ok(f.queries.every(({sql})=>sql.startsWith('SELECT ')));assert.ok(f.queries[0].sql.includes('LIMIT 2'));});
+test('scoped transport refuses delegated approval before reading the charge',async()=>{const f=fixture('routing.community.scoped');f.source.approved_by='delegated-admin';await assert.rejects(f.run);assert.equal(f.writes(),0);assert.equal(f.queries.length,1);});
 const mutations=[
   ['missing charge',f=>f.noCharge()],['duplicate charge',f=>f.duplicateCharge()],['reserved overlap',f=>f.reserved()],['ambiguous source',f=>f.ambiguousSource()],
   ['pending operation',f=>f.source.operation_state='pending'],['applied operation',f=>f.source.operation_state='applied'],['terminal step',f=>f.source.step_state='verified'],['draft plan',f=>f.source.plan_state='draft'],['missing approval',f=>f.source.approved_by=null],['policy drift',f=>f.source.policy_version++],['generation drift',f=>f.source.generation='other'],

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-manual-inverse-history.test.ts

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ function cursor(rows:unknown[],onFetch?:()=>void) {
 test("historical cursor authenticates more than two pages of genuine nonpersistent classifications",async()=>{
   const dir=await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(),"mm-manual-history-unit-")),previous=process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR;process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR=dir
   try {
-    const rows=[];for(let n=0;n<25;n++)rows.push((await fixture(false,n%2?6:7)).row)
+    const rows=[];for(let n=0;n<25;n++)rows.push((await fixture(false,6+n%3)).row)
     const f=cursor(rows)
     await assertLegacyManualHistoryWithinOwner(f.db,randomUUID(),at,()=>{})
     assert.equal(f.calls.filter(sql=>sql.startsWith("FETCH")).length,3)
@@ -76,8 +76,10 @@ test("historical authentication, active persistent refusal, future rejection and
     await assertLegacyManualHistoryWithinOwner(cursor([f.row]).db,f.profileId,"2026-11-01T13:01:00.001Z",()=>{})
     const expiredTamper={...f.row,source_evidence:null}
     await assert.rejects(assertLegacyManualHistoryWithinOwner(cursor([expiredTamper]).db,f.profileId,"2026-11-01T14:00:00.000Z",()=>{}))
-    const current={...f.row,recovery_version:7}
+    for (const version of [7,8]) {
+      const current={...f.row,recovery_version:version}
       await assert.rejects(assertLegacyManualHistoryWithinOwner(cursor([current]).db,f.profileId,"2026-11-01T14:00:00.000Z",()=>{}),/lacks durable charge/)
+    }
     const stripped={...f.input};delete stripped.persistentProfileAuthority
     await assert.rejects(assertLegacyManualHistoryWithinOwner(cursor([{...f.row,source_evidence:await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify({steps:[{kind:"service",service:"routing.community.scoped",input:stripped}]}))}]).db,f.profileId,at,()=>{}))
     const future={...f.intent,createdAt:"2026-11-01T12:00:00.001Z"}
@@ -112,14 +114,14 @@ test("state transfer cap MODEL refuses oversized or NULL history as a whole, wit
   }finally{if(previous===undefined)delete process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR;else process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR=previous;await rm(dir,{recursive:true,force:true})}
 })
 
-async function retentionFixture() {
+async function retentionFixture(version = 7) {
-  const f=await fixture(true,7), authority=f.input.persistentProfileAuthority as {packet:{profileVersion:number;scope:number[]};proof:string}
+  const f=await fixture(true,version), authority=f.input.persistentProfileAuthority as {packet:{profileVersion:number;scope:number[]};proof:string}
   const payload=await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify({MODEL:true}))
   const row={...f.row,recovery_payload:payload,authority_profile_version:1}
   const binding=manualInverseReceiptSchema.shape.binding.parse({revision:1,recoveryOperationId:f.intent.operationId,recoveryPlanId:row.recovery_plan_id,
     sourceOperationId:f.intent.sourceOperationId,sourcePlanId:row.source_plan_id,sourceStepIndex:0,profileId:f.profileId,profileVersion:1,
     connectionId:f.intent.connectionId,ownerId:f.intent.ownerId,originalPrincipal:f.input.principal,recoveryPrincipal:f.input.principal,
-    operationVersion:7,sourceVersion:7,authorityProof:authority.proof,sourceProof:f.intent.sourceProof,sourceRequestProof:f.input.requestProof,
+    operationVersion:version,sourceVersion:7,authorityProof:authority.proof,sourceProof:f.intent.sourceProof,sourceRequestProof:f.input.requestProof,
     recoveryRequestProof:f.intent.requestSeal,sourceEvidenceProof:fingerprint(row.source_evidence),recoveryEvidenceProof:fingerprint(row.recovery_evidence),
     recoveryPayloadProof:fingerprint(payload),scope:authority.packet.scope,createdAt:at,chargeUnits:1})
   const receipt={binding,proof:await sign(binding,"routing-manual-inverse-charge-v1")}
@@ -153,7 +155,8 @@ function retentionOwner(f:Awaited<ReturnType<typeof retentionFixture>>,present=t
 test('retention MODEL intent2 authenticates SQL clock after parent GC; unknown noReplay anchor survives',async()=>{
  const dir=await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(),'mm-intent2-retention-')),previous=process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR;process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR=dir
  try {
-  const f=await retentionFixture(),owner=retentionOwner(f),before=fingerprint(f.row)
+  for (const version of [7,8]) {
+    const f=await retentionFixture(version),owner=retentionOwner(f),before=fingerprint(f.row)
     // SQL aging and the transaction owner below are MODELS, never genuine SQL.
     await assertLegacyManualHistoryWithinOwner(owner.db,f.profileId,'2026-11-03T12:00:00.000Z',()=>{})
     assert.deepEqual(await retainManualInverseChargesWithinOwner(owner.db,1),{deleted:1})
@@ -164,6 +167,7 @@ test('retention MODEL intent2 authenticates SQL clock after parent GC; unknown n
     assert(candidate.indexOf("state IN('pending','running')")<candidate.indexOf('LIMIT 100'))
     assert(candidate.includes('r.authority_profile_version IS NOT NULL'))
     assert.equal(f.intent.revision,2);assert.equal(await decryptSecretExisting(f.row.intent_sealed),JSON.stringify(f.intent))
+  }
  }finally{if(previous===undefined)delete process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR;else process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR=previous;await rm(dir,{recursive:true,force:true})}
 })
 
@@ -182,6 +186,11 @@ test('retention MODEL refuses recent/future/malformed copy, present corrupt pare
   const t=retentionOwner(tamper);await assert.rejects(retainManualInverseChargesWithinOwner(t.db,1),/MAC/);assert.equal(t.deleted.length,0)
   const legacy=await fixture(true,7)
   await assert.rejects(assertLegacyManualHistoryWithinOwner(cursor([legacy.row]).db,legacy.profileId,'2026-11-03T12:00:00.000Z',()=>{}),/lacks durable/)
+  const wrongVersion=await retentionFixture(7);wrongVersion.row.recovery_version=8
+  const mismatched=retentionOwner(wrongVersion)
+  await assert.rejects(assertLegacyManualHistoryWithinOwner(mismatched.db,wrongVersion.profileId,'2026-11-03T12:00:00.000Z',()=>{}),/signed allocation/)
+  await assert.rejects(retainManualInverseChargesWithinOwner(mismatched.db,1),/hint/)
+  assert.equal(mismatched.deleted.length,0)
   // Revision2 payload proof cannot be replaced by an authentic stamp from a different payload.
   const payload=await retentionFixture();payload.row.recovery_payload=await encryptSecret('{}')
   await assert.rejects(assertLegacyManualHistoryWithinOwner(retentionOwner(payload,false).db,payload.profileId,'2026-11-03T12:00:00.000Z',()=>{}),/payload/)

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-manual-inverse-history.ts

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ export async function classifyManualInverseHistory(row:HistoricalRow,observedAt:
     intent.receiptId!==row.recovery_receipt_id || intent.validUntil!==iso(row.deadline) ||
     row.source_connection_id!==intent.connectionId || row.recovery_connection_id!==intent.connectionId ||
     row.source_action!=="routing.community.switch" || row.source_version!==7 ||
-    row.recovery_action!=="operations.recover" || ![6,7].includes(row.recovery_version??0) ||
+    row.recovery_action!=="operations.recover" || ![6,7,8].includes(row.recovery_version??0) ||
     !["partial","applied"].includes(row.source_state??"")) throw fail("Historical manual intent/source identity differs")
   const source=await sealedJson(row.source_evidence) as ChangeEvidence, recovery=await sealedJson(row.recovery_evidence) as ChangeEvidence
   const step=source.steps?.[0], inverse=recovery.steps?.[0]
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ export async function assertLegacyManualHistoryWithinOwner(db:PoolClient,profile
       // Authenticate any durable inverse row before treating this old manual
       // identity as represented by the normal profile ledger.
       const {authenticateManualInverseHistoryWithinOwner}=await import("./routing-manual-inverse-store.js")
-      if(await authenticateManualInverseHistoryWithinOwner(db,classified.intent,classified.authority,observedAt,{sourceEvidenceProof:fingerprint(row.source_evidence),recoveryEvidenceProof:fingerprint(row.recovery_evidence),recoveryPlanId:row.recovery_plan_id,sourcePlanId:row.source_plan_id,sourceRequestProof:classified.sourceRequestProof,sourcePrincipal:classified.sourcePrincipal,recoveryPrincipal:classified.recoveryPrincipal})) continue
+      if(await authenticateManualInverseHistoryWithinOwner(db,classified.intent,classified.authority,observedAt,{sourceEvidenceProof:fingerprint(row.source_evidence),recoveryEvidenceProof:fingerprint(row.recovery_evidence),recoveryPlanId:row.recovery_plan_id,recoveryVersion:row.recovery_version,sourcePlanId:row.source_plan_id,sourceRequestProof:classified.sourceRequestProof,sourcePrincipal:classified.sourcePrincipal,recoveryPrincipal:classified.recoveryPrincipal})) continue
       if(row.recovery_version!==6) throw fail("Current persistent manual inverse lacks durable charge")
       if(classified.authority.packet.profileId!==profileId) continue
       // Historical v6 sealed evidence.validUntil bounded admission; source and

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-manual-inverse-store.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { effectiveMcpConnection } from "./store.js"
 import { decryptSecretExisting, encryptSecret, fingerprint, McpError, privateFingerprinterExisting, privateSecretFingerprint } from "./security.js"
 import { routingProfileAuthorityBindingSchema } from "./routing-profile-authority.js"
 import type { RoutingSwitchLedgerEntry } from "./routing-switch-ledger-contract.js"
+import { findMcpOperation } from "./registry.js"
 
 const fail = (message: string) => new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", message, 409)
 const uuid = z.string().uuid(), proof = z.string().regex(/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/), stamp = z.string().datetime()
@@ -14,7 +15,7 @@ const principal = z.object({ connectionId: uuid, credentialId: uuid, credentialE
 export const manualInverseBindingSchema = z.object({ revision: z.literal(1), recoveryOperationId: uuid, recoveryPlanId: uuid,
   sourceOperationId: uuid, sourcePlanId: uuid, sourceStepIndex: z.literal(0), profileId: uuid, profileVersion: z.number().int().positive(),
   connectionId: uuid, ownerId: z.string().min(1).max(1000), originalPrincipal: principal, recoveryPrincipal: principal,
-  operationVersion: z.literal(7), sourceVersion: z.literal(7), authorityProof: proof, sourceProof: proof,
+  operationVersion: z.union([z.literal(7), z.literal(8)]), sourceVersion: z.literal(7), authorityProof: proof, sourceProof: proof,
   sourceRequestProof: proof, recoveryRequestProof: proof, sourceEvidenceProof: proof,
   recoveryEvidenceProof: proof, recoveryPayloadProof: proof,
   scope: z.array(z.number().int().positive().safe()).min(1).max(1000), createdAt: stamp, chargeUnits: z.literal(1) }).strict()
@@ -74,7 +75,8 @@ export async function selectManualInverseAdmissionWithinOwner(db: PoolClient, pl
   if (plan.operation_id!=="operations.recover") return undefined
   const step=evidence.steps[0]
   if (evidence.steps.length!==1 || step.kind!=="service" || step.service!=="routing.community.scoped.recover") return undefined
-  if (plan.operation_version!==7 || step.input.mode!=="manual") throw fail("Manual recovery action version/mode differs")
+  if (plan.operation_version!==findMcpOperation(plan.operation_id)?.version) throw new McpError("PLAN_EXPIRED", "Версия операции изменилась; подготовьте новый план", 409)
+  if (step.input.mode!=="manual") throw fail("Manual recovery mode differs")
   const { loadScopedManualRecoveryAdmissionWithinOwner } = await import("./routing-community-scoped-recovery.js")
   const loaded = await loadScopedManualRecoveryAdmissionWithinOwner(step.input, actor, db)
   const { source } = loaded
@@ -92,7 +94,7 @@ function expectedBinding(selected: NonNullable<Awaited<ReturnType<typeof selectM
   return manualInverseBindingSchema.parse({revision:1,recoveryOperationId:operationId,recoveryPlanId:plan.id,
     sourceOperationId:selected.source.row.id,sourcePlanId:selected.source.row.source_plan_id,sourceStepIndex:0,profileId:authority.profileId,profileVersion:authority.profileVersion,
     connectionId:actor.connectionId,ownerId:authority.ownerId,originalPrincipal:principal.parse(selected.input.principal),recoveryPrincipal:actor,
-    operationVersion:7,sourceVersion:7,authorityProof:selected.authority.proof,sourceProof:selected.source.sourceProof,
+    operationVersion:plan.operation_version,sourceVersion:selected.source.row.source_version,authorityProof:selected.authority.proof,sourceProof:selected.source.sourceProof,
     sourceRequestProof:selected.input.requestProof,recoveryRequestProof:selected.recoveryInput.requestProof,
     sourceEvidenceProof:selected.sourceEvidenceProof,recoveryEvidenceProof:fingerprint(plan.evidence.sealed),
     recoveryPayloadProof:fingerprint(plan.payload.sealed),scope:authority.scope,createdAt:observedAt,chargeUnits:1})
@@ -134,7 +136,7 @@ export async function admitManualInverseWithinOwner(db: PoolClient, operationId:
 /** A committed charge is required before the existing manual native intent.
  * This authenticates identity only; existing live/native authority still runs. */
 export async function assertManualInverseChargeWithinOwner(db:PoolClient,operationId:string,input:Record<string,unknown>,actor:McpPrincipal) {
-  const rows=(await db.query<StoredPlan>("SELECT p.* FROM mcp_operations o JOIN mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id WHERE o.id=$1 AND o.connection_id=$2 AND o.state='running' AND p.state='executing' AND p.operation_id='operations.recover' AND p.operation_version=7",[operationId,actor.connectionId])).rows
+  const rows=(await db.query<StoredPlan>("SELECT p.* FROM mcp_operations o JOIN mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id WHERE o.id=$1 AND o.connection_id=$2 AND o.state='running' AND p.state='executing' AND p.operation_id='operations.recover' AND p.operation_version=$3",[operationId,actor.connectionId,findMcpOperation("operations.recover")?.version])).rows
   if(rows.length!==1) throw fail("Manual native claim requires current running action version")
   const plan=rows[0], evidence=JSON.parse(await decryptSecretExisting(plan.evidence.sealed)) as ChangeEvidence
   const step=evidence.steps[0]
@@ -154,7 +156,7 @@ export async function assertManualInverseChargeWithinOwner(db:PoolClient,operati
 export async function authenticateManualInverseHistoryWithinOwner(db:PoolClient,
   intent:{revision?:number;manualInverseCharge?:ManualInverseReceipt;operationId:string;sourceOperationId:string;sourceReceiptId:string;sourceProof:string;requestSeal:string;connectionId:string;ownerId:string},
   authority:z.infer<typeof routingProfileAuthorityBindingSchema>,observedAt:string,
-  identity:{sourceEvidenceProof:string;recoveryEvidenceProof:string;recoveryPlanId:string|null;sourcePlanId:string|null;sourceRequestProof:unknown;sourcePrincipal:unknown;recoveryPrincipal:unknown}) {
+  identity:{sourceEvidenceProof:string;recoveryEvidenceProof:string;recoveryPlanId:string|null;recoveryVersion:number|null;sourcePlanId:string|null;sourceRequestProof:unknown;sourcePrincipal:unknown;recoveryPrincipal:unknown}) {
   const rows=(await db.query<ChargeRow>(`SELECT ${columns} FROM mcp_routing_manual_inverse_charges WHERE recovery_operation_id=$1 OR source_operation_id=$2 LIMIT 3`,[intent.operationId,intent.sourceOperationId])).rows
   const copy = intent.revision === 2 ? await authenticateCopy(intent.manualInverseCharge, observedAt) : undefined
   if (!rows.length && !copy) return false
@@ -166,7 +168,8 @@ export async function authenticateManualInverseHistoryWithinOwner(db:PoolClient,
     value.profileId!==authority.packet.profileId || value.profileVersion!==authority.packet.profileVersion || value.authorityProof!==authority.proof ||
     value.connectionId!==intent.connectionId || value.ownerId!==intent.ownerId || value.sourceProof!==intent.sourceProof ||
     value.recoveryRequestProof!==intent.requestSeal || value.sourceEvidenceProof!==identity.sourceEvidenceProof ||
-    value.recoveryEvidenceProof!==identity.recoveryEvidenceProof || value.recoveryPlanId!==identity.recoveryPlanId || value.sourcePlanId!==identity.sourcePlanId)throw fail("Historical inverse is not represented by its signed allocation")
+    value.recoveryEvidenceProof!==identity.recoveryEvidenceProof || value.recoveryPlanId!==identity.recoveryPlanId ||
+    value.operationVersion!==identity.recoveryVersion || value.sourcePlanId!==identity.sourcePlanId)throw fail("Historical inverse is not represented by its signed allocation")
   // Only revision2 needs this extra one-row bounded projection; preserve the
   // existing cursor page payload ceiling and legacy protocol untouched.
   const payload = copy ? (await db.query<{sealed:string|null}>("SELECT CASE WHEN octet_length(payload::text)<=1048576 THEN payload->>'sealed' END AS sealed FROM mcp_plans WHERE id=$1 LIMIT 2",[identity.recoveryPlanId])).rows : []
@@ -201,11 +204,11 @@ export async function retainManualInverseChargesWithinOwner(db: PoolClient, rete
       " WHERE r.mode='manual' AND r.source_operation_id=$1 AND r.source_step_index=0 AND r.recovery_operation_id=$2",[candidate.source_operation_id,candidate.recovery_operation_id])).rows
     if(rows.length!==1)throw fail("Retention intent/source pair disappeared")
     const row=rows[0],classified=await classifyManualInverseHistory(row,observedAt)
-    if(classified.kind!=="persistent" || classified.intent.revision!==2 || row.recovery_version!==7 ||
+    if(classified.kind!=="persistent" || classified.intent.revision!==2 || row.recovery_version!==classified.intent.manualInverseCharge.binding.operationVersion ||
         row.authority_profile_version!==candidate.profile_version || row.authority_profile_version!==classified.intent.manualInverseCharge.binding.profileVersion)
       throw fail("Retention hint is not an authenticated persistent intent2")
     if(!await authenticateManualInverseHistoryWithinOwner(db,classified.intent,classified.authority,observedAt,{
-      sourceEvidenceProof:fingerprint(row.source_evidence),recoveryEvidenceProof:fingerprint(row.recovery_evidence),recoveryPlanId:row.recovery_plan_id,sourcePlanId:row.source_plan_id,sourceRequestProof:classified.sourceRequestProof,sourcePrincipal:classified.sourcePrincipal,recoveryPrincipal:classified.recoveryPrincipal}))
+      sourceEvidenceProof:fingerprint(row.source_evidence),recoveryEvidenceProof:fingerprint(row.recovery_evidence),recoveryPlanId:row.recovery_plan_id,recoveryVersion:row.recovery_version,sourcePlanId:row.source_plan_id,sourceRequestProof:classified.sourceRequestProof,sourcePrincipal:classified.sourcePrincipal,recoveryPrincipal:classified.recoveryPrincipal}))
       throw fail("Retention parent is not authenticated")
     const result=await db.query("DELETE FROM mcp_routing_manual_inverse_charges WHERE recovery_operation_id=$1 AND source_operation_id=$2",[candidate.recovery_operation_id,candidate.source_operation_id])
     if(result.rowCount!==1)throw fail("Retention parent delete was not confirmed")

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-model.test.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import assert from "node:assert/strict"
 import { test } from "node:test"
 import { routeAiProfileSchema, type RouteObservation } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp-routing"
-import { rankRoutingCandidates, decideRoutingSwitch, type ControllerState, type PathHealth } from "./routing-model.js"
+import { rankRoutingCandidates, decideRoutingSwitch, selectFailoverReserveProbes, type ControllerState, type PathHealth } from "./routing-model.js"
 
 const now = Date.parse("2026-10-17T10:00:00Z"), at = new Date(now).toISOString()
 const profile = routeAiProfileSchema.parse({ name: "Test", serverId: 1, community: "65000:10", family: "ipv4", candidates: [
@@ -43,14 +43,63 @@ test("new unknown attempts block older successful data independently for each me
 test("failover requires three distinct failures and a freshly verified eligible standby", () => {
   const ranking = rankRoutingCandidates(profile, [...a, sample("b1", 1, 4, "wan-b"), sample("b2", 4, 3, "exit-b")], now)
   let state: ControllerState = {}
-  const health = (id: string, status: PathHealth["status"] = "failed"): PathHealth[] => [{ id, candidateId: "a", status, observedAt: at }, { id: "reserve", candidateId: "b", status: "passed", observedAt: at }]
+  const health = (id: string, time = now, status: PathHealth["status"] = "failed"): PathHealth[] => {
+    const observedAt = new Date(time).toISOString()
+    return [{ id, candidateId: "a", status, observedAt }, { id: "reserve", candidateId: "b", status: "passed", observedAt }]
+  }
   for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) { const next = decideRoutingSwitch(profile, state, ranking, "a", now, health("one")); state = next.state; assert.equal(next.switchTo, null) }
   assert.equal(state.failureCount, 1)
-  const second = decideRoutingSwitch(profile, state, ranking, "a", now, health("two")); assert.equal(second.switchTo, null)
+  const secondAt = now + 60000, thirdAt = now + 120000
-  assert.equal(decideRoutingSwitch(profile, second.state, ranking, "a", now, health("three")).switchTo, "b")
+  const second = decideRoutingSwitch(profile, state, ranking, "a", secondAt, health("two", secondAt)); assert.equal(second.switchTo, null)
-  assert.equal(decideRoutingSwitch(profile, second.state, ranking, "a", now, health("three", "unknown")).switchTo, null)
+  assert.equal(decideRoutingSwitch(profile, second.state, ranking, "a", thirdAt, health("three", thirdAt)).switchTo, "b")
-  assert.equal(decideRoutingSwitch(profile, { ...second.state, switches: [at, at, at] }, ranking, "a", now, health("three")).switchTo, null)
+  const unknown = decideRoutingSwitch(profile, second.state, ranking, "a", thirdAt, health("three", thirdAt, "unknown"))
-  assert.equal(decideRoutingSwitch(profile, second.state, ranking, "a", now + 100000, health("three")).switchTo, null)
+  assert.equal(unknown.switchTo, null)
+  assert.equal(unknown.state.failureObservedAt, undefined)
+  assert.equal(decideRoutingSwitch(profile, { ...second.state, switches: [at, at, at] }, ranking, "a", thirdAt, health("three", thirdAt)).switchTo, null)
+  assert.equal(decideRoutingSwitch(profile, second.state, ranking, "a", thirdAt + 100000, health("three", thirdAt)).switchTo, null)
+})
+test("failover starts a fresh series after downtime or legacy state and ignores reordered failures", () => {
+  const ranking = rankRoutingCandidates(profile, [...a, sample("b1", 1, 4, "wan-b"), sample("b2", 4, 3, "exit-b")], now)
+  const last = now + 60000
+  const persisted: ControllerState = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify({ failureCount: 2, failureKey: "two",
+    failureObservedAt: new Date(last).toISOString(), failingCandidateId: "a" }))
+  const check = (state: ControllerState, id: string, time: number, clock = time) => {
+    const observedAt = new Date(time).toISOString()
+    return decideRoutingSwitch(profile, state, ranking, "a", clock,
+      [{ id, candidateId: "a", status: "failed", observedAt }, { id: "reserve", candidateId: "b", status: "passed", observedAt }])
+  }
+  for (const result of [check(persisted, "two", last + 60000), check(persisted, "older", last - 1000, last),
+    check(persisted, "clock-rollback", last - 1000), check(persisted, "equal-time", last)]) {
+    assert.equal(result.switchTo, null)
+    assert.equal(result.state.failureCount, 2)
+    assert.equal(result.state.failureObservedAt, persisted.failureObservedAt)
+  }
+  for (const [state, time] of [[persisted, now + 4 * 3600000], [{ ...persisted, failureObservedAt: undefined }, last + 60000]] as const) {
+    const result = check(state, "next", time)
+    assert.equal(result.switchTo, null)
+    assert.equal(result.state.failureCount, 1)
+    assert.equal(result.state.failureObservedAt, new Date(time).toISOString())
+  }
+})
+test("bounded failover probing keeps the highest eligible reserve and eventually visits every other eligible probe", () => {
+  const controlProbe = { targetInterface: "exit-a", expectedHops: [{ serverId: 3, interface: "exit-a" }] }
+  const configured = routeAiProfileSchema.parse({ ...profile, excludedCandidateIds: ["05"],
+    candidates: Array.from({ length: 100 }, (_, index) => ({ ...profile.candidates[0], id: String(index).padStart(2, "0"),
+      controlProbe: index === 4 ? undefined : controlProbe })) })
+  const ranking = rankRoutingCandidates(configured, a, now)
+  const expected = ranking.filter(row => row.eligible && row.candidate.controlProbe && !["00", "01"].includes(row.candidate.id)).map(row => row.candidate.id)
+  let cursor: string | undefined
+  for (const alternate of expected) {
+    const probes = selectFailoverReserveProbes(ranking, "00", cursor)
+    assert.deepEqual(probes.candidateIds, ["01", alternate])
+    assert.equal(probes.cursor, alternate)
+    cursor = probes.cursor
+  }
+  assert.deepEqual(selectFailoverReserveProbes(ranking, "00", cursor).candidateIds, ["01", "02"])
+  assert.deepEqual(selectFailoverReserveProbes(ranking, "00", "05").candidateIds, ["01", "02"])
+  const pinned = rankRoutingCandidates({ ...configured, pinnedCandidateId: "09" }, a, now)
+  assert.deepEqual(selectFailoverReserveProbes(pinned, "00"), { candidateIds: ["09"], cursor: undefined })
+  assert.deepEqual(selectFailoverReserveProbes(pinned, "09"), { candidateIds: [], cursor: undefined })
 })
 test("routing combines RTT, independent losses and bottleneck speed, never claims an observed path", () => {
   const ranked = rankRoutingCandidates(profile, a, now).find(row => row.candidate.id === "a")!
@@ -92,3 +141,63 @@ test("controller does not count polling the same sample as consecutive confirmat
   assert.equal(decideRoutingSwitch(profile, { ...state, switches: [at, at, at] }, ranks, "a", now).switchTo, null)
   assert.equal(decideRoutingSwitch(profile, state, ranks, null, now).switchTo, null)
 })
+
+test("hysteresis retains pending confirmation without counting sub-threshold observations or releasing cooldown", () => {
+  const ranked = rankRoutingCandidates(profile, [...a, sample("b1", 1, 4, "wan-b"), sample("b2", 4, 3, "exit-b")], now)
+  const compare = (state: ControllerState, gain: number, observation: string, time = now) => {
+    const ranks = ["b", "a"].map(id => ({ ...ranked.find(row => row.candidate.id === id)!,
+      score: id === "a" ? 50 : 50 + gain, observationIds: [id + observation] }))
+    return decideRoutingSwitch(profile, state, ranks, "a", time)
+  }
+
+  const initial = compare({}, 15, "1").state
+  assert.equal(initial.consecutive, 1)
+  for (const [gain, observation] of [[6, "2"], [5, "3"]] as const) {
+    const result = compare(initial, gain, observation)
+    assert.equal(result.switchTo, null)
+    assert.deepEqual(result.state, initial)
+  }
+  const reset = compare(initial, 4, "4")
+  assert.equal(reset.state.pendingCandidateId, undefined)
+  assert.equal(reset.state.consecutive, 0)
+
+  const second = compare(initial, 15, "5")
+  assert.equal(second.switchTo, null)
+  const third = compare({ ...second.state, lastSwitchAt: at }, 15, "6")
+  assert.equal(third.state.consecutive, 3)
+  assert.equal(third.switchTo, null)
+
+  const afterCooldown = now + profile.cooldownSec * 1000
+  assert.equal(compare(third.state, 6, "7", afterCooldown).switchTo, null)
+  assert.equal(compare(third.state, 15, "8", afterCooldown).switchTo, "b")
+})
+
+test("a different pending candidate cannot borrow confirmations from a shared observation key", () => {
+  const ranks = rankRoutingCandidates(profile, [...a, sample("b1", 1, 4, "wan-b"), sample("b2", 4, 3, "exit-b")], now)
+    .map(row => ({ ...row, score: row.candidate.id === "a" ? 50 : 75 }))
+    .sort((left, right) => right.score - left.score)
+  const observationKey = ranks.flatMap(row => row.observationIds).sort().join(":")
+  const persisted: ControllerState = { pendingCandidateId: "previous-candidate", consecutive: 3, observationKey }
+  const selected = decideRoutingSwitch(profile, persisted, ranks, "a", now)
+  assert.equal(selected.switchTo, null)
+  assert.equal(selected.state.pendingCandidateId, "b")
+  assert.equal(selected.state.consecutive, 0)
+  assert.equal(selected.state.observationKey, observationKey)
+
+  const replay = decideRoutingSwitch(profile, selected.state, ranks, "a", now)
+  assert.equal(replay.switchTo, null)
+  assert.equal(replay.state.consecutive, 0)
+
+  const freshRanks = [{ ...ranks[0], observationIds: ["new-b-1", "new-b-2"] }, ranks[1]]
+  const fresh = decideRoutingSwitch(profile, replay.state, freshRanks, "a", now)
+  assert.equal(fresh.state.consecutive, 1)
+  assert.equal(fresh.switchTo, null)
+
+  const belowFloor = [{ ...freshRanks[0], score: 54 }, freshRanks[1]]
+  const reset = decideRoutingSwitch(profile, fresh.state, belowFloor, "a", now)
+  assert.equal(reset.state.pendingCandidateId, undefined)
+  assert.equal(reset.state.consecutive, 0)
+  const replayAfterReset = decideRoutingSwitch(profile, reset.state, freshRanks, "a", now)
+  assert.equal(replayAfterReset.switchTo, null)
+  assert.equal(replayAfterReset.state.consecutive, 0)
+})

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-model.ts

@@ -51,36 +51,58 @@ export function rankRoutingCandidates(profile: RouteAiProfile, observations: Rou
 }
 
 export interface PathHealth { id: string; candidateId: string; status: "passed" | "failed" | "unknown"; observedAt: string }
-export interface ControllerState { pendingCandidateId?: string; consecutive?: number; observationKey?: string; lastSwitchAt?: string; switches?: string[]; operationId?: string; pausedReason?: string; failureCount?: number; failureKey?: string; failingCandidateId?: string }
+export interface ControllerState { pendingCandidateId?: string; consecutive?: number; observationKey?: string; lastSwitchAt?: string; switches?: string[]; operationId?: string; pausedReason?: string; failureCount?: number; failureKey?: string; failureObservedAt?: string; failingCandidateId?: string }
+
+export function selectFailoverReserveProbes(ranking: ReturnType<typeof rankRoutingCandidates>, currentCandidateId: string, previous?: string) {
+  const standbys = ranking.filter(({ candidate, eligible }) => eligible && candidate.id !== currentCandidateId && candidate.controlProbe)
+    .map(({ candidate }) => candidate.id)
+  const [preferred, ...remaining] = standbys
+  if (remaining.length === 0) return { candidateIds: standbys, cursor: undefined }
+  const index = remaining.indexOf(previous ?? "")
+  const cursor = remaining[(index + 1) % remaining.length]
+  return { candidateIds: [preferred, cursor], cursor }
+}
+
+const pathHealthFreshnessSec = 90
 export function decideRoutingSwitch(profile: RouteAiProfile, state: ControllerState, ranking: ReturnType<typeof rankRoutingCandidates>, currentCandidateId: string | null, now = Date.now(), health: PathHealth[] = [], chargedSwitchesPerHour?: number) {
   const next: ControllerState = { ...state, switches: (state.switches ?? []).filter(at => now - Date.parse(at) < 3600000) }
   if (chargedSwitchesPerHour !== undefined && (!Number.isSafeInteger(chargedSwitchesPerHour) || chargedSwitchesPerHour < next.switches!.length || chargedSwitchesPerHour > 4096)) throw Error("Invalid common routing charge count")
   const switchCount = chargedSwitchesPerHour ?? next.switches!.length
   const best = ranking.find(candidate => candidate.eligible), current = ranking.find(candidate => candidate.candidate.id === currentCandidateId)
-  const currentHealth = health.find(value => value.candidateId === currentCandidateId && fresh(value.observedAt, 90, now))
+  const currentHealth = health.find(value => value.candidateId === currentCandidateId && fresh(value.observedAt, pathHealthFreshnessSec, now))
   if (currentHealth?.status === "failed" && currentCandidateId && !state.pausedReason) {
-    if (state.failureKey !== currentHealth.id) {
+    const observed = Date.parse(currentHealth.observedAt), previous = Date.parse(state.failureObservedAt ?? "")
-      next.failureCount = state.failingCandidateId === currentCandidateId ? (state.failureCount ?? 0) + 1 : 1
+    const sameCandidate = state.failingCandidateId === currentCandidateId
-      next.failureKey = currentHealth.id; next.failingCandidateId = currentCandidateId
+    if (state.failureKey === currentHealth.id) {
+      if (!sameCandidate || observed !== previous) return { state: next, switchTo: null, reason: "Ожидание новой проверки отказа" }
+    } else {
+      if (observed <= previous) return { state: next, switchTo: null, reason: "Ожидание новой проверки отказа" }
+      const continues = sameCandidate && fresh(state.failureObservedAt ?? null, pathHealthFreshnessSec, observed)
+      next.failureCount = continues ? (state.failureCount ?? 0) + 1 : 1
+      next.failureKey = currentHealth.id; next.failureObservedAt = currentHealth.observedAt; next.failingCandidateId = currentCandidateId
     }
-    const reserve = ranking.find(value => value.eligible && value.candidate.id !== currentCandidateId && health.some(check => check.candidateId === value.candidate.id && check.status === "passed" && fresh(check.observedAt, 90, now)))
+    const reserve = ranking.find(value => value.eligible && value.candidate.id !== currentCandidateId && health.some(check => check.candidateId === value.candidate.id && check.status === "passed" && fresh(check.observedAt, pathHealthFreshnessSec, now)))
     if ((next.failureCount ?? 0) < 3 || !reserve) return { state: next, switchTo: null, reason: "Failover ожидает три отдельных отказа и подтверждённый резерв" }
     if (switchCount >= profile.maxSwitchesPerHour) return { state: { ...next, pausedReason: "Лимит переключений" }, switchTo: null, reason: "Исчерпан часовой бюджет, включая failover" }
     if (next.lastSwitchAt && now - Date.parse(next.lastSwitchAt) < profile.cooldownSec * 1000) return { state: next, switchTo: null, reason: "Failover ожидает окончания cooldown" }
     return { state: { ...next, failureCount: 0 }, switchTo: reserve.candidate.id, reason: "Failover: три подтверждённых отказа и проверенный резерв" }
   }
-  next.failureCount = 0; next.failureKey = undefined; next.failingCandidateId = undefined
+  next.failureCount = 0; next.failureKey = undefined; next.failureObservedAt = undefined; next.failingCandidateId = undefined
   if (state.pausedReason || !currentCandidateId || !best || best.candidate.id === currentCandidateId) return { state: { ...next, pendingCandidateId: undefined, consecutive: 0 }, switchTo: null, reason: "Нет подтверждённого улучшения или текущего пути" }
   if (!current?.eligible || current.score === null) return { state: next, switchTo: null, reason: "Состояние текущего пути неизвестно; failover требует отдельных подтверждённых проверок отказа" }
   const gain = best.score! - current.score
   if (gain < Math.max(0, profile.switchThreshold - profile.hysteresis)) return { state: { ...next, consecutive: 0, pendingCandidateId: undefined }, switchTo: null, reason: "Сработал гистерезис" }
-  if (gain < profile.switchThreshold && next.pendingCandidateId !== best.candidate.id) return { state: next, switchTo: null, reason: "Порог улучшения не достигнут" }
+  if (gain < profile.switchThreshold) return { state: next, switchTo: null, reason: "Порог улучшения не достигнут" }
   const observationKey = [...best.observationIds, ...current.observationIds].sort().join(":")
+  if (next.pendingCandidateId !== undefined && next.pendingCandidateId !== best.candidate.id) {
+    next.pendingCandidateId = best.candidate.id
+    next.consecutive = 0
+  }
   if (observationKey !== next.observationKey) {
     next.consecutive = next.pendingCandidateId === best.candidate.id ? (next.consecutive ?? 0) + 1 : 1
     next.pendingCandidateId = best.candidate.id; next.observationKey = observationKey
   }
-  if ((next.consecutive ?? 0) < profile.confirmationSamples) return { state: next, switchTo: null, reason: "Ожидание новых измерений" }
+  if (next.pendingCandidateId !== best.candidate.id || (next.consecutive ?? 0) < profile.confirmationSamples) return { state: next, switchTo: null, reason: "Ожидание новых измерений" }
   if (next.lastSwitchAt && now - Date.parse(next.lastSwitchAt) < profile.cooldownSec * 1000) return { state: next, switchTo: null, reason: "Cooldown" }
   if (switchCount >= profile.maxSwitchesPerHour) return { state: { ...next, pausedReason: "Лимит переключений" }, switchTo: null, reason: "Исчерпан часовой бюджет переключений" }
   return { state: next, switchTo: best.candidate.id, reason: "Улучшение подтверждено свежими наблюдениями" }

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-native-endpoint.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+import { isIP } from "node:net"
+
+export function parseRoutingEndpoint(value: unknown) {
+  if (typeof value !== "string" || !value.length || value.length > 256) throw Error("missing-or-unsupported-field")
+  const match = /^([^%@/,\s]+)(?:\/(\d+))?(?:%([^%@/,\s]+))?(?:@([^%@/,\s]+))?$/.exec(value)
+  if (!match) throw Error("unsupported-endpoint")
+  const [, address, prefix, interfaceName, vrf] = match
+  const family = isIP(address)
+  if (!family) throw Error("unsupported-address")
+  if (prefix !== undefined && prefix !== String(family === 4 ? 32 : 128)) throw Error("unsupported-peer-range")
+  return { address, interface: interfaceName, vrf }
+}
+
+export function matchesBgpSessionContext(
+  row: Record<string, unknown>,
+  expected: { table: string; vrf: string },
+  local: ReturnType<typeof parseRoutingEndpoint>,
+  remote: ReturnType<typeof parseRoutingEndpoint>,
+) {
+  if (!Object.hasOwn(row, "routing-table") || row["routing-table"] !== expected.table) return false
+  if (Object.hasOwn(row, "vrf")) {
+    return row.vrf === expected.vrf && (local.vrf === undefined || local.vrf === expected.vrf) &&
+      (remote.vrf === undefined || remote.vrf === expected.vrf)
+  }
+  // RouterOS may report the transport VRF only in the two runtime addresses.
+  // The installation table alone cannot identify it.
+  return local.vrf === expected.vrf && remote.vrf === expected.vrf
+}

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-network-forward-rounds.owned.test.ts

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ assert(process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR && isAbsolute(process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR))
 assert.equal(basename(resolve(process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR)), "state")
 assert(basename(dirname(resolve(process.env.MCP_STATE_DIR))).startsWith("mm-mcp-test-"))
 const originalEffects = process.env.MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_ORIGINAL_EFFECTS === "true"
+const controllerFailoverOnly = process.env.MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_CONTROLLER_FAILOVER_ONLY === "true"
+assert(!controllerFailoverOnly || originalEffects, "Focused controller failover requires the owned original-effects fixture")
 assert(!(originalEffects && process.env.MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_WORKER_REPRO === "true"), "Owned effect acceptance cannot mix with the worker repro profile")
 process.env.AUTH_REQUIRED = "true"
 process.env.AUTH_JWT_SECRET = "owned-routing-forward-rounds-acceptance-secret"
@@ -35,7 +37,7 @@ try {
     console.log("Worker fixture repro:",await (await import("./routing-worker-fixture-isolation.sql-helper.js")).acceptRoutingWorkerFixtureIsolation(actor))
   }
   const result = await (await import("./routing-community-scoped-acceptance.js")).acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor,
-    originalEffects ? { originalEffectsOnly: true } : process.env.MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_WORKER_REPRO==="true"?{}:{ forwardRoundsOnly: true })
+    originalEffects ? { originalEffectsOnly: true, controllerFailoverOnly } : process.env.MMAPP_OWN_ROUTING_WORKER_REPRO==="true"?{}:{ forwardRoundsOnly: true })
   assert.equal(result.accepted, true)
 } finally {
   await (await import("../../services/scheduler.js")).stopSchedulerForDatabaseOperation()

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-network-native-parser.test.ts

@@ -154,6 +154,25 @@ for (const mutation of ["duplicate-config", "wrong-config-id", "unresolved-templ
   assert.equal(f.parser.parseBgp("peer1", raw).status, "unknown")
 })
 
+for (const ipv6 of [false, true]) test("BGP runtime context can come from both exact qualified " + (ipv6 ? "IPv6" : "IPv4") + " endpoints", () => {
+  const f = fixture(ipv6), raw = structuredClone(f.bgp) as unknown as RawMutation, session = raw.payload[0]
+  const local = session["local.address"], remote = session["remote.address"]
+  delete session.vrf
+  session["local.address"] = `${local}@main`
+  session["remote.address"] = `${remote}@main`
+  const observation = f.parser.parseBgp("peer1", raw)
+  assert.equal(observation.status, "observed", JSON.stringify(observation))
+  assert.equal(observation.securityProof, false)
+  for (const mutation of [
+    { "remote.address": remote }, { "remote.address": `${remote}@tenant` },
+    { "remote.address": `${remote}@main@main` }, { "routing-table": "main" },
+    { vrf: "tenant" }, { vrf: null },
+  ]) {
+    assert.equal(f.parser.parseBgp("peer1", { ...raw, payload: [{ ...session, ...mutation }] }).status, "unknown")
+  }
+  assert.equal(f.parser.parseBgp("peer1", { ...raw, payload: [session, { ...session, ".id": "*B3" }] }).status, "unknown")
+})
+
 test("native cached non-established BGP cannot invent a model FSM state from an undocumented field", () => {
   const f = fixture(), raw = structuredClone(f.bgp) as unknown as RawMutation
   raw.payload[0].established = "false"

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-network-native-parser.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { isIP } from "node:net"
 import { z } from "zod"
 import { canonicalBgpPolicyPrefix } from "../../services/bgp-community-policy-model.js"
 import { captureRoutingNetworkManifest, type RoutingNetworkRound } from "./routing-network-verifier-model.js"
+import { matchesBgpSessionContext, parseRoutingEndpoint } from "./routing-native-endpoint.js"
 
 /** Pure decoded-response parsers, NOT source authentication or completeness
  * proof. Only the explicit RouterOS7.20–7.26 field subset below is recognized.
@@ -32,11 +33,8 @@ function canonicalAddress(value: unknown): string {
   return canonicalBgpPolicyPrefix(text + "/" + (family === 4 ? 32 : 128)).split("/")[0]
 }
 function endpoint(value: unknown) {
-  const text = literal(value), match = /^([^%@/,\s]+)(?:\/(\d+))?(?:%([^%@/,\s]+))?(?:@([^%@/,\s]+))?$/.exec(text)
+  const parsed = parseRoutingEndpoint(value)
-  if (!match) return fail("unsupported-endpoint")
+  return { ...parsed, address: canonicalAddress(parsed.address) }
-  const address = canonicalAddress(match[1])
-  if (match[2] !== undefined && match[2] !== String(isIP(address) === 4 ? 32 : 128)) return fail("unsupported-peer-range")
-  return { address, interface: match[3], vrf: match[4] }
 }
 function decodedRows(payload: unknown, maximum = 1000, ids = true): Row[] {
   let nodes = 0
@@ -144,7 +142,7 @@ export function captureRoutingNetworkNativeParser(rawManifest: unknown) {
         if (instance !== wanted.instance) continue
         if (local.address !== wanted.localAddress || remote.address !== wanted.remoteAddress) continue
         if (integer(row["remote.as"], 4294967295) !== wanted.remoteAsn || !afi(row["remote.afi"]).includes(expectedAfi) || !afi(row["local.afi"]).includes(expectedAfi)) return unknown("bgp-session-asn-or-afi-drift")
-        if (row.vrf !== binding.vrf || row["routing-table"] !== binding.table || [local.vrf, remote.vrf].some(vrf => vrf !== undefined && vrf !== binding.vrf) || local.interface !== binding.local.interface || remote.interface !== binding.remote.interface) return unknown("bgp-session-context-drift")
+        if (!matchesBgpSessionContext(row, binding, local, remote) || local.interface !== binding.local.interface || remote.interface !== binding.remote.interface) return unknown("bgp-session-context-drift")
         relevant.push(row)
       }
       if (relevant.length !== 1) return unknown("missing-or-ambiguous-bgp-session")

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-network-scoped-context.test.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ import { nativeBgpRows, bgpTemplateReferences } from "../../services/bgp-export-
 import { bgpFilterName, effectiveBgpFilter, stableBgpPolicyRow } from "../../services/bgp-filter-binding-model.js"
 import { canonicalVrfMembers } from "../../services/vrf-members.js"
 import { readOspfEffectiveDisabled } from "../../services/ospf-effective-disabled.js"
+import { isConfirmedRoutingFibTable } from "../../services/routing-table-fib.js"
 import * as contextModel from "./routing-community-context-model.js"
+import { prepareOriginalEffectSelection } from "./routing-original-effects.js"
 import { readMeasurementAddress } from "./routing-measurement-address.js"
 import { routeContextClients } from "./routing-community-context-native.js"
 import { pathProofTag } from "./path-proof-purpose.js"
@@ -65,9 +67,8 @@ async function fixture(autoRecovery = false) {
     afterHttp?.(); afterHttp = undefined
     if (afterPath?.path === path) { const run = afterPath.run; afterPath = undefined; run() }
   })
-  await new Promise<void>(resolve => router.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve))
   const now = Date.now(), fingerprint = (value: unknown) => createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify(value)).digest("hex")
-  const endpoint = { id: 1, host: "127.0.0.1", port: (router.address() as { port: number }).port, username: "fixture", password: "private", useSsl: false, verifySsl: true, enabled: true, routingEndpointEpoch: randomUUID() }
+  const endpoint = { id: 1, host: "127.0.0.1", port: 0, username: "fixture", password: "private", useSsl: false, verifySsl: true, enabled: true, routingEndpointEpoch: randomUUID() }
   const principal = { connectionId: randomUUID(), credentialId: randomUUID(), credentialExpiresAt: new Date(now + 600000).toISOString() }
   const connection = { id: principal.connectionId, owner_id: "owner", generation: "generation", owner_permissions: ["mm:network:read"],
     policy: { permissions: ["mm:network:read"], scope: { serverIds: [1] }, expiresAt: new Date(now + 600000).toISOString() }, owner_valid_until: new Date(now + 600000) }
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@ async function fixture(autoRecovery = false) {
     "./routing-community-context-native.js": { routeContextClients }, "../../services/vrf-members.js": { canonicalVrfMembers }, "../../services/ospf-effective-disabled.js": { readOspfEffectiveDisabled },
     "./routing-measurement-address.js": { readMeasurementAddress } }
   await loadSource("./routing-community-context.ts", { ...common, "./routing-network-native-session.js": native,
+    "../../services/routing-table-fib.js": { isConfirmedRoutingFibTable }, "./routing-original-effects.js": { prepareOriginalEffectSelection },
     "../../services/bgp-export-model.js": { nativeBgpRows, bgpTemplateReferences }, "../../services/bgp-filter-binding-model.js": { bgpFilterName, effectiveBgpFilter, stableBgpPolicyRow },
     "./routing-community-context-model.js": contextModel, "./path-proof-purpose.js": { pathProofTag },
     "./management-transport.js": { assertManagementTransport: async () => { throw Error("No alternate management fixture") } } }, context)
@@ -103,14 +105,23 @@ async function fixture(autoRecovery = false) {
   await loadSource("./routing-network-scoped-context.ts", { "./routing-network-native-session.js": native }, privateApi)
   const create = native.createRoutingNetworkNativeSession as (options: unknown) => Promise<Session>
   const abort = new AbortController()
-  const session = await create({ sourceOperationId: row.id, context: { principal, connection, signal: abort.signal }, authorize: authority, deadline: now + 119000, manifest: { servers: [1], probes: [] } })
+  await new Promise<void>(resolve => router.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve))
+  endpoint.port = (router.address() as { port: number }).port
+  const closeRouter = () => {
+    router.closeAllConnections()
+    return new Promise<void>(resolve => router.close(() => resolve()))
+  }
+  const session = await create({ sourceOperationId: row.id, context: { principal, connection, signal: abort.signal }, authorize: authority, deadline: now + 119000, manifest: { servers: [1], probes: [] } }).catch(async error => {
+    await closeRouter()
+    throw error
+  })
   const readContext = privateApi.readRoutingNetworkScopedCommunityContext as (token: Token) => Promise<Context>
   return { session, readContext: () => readContext(session.sharedContext), forged: () => readContext(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(session.sharedContext))),
     readResource: native.readRoutingNetworkSharedResource as (token: Token, server: number, path: string, body?: Record<string, string>) => Promise<unknown>,
     bypassTail: context.readRouteCommunityContextWithSharedNativeSession as (token: Token) => Promise<unknown>,
     counters: () => ({ requests, wireBytes, wireRows, rawGetObjects }), bulk: (value: number) => { bulk = value }, padding: (value: number) => { padding = value },
     revoke: () => { revoked = true }, abort: () => abort.abort(), afterHttp: (hook: () => void) => { afterHttp = hook }, afterPath: (path: string, hook: () => void) => { afterPath = { path, run: hook } },
-    cleanup: async () => { session.close(); router.closeAllConnections(); await new Promise<void>(resolve => router.close(() => resolve())) } }
+    cleanup: async () => { session.close(); await closeRouter() } }
 }
 
 test("actual source context and snapshots share one pinned HTTP request/byte/row budget including object /get", async () => {

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-original-effects-controller.test.mjs

@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ const require=createRequire(new URL('../../../package.json',import.meta.url)),ts
 const hash=value=>createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(value)).digest('hex'),sign=async(value,purpose)=>hash([purpose,value]);
 const code=ts.transpileModule(await readFile(new URL('./routing-controller-baseline.ts',import.meta.url),'utf8'),{compilerOptions:{module:ts.ModuleKind.CommonJS,target:ts.ScriptTarget.ES2022}}).outputText;
 const effectCode=ts.transpileModule(await readFile(new URL('./routing-original-effects.ts',import.meta.url),'utf8'),{compilerOptions:{module:ts.ModuleKind.CommonJS,target:ts.ScriptTarget.ES2022}}).outputText,effectExports={};
-new Function('exports','require',effectCode)(effectExports,name=>{if(name==='node:net')return require('node:net');if(name==='zod')return{z};if(name==='./security.js')return{fingerprint:hash};if(name==='./routing-community-context-model.js')return{};throw Error(name);});
+const endpointCode=ts.transpileModule(await readFile(new URL('./routing-native-endpoint.ts',import.meta.url),'utf8'),{compilerOptions:{module:ts.ModuleKind.CommonJS,target:ts.ScriptTarget.ES2022}}).outputText,endpointExports={};
+new Function('exports','require',endpointCode)(endpointExports,require);
+new Function('exports','require',effectCode)(effectExports,name=>{if(name==='node:net')return require('node:net');if(name==='zod')return{z};if(name==='./security.js')return{fingerprint:hash};if(name==='./routing-community-context-model.js')return{};if(name==='./routing-native-endpoint.js')return endpointExports;throw Error(name);});
 const preparedValue={status:'prepared',revision:1,serverId:1,routeSelectionScope:'table-afi-community-observation',candidateId:'b',family:'ipv4',table:'tenant',community:'65000:10',expectedGateway:'192.0.2.9',expectedImmediate:{address:'198.51.100.2',interface:'ether2'},binding:{connectionId:'*c',sessionId:'*s',instance:'default',table:'tenant',vrf:'main',localAddress:'192.0.2.1',remoteAddress:'192.0.2.2',remoteAsn:65001,afi:'ip'},bfd:{applicability:'not-configured',evidence:'explicit-use-bfd-false'},routes:[{nativeId:'*r',prefix:'203.0.113.0/24',originalGateway:'192.0.2.8'}],probe:{key:'b',serverId:1,destination:'198.51.100.20',source:'198.51.100.10',interface:'wan',probeVrf:'probe',expectedHops:['198.51.100.20']}};
 async function fixture(selection='absent',effectStatus='observed-expected',switched=true){
  const principal={connectionId:randomUUID(),credentialId:randomUUID(),credentialExpiresAt:new Date(Date.now()+120000).toISOString()},profileId=randomUUID(),planId=randomUUID(),operationId=randomUUID(),grant=new Date(Date.now()+60000).toISOString();

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-original-effects.test.mjs

@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ import { isIP } from 'node:net';
 import { randomUUID, createHash } from 'node:crypto';
 const require=createRequire(new URL('../../../package.json',import.meta.url)), ts=require('typescript'),{z}=require('zod');
 const source=await readFile(new URL('./routing-original-effects.ts',import.meta.url),'utf8');
-const exports={};
+const exports={}, endpointExports={};
+const endpointSource=await readFile(new URL('./routing-native-endpoint.ts',import.meta.url),'utf8');
+new Function('exports','require',ts.transpileModule(endpointSource,{compilerOptions:{module:ts.ModuleKind.CommonJS,target:ts.ScriptTarget.ES2022}}).outputText)(endpointExports,require);
 const gateway=value=>{const match=/^([^@%\s,]+)(?:%([^@%\s,]+))?(?:@([^@%\s,]+))?$/.exec(value);if(!match||!isIP(match[1]))throw Error();return {address:match[1],family:isIP(match[1]),interface:match[2]??null,resolverTable:match[3]??'main'};};
-const providers={ 'node:net':{isIP},'node:crypto':{randomUUID},zod:{z},'./routing-community-context-model.js':{routeGatewayContext:gateway},'./security.js':{fingerprint:value=>createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(value)).digest('hex')},
+const providers={ 'node:net':{isIP},'node:crypto':{randomUUID},zod:{z},'./routing-community-context-model.js':{routeGatewayContext:gateway},'./routing-native-endpoint.js':endpointExports,'./security.js':{fingerprint:value=>createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(value)).digest('hex')},
   './path-verification.js':{inspectControlPing:rows=>{const row=rows.at(-1),sent=Number(row.sent),received=Number(row.received);return {confirmedFailure:sent===3&&received===0,ping:{measured:sent===3&&Number.isInteger(received)&&received>=0&&received<=3,loss:(sent-received)/sent*100}};},
     inspectTrace:(rows,destination,expected)=>({verified:Array.isArray(rows)&&rows.at(-1)?.address===destination&&expected.every(x=>rows.some(r=>r.address===x))})}};
 new Function('exports','require',ts.transpileModule(source,{compilerOptions:{module:ts.ModuleKind.CommonJS,target:ts.ScriptTarget.ES2022}}).outputText)(exports,name=>{assert.ok(providers[name],name);return providers[name];});
@@ -26,11 +28,33 @@ function fixture(){
 }
 test('actual captured predicate seals BGP destinations separately from static resolver ID',()=>{const f=fixture();assert.equal(f.selection.status,'prepared');assert.equal(f.selection.routes[0].nativeId,'*r');assert.notEqual(f.selection.routes[0].nativeId,f.raw.candidate['.id']);assert.equal(f.selection.binding.sessionId,'*s');assert.equal('sessionKey'in f.selection.routes[0],false);});
 test('two real effect captures can observe expected FIB/adjacency/probe while logcoverage and stronger claims stay false',async()=>{const f=fixture(),result=await f.inspect([f.sample(),f.sample()]);assert.equal(result.status,'observed-expected');assert.equal(result.logCoverage,'unknown');assert.equal(result.routeOriginVerified,false);assert.equal(result.recursiveChainVerified,false);assert.equal(result.forwardingVerified,false);assert.equal(result.autoRecoveryAllowed,false);assert.equal(result.rounds[0].relatedTopicRows,1);});
+function qualifyRuntimeSession(row) {
+ delete row.vrf;
+ row['local.address'] += '@main';
+ row['remote.address'] += '@main';
+}
+test('BGP session uses exact runtime endpoint qualifiers when VRF is absent and the installation table is separate',async()=>{
+ const f=fixture();
+ qualifyRuntimeSession(f.raw.sessions[0]);
+ const selection=f.prepare();
+ assert.equal(selection.status,'prepared');
+ assert.equal(selection.binding.vrf,'main');
+ assert.equal(selection.binding.table,'tenant');
+ const samples=[f.sample(),f.sample()];
+ const report=await exports.inspectOriginalEffectRounds(selection,samples,f.baseline);
+ assert.equal(report.status,'observed-expected');
+ assert.equal(report.routeOriginVerified,false);
+});
 for(const [name,change]of[
  ['missing affected BGP route',f=>{f.raw.routes=[];}],['ambiguous prefix',f=>{f.raw.routes.push({...f.raw.routes[0],'.id':'*r2'});}],
  ['connected resolver is not affected BGP route',f=>{f.raw.routes[0].bgp='false';f.raw.routes[0].connect='true';}],
  ['unresolved inheritance',f=>{f.raw.connections[0].templates='template';}],['BFD not explicitly known',f=>{delete f.raw.connections[0]['use-bfd'];}],
  ['router-selected source retained as unsupported effect subset',f=>{delete f.raw.probe.source;}],['mixed session identity',f=>{f.raw.sessions.push({...f.raw.sessions[0],'.id':'*s2'});}],
+ ['implicit VRF without both endpoint qualifiers',f=>{qualifyRuntimeSession(f.raw.sessions[0]);f.raw.sessions[0]['local.address']='192.0.2.1';}],
+ ['qualified endpoints in the installation table',f=>{qualifyRuntimeSession(f.raw.sessions[0]);f.raw.sessions[0]['remote.address']='192.0.2.2@tenant';}],
+ ['contradictory explicit VRF',f=>{qualifyRuntimeSession(f.raw.sessions[0]);f.raw.sessions[0].vrf='tenant';}],
+ ['malformed peer ASN',f=>{f.raw.sessions[0]['remote.as']='0xfde9';}],
+ ['duplicate native ID even with unrelated tuple',f=>{f.raw.sessions.push({...f.raw.sessions[0],instance:'unrelated'});}],
  ['noncanonical AFI prefix',f=>{f.raw.routes[0]['dst-address']='2001:db8::/64';}]
 ])test(`prepared ambiguity/unsupported remains unknown: ${name}`,()=>{const f=fixture();change(f);assert.equal(f.prepare().status,'unknown');});
 test('baseline binds saved route IDs/prefix/gateway and does not infer operation UUID',()=>{const f=fixture(),base=f.sample();base.servers[0].routes.payload=structuredClone(f.raw.routes);assert.equal(exports.originalEffectBaselineMatches(f.selection,base),true);base.servers[0].routes.payload[0]['.id']='*different';assert.equal(exports.originalEffectBaselineMatches(f.selection,base),false);});

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-original-effects.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { isIP } from "node:net"
 import { z } from "zod"
 import type { RouteAiProfile } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp-routing"
 import { routeGatewayContext } from "./routing-community-context-model.js"
+import { matchesBgpSessionContext, parseRoutingEndpoint } from "./routing-native-endpoint.js"
 import { fingerprint } from "./security.js"
 
 type Row = Record<string, unknown>
@@ -43,10 +44,27 @@ export type OriginalEffectReport = z.infer<typeof originalEffectReportSchema>
 export const unknownOriginalEffects = (reason: string): OriginalEffectReport => ({ scope: "prepared-route-fib-adjacency-control-effects", status: "unknown", reason,
   rounds: [], logSource: "routeros-rest-ring", logCoverage: "unknown", selectionIdentity: null, routeSelectionScope: "table-afi-community-observation", transitionAttribution: "unproven", switchEffectObserved: false, semanticProof: false, routeOriginVerified: false, recursiveChainVerified: false, forwardingVerified: false, autoRecoveryAllowed: false })
 
-function tuple(row: Row, expected: Prepared["binding"], session: boolean) {
+function connectionMatches(row: Row, expected: Prepared["binding"]) {
   return row.instance === expected.instance && row["routing-table"] === expected.table && row.vrf === expected.vrf &&
-    row["local.address"] === expected.localAddress && row["remote.address"] === expected.remoteAddress && Number(row["remote.as"]) === expected.remoteAsn &&
+    row["local.address"] === expected.localAddress && row["remote.address"] === expected.remoteAddress &&
-    (session ? row["local.afi"] === expected.afi && row["remote.afi"] === expected.afi : row.afi === expected.afi)
+    (row["remote.as"] === expected.remoteAsn || row["remote.as"] === String(expected.remoteAsn)) &&
+    row.afi === expected.afi
+}
+
+function selectBgpSession(rows: Row[], expected: Prepared["binding"]) {
+  try {
+    let match: Row | undefined
+    for (const row of rows) {
+      if (row.instance !== expected.instance) continue
+      const local = parseRoutingEndpoint(row["local.address"]), remote = parseRoutingEndpoint(row["remote.address"])
+      if (local.address !== expected.localAddress || remote.address !== expected.remoteAddress) continue
+      if (match || local.interface !== undefined || remote.interface !== undefined || !matchesBgpSessionContext(row, expected, local, remote) ||
+          (row["remote.as"] !== expected.remoteAsn && row["remote.as"] !== String(expected.remoteAsn)) || row["local.afi"] !== expected.afi || row["remote.afi"] !== expected.afi ||
+          row.state !== undefined || flag(row.established) === undefined || !id.safeParse(row[".id"]).success) return undefined
+      match = row
+    }
+    return match && unique(rows, String(match[".id"])).length === 1 ? match : undefined
+  } catch { return undefined }
 }
 function selectedRows(rows: Row[], selection: Pick<Prepared, "table" | "family" | "community">) {
   return rows.filter(row => row["routing-table"] === selection.table && family(row) === selection.family && flag(row.bgp) === true && communities(row).includes(selection.community))
@@ -69,10 +87,10 @@ export function prepareOriginalEffectSelection(profile: RouteAiProfile, candidat
     const peer = connection[0], afi = profile.family === "ipv4" ? "ip" : "ipv6"
     const wanted = tupleSchema.parse({ connectionId: peer[".id"], sessionId: "*0", instance: binding.instance, table: binding.table, vrf: binding.vrf,
       localAddress: peer["local.address"], remoteAddress: peer["remote.address"], remoteAsn: Number(peer["remote.as"]), afi })
-    if (!tuple(peer, wanted, false)) throw Error()
+    if (!connectionMatches(peer, wanted)) throw Error()
-    const sessions = raw.sessions.filter(row => tuple(row, wanted, true))
+    const session = selectBgpSession(raw.sessions, wanted)
-    if (sessions.length !== 1 || flag(sessions[0].established) === undefined) throw Error()
+    if (!session) throw Error()
-    wanted.sessionId = id.parse(sessions[0][".id"])
+    wanted.sessionId = id.parse(session[".id"])
     const affected = selectedRows(raw.routes, profile)
     if (!affected.length || affected.length > 32 || new Set(affected.map(row => row["dst-address"])).size !== affected.length || new Set(affected.map(row => row[".id"])).size !== affected.length) throw Error()
     for (const row of affected) {
@@ -130,10 +148,10 @@ export async function inspectOriginalEffectRounds(rawSelection: unknown, samples
       return { prefix: wanted.prefix, status }
     })
     const connections = unique(source.bgp.connectionsPayload, selection.binding.connectionId)
-    const sessions = source.bgp.payload.filter(row => tuple(row, selection.binding, true))
+    const session = selectBgpSession(source.bgp.payload, selection.binding)
     let bgp: z.infer<typeof state> = "unknown"
-    if (connections.length === 1 && tuple(connections[0], selection.binding, false) && flag(connections[0].disabled) === false && flag(connections[0]["use-bfd"]) === false &&
+    if (connections.length === 1 && connectionMatches(connections[0], selection.binding) && flag(connections[0].disabled) === false && flag(connections[0]["use-bfd"]) === false &&
-      sessions.length === 1 && sessions[0][".id"] === selection.binding.sessionId && flag(sessions[0].established) !== undefined) bgp = flag(sessions[0].established) ? "observed-expected" : "observed-other"
+      session?.[".id"] === selection.binding.sessionId) bgp = flag(session.established) ? "observed-expected" : "observed-other"
     const probe = sample.probes.find(row => row.key === selection.probe.key)
     let controlProbe: "passed" | "failed" | "unknown" = "unknown"
     if (probe) {

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-profiles.ts

@@ -4,21 +4,22 @@ import { prepareRoutingControllerBaseline, assertRoutingControllerBaseline, rout
 import { publicRoutingControllerState } from "./routing-community-public.js"
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"
 import { z } from "zod"
-import { routeAiProfileSchema, type RouteAiProfile } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp-routing"
+import { routeAiControllerBlockReason, routeAiProfileSchema, usesScopedRouteAiContext, type RouteAiProfile } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp-routing"
 import { pool } from "../../db/index.js"
 import { registerMcpService } from "./service-registry.js"
 import { accessGeneration, McpError } from "./security.js"
 import { audit, validatePrincipal, type McpPrincipal } from "./store.js"
-import { decideRoutingSwitch, type ControllerState, type PathHealth, type rankRoutingCandidates } from "./routing-model.js"
+import { decideRoutingSwitch, selectFailoverReserveProbes, type ControllerState, type PathHealth, type rankRoutingCandidates } from "./routing-model.js"
 import type { add } from "./actions.js"
-import { routeContextExecutionReason } from "./routing-community-context-model.js"
+import { COMMUNITY_PATH_MAX_AGE_MS } from "./path-proof-purpose.js"
 import { controllerProfileCurrent, publishControllerState, saveControllerProfileCas, withControllerProfileLease } from "./routing-controller-fence.js"
 import { assertIdentifiedRoutingCompletion, createRoutingReservationStore } from "./routing-reservation-store.js"
 
 const targetIds = (profile: RouteAiProfile) => [...new Set([profile.serverId, ...profile.candidates.flatMap(candidate => [candidate.jumpHostId, candidate.exitNodeId])])]
-const executionGuardMessage = (profile: RouteAiProfile) => profile.autoRecovery
+function assertControllerCanBeEnabled(profile: RouteAiProfile) {
-  ? "ROUTE_RECOVERY_EXECUTOR_UNAVAILABLE: автоматическое восстановление требует исполнителя с отдельным подтверждением состояния после переключения; профиль можно сохранить выключенным"
+  const reason = routeAiControllerBlockReason(profile)
-  : "Контроллер scoped table/VRF/input-chain пока недоступен; профиль можно сохранить выключенным"
+  if (reason) throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", reason, 409)
+}
 export function registerRoutingProfileActions(register: typeof add) {
   register("routing.profiles.read", "mm_route_profiles_list", "Профили и состояние контроллера Route AI", "network", "mm:network:read", "read", "connection", z.object({}).strict(), {
     read: async (_input, context) => ({ profiles: (await pool.query("SELECT id,version,config,state,enabled,grant_expires_at,updated_at FROM mcp_routing_profiles WHERE connection_id=$1 ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT 200", [context.connection.id])).rows.filter(row => targetIds(routeAiProfileSchema.parse(row.config)).every(id => context.connection.policy.scope.serverIds.includes(id))).map(row=>({...row,state:publicRoutingControllerState(row.state)})) }),
@@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ export function registerRoutingProfileActions(register: typeof add) {
   registerMcpService("routing.profile.save", {
     current: async input => (await pool.query("SELECT id,version,config,enabled,grant_expires_at FROM mcp_routing_profiles WHERE id=$1 AND connection_id=$2", [input.profileId, input.connectionId])).rows[0] ?? null,
     execute: async input => {
-      if (input.enabled && routeContextExecutionReason(routeAiProfileSchema.parse(input.profile))) throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", executionGuardMessage(routeAiProfileSchema.parse(input.profile)), 409)
+      if (input.enabled) assertControllerCanBeEnabled(routeAiProfileSchema.parse(input.profile))
       if (input.expectedVersion !== null && (!Number.isSafeInteger(input.expectedVersion) || Number(input.expectedVersion) < 1)) throw new McpError("PLAN_EXPIRED", "План не содержит ожидаемую версию профиля", 409)
       if (input.enabled) {
         const principal=await routingControllerBaselinePrincipal(input.baseline),connection=await validatePrincipal(principal)
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ export function registerRoutingProfileActions(register: typeof add) {
     target: input => ({ scope: "servers", serverIds: targetIds(routeAiProfileSchema.parse(input.profile)) }),
     prepare: async (input, context) => {
       const profile = routeAiProfileSchema.parse(input.profile), ids = targetIds(profile), profileId = input.profileId ?? randomUUID()
-      if (input.enabled && routeContextExecutionReason(profile)) throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", executionGuardMessage(profile), 409)
+      if (input.enabled) assertControllerCanBeEnabled(profile)
       const expires = Date.parse(String(input.expiresAt)), credentialExpires = Date.parse(context.principal.credentialExpiresAt)
       if (expires <= Date.now() || expires > Math.min(Date.now() + 86400000, credentialExpires, Date.parse(context.connection.policy.expiresAt), context.connection.owner_valid_until.getTime())) throw new McpError("INVALID_EXPIRATION", "Допуск контроллера ограничен 24 часами и сроком подтверждения прав владельца", 400)
       const existing = (await pool.query("SELECT id,connection_id,version,config,enabled,grant_expires_at FROM mcp_routing_profiles WHERE id=$1", [profileId])).rows[0]
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ export function registerRoutingProfileActions(register: typeof add) {
   })
 }
 
-interface PersistentController extends ControllerState { baseline?:RoutingControllerBaseline; planId?: string; candidateId?: string; expectedCandidateId?: string; reason?: string; checkedAt?: string; probedAt?: string }
+interface PersistentController extends ControllerState { baseline?:RoutingControllerBaseline; planId?: string; candidateId?: string; expectedCandidateId?: string; reason?: string; checkedAt?: string; probedAt?: string; failoverReserveCursor?: string }
 /** Also fenced per profile so direct/concurrent ticks cannot publish stale state. */
 export async function tickRoutingProfiles() {
   const { invokeMcpTool, applyPlan } = await import("./runtime.js")
@@ -77,7 +78,8 @@ export async function tickRoutingProfiles() {
       }
       const current = async () => { if (!await controllerProfileCurrent(lease, row)) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Допуск профиля изменился во время цикла", 409) }
       try {
-        if (routeContextExecutionReason(profile)) { await stop(executionGuardMessage(profile)); return }
+        const controllerBlock = routeAiControllerBlockReason(profile)
+        if (controllerBlock) { await stop(controllerBlock); return }
         if (row.grant_expires_at.getTime() <= Date.now() || row.generation !== await accessGeneration() || !row.credential_id) { await stop("Допуск контроллера истёк или отозван"); return }
         const principal: McpPrincipal = await routingControllerBaselinePrincipal(state.baseline)
         const connection = await validatePrincipal(principal)
@@ -93,6 +95,7 @@ export async function tickRoutingProfiles() {
             next.lastSwitchAt = at; next.switches = [...(state.switches ?? [])]; next.consecutive = 0
             next.expectedCandidateId = state.candidateId
             delete next.planId; delete next.candidateId; delete next.pendingCandidateId; delete next.operationId
+            delete next.failoverReserveCursor
             next.reason = "Изменение конфигурации проверено; ожидаются новые измерения сети"
           } else if (plan.operation_id) next.reason = "Операция выполняется"
           else if (plan.expires_at.getTime() <= Date.now()) { await stop("План истёк без подтверждения"); return }
@@ -109,21 +112,44 @@ export async function tickRoutingProfiles() {
           const analysis = await invokeMcpTool(principal, "mm_route_optimizer_analyze", { profile }) as { ranking: ReturnType<typeof rankRoutingCandidates>; currentCandidateId: string | null }
           if (state.expectedCandidateId && analysis.currentCandidateId !== state.expectedCandidateId) { await stop("Наблюдаемый путь изменился вне ожидаемого переключения; требуется проверка вмешательства или дрейфа"); return }
           if (analysis.currentCandidateId) next.expectedCandidateId = analysis.currentCandidateId
-          const health: PathHealth[] = []
-          const selected = [analysis.currentCandidateId, ...analysis.ranking.filter(value => value.eligible).slice(0, 2).map(value => value.candidate.id)]
           if (profile.candidates.some(candidate => candidate.controlProbe) && !connection.policy.scope.operationIds.includes("routing.path.verify")) { await stop("Не выдано право контрольной проверки пути"); return }
-          for (const candidateId of [...new Set(selected)].filter((id): id is string => !!id)) {
+          const probeCandidate = async (candidateId: string): Promise<PathHealth | undefined> => {
+            if (!profile.candidates.find(candidate => candidate.id === candidateId)?.controlProbe) return
             await current()
-            if (profile.candidates.find(candidate => candidate.id === candidateId)?.controlProbe) health.push(await invokeMcpTool(principal, "mm_route_path_verify", { profile, candidateId }) as PathHealth)
+            return await invokeMcpTool(principal, "mm_route_path_verify", { profile, candidateId }) as PathHealth
+          }
+          const currentHealth = analysis.currentCandidateId ? await probeCandidate(analysis.currentCandidateId) : undefined
+          const health = currentHealth ? [currentHealth] : []
+          const failoverProbes = analysis.currentCandidateId && currentHealth?.status === "failed"
+            ? selectFailoverReserveProbes(analysis.ranking, analysis.currentCandidateId, state.failoverReserveCursor) : undefined
+          const candidates = failoverProbes?.candidateIds ?? analysis.ranking.filter(value => value.eligible).slice(0, 2)
+            .map(value => value.candidate.id).filter(id => id !== analysis.currentCandidateId)
+          for (const candidateId of candidates) {
+            const observed = await probeCandidate(candidateId)
+            if (observed) health.push(observed)
           }
           await assertRoutingControllerBaseline(state.baseline,row.id,row.version,profile,row.grant_expires_at.toISOString(),{principal,connection})
           const charges = await createRoutingReservationStore().readHourlyCharges(row.id, principal)
           await current()
-          const decision = decideRoutingSwitch(profile, state, analysis.ranking, analysis.currentCandidateId, Date.now(), health, charges.totalCharges)
+          const decisionAt = Date.now()
+          const hasFreshPassedProbe = (candidateId: string | null) => health.some(probe => {
+            if (probe.candidateId !== candidateId || probe.status !== "passed") return false
+            const age = decisionAt - Date.parse(probe.observedAt)
+            return age >= 0 && age < COMMUNITY_PATH_MAX_AGE_MS
+          })
+          const decision = decideRoutingSwitch(profile, state, analysis.ranking, analysis.currentCandidateId, decisionAt, health, charges.totalCharges)
           Object.assign(next, decision.state, { reason: decision.reason })
+          if (!failoverProbes?.cursor) delete next.failoverReserveCursor
+          else if (!hasFreshPassedProbe(failoverProbes.cursor)) {
+            // Advance past failed/unknown reserves. Keep rechecking a passing
+            // reserve while the current path accumulates independent failures.
+            next.failoverReserveCursor = failoverProbes.cursor
+          }
           next.probedAt = new Date().toISOString()
           if (decision.state.pausedReason) { await stop(decision.state.pausedReason); return }
-          if (decision.switchTo) {
+          if (decision.switchTo && usesScopedRouteAiContext(profile) && !hasFreshPassedProbe(decision.switchTo)) {
+            next.reason = "Ожидается успешная контрольная проба выбранного пути"
+          } else if (decision.switchTo) {
             await current()
             await assertRoutingControllerBaseline(state.baseline,row.id,row.version,profile,row.grant_expires_at.toISOString(),{principal,connection})
             const prepared = await invokeMcpTool(principal, "mm_route_optimizer_plan", { profile, candidateId: decision.switchTo }, undefined, { persistentRoutingProfile: { id: row.id, version: row.version } }) as { planId: string }

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-recovery-authority.sql-helper.ts

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ export async function acceptRoutingRecoveryAuthoritySql() {
   const { pool } = await import("../../db/index.js")
   const { mcpConnectionPolicySchema } = await import("@mmapp/contracts/mcp")
   const { routeAiProfileSchema } = await import("@mmapp/contracts/mcp-routing")
-  const { accessGeneration } = await import("./security.js")
+  const { accessGeneration, McpError } = await import("./security.js")
   const { readRoutingEndpoints, createRoutingSourceContext } = await import("./routing-observation-source.js")
   const { resolveRoutingProfileAuthority } = await import("./routing-profile-authority.js")
   const { captureScopedRecoveryAuthority, scopedRecoveryDeadlineCeiling } = await import("./routing-community-scoped-recovery.js")
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ export async function acceptRoutingRecoveryAuthoritySql() {
   assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT current_database() AS name")).rows[0].name, "postgres")
   const previousEnabled = (await pool.query("SELECT enabled FROM mcp_settings WHERE id=1")).rows[0].enabled as boolean
   const profileIds: string[] = [], ids: number[] = []
-  let nativeHttpRequests = 0, callbackDispatches = 0, durableIntents = 0
+  let nativeHttpRequests = 0, callbackDispatches = 0, dispatchFences = 0
   const listener = createServer((req, res) => { nativeHttpRequests++; req.resume(); res.setHeader("content-type", "application/json"); res.end("{}") })
   try {
     await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => { listener.once("error", reject); listener.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => { listener.off("error", reject); resolve() }) })
@@ -65,12 +65,7 @@ export async function acceptRoutingRecoveryAuthoritySql() {
       const path = "/routing/filter/rule/*1"
       await assert.rejects(withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: ownerId, connectionId, approved: true, serverIds: ids, serverWide: true, objects: [],
         authorize: async () => { await captured.assert() }, beforeDispatch: async () => {
-          assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_audit WHERE connection_id=$1 AND action='configuration.intent' AND payload->>'path'=$2", [connectionId, path])).rows[0].n, 1)
+          dispatchFences++
-          durableIntents++
-          if (change === "edit") await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET version=version+1,config=jsonb_set(config,'{name}','\"late edit\"') WHERE id=$1", [profileId])
-          if (change === "disable") await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET enabled=false WHERE id=$1", [profileId])
-          if (change === "grant") await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET grant_expires_at=clock_timestamp()-interval '1 second' WHERE id=$1", [profileId])
-          await captured.assert()
         },
       }, () => executeGuardedConfigurationWrite(ids[0], "PATCH", path, async () => {
         callbackDispatches++
@@ -78,12 +73,17 @@ export async function acceptRoutingRecoveryAuthoritySql() {
           const req = request({ hostname: "127.0.0.1", port, path: "/rest" + path, method: "PATCH", timeout: 1000 }, res => { res.resume(); res.once("end", resolve) })
           req.once("error", reject); req.once("timeout", () => req.destroy(new Error("Synthetic loopback timeout"))); req.end("{}")
         })
-      })), /Постоянный допуск/)
+      })), (error: unknown) => error instanceof McpError && error.code === "STATE_CONFLICT" && /Активный routing profile/.test(error.message))
-      assert.equal(callbackDispatches, 0); assert.equal(nativeHttpRequests, 0)
+      assert.equal(callbackDispatches, 0); assert.equal(nativeHttpRequests, 0); assert.equal(dispatchFences, 0)
-      assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_audit WHERE connection_id=$1 AND action='configuration.unconfirmed'", [connectionId])).rows[0].n, 1)
+      assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM mcp_audit WHERE connection_id=$1 AND action IN ('configuration.intent','configuration.unconfirmed','configuration.acknowledged')", [connectionId])).rows[0].n, 0)
+
+      if (change === "edit") await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET version=version+1,config=jsonb_set(config,'{name}','\"late edit\"') WHERE id=$1", [profileId])
+      if (change === "disable") await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET enabled=false WHERE id=$1", [profileId])
+      if (change === "grant") await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET grant_expires_at=clock_timestamp()-interval '1 second' WHERE id=$1", [profileId])
+      await assert.rejects(captured.assert(), /Постоянный допуск/)
     }
-    return { cases: 3, lateMutations: ["edit", "disable", "grant"], deepCaptureCases: 3, durableIntents, callbackDispatches, nativeHttpRequests,
+    return { cases: 3, deepCaptureCases: 3, directGuardBeforeIntent: true, dispatchFences, callbackDispatches, nativeHttpRequests,
-      productionSessionAuthorityFence: true, realSql: true, productionHmac: true, fullInverseLifecycleRepeated: false, controllerEnabled: false, externalNetwork: false }
+      capturedAuthorityChanges: ["edit", "disable", "grant"], realSql: true, productionHmac: true, controllerEnabled: false, externalNetwork: false }
   } finally {
     if (profileIds.length) await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_routing_profiles SET enabled=false WHERE id=ANY($1::uuid[])", [profileIds])
     if (ids.length) await pool.query("UPDATE servers SET enabled=false WHERE id=ANY($1::int[])", [ids])

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-recovery-authority.sql.test.ts

@@ -2,9 +2,26 @@ import { assertOwnedRoutingRecoveryAuthoritySql, acceptRoutingRecoveryAuthorityS
 
 // Guard precedes imports that configure a pool or load private MCP state.
 assertOwnedRoutingRecoveryAuthoritySql()
+process.env.AUTH_REQUIRED = "true"
+process.env.AUTH_JWT_SECRET = "owned-routing-recovery-authority-acceptance-secret"
+process.env.AUTH_ISSUER = "https://owned-routing-recovery-authority.test"
 const { pool, closePool } = await import("../../db/index.js")
 try {
   const { applySqlMigrations } = await import("../../db/migrate.js")
   await applySqlMigrations(pool)
   console.log("captured recovery authority SQL acceptance:", JSON.stringify(await acceptRoutingRecoveryAuthoritySql()))
-} finally { await closePool() }
+  const { updateMcpSettings } = await import("./store.js")
+  await import("./actions.js")
+  const { acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch } = await import("./routing-community-scoped-acceptance.js")
+  const actor = { id: "owned-routing-recovery-authority", email: "routing-recovery@example.invalid", name: "Owned recovery authority",
+    apps: ["mm"], permissions: ["mm:settings:admin", "mm:mcp:admin", "mm:mcp:approve", "mm:network:read", "mm:network:write", "mm:filters:write", "mm:servers:admin"],
+    issuedAt: Date.now() - 1000, expiresAt: Date.now() + 900000 }
+  await updateMcpSettings({ enabled: true }, actor)
+  for (const lateInverseAuthorityChange of ["edit", "disable", "grant"] as const) {
+    const evidence = await acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor, { lateInverseAuthorityChange })
+    console.log("genuine late inverse authority SQL acceptance:", JSON.stringify(evidence))
+  }
+} finally {
+  await (await import("../../services/scheduler.js")).stopSchedulerForDatabaseOperation()
+  await closePool()
+}

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-reservation-runtime.sql.test.ts

@@ -14,8 +14,10 @@ try {
     issuedAt: Date.now() - 1000, expiresAt: Date.now() + 900000 }
   await (await import("./store.js")).updateMcpSettings({ enabled: true }, actor)
   await import("./actions.js")
-  const mixed = await (await import("./routing-community-scoped-acceptance.js")).acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor,
+  const { acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch } = await import("./routing-community-scoped-acceptance.js")
-    { manualInverseChargeOnly: true, manualInverseChargeCase: "mixed-forward" })
+  const inverse = await acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor, { manualInverseChargeOnly: true })
+  console.log("private routing v8 manual inverse charge and intent SQL acceptance:", JSON.stringify(inverse))
+  const mixed = await acceptScopedRouteCommunitySwitch(actor, { manualInverseChargeOnly: true, manualInverseChargeCase: "mixed-forward" })
   console.log("private routing mixed forward/manual inverse admission SQL acceptance:", JSON.stringify(mixed))
 } finally {
   await (await import("../../services/scheduler.js")).stopSchedulerForDatabaseOperation()

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-reservation-runtime.ts

@@ -4,10 +4,29 @@ import { routeAiProfileSchema } from "@mmapp/contracts/mcp-routing"
 import type { ChangeEvidence } from "./action-types.js"
 import type { McpPrincipal, StoredPlan } from "./store.js"
 import { decryptSecret, fingerprint, McpError } from "./security.js"
-import { assertScopedCommunityRequest } from "./routing-community-scoped-request.js"
+import { assertScopedCommunityRequest, readScopedPathCheckpoint } from "./routing-community-scoped-request.js"
 import { assertPersistentScopedProfileAuthority, routingProfileAuthorityBindingSchema } from "./routing-profile-authority.js"
 import { loadRoutingMainTransitionPreparation } from "./routing-main-transition.js"
 
+export function requiresScopedRoutingOwnerApproval(evidence: ChangeEvidence) {
+  const step = evidence.steps[0]
+  return evidence.steps.length === 1 && step.kind === "service" &&
+    step.service === "routing.community.scoped" && step.input.proofRevision === 3
+}
+
+export async function readScopedRoutingPathAdmissionDeadline(db: PoolClient, evidence: ChangeEvidence, connectionId: string) {
+  const step = evidence.steps[0]
+  if (step.kind !== "service" || step.service !== "routing.community.scoped" || step.input.proofRevision !== 3 ||
+    routeAiProfileSchema.parse(step.input.profile).autoRecovery) return
+  const { pathCheckId, pathCheckpointProof } = step.input
+  if (typeof pathCheckId !== "string" || typeof pathCheckpointProof !== "string") {
+    throw new McpError("MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN", "Подтверждение пути изменилось", 409)
+  }
+  const checkpoint = await readScopedPathCheckpoint(db, pathCheckId, connectionId)
+  if (checkpoint.proof !== pathCheckpointProof) throw new McpError("MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN", "Подтверждение пути изменилось", 409)
+  return checkpoint.validUntil
+}
+
 /** Only authenticated encrypted evidence can select this admission lane. */
 export async function routingReservationEvidence(plan: Pick<StoredPlan, "operation_id" | "operation_version">, evidence: ChangeEvidence) {
   if (plan.operation_id !== "routing.community.switch" || evidence.steps.length !== 1) return undefined

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-reservation-store.ts

@@ -506,6 +506,7 @@ export async function assertPersistentRoutingForwardTransportCharge(db: Pick<Poo
   if (source.length !== 1) throw fail("Exact transport source unavailable")
   const row = source[0], observedAt = iso(row.observed_at)
   if (row.operation_state !== "running" || row.plan_state !== "executing" || row.step_state !== "intent" || !row.approved_by ||
+      metadata.serviceName === "routing.community.scoped" && row.approved_by !== ownerId ||
       row.policy_version !== metadata.policyVersion || row.generation !== metadata.generation ||
       typeof row.evidence_sealed !== "string" || typeof row.payload_sealed !== "string" ||
       fingerprint(row.intended_state) !== fingerprint(redact({ kind: "service", service: metadata.serviceName, input: metadata.serviceInput })) ||

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-reservation.sql-helper.ts

@@ -352,6 +352,47 @@ export async function acceptRoutingReservationSql(options: { runtimeAdmission?:
       await assert.rejects(store.beginForwardAttempt(reservation.forwardAllocation), /capability/)
       names.push("spent forward/no genuine checkpoint and preterminal unused-proof refuse; unknown never replays or refunds")
     }
+    {
+      const f = await fixture(), source = await f.makeSource(), reservation = await store.reserve(source.operationId)
+      const { saveScopedConfigurationCheckpoint, saveScopedNetworkCheckpoint } = await import("./routing-community-scoped-checkpoint.js")
+      const { executeReservedScopedRecovery } = await import("./routing-community-scoped-recovery.js")
+      await pool.query("UPDATE mcp_operations SET state='running' WHERE id=$1", [source.operationId])
+      const step = { kind: "service", service: "routing.community.scoped", input: source.input }
+      await pool.query("INSERT INTO mcp_operation_steps(operation_id,step_index,state,intended_state) VALUES($1,0,'intent',$2::jsonb)",
+        [source.operationId, JSON.stringify(security.redact(step))])
+      await pool.query("INSERT INTO mcp_operation_checkpoints(operation_id,step_index,before_sealed) VALUES($1,0,$2)",
+        [source.operationId, await security.encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(source.input.beforeRules))])
+      assert(reservation.forwardAllocation)
+      await store.beginForwardAttempt(reservation.forwardAllocation)
+      // Use the actual checkpoint writers for production crypto and SQL, but
+      // deliberately seed a synthetic failed-forward observation. No PATCH
+      // or genuine network observation is part of this owned component case.
+      const requestSeal = String(source.input.requestProof)
+      const configuration = await saveScopedConfigurationCheckpoint(source.input, requestSeal)
+      await saveScopedNetworkCheckpoint(source.input, requestSeal, { id: randomUUID(), candidateId: "b",
+        status: "failed", observedAt: configuration.observedAt })
+      const published = await store.recordForwardOutcome(reservation.reservationId)
+      assert(published.allocation)
+      assert.equal(published.receipt.state.inverse, "held")
+      const refused = { sourceOperationId: randomUUID(), principal: f.principal }
+      await assert.rejects(executeReservedScopedRecovery(published.allocation, refused), /Reserved runner identity differs/)
+      const unknown = await store.read(reservation.reservationId, f.principal)
+      assert.deepEqual(unknown.state, { ...published.receipt.state, revision: published.receipt.state.revision + 2, inverse: "unknown" })
+      assert.equal(unknown.chargedMutationUnits, 2)
+      assert.equal(unknown.chargedProfileSlots, 2)
+      assert.equal(unknown.refundsAvailable, false)
+      const shared = (await pool.query(`SELECT state,slot_phase,inverse_intent_sealed,inverse_configuration_sealed,verified_sealed
+        FROM mcp_scoped_recovery_intents WHERE reservation_id=$1`, [reservation.reservationId])).rows
+      assert.deepEqual(shared, [{ state: "unknown", slot_phase: "reserved-attempt", inverse_intent_sealed: null,
+        inverse_configuration_sealed: null, verified_sealed: null }])
+      await assert.rejects(executeReservedScopedRecovery(published.allocation, refused), /capability/)
+      await assert.rejects(store.recordForwardOutcome(reservation.reservationId), /republished/)
+      await assert.rejects(store.proveUnusedInverse(reservation.reservationId), /terminal applied/)
+      assert.equal(await used(f.connectionId), 2)
+      assert.equal((await store.readHourlyCharges(f.profileId, f.principal)).reservedCharges, 2)
+      assert.deepEqual((await store.read(reservation.reservationId, f.principal)).state, unknown.state)
+      names.push("genuine inverse capability on synthetic failed-forward checkpoints: acknowledged spend, late identity refusal, signed same-slot unknown and both charges conserved without replay or refund")
+    }
     {
       const f = await fixture(), source = await f.makeSource(), reservation = await store.reserve(source.operationId)
       const saved = (await pool.query("SELECT state_proof FROM mcp_routing_reservations WHERE id=$1", [reservation.reservationId])).rows[0].state_proof

backend/src/modules/mcp/routing-worker-fixture-isolation.sql-helper.ts

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ export async function acceptRoutingWorkerFixtureIsolation(actor:AuthUser) {
     const changed=(await pool.query("SELECT enabled,state,version,grant_expires_at FROM mcp_routing_profiles WHERE id=$1",[id])).rows[0]
     assert.equal(changed.enabled,false);assert.equal(changed.version,1)
     assert.equal(changed.grant_expires_at.toISOString(),expiry.toISOString())
-    assert.match(changed.state.pausedReason,/Контроллер scoped table\/VRF\/input-chain пока недоступен/)
+    assert.match(changed.state.pausedReason,/Укажите явную BGP-привязку/)
     const pauses=(await pool.query("SELECT id FROM mcp_audit WHERE action='controller.pause' AND payload->>'profileId'=$1",[id])).rows
     assert.equal(pauses.length,1)
     await assert.rejects(assertRoutingProfileAuthority(authority,context),(error:{code?:string})=>error.code==="STATE_CONFLICT")

backend/src/modules/mcp/runtime.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 import { pollErrorLog } from "../../services/server-poll-error-provenance.js"
+import { vrfPreparationDiagnostic } from "./vrf-preparation-diagnostic.js"
+import { createVrfRuntimeDiagnosticBoundary } from "../../services/vrf-execution-diagnostic.js"
+import { capturePublishedServerProbeTerminalProof } from "../../services/server-probe-operation-retirement.js"
+import { SERVER_PROBE_OPERATION } from "../../services/server-probe-authority.js"
 import { preparedPlanExpiry } from "./plan-expiry.js"
 import { acknowledgedCreateId, assertNoCallerCreateId } from "./native-create-identity.js"
 import { randomUUID, createHash } from "node:crypto"
@@ -11,6 +15,7 @@ import { logSettingsPatchSchema } from "@mmapp/contracts"
 import { pool } from "../../db/index.js"
 import { hasPermission, type AuthUser } from "../../lib/permissions.js"
 import { createUser, updateUser, deleteUser, addBinding, removeBinding, getUserById } from "../users/service/users-service.js"
+import { normalizeBindingPeer } from "../users/peer-bind.js"
 import { getLogSettings, updateLogSettings } from "../../services/router-logs-collector.js"
 import { refreshScheduler } from "../../services/scheduler.js"
 import { withApplicationMutationLock, withConfigMutationLock } from "../../services/config-mutation-lock.js"
@@ -18,17 +23,19 @@ import { withOperationConfigurationLockClient, assertOperationConfigurationLockS
 import { sharedDatabaseGate } from "../../services/shared-database-gate.js"
 import { withRuntimePollPrincipalSource, executeRuntimePollPolicyTransaction, type RuntimePollPolicyLoan } from "./runtime-poll-principal-boundary.js"
 import { readPollRuntimePolicySource, type PollRuntimePolicySource } from "./poll-runtime-policy-source.js"
-import { withVerifiedConfigurationChange } from "../../services/config-mutation-policy.js"
+import { withVerifiedConfigurationChange, assertVerifiedConfigurationAccess } from "../../services/config-mutation-policy.js"
 import { beginMcpOperationAdmission, insertMcpOperationAdmission, retireMcpOperationAdmission, withMcpOperationExecutionOrigin, stripMcpOperationExecutionPrivateResult, type McpOperationAdmission } from "./operation-execution-origin.js"
 import { createOspfOwnerSourceGuard, verifyOspfOwnerGraph, verifyOspfOwnerGraphAtPhase } from "./ospf-owner-graph.js"
 import { evaluateMcpPolicy } from "./policy.js"
 import { findAction, findActionByOperation } from "./actions.js"
+import { refuseExpiredOperationReplay } from "./operation-replay-tombstones.js"
 import { accessGeneration, decryptSecret, encryptSecret, fingerprint, privateSecretFingerprint, McpError, redact } from "./security.js"
 import { audit, getConnection, transaction, validatePrincipal, effectiveMcpConnection, assertConnectionVisible, type McpPrincipal, type ConnectionRow, type StoredPlan, type StoredOperation } from "./store.js"
 import { executeRosStep, readRosSnapshot, resourceById, routerClient, type RosSnapshot } from "./resources.js"
 import { verifyRosStepSnapshots } from "./ros-step-verification.js"
 import { createRosPrefix } from "./ros-prefix.js"
 import type { ActionContext, ChangeEvidence, ChangeStep } from "./action-types.js"
+import { logsFollowCancellation } from "./logs-follow-cancellation.js"
 import { findMcpService, type McpServiceExecutionContext } from "./service-registry.js"
 import { withDiagnosticCancellation } from "./diagnostic-cancellation.js"
 import { z } from "zod"
@@ -44,7 +51,7 @@ import { serviceNativeProgress } from "./service-native-progress.js"
 import { serviceDiagnosticProgress, serviceDiagnosticReceipt } from "./service-diagnostic-progress.js"
 import { admitManualInverseWithinOwner } from "./routing-manual-inverse-store.js"
 import { withRoutingReservationAdmission, createRoutingReservationStore, readHistoricalChargesWithinOwner, admitPersistentRoutingForwardWithinOwner, type RoutingReservedForwardAllocation } from "./routing-reservation-store.js"
-import { lockRoutingReservationAdmissionSource, routingReservationEvidence } from "./routing-reservation-runtime.js"
+import { lockRoutingReservationAdmissionSource, readScopedRoutingPathAdmissionDeadline, requiresScopedRoutingOwnerApproval, routingReservationEvidence } from "./routing-reservation-runtime.js"
 import { executeReservedRoutingStep, hasConfirmedReservedRoutingForward, type ReservedRoutingStepOutcome } from "./routing-reserved-step.js"
 
 let activeRunners = 0
@@ -74,6 +81,12 @@ async function policyInput(client: Pick<PoolClient, "query">, connection: Connec
     usage: { callsInMinute: Number(usage.calls), mutationsInHour: Number(usage.mutations), concurrentReads: Number(usage.reads) }, auditAvailable: true,
   }
 }
+
+export async function readMcpPolicyPreviewInput(connection: ConnectionRow, input: Pick<McpPolicyPreviewRequest, "operationId" | "target" | "objects" | "objectCount">): Promise<McpPolicyPreviewRequest> {
+  const current = await policyInput(pool, connection, input.operationId, input.target)
+  return { ...current, objects: input.objects, objectCount: input.objectCount }
+}
+
 async function temporaryScope(client: Pick<PoolClient, "query">, connection: ConnectionRow, credentialId: string) {
   const { rows } = await client.query("SELECT payload FROM mcp_grants WHERE connection_id=$1 AND revoked_at IS NULL AND payload->>'credentialId'=$2", [connection.id, credentialId])
   if (!rows.length) return undefined
@@ -109,12 +122,24 @@ async function completeRequest(id: string, started: number, result: unknown, err
   })
 }
 export async function invokeMcpTool(principal: McpPrincipal, toolName: string, raw: unknown, signal?: AbortSignal, internal?: { persistentRoutingProfile: { id: string; version: number } }): Promise<unknown> {
+  if (toolName === "mm_logs_follow") {
+    const maintenance = new AbortController()
+    return sharedDatabaseGate.request(
+      () => invokeMcpToolInner(principal, toolName, raw, signal, internal, maintenance.signal),
+      () => maintenance.abort(new McpError("RESET_REQUIRED", "База данных перешла в режим обслуживания; начните новое чтение", 409)),
+    )
+  }
   return sharedDatabaseGate.request(() => invokeMcpToolInner(principal, toolName, raw, signal, internal))
 }
-async function invokeMcpToolInner(principal: McpPrincipal, toolName: string, raw: unknown, signal?: AbortSignal, internal?: { persistentRoutingProfile: { id: string; version: number } }): Promise<unknown> {
+async function invokeMcpToolInner(principal: McpPrincipal, toolName: string, raw: unknown, signal?: AbortSignal, internal?: { persistentRoutingProfile: { id: string; version: number } }, logsFollowMaintenance?: AbortSignal): Promise<unknown> {
   const action = findAction(toolName), input = action.schema.parse(raw) as Record<string, unknown>, started = Date.now()
   const call = await reserveCall(principal, toolName, input, signal)
+  const cancelled = () => logsFollowMaintenance && logsFollowCancellation(logsFollowMaintenance, signal)
+  const assertActive = () => { const failure = cancelled(); if (failure) throw failure }
+  let vrfPreparing = false
   try {
+    assertActive()
+    if (logsFollowMaintenance) call.context.logsFollowMaintenance = logsFollowMaintenance
     if (internal) {
       if (action.operation.id !== "routing.community.switch") throw new McpError("INVALID_INPUT", "Контекст профиля не относится к этой операции", 400)
       call.context.persistentRoutingProfile = z.object({ id: z.string().uuid(), version: z.number().int().positive().safe() }).strict().parse(internal.persistentRoutingProfile)
@@ -122,6 +147,7 @@ async function invokeMcpToolInner(principal: McpPrincipal, toolName: string, raw
     let result: unknown
     if (action.read) result = await action.read(input, call.context)
     else if (action.prepare) {
+      vrfPreparing = ["ros.vrf.create", "ros.vrf.update", "ros.vrf.delete"].includes(action.operation.id)
       const evidence = await action.prepare(input, call.context)
       result = await transaction(async client => {
         await client.query("SELECT id FROM mcp_connections WHERE id=$1 FOR UPDATE", [principal.connectionId])
@@ -133,7 +159,7 @@ async function invokeMcpToolInner(principal: McpPrincipal, toolName: string, raw
         let decision = evaluateMcpPolicy(check)
         if (decision.decision === "denied") throw new McpError(decision.reasons[0].code, decision.reasons.map(reason => reason.message).join("; "))
         const id = randomUUID(), expiresAt = preparedPlanExpiry(action.operation.id, action.operation.section, evidence)
-        if (!expiresAt) throw new McpError("PLAN_EXPIRED", "Срок исходного плана опроса истёк или недоступен; подготовьте новый план", 409)
+        if (!expiresAt) throw new McpError("PLAN_EXPIRED", "Срок исходных данных плана истёк или недоступен; подготовьте новый план", 409)
         const generation = await accessGeneration()
         await client.query("INSERT INTO mcp_plans(id,connection_id,operation_id,operation_version,policy_version,generation,payload,evidence,state,expires_at) VALUES($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7::jsonb,$8::jsonb,$9,$10)", [id, connection.id, action.operation.id, action.operation.version, connection.policy.version, generation, JSON.stringify({ sealed: await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(input)) }), JSON.stringify({ sealed: await encryptSecret(JSON.stringify(evidence)) }), decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft", expiresAt])
         const vrfTicket = await prepareRuntimeVrfTicket({ operationId: action.operation.id, operationVersion: action.operation.version, planId: id, connectionId: connection.id, ownerId: connection.owner_id, evidence, sql: client,
@@ -169,13 +195,27 @@ async function invokeMcpToolInner(principal: McpPrincipal, toolName: string, raw
         await audit(client, connection.owner_id, "plan.create", connection.id, { planId: id, operationId: action.operation.id, decision })
         return { planId: id, expiresAt: expiresAt.toISOString(), state: decision.decision === "approval-required" ? "awaiting-approval" : "draft", decision, changes: redact(publicMcpChangeEvidence(action.operation.id, evidence)), ...(vrfTicket ? { vrfTicket } : {}), executionAvailable: true }
       })
+      vrfPreparing = false
     } else throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", "Нет обработчика операции", 409)
+    assertActive()
     const current = await effectiveMcpConnection(principal)
+    assertActive()
     if (fingerprint(current.policy) !== fingerprint(call.context.connection.policy) || fingerprint(current.owner_permissions) !== fingerprint(call.context.connection.owner_permissions)) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Доступ изменился во время вызова; результат не выдан", 409)
     const output = redact(result)
     await completeRequest(call.requestId, started, output)
+    assertActive()
     return output
-  } catch (error) { await completeRequest(call.requestId, started, null, error); throw error }
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (vrfPreparing) {
+      try {
+        const diagnostic = vrfPreparationDiagnostic(call.requestId, action.operation.id, error)
+        if (diagnostic) console.error(JSON.stringify(diagnostic))
+      } catch { /* Diagnostics must never replace the original failure. */ }
+    }
+    const failure = cancelled() ?? error
+    await completeRequest(call.requestId, started, null, failure)
+    throw failure
+  }
 }
 
 export async function loadPlan(id: string, client: Pick<PoolClient, "query"> = pool): Promise<StoredPlan> {
@@ -197,6 +237,10 @@ export async function approvePlan(id: string, actor: AuthUser, approve: boolean)
     if (!["awaiting-approval", "draft"].includes(plan.state) || plan.expires_at.getTime() <= Date.now() || plan.generation !== await accessGeneration()) throw new McpError("PLAN_EXPIRED", "План устарел или уже запущен", 409)
     const action = findActionByOperation(plan.operation_id)
     if (!hasPermission(actor.permissions, "mm:mcp:approve") || action.operation.requiredPermissions.some(permission => !hasPermission(actor.permissions, permission))) throw new McpError("PERMISSION_DENIED", "Нет прав на подтверждение действия")
+    if (approve && actor.id !== connection.owner_id && plan.operation_id === "routing.community.switch" &&
+      requiresScopedRoutingOwnerApproval(JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(plan.evidence.sealed)) as ChangeEvidence)) {
+      throw new McpError("PERMISSION_DENIED", "Переключение постоянного профиля подтверждает владелец подключения", 403)
+    }
     await client.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET state=$2,approved_by=$3,approved_at=now() WHERE id=$1", [id, approve ? "approved" : "cancelled", actor.id])
     await audit(client, actor.id, approve ? "plan.approve" : "plan.reject", connection.id, { planId: id })
   })
@@ -236,7 +280,7 @@ async function serviceExecute(service: string, input: Record<string, unknown>, c
   if (service === "users.create") return createUser(appUserCreateSchema.parse(input.user))
   if (service === "users.update") return updateUser(String(input.id), appUserUpdateSchema.parse(input.user))
   if (service === "users.delete") return deleteUser(String(input.id))
-  if (service === "users.binding_add") return addBinding(String(input.id), userBindingCreateSchema.parse(input.binding))
+  if (service === "users.binding_add") return addBinding(String(input.id), userBindingCreateSchema.parse(input.binding), { assertCurrent: assertVerifiedConfigurationAccess })
   if (service === "users.binding_remove") return removeBinding(String(input.id), String(input.bindingId))
   if (service === "logs.settings.update") { const result = await updateLogSettings(logSettingsPatchSchema.parse(input.settings)); await refreshScheduler(); return result }
   throw new McpError("UNSUPPORTED_CAPABILITY", "Неизвестный сервис", 409)
@@ -260,7 +304,11 @@ export async function verifyStep(step: ChangeStep, result: unknown, before?: Ros
     if (step.service === "users.binding_remove") { const current = await getUserById(String(step.input.id)); return !!current && !current.bindings.some(binding => binding.id === step.input.bindingId) }
     if (step.service === "users.binding_add") {
       const binding = userBindingCreateSchema.parse(step.input.binding), current = await getUserById(String(step.input.id))
-      return !!current?.bindings.some(item => item.serverId === binding.serverId && item.interfaceName === binding.interfaceName && item.peerPublicKey === (binding.peerPublicKey ?? ""))
+      const createdId = result && typeof result === "object" ? (result as { id?: unknown }).id : undefined
+      return typeof createdId === "string" && !!current?.bindings.some(item => item.id === createdId
+        && item.serverId === binding.serverId && item.interfaceName === binding.interfaceName.trim()
+        && (binding.interfaceType === undefined || item.interfaceType === binding.interfaceType)
+        && item.peerPublicKey === normalizeBindingPeer(item.interfaceType, binding.peerPublicKey))
     }
     if (step.service === "logs.settings.update") {
       const current = await getLogSettings() as unknown as Record<string, unknown>
@@ -291,6 +339,7 @@ export async function applyPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempot
       reservedRouting = !!await routingReservationEvidence(original, originalEvidence)
       return existing
     }
+    await refuseExpiredOperationReplay(client, principal, connection.id, planId, idempotencyKey)
     await client.query("SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtextextended('mcp-runner-admission',0))")
     const pending = await client.query<{ count: number }>("SELECT count(*)::int AS count FROM mcp_operations WHERE state IN ('pending','running')")
     if (pending.rows[0].count >= 100) throw new McpError("BUDGET_EXCEEDED", "Очередь исполнителя заполнена; повторите подготовленное применение позже", 429)
@@ -301,6 +350,11 @@ export async function applyPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempot
     const action = findActionByOperation(plan.operation_id)
     if (plan.policy_version !== connection.policy.version || plan.operation_version !== action.operation.version || plan.generation !== await accessGeneration() || plan.expires_at.getTime() <= Date.now()) throw new McpError("PLAN_EXPIRED", "План или его разрешения устарели", 409)
     if (!["draft", "approved"].includes(plan.state)) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "План требует подтверждения или недоступен", 409)
+    let scopedPathExpiresAt: number | undefined
+    if (plan.operation_id === "routing.community.switch" && requiresScopedRoutingOwnerApproval(evidence)) {
+      if (plan.approved_by !== connection.owner_id) throw new McpError("APPROVAL_REQUIRED", "Переключение постоянного профиля подтверждает владелец подключения", 409)
+      scopedPathExpiresAt = await readScopedRoutingPathAdmissionDeadline(client, evidence, connection.id)
+    }
     if (evidence.validUntil && (!Number.isFinite(Date.parse(evidence.validUntil)) || Date.now() >= Date.parse(evidence.validUntil))) {
       throw new McpError("MEASUREMENT_UNKNOWN", "Измерения плана устарели; подготовьте новый план", 409)
     }
@@ -323,7 +377,7 @@ export async function applyPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempot
     {
       const grantWall=Date.now(),grantMonotonic=performance.now()
       const grant=await readMcpTemporaryGrantOrigin(client,connection.id,principal.credentialId)
-      const admissionExpiresAt=Math.min(plan.expires_at.getTime(),evidence.validUntil?Date.parse(evidence.validUntil):Infinity,Date.parse(principal.credentialExpiresAt),Date.parse(connection.policy.expiresAt),connection.owner_valid_until.getTime(),grant.expiresAt??Infinity)
+      const admissionExpiresAt=Math.min(plan.expires_at.getTime(),evidence.validUntil?Date.parse(evidence.validUntil):Infinity,Date.parse(principal.credentialExpiresAt),Date.parse(connection.policy.expiresAt),connection.owner_valid_until.getTime(),grant.expiresAt??Infinity,scopedPathExpiresAt??Infinity)
       originalServiceGrant=Object.freeze({...grant,monotonicEnd:grant.expiresAt===null?Infinity:grantMonotonic+Math.max(0,grant.expiresAt-grantWall),admissionExpiresAt,admissionMonotonicEnd:grantMonotonic+Math.max(0,admissionExpiresAt-grantWall)})
       await assertOriginalMcpTemporaryGrant(client,connection.id,principal.credentialId,originalServiceGrant)
     }
@@ -359,6 +413,7 @@ export async function applyPlan(principal: McpPrincipal, planId: string, idempot
 async function executeOperation(operationId: string, principal: McpPrincipal, routingReservationForward?: RoutingReservedForwardAllocation, routingReservationId?: string,originalServiceGrant?:OriginalServiceGrant, operationAdmission?: McpOperationAdmission): Promise<void> {
   return withMcpOperationExecutionOrigin(operationAdmission, async () => {
   const lease = await pool.connect()
+    let terminalProbe: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof executeOperationWithLease>>
   let locked = false, released = false
   const ownerLifetime = new AbortController()
   // This closure is the SINGLE owner of physical destruction/release.
@@ -380,7 +435,7 @@ async function executeOperation(operationId: string, principal: McpPrincipal, ro
       throw error
     }
     if (released || !locked) return
-    await withOperationConfigurationLockClient(lease, retire, ownerLifetime.signal,
+    terminalProbe = await withOperationConfigurationLockClient(lease, retire, ownerLifetime.signal,
       () => executeOperationWithLease(operationId, principal, routingReservationForward, routingReservationId, originalServiceGrant))
   } finally {
     if (!released && locked) {
@@ -395,14 +450,20 @@ async function executeOperation(operationId: string, principal: McpPrincipal, ro
       lease.release()
     }
   }
+  // Capture has its own bounded checkout and may fail without rewriting the
+  // acknowledged terminal outcome or redispatching the diagnostic.
+  if (terminalProbe) {
+    try { await capturePublishedServerProbeTerminalProof(terminalProbe) } catch { /* Existing retention remains authoritative. */ }
+  }
   })
 }
-async function executeOperationWithLease(operationId: string, principal: McpPrincipal, routingReservationForward?: RoutingReservedForwardAllocation, routingReservationId?: string,originalServiceGrant?:OriginalServiceGrant): Promise<void> {
+async function executeOperationWithLease(operationId: string, principal: McpPrincipal, routingReservationForward?: RoutingReservedForwardAllocation, routingReservationId?: string,originalServiceGrant?:OriginalServiceGrant) {
   const { rows: [operation] } = await pool.query<StoredOperation>("SELECT * FROM mcp_operations WHERE id=$1 AND state='running'", [operationId])
   if (!operation) return
   const plan = await loadPlan(operation.plan_id), evidence = JSON.parse(await decryptSecret(plan.evidence.sealed)) as ChangeEvidence
   const serverIds = evidence.target.scope === "servers" ? evidence.target.serverIds : evidence.objects.flatMap(object => object.serverId ? [object.serverId] : [])
   let attempted = false, confirmed = 0, activeServiceStep = false
+  let vrfDiagnosticFallback: ReturnType<typeof createVrfRuntimeDiagnosticBoundary> | undefined
   let reservedForwardPassed = false
   let reservedRecoverySummary: Record<string, unknown> | undefined
   const diagnosticOnly = evidence.steps.length === 1 && evidence.steps.every(step => step.kind === "service" && findMcpService(step.service)?.cancellableDiagnostic === true)
@@ -510,17 +571,23 @@ async function executeOperationWithLease(operationId: string, principal: McpPrin
           originalExpiresAt:Math.min(plan.expires_at.getTime(),evidence.validUntil?Date.parse(evidence.validUntil):Infinity,Date.parse(principal.credentialExpiresAt),Date.parse(connection.policy.expiresAt),connection.owner_valid_until.getTime(),originalServiceGrant!.admissionExpiresAt),
           serviceInput:step.input}:undefined
         const reservedStep: { outcome?: ReservedRoutingStepOutcome<unknown> } = {}
+        vrfDiagnosticFallback = productionVrf && step.kind === "ros" && step.step.resource === "vrf" && ["ros.vrf.create", "ros.vrf.update", "ros.vrf.delete", "routing.vrf.update"].includes(plan.operation_id)
+          ? createVrfRuntimeDiagnosticBoundary(operationId, step.step.action === "update" ? "patch" : step.step.action, diagnostic => { console.error(JSON.stringify(diagnostic)) }) : undefined
         const result = await withVerifiedConfigurationChange({ actorId: connection.owner_id, connectionId: connection.id, serverIds, objects: evidence.objects, approved: !!plan.approved_by, serverWide: step.kind === "service", ...(serviceExecution?{serviceExecution}:{}), authorize: async () => { await (step.kind === "ros" ? authorizeCatalog() : authorize()) }, ...(step.kind === "ros" ? { beforeDispatch: async () => { await prefix!.check(authorizeCatalog); await authorize(); await authorizeCatalog(); if (productionVrf) { if (!vrfBeforeDispatch) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "VRF command guard отсутствует", 409); await vrfBeforeDispatch() } } } : {}) },
           async () => {
+            vrfDiagnosticFallback?.executorEntered()
             if (step.kind === "ros") {
               if (!productionVrf) return executeRosStep(step.step)
               const before = evidence.snapshots.find(snapshot => snapshot.resource === "vrf" && snapshot.serverId === step.step.serverId)
               if (!before?.sourceProof) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "Нет VRF source-v3 proof", 409)
               if (!["ros.vrf.create", "ros.vrf.update", "ros.vrf.delete", "routing.vrf.update"].includes(plan.operation_id)) throw new McpError("STATE_CONFLICT", "VRF action binding изменён", 409)
-              return executeVrfProductionStep({ operationId, planId: plan.id, connectionId: connection.id, ownerId: connection.owner_id,
+              const receipt = await executeVrfProductionStep({ operationId, planId: plan.id, connectionId: connection.id, ownerId: connection.owner_id,
                 operationName: plan.operation_id as "ros.vrf.create" | "ros.vrf.update" | "ros.vrf.delete" | "routing.vrf.update", operationVersion: plan.operation_version,
                 stepIndex: index, step: step.step, sourceProof: before.sourceProof, originalSnapshots: evidence.snapshots, authorize: authorizeCatalog,
-                assertDependencies: () => prefix!.check(authorizeCatalog), installBeforeDispatch: guard => { vrfBeforeDispatch = guard } })
+                assertDependencies: () => prefix!.check(authorizeCatalog), installBeforeDispatch: guard => { vrfBeforeDispatch = guard },
+                onDiagnostic: diagnostic => { vrfDiagnosticFallback?.observed(diagnostic) } })
+              vrfDiagnosticFallback?.executorReturned()
+              return receipt
             }
             const forward = () => serviceExecute(step.service, step.input, { operationId, phase: "forward", stepIndex: index, ...(routingReservationForward ? { routingReservationForward } : {}) })
             if (!routingReservationId) return step.service === "servers.poll" ? withRuntimePollPrincipalSource(principal, async (current, policyLoan) => {
@@ -533,6 +600,7 @@ async function executeOperationWithLease(operationId: string, principal: McpPrin
             reservedStep.outcome = await executeReservedRoutingStep({ reservationId: routingReservationId, sourceOperationId: operationId, principal, forward })
             return reservedStep.outcome.forwardResult
           })
+        vrfDiagnosticFallback = undefined
         if (reservedStep.outcome?.kind === "recovered") {
           // The generic source remains intent/result=null until the private
           // inverse has finished. Record the forward ACK, never B VERIFIED
@@ -576,14 +644,18 @@ async function executeOperationWithLease(operationId: string, principal: McpPrin
     })
     await (evidence.steps.some(step => step.kind === "service") ? withApplicationMutationLock(applyWithLocks) : applyWithLocks())
     assertOperationConfigurationLockCheckpoint()
-    await transaction(async client => {
+    const receiptId = plan.operation_id === SERVER_PROBE_OPERATION ? diagnosticReceipt?.receiptId : undefined
+    const finishedAt = await transaction(async client => {
       assertOperationConfigurationLockCheckpoint()
-      await client.query("UPDATE mcp_operations SET state='applied',verification=$3,result=$2::jsonb,finished_at=now() WHERE id=$1", [operationId, JSON.stringify({ confirmedWrites: diagnosticOnly ? 0 : confirmed, verificationScope: evidence.verificationScope ?? "configuration", ...(diagnosticOnly ? { completedServiceSteps: confirmed, diagnosticReceipt } : {}) }), evidence.verificationScope === "acknowledgement" ? "inconclusive" : "passed"])
+      const terminal = await client.query<{ finished_at: string }>("UPDATE mcp_operations SET state='applied',verification=$3,result=$2::jsonb,finished_at=now() WHERE id=$1"
+        + (receiptId ? ` RETURNING to_char(finished_at AT TIME ZONE 'UTC','YYYY-MM-DD"T"HH24:MI:SS.US"Z"') AS finished_at` : ""),
+      [operationId, JSON.stringify({ confirmedWrites: diagnosticOnly ? 0 : confirmed, verificationScope: evidence.verificationScope ?? "configuration", ...(diagnosticOnly ? { completedServiceSteps: confirmed, diagnosticReceipt } : {}) }), evidence.verificationScope === "acknowledgement" ? "inconclusive" : "passed"])
       assertOperationConfigurationLockCheckpoint()
       await client.query("UPDATE mcp_plans SET state='completed' WHERE id=$1", [plan.id])
       assertOperationConfigurationLockCheckpoint()
       await audit(client, "mcp-runner", "operation.complete", operation.connection_id, { operationId, confirmedWrites: diagnosticOnly ? 0 : confirmed, ...(diagnosticOnly ? { completedServiceSteps: confirmed, diagnosticReceipt } : {}) })
       assertOperationConfigurationLockCheckpoint()
+      return receiptId ? terminal.rows[0]?.finished_at : undefined
     })
     assertOperationConfigurationLockCheckpoint()
     if (routingReservationId && reservedForwardPassed) {
@@ -592,7 +664,9 @@ async function executeOperationWithLease(operationId: string, principal: McpPrin
       await createRoutingReservationStore().proveUnusedInverse(routingReservationId).catch(() => {})
     }
     assertOperationConfigurationLockCheckpoint()
+    if (receiptId && finishedAt) return { receiptId, operationId, connectionId:operation.connection_id, finishedAt }
   } catch (error) {
+    vrfDiagnosticFallback?.failure(error)
     if (routingReservationId && hasConfirmedReservedRoutingForward(error)) confirmed = Math.max(confirmed, 1)
     if (error instanceof VrfProductionAcknowledgedFailure) confirmed = Math.max(confirmed, error.acknowledgedWrites)
     const code = error instanceof VrfProductionClaimOutcomeUnknown ? "VRF_CLAIM_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN" : error instanceof McpError ? error.code : "DEVICE_UNAVAILABLE"

backend/src/modules/mcp/server-probe-actions.test.ts

@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ const principal = { connectionId, credentialId, credentialExpiresAt: new Date(no
 const proof = async (value: unknown) => createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify(value)).digest("hex")
 const context = { principal, connection: { id: connectionId, owner_id: "owner", owner_claims_issued_at: new Date(now - 1000) } } as ActionContext
 let assertions = 0
-function fixture() {
+function fixture(retiredSource?: ServerProbeMcpDependencies["retiredSource"]) {
   const events: string[] = [], receipts = new Map<string, ServerProbeReceipt>(), contexts: ServerProbeJournalContext[] = [], sealed = new Map<string, string>()
-  let evidence: ChangeEvidence, result: unknown = null, stepState = "intent", operationState = "running", scope = [2, 9], revoked = false, sqlTamper: string | undefined, dispatchFailure: unknown, preparedTool: PreparedServerProbe["tool"] = "ping", mismatchDestination = false, nextCipher = 0, revokeOnQuery = false, expiredPrepared = false, clock = now
+  let evidence: ChangeEvidence, result: unknown = null, stepState = "intent", operationState = "running", scope = [2, 9], revoked = false, sqlTamper: string | undefined, dispatchFailure: unknown, preparedTool: PreparedServerProbe["tool"] = "ping", mismatchDestination = false, nextCipher = 0, revokeOnQuery = false, expiredPrepared = false, clock = now, liveHistory = true
   const access: ServerProbeAuthority = { transport: "mcp", ownerId: "owner", connectionId, credentialId, expiresAt: now + 600000, generation: "generation", policyProof: "1".repeat(64), ownerProof: "2".repeat(64), active: true, operationAllowed: true, scopeServerIds: scope, ownerPermissions: ["mm:servers:write"], policyPermissions: ["mm:servers:write"] }
   const readAuthority = async () => { events.push("authority"); if (revoked) throw new ServerProbeExecutionError("PERMISSION_DENIED", "PRIVATE_PROVIDER_SECRET", 403); return { ...access, expiresAt: clock + 600000, scopeServerIds: [...scope] } }
   const assertProtections = async (ids: number[]) => { events.push("protections"); if (ids.some(id => !scope.includes(id))) throw new Error("out of scope") }
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ function fixture() {
     read: async id => { events.push("journal.read"); return receipts.get(id) },
   }
   const deps: ServerProbeMcpDependencies = {
+    retiredSource,
     authority: (() => ({ readAuthority, assertProtections })) as ServerProbeMcpDependencies["authority"],
     historicalAuthority: ((currentPrincipal: typeof principal) => ({ readAuthority: async () => { events.push("read-authority"); return { ...await readAuthority(), connectionId: currentPrincipal.connectionId, credentialId: currentPrincipal.credentialId } }, assertProtections })) as ServerProbeMcpDependencies["historicalAuthority"],
     history: dependencies => createServerProbeJournalHistoryReader({ ...dependencies, loadArchive: async binding => {
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ function fixture() {
     journal: (ctx, dependencies, execution) => { assert.equal(execution?.deadlineAt, Date.parse(prepared().expiresAt)); contexts.push(ctx); return { ...journal, read: async (...args) => { await dependencies.assertAuthority(ctx, args[1]); return journal.read(...args) }, claim: async binding => { await dependencies.assertAuthority(ctx, binding.bindingProof); return journal.claim(binding) } } },
     query: async (sql, values) => {
       events.push("sql"); if (revokeOnQuery) revoked = true
-      if (sql.includes("probe-history:scope")) { assert.equal(values[2], connectionId); assert.equal(values[3], "owner"); return [{ source_server_id: 9, destination_server_id: preparedTool === "bandwidth" ? 2 : null }] }
+      if (sql.includes("probe-history:scope")) { assert.equal(values[2], connectionId); assert.equal(values[3], "owner"); return liveHistory ? [{ source_server_id: 9, destination_server_id: preparedTool === "bandwidth" ? 2 : null }] : [] }
       if (sql.includes("FROM servers")) { assert.ok(sql.includes("ANY($1::int[])")); assert.deepEqual(values[0], scope); return sql.includes("AND id=$2") ? [] : [{ id: 2, host: "peer", enabled: true }] }
       if (!sql.includes("mcp_operation_steps")) return [{ evidence: { sealed: await seal(JSON.stringify(evidence)) } }]
       assert.equal(values[0], connectionId); assert.equal(values[1], "owner"); assert.equal(values[2], "servers.probes.run")
@@ -68,8 +69,9 @@ function fixture() {
     }, seal, open, proof, now: () => clock,
   }
   const adapter = createServerProbeMcpAdapter(deps)
+  const retireHistory = () => { liveHistory = false }
   const prepare = async (tool: PreparedServerProbe["tool"] = "ping") => { evidence = await adapter.prepare({ serverId: 9, request: tool === "bandwidth" ? { tool, bwRemoteAddress: "peer", dstServerId: 8 } : { tool, target: "192.0.2.1" } }, context); const step = evidence.steps[0]; assert.equal(step.kind, "service"); return step.kind === "service" ? step.input : assert.fail() }
-  return { adapter, events, receipts, contexts, prepare, setResult: (value: unknown) => { result = value; stepState = "applied" }, finishOperation: () => { operationState = "applied"; stepState = "acknowledged" }, setTamper: (value?: string) => { sqlTamper = value }, revoke: () => { revoked = true }, setScope: (value: number[]) => { scope = value }, fail: (value: unknown) => { dispatchFailure = value }, revokeOnQuery: () => { revokeOnQuery = true }, evidence: () => evidence, mismatchDestination: () => { mismatchDestination = true }, expirePrepared: () => { expiredPrepared = true; clock = now + 3600000 } }
+  return { adapter, events, receipts, contexts, prepare, retireHistory, setResult: (value: unknown) => { result = value; stepState = "applied" }, finishOperation: () => { operationState = "applied"; stepState = "acknowledged" }, setTamper: (value?: string) => { sqlTamper = value }, revoke: () => { revoked = true }, setScope: (value: number[]) => { scope = value }, fail: (value: unknown) => { dispatchFailure = value }, revokeOnQuery: () => { revokeOnQuery = true }, evidence: () => evidence, mismatchDestination: () => { mismatchDestination = true }, expirePrepared: () => { expiredPrepared = true; clock = now + 3600000 } }
 }
 
 for (const tool of ["ping", "traceroute", "bandwidth", "dns", "route", "mtu"] as const) {
@@ -128,6 +130,38 @@ for (const input of [{ serverId: 9, request: { tool: "ping", target: "x", creden
   await assert.rejects(f.adapter.service.execute(input, { operationId, phase: "forward", stepIndex: 0, signal: controller.signal })); assert.equal(f.events.filter(event => event === "execute").length, attempted); assertions += 3
 }
 assert.ok(!("diagnosticProgress" in serverProbeSafeMcpError(new ServerProbeExecutionError("X", "secret", 500, "unknown", 99), { receiptId, operationId, stageBudget: 1 }))); assertions++
+{
+  const hash = "3".repeat(64), date = (value: number) => new Date(value).toISOString().replace("Z", "000Z")
+  const retired = { source: { version: 1 as const, operation: "servers.probes.run" as const, operationVersion: 1 as const, tool: "ping" as const,
+    receiptId, executionId: operationId, connectionId, ownerId: "owner", planId: randomUUID(), originalCredentialId: credentialId,
+    sourceServerId: 9, serverIds: [9], issuedAt: now - 1000, authorityExpiresAt: date(now + 600000), terminalAt: date(now + 600000),
+    activityAt: date(now + 600000), gcNotBefore: date(now + 87060000), retentionDays: 1, safetyMs: 60000,
+    bindingProof: hash, sourceDigest: hash, terminalDigest: hash, stageSnapshotDigest: hash, receiptProof: hash, ciphertextSha256: hash,
+  }, payloadPurged: false }
+  let lookups = 0, changeOnRecheck = false
+  const f = fixture(async lookup => {
+    lookups++
+    assert.deepEqual(lookup, { receiptId, operationId, connectionId, ownerId: "owner", scopeServerIds: [2, 9] })
+    return changeOnRecheck && lookups % 2 === 0 ? undefined : retired
+  })
+  const input = await f.prepare(), output = await f.adapter.service.execute(input, { operationId, phase: "forward", stepIndex: 0 })
+  f.setResult(output); f.finishOperation()
+  const request = { operationId, receiptId, page: 0 }
+  const live = await f.adapter.readPage(request, context)
+  assert.equal(lookups, 0)
+  f.retireHistory()
+  const rotated = { ...context, principal: { ...principal, credentialId: randomUUID() } }
+  assert.deepEqual(await f.adapter.readPage(request, rotated), live)
+  assert.deepEqual(await f.adapter.receiptTarget(request, rotated), { scope: "servers", serverIds: [9] })
+  const beforeForeign = lookups
+  await assert.rejects(f.adapter.readPage(request, { ...rotated, connection: { ...context.connection, owner_id: "foreign" } }))
+  assert.equal(lookups, beforeForeign)
+  lookups = 0; changeOnRecheck = true
+  const privateReads = f.events.filter(event => event === "history.read").length
+  await assert.rejects(f.adapter.readPage(request, rotated))
+  assert.equal(f.events.filter(event => event === "history.read").length, privateReads)
+  assertions += 7
+}
 {
   const f = fixture(), input = await f.prepare("bandwidth"), output = await f.adapter.service.execute(input, { operationId, phase: "forward", stepIndex: 0 }); f.setResult(output); f.finishOperation(); f.expirePrepared()
   await assert.rejects(f.adapter.service.current(input))

backend/src/modules/mcp/server-probe-actions.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import { serverProbeReceiptPage } from "../../services/server-probe-public-resul
 import { decryptSecret, encryptSecret, fingerprint, privateSecretFingerprint, McpError, redact } from "./security.js"
 import type { ActionContext, ChangeEvidence } from "./action-types.js"
 import type { McpServiceHandler } from "./service-registry.js"
+import type { findRetiredServerProbeHistory, ServerProbeRetiredLookup } from "../../services/server-probe-retired-history.js"
 
 /** Foundations only: importing this module registers no tools or services. */
 export const serverProbeActionSchema = z.object({ serverId: z.number().int().positive().safe(), request: serverProbeExecutionRequest }).strict()
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ export interface ServerProbeMcpDependencies {
   executor: typeof createProductionServerProbeExecutor
   journal: (context: ServerProbeJournalContext, dependencies: ServerProbeJournalDependencies, execution?: { signal?: AbortSignal; deadlineAt?: number }) => ServerProbeJournal
   query: Query
+  retiredSource?: (lookup: ServerProbeRetiredLookup) => ReturnType<typeof findRetiredServerProbeHistory>
   seal: (value: string) => Promise<string>
   open: (value: string) => Promise<string>
   proof: (value: unknown) => Promise<string>
@@ -52,7 +54,7 @@ export async function openServerProbeMcpBinding(raw: Record<string, unknown>, cr
   return { input, binding }
 }
 const ids = (prepared: PreparedServerProbe) => [...new Set([prepared.serverId, ...(prepared.destinationServerId ? [prepared.destinationServerId] : [])])].sort((a, b) => a - b)
-function metadata(receipt: ServerProbeReceipt, operationId: string, stageBudget: number) {
+export function serverProbeReceiptMetadata(receipt: ServerProbeReceipt, operationId: string, stageBudget: number) {
   const page = serverProbeReceiptPage(receipt, 0)
   if (!Number.isSafeInteger(receipt.attemptedStages) || !Number.isSafeInteger(receipt.completedStages) || receipt.completedStages < 0 || receipt.completedStages > receipt.attemptedStages || receipt.attemptedStages > stageBudget) return denied()
   return { operationId, receiptId: receipt.receiptId, tool: receipt.tool, status: receipt.state, httpStatus: receipt.httpStatus, stageBudget, attemptedStages: receipt.attemptedStages, completedStages: receipt.completedStages, sha256: page.sha256, totalPages: page.totalPages, bytes: page.bytes, automaticReplay: false, forwardingVerified: false }
@@ -119,7 +121,7 @@ export function createServerProbeMcpAdapter(overrides: Partial<ServerProbeMcpDep
     await owned(input, binding, row.operation_id)
     await preflight(binding, signal)
     if (!receipt || receipt.receiptId !== input.receiptId || receipt.serverId !== binding.prepared.serverId || receipt.destinationServerId !== binding.prepared.destinationServerId || receipt.tool !== binding.prepared.tool) return denied()
-    return { row, receipt, result: metadata(receipt, row.operation_id, binding.stageBudget) }
+    return { row, receipt, result: serverProbeReceiptMetadata(receipt, row.operation_id, binding.stageBudget) }
   }
   const target = async (raw: Record<string, unknown>, context: ActionContext): Promise<ChangeEvidence["target"]> => {
     const input = serverProbeActionSchema.parse(raw), access = deps.authority(context.principal, { signal: context.signal })
@@ -177,7 +179,7 @@ export function createServerProbeMcpAdapter(overrides: Partial<ServerProbeMcpDep
         const { executor } = execution(input, binding, row, true, context.signal)
         const receipt = await executor.execute(binding.prepared, context.signal)
         await preflight(binding, context.signal); await owned(input, binding, context.operationId, true); await preflight(binding, context.signal)
-        return metadata(receipt, context.operationId, binding.stageBudget)
+        return serverProbeReceiptMetadata(receipt, context.operationId, binding.stageBudget)
       } catch (error) { throw serverProbeSafeMcpError(error, progress) }
     },
     verify: async (raw, result) => {
@@ -200,19 +202,47 @@ export function createServerProbeMcpAdapter(overrides: Partial<ServerProbeMcpDep
         AND j.source_server_id=ANY($6::int[]) AND (j.destination_server_id IS NULL OR j.destination_server_id=ANY($6::int[])) LIMIT 2`,
     [request.receiptId, request.operationId, context.principal.connectionId, initial.ownerId, SERVER_PROBE_OPERATION, initial.scopeServerIds])
     await fresh()
-    if (rows.length !== 1) return denied()
+    const loadRetired = deps.retiredSource
-    const row = rows[0], serverIds = [...new Set([z.number().int().positive().safe().parse(row.source_server_id), ...(row.destination_server_id === null ? [] : [z.number().int().positive().safe().parse(row.destination_server_id)])])].sort((a, b) => a - b)
+    const readRetired = rows.length === 0 && loadRetired ? () => loadRetired({
+      receiptId: request.receiptId, operationId: request.operationId, connectionId: context.principal.connectionId,
+      ownerId: initial.ownerId, scopeServerIds: initial.scopeServerIds,
+    }) : undefined
+    const retired = readRetired ? await readRetired() : undefined
+    if (readRetired) await fresh()
+    if (rows.length !== 1 && !retired) return denied()
+    const row = rows[0]
+    const serverIds = retired ? retired.source.serverIds : [...new Set([z.number().int().positive().safe().parse(row.source_server_id), ...(row.destination_server_id === null ? [] : [z.number().int().positive().safe().parse(row.destination_server_id)])])].sort((a, b) => a - b)
     const fence = async () => { const current = await fresh(); if (serverIds.some(id => !current.scopeServerIds.includes(id))) return denied(); await access.assertProtections(serverIds, current); await fresh() }
     await fence()
-    return { initial, serverIds, fence }
+    const retiredFence = retired && readRetired ? async () => {
+      await fence()
+      const current = await readRetired()
+      await fence()
+      if (!current || fingerprint(current) !== fingerprint(retired)) return denied()
+    } : undefined
+    return { initial, serverIds, fence, retired, retiredFence }
   }
   const receiptTarget = async (raw: Record<string, unknown>, context: ActionContext): Promise<ChangeEvidence["target"]> => {
-    const request = serverProbeReceiptReadSchema.parse(raw), { serverIds, fence } = await historicalAccess(request, context)
+    const request = serverProbeReceiptReadSchema.parse(raw), { serverIds, fence, retiredFence } = await historicalAccess(request, context)
-    await fence(); return { scope: "servers", serverIds }
+    await (retiredFence ?? fence)(); return { scope: "servers", serverIds }
   }
   const readPage = async (raw: Record<string, unknown>, context: ActionContext) => {
     try {
-      const request = serverProbeReceiptReadSchema.parse(raw), { initial, serverIds, fence } = await historicalAccess(request, context)
+      const request = serverProbeReceiptReadSchema.parse(raw), { initial, serverIds, fence, retired, retiredFence } = await historicalAccess(request, context)
+      if (retired && retiredFence) {
+        const source = retired.source
+        const originalContext: ServerProbeJournalContext = {
+          identity: { kind: "mcp", ownerId: source.ownerId, executionId: source.executionId, connectionId: source.connectionId, credentialId: source.originalCredentialId,
+            issuedAt: source.issuedAt, expiresAt: Date.parse(source.authorityExpiresAt), operationName: SERVER_PROBE_OPERATION },
+          sourceServerId: source.sourceServerId, ...(source.destinationServerId !== undefined ? { destinationServerId: source.destinationServerId } : {}), tool: source.tool,
+        }
+        await retiredFence()
+        const reader = deps.history({ assertReadAuthority: retiredFence }, { signal: context.signal })
+        const receipt = await reader.read({ context: originalContext, receiptId: source.receiptId, bindingProof: source.bindingProof })
+        const page = serverProbeReceiptPage(receipt, request.page)
+        await retiredFence()
+        return page
+      }
       await fence()
       const rows = await deps.query(`SELECT p.evidence FROM mcp_operations o JOIN mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id AND p.connection_id=o.connection_id JOIN mcp_connections c ON c.id=o.connection_id WHERE o.id=$1 AND o.connection_id=$2 AND c.owner_id=$3 AND p.operation_id=$4 AND p.operation_version=1 AND octet_length(p.evidence::text)<=2097152 LIMIT 2`, [request.operationId, context.principal.connectionId, initial.ownerId, SERVER_PROBE_OPERATION])
       await fence(); if (rows.length !== 1) return denied()

backend/src/modules/mcp/server-probe-all-tools.sql-helper.ts

@@ -171,6 +171,16 @@ export async function acceptServerProbeAllToolsSql() {
       assert.equal(done.result.confirmedWrites, 0); assert.equal(done.result.completedServiceSteps, 1); assert.equal(done.result.verificationScope, "acknowledgement")
       const receipt = done.result.diagnosticReceipt as { receiptId: string; stageBudget: number; attemptedStages: number; completedStages: number; totalPages: number; sha256: string }
       assert(receipt); assert.equal(receipt.attemptedStages, receipt.completedStages); assert(receipt.attemptedStages > 0 && receipt.attemptedStages <= receipt.stageBudget)
+      let captured = false
+      for (const until = Date.now()+2000; Date.now()<until;) {
+        const proof = (await pool.query(`SELECT f.source->>'terminalAt'=to_char(GREATEST(o.finished_at,p.expires_at) AT TIME ZONE 'UTC',
+          'YYYY-MM-DD"T"HH24:MI:SS.US"Z"') AS terminal_matches FROM server_probe_terminal_proofs f
+          JOIN mcp_operations o ON o.id=f.operation_id JOIN mcp_plans p ON p.id=o.plan_id
+          WHERE f.operation_id=$1 AND f.receipt_id=$2`, [done.id,receipt.receiptId])).rows[0]
+        if (proof) { assert.equal(proof.terminal_matches,true); captured = true; break }
+        await delay(20)
+      }
+      assert.equal(captured,true,"Owned successful diagnostic did not publish its terminal proof")
       const step = (await pool.query("SELECT state,result FROM mcp_operation_steps WHERE operation_id=$1", [done.id])).rows
       assert.equal(step.length, 1); assert.equal(step[0].state, "acknowledged")
       for (const field of ["output", "data", "contentB64", "bindingCiphertext"]) assert(!Object.hasOwn(step[0].result, field))
@@ -201,6 +211,49 @@ export async function acceptServerProbeAllToolsSql() {
       cases.push(tool + ": actual public plan/approval/apply, receipt metadata, full stage ledger and checksum pages without redispatch")
     }
 
+    // Force a genuine capture SQL failure after the real diagnostic has
+    // committed. A sequence records the rejected attempt despite rollback.
+    const captureFault = await fixture()
+    const faultPlan = await prepare(captureFault, { tool: "route", target: "127.0.0.1" })
+    await pool.query("CREATE SEQUENCE public.owned_probe_capture_failure")
+    try {
+      await pool.query(`CREATE FUNCTION public.owned_probe_capture_failure() RETURNS trigger LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $$
+        BEGIN
+          IF NEW.source->>'connectionId'=TG_ARGV[0] THEN
+            PERFORM nextval('public.owned_probe_capture_failure');
+            RAISE EXCEPTION 'owned terminal proof insertion refused';
+          END IF;
+          RETURN NEW;
+        END $$`)
+      try {
+        assert.match(captureFault.principal.connectionId,/^[a-f0-9-]{36}$/)
+        await pool.query(`CREATE TRIGGER owned_probe_capture_failure BEFORE INSERT ON public.server_probe_terminal_proofs
+          FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION public.owned_probe_capture_failure('${captureFault.principal.connectionId}')`)
+        try {
+          const beforeFault = requests+dnsUdp+dnsTcp, faultKey=randomUUID()
+          const applied = await applyPlan(captureFault.principal,faultPlan,faultKey), done=await terminal(applied.id)
+          let attempted = false
+          for (const until=Date.now()+2500;Date.now()<until;) {
+            attempted = (await pool.query("SELECT is_called FROM public.owned_probe_capture_failure")).rows[0].is_called
+            if (attempted) break
+            await delay(20)
+          }
+          assert.equal(attempted,true,"Owned post-COMMIT capture insert must have reached the injected SQL failure")
+          assert.equal(done.state,"applied"); assert.equal(done.error_code,null)
+          assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT 1 FROM server_probe_terminal_proofs WHERE operation_id=$1",[applied.id])).rows.length,0)
+          const originalReceipt = done.result.diagnosticReceipt as { receiptId:string; sha256:string }
+          const page = await invokeMcpTool(captureFault.principal,"mm_server_probe_receipt_get",
+            { operationId:applied.id,receiptId:originalReceipt.receiptId,page:0 }) as {sha256:string}
+          assert.equal(page.sha256,originalReceipt.sha256)
+          assert.equal((await applyPlan(captureFault.principal,faultPlan,faultKey)).id,applied.id)
+          assert.equal((await terminal(applied.id)).state,"applied")
+          assert.equal(requests+dnsUdp+dnsTcp,beforeFault+1)
+          assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT last_value::int AS attempts FROM public.owned_probe_capture_failure")).rows[0].attempts,1)
+        } finally { await pool.query("DROP TRIGGER owned_probe_capture_failure ON public.server_probe_terminal_proofs") }
+      } finally { await pool.query("DROP FUNCTION public.owned_probe_capture_failure()") }
+    } finally { await pool.query("DROP SEQUENCE public.owned_probe_capture_failure") }
+    cases.push("terminal proof SQL refusal: acknowledged result remains applied and readable, exactly one loopback measurement and no retry")
+
     // Pause only the one runner's pending->running SQL BEFORE sending it. This
     // leaves a real pending approved source, allowing genuine durable cancel.
     // A server-table lock after 'running' would have no intent step yet and the
@@ -209,8 +262,9 @@ export async function acceptServerProbeAllToolsSql() {
     const entered = gate(), resume = gate(); releasePending = resume.resolve
     let heldOperation = "", held = false
     pool.query = (async function (...args: unknown[]) {
-      if (!held && typeof args[0] === "string" && args[0].startsWith("UPDATE mcp_operations SET state='running'")) {
+      const query = args[0] as { text?: string; values?: unknown[] } | undefined
-        held = true; heldOperation = String((args[1] as unknown[])[0]); entered.resolve(); await resume.promise
+      if (!held && query?.text?.startsWith("/* mcp-operation-root:claim */") && typeof query.values?.[0] === "string") {
+        held = true; heldOperation = query.values[0]; entered.resolve(); await resume.promise
       }
       return Reflect.apply(originalQuery, pool, args)
     }) as typeof pool.query

backend/src/modules/mcp/server-probe-storage-host.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 import { createMcpServerProbeAuthority, createMcpServerProbeReadAuthority } from "../../services/server-probe-authority.js"
 import { createProductionServerProbeExecutor } from "../../services/server-probe-execution.js"
 import { createServerProbeStorageHistoryReader } from "../../services/server-probe-storage-history.js"
+import { findRetiredServerProbeHistory } from "../../services/server-probe-retired-history.js"
 import { createSqlServerProbeSourceReaders } from "../../services/server-probe-storage-source.js"
 import { createProbeStorageHostIo } from "../../services/server-probe-storage-host-io.js"
 import { assertVerifiedConfigurationAccess } from "../../services/config-mutation-policy.js"
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ export function createStorageServerProbeMcpAdapter(limits: ProbeStorageLimits =
     },
   }
   const adapter = createServerProbeMcpAdapter({ query: io.rows, journal: io.journal,
+    retiredSource: lookup => findRetiredServerProbeHistory(io.rows, lookup),
     authority: (principal, options) => createMcpServerProbeAuthority(principal, options, authorityDependencies),
     historicalAuthority: (principal, options) => createMcpServerProbeReadAuthority(principal, options, authorityDependencies),
     history: (dependencies, execution) => createServerProbeStorageHistoryReader({ assertReadAuthority: dependencies.assertReadAuthority,

backend/src/modules/mcp/users-bindings-owned.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict"
+process.env.AUTH_REQUIRED = "true"
+process.env.AUTH_JWT_SECRET = "users-bindings-owned-acceptance-secret"
+const { pool, closePool } = await import("../../db/index.js")
+const { applySqlMigrations } = await import("../../db/migrate.js")
+const { updateMcpSettings } = await import("./store.js")
+const actor = { id: "users-bindings-owner", email: "users@example.invalid", name: "User binding owner", apps: ["mm"], permissions: ["mm:settings:admin"], expiresAt: Date.now() + 3600000 }
+try {
+  await applySqlMigrations(pool)
+  assert.equal((await pool.query("SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM servers")).rows[0].n, 0, "Disposable empty database required")
+  await updateMcpSettings({ enabled: true }, actor)
+  await (await import("../../test/mcp-users-bindings.js")).verifyMcpUserBindings(actor)
+} finally {
+  await closePool()
+}

backend/src/modules/mcp/vrf-preparation-diagnostic.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict"
+import { test } from "node:test"
+import { vrfPreparationDiagnostic } from "./vrf-preparation-diagnostic.js"
+
+const requestId = "12345678-1234-4123-8123-123456789abc"
+const operationId = "ros.vrf.update"
+function fixture(message = "VRF production transition refused: static address provenance/context", stack?: string) {
+  const error = new Error(message)
+  if (stack !== undefined) Object.defineProperty(error, "stack", { value: stack, configurable: true, writable: true })
+  return error
+}
+const stack = "Error: SECRET-PASSWORD 192.0.2.9 native-body\n    at must (C:\\private\\backend\\src\\services\\vrf-production-transition.ts:80:82)\n    at wrapped (C:\\private\\backend\\src\\modules\\mcp\\vrf-ticket-runtime.ts:76:9)"
+
+test("plain Error at known refusal produces bounded first owned source, stage and constant reason", () => {
+  const diagnostic = vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, fixture(undefined, stack))
+  assert.deepEqual(diagnostic, { event: "mcp.vrf.preparation-failed", requestId, operationId, stage: "transition", errorClass: "Error", firstOwnedFrame: { source: "vrf-production-transition", line: 80 }, reason: "static-address-context" })
+  for (const secret of ["SECRET-PASSWORD", "192.0.2.9", "private", "native-body", "must", "stack", "message"]) assert.ok(!JSON.stringify(diagnostic).includes(secret), secret)
+})
+test("real constructed Error with native stack never returns function names or raw text", () => {
+  const diagnostic = vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, "ros.vrf.create", new Error("SECRET native payload"))!
+  assert.equal(diagnostic.errorClass, "Error"); assert.equal(diagnostic.reason, "other")
+  assert.ok(!JSON.stringify(diagnostic).includes("SECRET"))
+  const known = new Error("VRF production transition refused: dependency connected route identity")
+  const result = vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, known)!
+  assert.equal(result.reason, "connected-route-identity"); assert.equal(result.stage, "transition")
+  // Native lazy stack accessors stay unmaterialized. No prepareStackTrace hook
+  // is needed to classify the actual own-data refusal message.
+  assert.equal(typeof Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(known, "stack")?.get, "function")
+  assert.equal(result.firstOwnedFrame, undefined)
+})
+test("exact known messages map to enums; appended secrets remain other", () => {
+  for (const [message, reason] of [
+    ["VRF production ticket refused: original dependency projection changed during preparation", "original-dependency-projection"],
+    ["VRF production transition refused: dependency connected route identity", "connected-route-identity"],
+    ["VRF production transition refused: missing ordered main VRF", "main-vrf-context"],
+    ["VRF production transition refused: main VRF shape", "main-vrf-context"],
+  ]) {
+    assert.equal(vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, fixture(message))!.reason, reason)
+    assert.equal(vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, fixture(message + " SECRET"))!.reason, "other")
+  }
+})
+test("actual native Error unknown refusal suffix maps only reviewed stage without exposing secrets", () => {
+  for (const [prefix, stage] of [["VRF production read refused: ", "read"], ["VRF production admission refused: ", "admission"], ["VRF production transition refused: ", "transition"], ["VRF production ticket refused: ", "ticket"]]) {
+    const error = new Error(prefix + "SECRET-PASSWORD 192.0.2.9 native-body")
+    Object.defineProperty(error, "name", { get() { throw Error("SECRET name getter invoked") } })
+    const result = vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, error)!
+    assert.equal(result.stage, stage); assert.equal(result.reason, "other"); assert.equal(result.firstOwnedFrame, undefined)
+    for (const secret of ["SECRET-PASSWORD", "192.0.2.9", "native-body", prefix]) assert.ok(!JSON.stringify(result).includes(secret))
+  }
+  const tooLong = fixture("VRF production read refused: " + "S".repeat(512))
+  assert.equal(vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, tooLong)!.stage, "other")
+})
+test("proxy, prototype and toStringTag spoofing reject without triggering traps", () => {
+  let traps = 0
+  const fail = () => { traps++; throw Error("SECRET getter called") }
+  const proxy = new Proxy(fixture(), { get: fail, getPrototypeOf: fail, getOwnPropertyDescriptor: fail, ownKeys: fail })
+  const spoof = Object.create(Error.prototype) as object
+  Object.defineProperties(spoof, { message: { get: fail }, stack: { get: fail }, [Symbol.toStringTag]: { get: fail } })
+  for (const error of [proxy, spoof, { name: "Error", message: "SECRET", stack }]) assert.deepEqual(vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, error), { event: "mcp.vrf.preparation-failed", requestId, operationId, stage: "other", errorClass: "NonError", reason: "other" })
+  assert.equal(traps, 0)
+})
+test("actual Error own accessors and constructor/name getters are never invoked", () => {
+  for (const field of ["message", "stack"]) {
+    const error = fixture(undefined, stack), calls = { count: 0 }
+    Object.defineProperty(error, field, { get() { calls.count++; throw Error("SECRET") } })
+    Object.defineProperty(error, "name", { get() { calls.count++; throw Error("SECRET") } })
+    Object.defineProperty(error, "constructor", { get() { calls.count++; throw Error("SECRET") } })
+    const diagnostic = vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, error)!
+    assert.equal(diagnostic.reason, field === "stack" ? "static-address-context" : "other"); assert.equal(diagnostic.stage, field === "stack" ? "transition" : "other"); assert.equal(diagnostic.firstOwnedFrame, undefined)
+    assert.equal(calls.count, 0)
+  }
+})
+test("built-in error classes use prototype identity and subclasses remain a fixed enum", () => {
+  for (const [error, expected] of [[new TypeError("SECRET"), "TypeError"], [new RangeError("SECRET"), "RangeError"], [new SyntaxError("SECRET"), "SyntaxError"], [new (class SecretError extends Error {})("SECRET"), "OtherNativeError"]] as const) assert.equal(vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, error)!.errorClass, expected)
+})
+test("nested Linux/Windows/compiled paths return source enums with bounded line only", () => {
+  for (const path of ["/app/dist/services/vrf-production-read.js", "file:///app/dist/services/vrf-production-read.js", "file:///C:/workspace/backend/src/services/vrf-production-read.ts", "C:\\workspace\\backend\\src\\services\\vrf-production-read.ts"]) {
+    const diagnostic = vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, fixture("unexpected", `Error: SECRET\n    at external (/tmp/node_modules/native.js:99:2)\n    at closure (${path}:203:12)`))!
+    assert.equal(diagnostic.stage, "read"); assert.deepEqual(diagnostic.firstOwnedFrame, { source: "vrf-production-read", line: 203 })
+    assert.ok(!JSON.stringify(diagnostic).includes(path))
+  }
+})
+test("non-owned paths, wrong directories and invalid line numbers never pass through", () => {
+  for (const path of ["/app/dist/services/private-secret.ts:1:1", "/app/dist/other/vrf-production-read.ts:1:1", "/app/dist/services/vrf-production-read.ts:0:1", "/app/dist/services/vrf-production-read.ts:1000001:1", "https://secret.example/src/services/vrf-production-read.ts:1:1"]) assert.equal(vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, fixture("unexpected", `Error: SECRET\n    at run (${path})`))!.firstOwnedFrame, undefined)
+})
+test("stack scan has fixed byte/line bounds and never inspects error causes", () => {
+  const error = fixture("SECRET", "Error: SECRET\n" + "    at external (/tmp/external.js:1:1)\n".repeat(70) + "    at internal (/app/dist/services/vrf-production-transition.js:80:1)")
+  Object.defineProperty(error, "cause", { get() { throw Error("SECRET cause accessed") } })
+  assert.equal(vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, error)!.firstOwnedFrame, undefined)
+  error.stack = "Error: " + "S".repeat(17000) + "\n    at internal (/app/dist/services/vrf-production-transition.js:80:1)"
+  assert.equal(vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, error)!.firstOwnedFrame, undefined)
+})
+test("nonerrors have no copied fields; non-VRF/non-UUID calls have no diagnostic", () => {
+  for (const error of [null, undefined, "SECRET", 42, Symbol("SECRET"), () => { throw Error("SECRET") }]) assert.equal(vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operationId, error)!.errorClass, "NonError")
+  for (const operation of ["ros.vrf.list", "routing.vrf.update", "mcp.operation.apply", "ros.bridge.update", "ros.vrf.update SECRET"]) assert.equal(vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId, operation, fixture()), undefined)
+  assert.equal(vrfPreparationDiagnostic("SECRET-not-a-uuid", operationId, fixture()), undefined)
+})

backend/src/modules/mcp/vrf-preparation-diagnostic.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+import { types } from "node:util"
+
+const ownedSources = {
+  "vrf-production-read": { directory: "services", stage: "read" },
+  "vrf-production-admission": { directory: "services", stage: "admission" },
+  "vrf-production-transition": { directory: "services", stage: "transition" },
+  "vrf-production-ticket-store": { directory: "services", stage: "ticket" },
+  "vrf-production-action-binding": { directory: "services", stage: "admission" },
+  "vrf-members": { directory: "services", stage: "read" },
+  "vrf-ticket-runtime": { directory: "modules/mcp", stage: "ticket" },
+  "resources": { directory: "modules/mcp", stage: "read" },
+  "actions": { directory: "modules/mcp", stage: "other" },
+  "runtime": { directory: "modules/mcp", stage: "runtime" },
+} as const
+type Source = keyof typeof ownedSources
+type Stage = typeof ownedSources[Source]["stage"]
+type Reason = "original-dependency-projection" | "static-address-context" | "connected-route-identity" | "main-vrf-context" | "other"
+type ErrorClass = "Error" | "TypeError" | "RangeError" | "SyntaxError" | "ReferenceError" | "URIError" | "EvalError" | "OtherNativeError" | "NonError"
+type Operation = "ros.vrf.create" | "ros.vrf.update" | "ros.vrf.delete"
+export interface VrfPreparationDiagnostic {
+  event: "mcp.vrf.preparation-failed"; requestId: string; operationId: Operation;
+  stage: Stage; errorClass: ErrorClass;
+  firstOwnedFrame?: { source: Source; line: number };
+  reason: Reason;
+}
+
+// Only complete, reviewed constant refusals. No user/native text is copied and
+// appending any text (including secrets) intentionally maps back to "other".
+const reasons = new Map<string, Reason>([
+  ["VRF production ticket refused: original dependency projection changed during preparation", "original-dependency-projection"],
+  ["VRF production transition refused: static address provenance/context", "static-address-context"],
+  ["VRF production transition refused: dependency connected route identity", "connected-route-identity"],
+  ["VRF production transition refused: missing ordered main VRF", "main-vrf-context"],
+  ["VRF production transition refused: main VRF shape", "main-vrf-context"],
+])
+const refusalStages: ReadonlyArray<readonly [string, Stage]> = [
+  ["VRF production read refused: ", "read"],
+  ["VRF production admission refused: ", "admission"],
+  ["VRF production transition refused: ", "transition"],
+  ["VRF production ticket refused: ", "ticket"],
+]
+const classes: Array<[object, ErrorClass]> = [
+  [Error.prototype, "Error"], [TypeError.prototype, "TypeError"], [RangeError.prototype, "RangeError"], [SyntaxError.prototype, "SyntaxError"],
+  [ReferenceError.prototype, "ReferenceError"], [URIError.prototype, "URIError"], [EvalError.prototype, "EvalError"],
+]
+const uuid = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-8][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+
+function dataString(error: object, key: "message" | "stack"): string | undefined {
+  const descriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(error, key)
+  return descriptor && Object.hasOwn(descriptor, "value") && typeof descriptor.value === "string" ? descriptor.value : undefined
+}
+function ownedFrame(stack: string | undefined): VrfPreparationDiagnostic["firstOwnedFrame"] {
+  if (!stack) return undefined
+  // Bound work before splitting, and ignore the first error-message line.
+  for (const line of stack.slice(0, 16384).split(/\r?\n/).slice(1, 65)) {
+    if (line.length > 2048 || !/^\s+at\s/.test(line)) continue
+    const match = /(?:^|[ (])(?:file:\/\/)?(?:[A-Za-z]:[\\/]|\/)[^\r\n]*?[\\/](?:src|dist)[\\/](services|modules[\\/]mcp)[\\/]([a-z-]+)\.(?:ts|js):([1-9]\d{0,6}):[1-9]\d{0,6}\)?$/.exec(line)
+    if (!match || !Object.hasOwn(ownedSources, match[2])) continue
+    const source = match[2] as Source, lineNumber = Number(match[3])
+    if (match[1].replaceAll("\\", "/") !== ownedSources[source].directory || lineNumber > 1000000) continue
+    return { source, line: lineNumber }
+  }
+  return undefined
+}
+
+/** Pure bounded diagnostic. Never inspect arbitrary error getters/proxies,
+ * retain original objects, or expose messages, paths, addresses or stack text. */
+export function vrfPreparationDiagnostic(requestId: string, operationId: string, error: unknown): VrfPreparationDiagnostic | undefined {
+  if (typeof requestId !== "string" || !uuid.test(requestId) || !["ros.vrf.create", "ros.vrf.update", "ros.vrf.delete"].includes(operationId)) return undefined
+  const result: VrfPreparationDiagnostic = { event: "mcp.vrf.preparation-failed", requestId, operationId: operationId as Operation, stage: "other", errorClass: "NonError", reason: "other" }
+  // isNativeError is an internal-slot check, unlike instanceof/toString. It
+  // rejects Proxy(Error) and prototype/toStringTag imitations without traps.
+  if (!types.isNativeError(error)) return result
+  result.errorClass = classes.find(([prototype]) => Object.getPrototypeOf(error) === prototype)?.[1] ?? "OtherNativeError"
+  const message = dataString(error, "message"), stack = dataString(error, "stack")
+  if (message !== undefined && message.length <= 512) {
+    result.reason = reasons.get(message) ?? "other"
+    result.stage = refusalStages.find(([prefix]) => message.startsWith(prefix))?.[1] ?? "other"
+  }
+  // Node 22 uses a native lazy stack accessor. We deliberately do not invoke
+  // it (nor Error.prepareStackTrace); exact own-message reasons still work.
+  if (message === undefined || stack === undefined) return result
+  const frame = ownedFrame(stack)
+  if (frame) { result.firstOwnedFrame = frame; result.stage = ownedSources[frame.source].stage }
+  return result
+}

backend/src/modules/mcp/vrf-ticket-runtime.ts

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ export async function prepareRuntimeVrfTicket(input: VrfRuntimeTicketInput, depe
   const actionId = vrfNativeActionFor(input.operationId, request)
   const context: PrepareVrfProductionTicketInput["context"] = { binding: { planId: input.planId, actorId: input.ownerId, serverId: native.serverId, sourceProof }, connectionId: input.connectionId, actionId,
     actionVersion: input.operationId === "routing.vrf.update" ? Number(findMcpOperation(actionId)?.version) : input.operationVersion,
-    ...(input.operationId === "routing.vrf.update" ? { authorityAction: { id: "routing.vrf.update" as const, version: input.operationVersion as 3 } } : {}) }
+    ...(input.operationId === "routing.vrf.update" ? { authorityAction: { id: "routing.vrf.update" as const, version: input.operationVersion as 4 } } : {}) }
   assertVrfActionContext(context, request); assertVrfAliasEvidence(context, request, evidence)
   const authority = async () => {
     await input.assertAuthority()

backend/src/modules/mcp/workers.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"
 import { retainServerProbeStorage } from "../../services/server-probe-retention.js"
+import { maintainServerProbeOperationRetirement } from "../../services/server-probe-operation-retirement.js"
 import { collectExpiredServerPollStorage } from "../../services/server-poll-storage-retention.js"
 import { compactCompletedServerPollStorage } from "../../services/server-poll-terminal-compaction.js"
+import { retireCompletedServerPollOperations } from "../../services/server-poll-operation-retirement.js"
 import { pool } from "../../db/index.js"
 import { sharedDatabaseGate } from "../../services/shared-database-gate.js"
 import { recoverMcpOperations, verifyStep } from "./runtime.js"
+import { retireOrdinaryMcpOperations } from "./ordinary-operation-retirement.js"
 import { audit, getMcpSettings } from "./store.js"
 import { accessGeneration, decryptSecret, redact } from "./security.js"
 import { tickRoutingProfiles } from "./routing-profiles.js"
@@ -48,11 +51,22 @@ export async function detectMcpDrift() {
   }
 }
 
+const mcpRetentionBatchSize = 1000
+
 async function retainMcpData() {
   const settings = await getMcpSettings()
-  await pool.query("DELETE FROM mcp_requests WHERE created_at<now()-make_interval(days=>$1) AND status NOT IN ('running')", [settings.requestsRetentionDays])
+  await pool.query(`WITH expired AS (
-  await pool.query("DELETE FROM mcp_audit WHERE created_at<now()-make_interval(days=>$1)", [settings.auditRetentionDays])
+    SELECT id FROM mcp_requests WHERE created_at<now()-make_interval(days=>$1) AND status NOT IN ('running')
-  await pool.query("DELETE FROM mcp_artifacts WHERE expires_at<now()")
+    ORDER BY created_at,id LIMIT $2 FOR UPDATE
+  ) DELETE FROM mcp_requests USING expired WHERE mcp_requests.id=expired.id`, [settings.requestsRetentionDays, mcpRetentionBatchSize])
+  await pool.query(`WITH expired AS (
+    SELECT id FROM mcp_audit WHERE created_at<now()-make_interval(days=>$1)
+    ORDER BY created_at,id LIMIT $2 FOR UPDATE
+  ) DELETE FROM mcp_audit USING expired WHERE mcp_audit.id=expired.id`, [settings.auditRetentionDays, mcpRetentionBatchSize])
+  await pool.query(`WITH expired AS (
+    SELECT id FROM mcp_artifacts WHERE expires_at<now()
+    ORDER BY expires_at,id LIMIT $1 FOR UPDATE
+  ) DELETE FROM mcp_artifacts USING expired WHERE mcp_artifacts.id=expired.id`, [mcpRetentionBatchSize])
   await pool.query("DELETE FROM mcp_oauth_requests WHERE expires_at<now()-interval '1 day'")
   await pool.query("DELETE FROM mcp_budget_buckets WHERE bucket<now()-interval '2 days'")
   await routingReservationTransaction(db => retainManualInverseChargesWithinOwner(db, settings.requestsRetentionDays))
@@ -79,8 +93,11 @@ export async function tickMcpWorkers() {
       await retainMcpData()
       await retainServerProbeStorage()
       await compactCompletedServerPollStorage()
+      await retireCompletedServerPollOperations()
       await collectExpiredServerPollStorage()
+      await retireOrdinaryMcpOperations()
       if ((await getMcpSettings()).enabled) { await detectMcpDrift(); await tickRoutingProfiles() }
+      await maintainServerProbeOperationRetirement()
     } finally {
       if (locked) try { await lease.query("SELECT pg_advisory_unlock(hashtextextended('mcp-workers',0))") } catch { unsafe = true }
       lease.release(unsafe)

backend/src/modules/users/binding-native-read.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import type { UserBindingCreate } from "@mmapp/contracts/users"
+import { getServerRowById } from "../servers/repository/servers-repository.js"
+import { MikrotikClient } from "../../services/mikrotik.js"
+import { sameWireguardEndpoint } from "../../services/wireguard-source.js"
+import { ipsecClientBindingKeys, type IpsecServerState } from "../../services/ipsec-live.js"
+import { bindingNativeRows, readBindingTarget, UserBindingTargetError } from "./binding-target.js"
+
+export function readNativeUserBindingTarget(input: UserBindingCreate, options: { signal?: AbortSignal; assertCurrent?: () => Promise<unknown> } = {}) {
+  return readBindingTarget(input, async () => {
+    const server = await getServerRowById(input.serverId)
+    if (!server?.enabled) throw new UserBindingTargetError("Сервер отключён или не найден", 404)
+    const client = MikrotikClient.fromServer(server)
+    return {
+      async assertCurrent() {
+        const fresh = await getServerRowById(input.serverId)
+        if (!fresh || !sameWireguardEndpoint(fresh, server)) throw new UserBindingTargetError("Источник привязки изменился", 409)
+      },
+      get: (path, timeout, signal, maximum) => client.get(path, timeout, signal, maximum),
+      ipsecKeys: (certs, peers, identities) => ipsecClientBindingKeys({ server,
+        certs: bindingNativeRows(certs, [".id", "name"]) as IpsecServerState["certs"],
+        peers: bindingNativeRows(peers, [".id"]) as IpsecServerState["peers"],
+        identities: bindingNativeRows(identities, [".id"]) as IpsecServerState["identities"],
+      }),
+    }
+  }, options)
+}